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CLIANN HERRING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff,
284TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STEVEN MORRISON
REYNIEL FUNDORA
OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, TEXAS
STEVEN MORRISON’S RESPONSE TO REYNIEL FUNDORA’S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, STEVEN MORRISON MORRISON), files
this Response to the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and for New Trial filed by Third-Party
REYNIEL FUNDORA ), and requests that the Court deny the
same. In support thereof, MORRISON shows the following:
1. Background
This suit was initiated on October 6, 2021, when Plaintiff, CLIANN HERRING (herein
) asserted a number of claims against related to a boat which was
originally purchased by from FUNDORA and then sold by to
just days later. On April 1, 2022, MORRISON brought third party claims against
FUNDORA for breach of contract and fraud related to ’s sale of the boat to
On August 9, 2022, the Court reset trial to March 6, 2023 by way of a scheduling order
which also specified deadlines for the filing and exchange of witness lists, exhibit lists, and
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
FUNDORA filed his answer to MORRISON’s claims on November 21, 2022, making his
deadline to provide the disclosures required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194 December 21,
2022. On December 6, 2022, MORRISON provided the August 9, 2022 scheduling order to
FUNDORA, which included notice of the March 6, 2022 trial setting.
On February 21, 2023, MORRISON provided his exhibits, witness list, and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to FUNDORA. FUNDORA failed to do the same.
FUNDORA also failed to provide his disclosures required by Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure at any point in the case.
On February 28, 2023, the Court advised the undersigned and counsel for FUNDORA that
the case was assigned for trial on March 16, 2023 at 9:00 a.m.
On March 12, 2023, the Court signed an order granting HERRING’s non-suit, dismissing
only those claims between HERRING and MORRISON and remaining silent with respect to any
claims between MORRISON and FUNDORA.
On March 16, 2023, MORRISON appeared before the Court as directed. When
FUNDORA failed to appear, the Court attempted to call FUNDORA’s attorney, but nobody
answered. The Court also admitted as an exhibit proof of service on FUNDORA of the Court’s
August 9, 2022 scheduling order setting trial for March 6, 2023, and the Court took notice of its
notification to counsel that trial would begin on March 16, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. The case proceeded
to final trial, and the Court rendered judgment in favor of MORRISON and against FUNDORA,
signing the written judgment on the same date.
2. Argument and Authority
FUNDORA correctly states the elements for setting aside a default judgment as articulated
in Craddock. However, he has not satisfied any of the elements for the reasons stated below, and
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
Page 2 of 8
his Motion should be denied.
2.1 Conscious Indifference
FUNDORA first argues that his failure to appear at trial was not intentional or the result
of conscious indifference but was instead based on the alleged instruction, made orally and not in
writing, of an unnamed clerk that there would be “no trial.” MORRISON finds this dubious given
that it was not in writing and the clerk is not named in the Motion, and FUNDORA’s contention
that he was “ready for trial” is belied by this Court’s own file: FUNDORA failed to provide any
exhibits, witness list, or proposed findings of fact, despite the same being required by the Court.
There is little to indicate that FUNDORA was actually ready for and going to appear at trial other
than the conclusory and unsworn assertions in his Motion.1 His failure to provide these required
pretrial documents, despite having notice of the deadlines, actually suggests he had no intention to
appear at all.
And, even if the allegations regarding the clerk’s statements are true, they still do not
adequately explain FUNDORA’s failure to appear, particularly given that (1) the March 12, 2023
order of dismissal was silent as to any claims related to FUNDORA and thus did not dismiss those
claims; and (2) FUNDORA never bothered to contact MORRISON regarding the alleged
conversation with the clerk or whether MORRISON intended to appear for trial regardless of what
was allegedly reflected online or told to him by the Court’s staff. Had he done so, MORRISON
would have advised him that he intended to appear on the date the case was assigned for trial
anyway and address any scheduling confusion with the Court on that date. A person of reasonable
sensibilities under similar circumstances would have at least contacted MORRISON regarding
1The verification provided by his attorney at the end of the motion is insufficient, as it does not comply with Section
132.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Specifically, it does not state that it is subject to penalty of
perjury, as required by subsection (c)(2), and it does not state the declarant’s date of birth, as required by subsection
(d).
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
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the issue, if not actually appeared on the date trial was set, particularly given that the dismissal
order did not, on its face, dismiss any claims against FUNDORA. See Munoz v. Rivera, 225
S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (conscious indifference means a failure to take
some action which would seem indicated to a person of reasonable sensibilities under the same
circumstances); State v. Sledge, 982 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet.
denied) (same); Johnson v. Edmonds, 712 S.W.2d 651, 652-53 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no
writ) (same).
Thus, there was no adequate justification for FUNDORA’s failure to appear, and his failure
to comply with the Court’s pretrial deadlines or his disclosure obligations shows he had no
intention to appear at trial anyway. FUNDORA’s failure to appear was at least consciously
indifferent, if not intentional, and his Motion should be denied.
2.2 No Meritorious Defense
FUNDORA next argues that he has a meritorious defense based on his affidavit attached
to his Motion as Exhibit 3, as well as his Exhibits 4, 5, and 6, which he presumably would have
offered as exhibits at trial. But FUNDORA would have been precluded from offering any evidence
or testimony at trial because he failed provide any legal theories or factual bases for his defenses,
as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(3), and any documents on which he relied
to support his defenses, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(6). Exclusion was
therefore mandatory under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6(a). His failure to provide an
exhibit list and proposed findings of fact as required by the Court’s Docket Control Order would
likewise have supported exclusion of his evidence. In view of these mandatory exclusions, he
could not have proved any meritorious defense.
In addition, to prove a meritorious defense, the Motion must allege facts which in law
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
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would constitute a defense to MORRISON’s cause of action and provide prima facie proof of the
defense in the form of affidavits or other evidence. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.
1966). FUNDORA’s Motion fails to meet this requirement because his affidavit at Exhibit 3 does
not meet the requirements for an affidavit, and his remaining exhibits were not properly
authenticated and are therefore not admissible. Regarding the sufficiency of FUNDORA’s
affidavit in particular, page 2 indicates that it was executed in Texas County, Texas—a place which
does not exist. In addition, it appears to have been sworn to and subscribed by a “Lidice Garcia
Garcia,” not FUNDORA himself. Accordingly, it does not meet the requirements of an affidavit.
See In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (requiring that the party
making the affidavit swear to it under oath). With no affidavit supporting the “meritorious defense”
prong, the Motion fails on its face.
Even if it did not, nearly everything in FUNDORA’s Exhibits is consistent with what was
offered at trial. FUNDORA offers no new specific facts which, if taken as true, would have
rebutted or controverted MORRISON’s evidence. In fact, some of the text messages are identical
to ones offered at trial. FUNDORA’s Exhibit 6, which appears to be the Facebook Marketplace
advertisement for the subject boat, even states the boat is in “perfect condition,” proving the
existence of an express warranty, consistent with MORRISON’s trial testimony. Similarly, his
statements that he “disclosed all the information [he] knew about the boat” and “was not aware of
any significant mechanical issues” is consistent with a finding that the warranties regarding the
boat’s “perfect” condition were made recklessly without regard to their truth (especially given that
FUNDORA offers nothing to rebut HERRING’s testimony regarding the problems with the boat).
While FUNDORA makes a number of conclusory statements in his affidavit, these
conclusions do not provide the kind of specific facts required to make a prima facie showing of
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
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his defense. For example, FUNDORA makes the bare assertion that MORRISON “agreed to
purchase the boat as it is without any warranty” but does not provide specific facts showing how
this occurred or supporting any conclusion that there was a valid disclaimer of the express warranty
contained in Exhibit 6 or the one about which MORRISON testified. He similarly does not
provide any specific facts to show what MORRISON allegedly did to “thoroughly inspect” or
“carefully inspect[]” the boat, instead making only conclusory assertions unsupported by any
specific facts. And his statement that he “disclosed all the information [he] knew about the boat”
suffers the same fate, as he does not indicate what he allegedly disclosed.
Lastly, HERRING’s testimony, which proved the nature and extent of the breach and
resulting damages, is completely unaddressed and unrebutted in the exhibits offered by
FUNDORA. All issues related to the boat’s title, as well as exemplary damages (including that
FUNDORA fled to Colorado, where he was served), are likewise unaddressed and unrebutted.
Accordingly, FUNDORA is unable to establish a meritorious defense.
2.3 Prejudice
FUNDORA last argues that there is no prejudice to MORRISON because FUNDORA is
ready to proceed to trial immediately and is willing to reimburse MORRISON’s expenses incurred
in obtaining the default judgment. However, these factors are not dispositive. Dir., State
Employees Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 270 n. 3 (Tex. 1994). In addition,
MORRISON’s proof of damages was based largely on the testimony of HERRING, who is 83
years old as indicated by a Public Data search of her driver’s license. There is therefore a risk of
not having her testimony available at re-trial of the case, which would prevent MORRISON from
recovering on his claims.
To the extent the Court is inclined to grant FUNDORA’s Motion, MORRISON requests
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
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the Court set a date and time for a hearing for the purpose of determining the amount of reasonable
and necessary attorney fees incurred by MORRISON in obtaining the default judgment, which
FUNDORA should be ordered to pay.
3. Prayer
Based on the foregoing, MORRISON prays that FUNDORA’s motion be denied. If the
Court is inclined to grant the motion, MORRISON requests the Court set a hearing for an award
of attorney fees, as requested herein. MORRISON prays for general relief.
Respectfully submitted,
TOOMBS IMEL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
777 Post Oak Blvd, Suite 950
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone: (713) 449-4958
/s/ Walter J. Schouten, Jr.
_____________________________________
WALTER J. SCHOUTEN, JR.
State Bar No. 24077168
walter@toombsimel.com
Attorney for STEVEN MORRISON
UNSWORN DECLARATION
My name is Walter J. Schouten, Jr., my date of birth is September 2, 1986, and my address
is 777 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 950, Houston, Texas 77056. I am the attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff
Steven Morrison. I have reviewed the foregoing motion and declare under penalty of perjury that
the factual statements within the motion are within my personal knowledge and are true and
correct.
Executed in Harris County, State of Texas, on the 18th day of April, 2023.
/s/ Walter J. Schouten, Jr.
_____________________________________
WALTER J. SCHOUTEN, JR., Declarant
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing document has been delivered
or forwarded to all counsel and unrepresented persons listed below, [ ] by personal delivery or
receipted delivery service, or [ ] by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, by
depositing the same, postpaid, in an official deposit under the care and custody of the United States
Postal Service, or [ ] by facsimile to the recipient’s facsimile number identified below, or [ X ]
by e-service to the recipient’s email address identified below and the electronic transmission was
reported as complete, on this 18th day of April, 2023, in accordance with the Rule 21a of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:
Via E-Service: mvarela@varela.law
MARIO VARELA
8554 Katy Freeway, Suite 340
Houston, Texas 77024
(713) 684-3550
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
/s/ Walter J. Schouten, Jr.
____________________________________
WALTER J. SCHOUTEN, JR.
Attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff
Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
Page 8 of 8
Preview
CLIANN HERRING IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, 284TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT STEVEN MORRISON REYNIEL FUNDORA OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, TEXAS STEVEN MORRISON’S RESPONSE TO REYNIEL FUNDORA’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, STEVEN MORRISON MORRISON), files this Response to the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and for New Trial filed by Third-Party REYNIEL FUNDORA ), and requests that the Court deny the same. In support thereof, MORRISON shows the following: 1. Background This suit was initiated on October 6, 2021, when Plaintiff, CLIANN HERRING (herein ) asserted a number of claims against related to a boat which was originally purchased by from FUNDORA and then sold by to just days later. On April 1, 2022, MORRISON brought third party claims against FUNDORA for breach of contract and fraud related to ’s sale of the boat to On August 9, 2022, the Court reset trial to March 6, 2023 by way of a scheduling order which also specified deadlines for the filing and exchange of witness lists, exhibit lists, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment FUNDORA filed his answer to MORRISON’s claims on November 21, 2022, making his deadline to provide the disclosures required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194 December 21, 2022. On December 6, 2022, MORRISON provided the August 9, 2022 scheduling order to FUNDORA, which included notice of the March 6, 2022 trial setting. On February 21, 2023, MORRISON provided his exhibits, witness list, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to FUNDORA. FUNDORA failed to do the same. FUNDORA also failed to provide his disclosures required by Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure at any point in the case. On February 28, 2023, the Court advised the undersigned and counsel for FUNDORA that the case was assigned for trial on March 16, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. On March 12, 2023, the Court signed an order granting HERRING’s non-suit, dismissing only those claims between HERRING and MORRISON and remaining silent with respect to any claims between MORRISON and FUNDORA. On March 16, 2023, MORRISON appeared before the Court as directed. When FUNDORA failed to appear, the Court attempted to call FUNDORA’s attorney, but nobody answered. The Court also admitted as an exhibit proof of service on FUNDORA of the Court’s August 9, 2022 scheduling order setting trial for March 6, 2023, and the Court took notice of its notification to counsel that trial would begin on March 16, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. The case proceeded to final trial, and the Court rendered judgment in favor of MORRISON and against FUNDORA, signing the written judgment on the same date. 2. Argument and Authority FUNDORA correctly states the elements for setting aside a default judgment as articulated in Craddock. However, he has not satisfied any of the elements for the reasons stated below, and Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 2 of 8 his Motion should be denied. 2.1 Conscious Indifference FUNDORA first argues that his failure to appear at trial was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was instead based on the alleged instruction, made orally and not in writing, of an unnamed clerk that there would be “no trial.” MORRISON finds this dubious given that it was not in writing and the clerk is not named in the Motion, and FUNDORA’s contention that he was “ready for trial” is belied by this Court’s own file: FUNDORA failed to provide any exhibits, witness list, or proposed findings of fact, despite the same being required by the Court. There is little to indicate that FUNDORA was actually ready for and going to appear at trial other than the conclusory and unsworn assertions in his Motion.1 His failure to provide these required pretrial documents, despite having notice of the deadlines, actually suggests he had no intention to appear at all. And, even if the allegations regarding the clerk’s statements are true, they still do not adequately explain FUNDORA’s failure to appear, particularly given that (1) the March 12, 2023 order of dismissal was silent as to any claims related to FUNDORA and thus did not dismiss those claims; and (2) FUNDORA never bothered to contact MORRISON regarding the alleged conversation with the clerk or whether MORRISON intended to appear for trial regardless of what was allegedly reflected online or told to him by the Court’s staff. Had he done so, MORRISON would have advised him that he intended to appear on the date the case was assigned for trial anyway and address any scheduling confusion with the Court on that date. A person of reasonable sensibilities under similar circumstances would have at least contacted MORRISON regarding 1The verification provided by his attorney at the end of the motion is insufficient, as it does not comply with Section 132.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Specifically, it does not state that it is subject to penalty of perjury, as required by subsection (c)(2), and it does not state the declarant’s date of birth, as required by subsection (d). Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 3 of 8 the issue, if not actually appeared on the date trial was set, particularly given that the dismissal order did not, on its face, dismiss any claims against FUNDORA. See Munoz v. Rivera, 225 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (conscious indifference means a failure to take some action which would seem indicated to a person of reasonable sensibilities under the same circumstances); State v. Sledge, 982 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (same); Johnson v. Edmonds, 712 S.W.2d 651, 652-53 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (same). Thus, there was no adequate justification for FUNDORA’s failure to appear, and his failure to comply with the Court’s pretrial deadlines or his disclosure obligations shows he had no intention to appear at trial anyway. FUNDORA’s failure to appear was at least consciously indifferent, if not intentional, and his Motion should be denied. 2.2 No Meritorious Defense FUNDORA next argues that he has a meritorious defense based on his affidavit attached to his Motion as Exhibit 3, as well as his Exhibits 4, 5, and 6, which he presumably would have offered as exhibits at trial. But FUNDORA would have been precluded from offering any evidence or testimony at trial because he failed provide any legal theories or factual bases for his defenses, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(3), and any documents on which he relied to support his defenses, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(6). Exclusion was therefore mandatory under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6(a). His failure to provide an exhibit list and proposed findings of fact as required by the Court’s Docket Control Order would likewise have supported exclusion of his evidence. In view of these mandatory exclusions, he could not have proved any meritorious defense. In addition, to prove a meritorious defense, the Motion must allege facts which in law Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 4 of 8 would constitute a defense to MORRISON’s cause of action and provide prima facie proof of the defense in the form of affidavits or other evidence. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex. 1966). FUNDORA’s Motion fails to meet this requirement because his affidavit at Exhibit 3 does not meet the requirements for an affidavit, and his remaining exhibits were not properly authenticated and are therefore not admissible. Regarding the sufficiency of FUNDORA’s affidavit in particular, page 2 indicates that it was executed in Texas County, Texas—a place which does not exist. In addition, it appears to have been sworn to and subscribed by a “Lidice Garcia Garcia,” not FUNDORA himself. Accordingly, it does not meet the requirements of an affidavit. See In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (requiring that the party making the affidavit swear to it under oath). With no affidavit supporting the “meritorious defense” prong, the Motion fails on its face. Even if it did not, nearly everything in FUNDORA’s Exhibits is consistent with what was offered at trial. FUNDORA offers no new specific facts which, if taken as true, would have rebutted or controverted MORRISON’s evidence. In fact, some of the text messages are identical to ones offered at trial. FUNDORA’s Exhibit 6, which appears to be the Facebook Marketplace advertisement for the subject boat, even states the boat is in “perfect condition,” proving the existence of an express warranty, consistent with MORRISON’s trial testimony. Similarly, his statements that he “disclosed all the information [he] knew about the boat” and “was not aware of any significant mechanical issues” is consistent with a finding that the warranties regarding the boat’s “perfect” condition were made recklessly without regard to their truth (especially given that FUNDORA offers nothing to rebut HERRING’s testimony regarding the problems with the boat). While FUNDORA makes a number of conclusory statements in his affidavit, these conclusions do not provide the kind of specific facts required to make a prima facie showing of Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 5 of 8 his defense. For example, FUNDORA makes the bare assertion that MORRISON “agreed to purchase the boat as it is without any warranty” but does not provide specific facts showing how this occurred or supporting any conclusion that there was a valid disclaimer of the express warranty contained in Exhibit 6 or the one about which MORRISON testified. He similarly does not provide any specific facts to show what MORRISON allegedly did to “thoroughly inspect” or “carefully inspect[]” the boat, instead making only conclusory assertions unsupported by any specific facts. And his statement that he “disclosed all the information [he] knew about the boat” suffers the same fate, as he does not indicate what he allegedly disclosed. Lastly, HERRING’s testimony, which proved the nature and extent of the breach and resulting damages, is completely unaddressed and unrebutted in the exhibits offered by FUNDORA. All issues related to the boat’s title, as well as exemplary damages (including that FUNDORA fled to Colorado, where he was served), are likewise unaddressed and unrebutted. Accordingly, FUNDORA is unable to establish a meritorious defense. 2.3 Prejudice FUNDORA last argues that there is no prejudice to MORRISON because FUNDORA is ready to proceed to trial immediately and is willing to reimburse MORRISON’s expenses incurred in obtaining the default judgment. However, these factors are not dispositive. Dir., State Employees Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 270 n. 3 (Tex. 1994). In addition, MORRISON’s proof of damages was based largely on the testimony of HERRING, who is 83 years old as indicated by a Public Data search of her driver’s license. There is therefore a risk of not having her testimony available at re-trial of the case, which would prevent MORRISON from recovering on his claims. To the extent the Court is inclined to grant FUNDORA’s Motion, MORRISON requests Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 6 of 8 the Court set a date and time for a hearing for the purpose of determining the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred by MORRISON in obtaining the default judgment, which FUNDORA should be ordered to pay. 3. Prayer Based on the foregoing, MORRISON prays that FUNDORA’s motion be denied. If the Court is inclined to grant the motion, MORRISON requests the Court set a hearing for an award of attorney fees, as requested herein. MORRISON prays for general relief. Respectfully submitted, TOOMBS IMEL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 777 Post Oak Blvd, Suite 950 Houston, Texas 77056 Telephone: (713) 449-4958 /s/ Walter J. Schouten, Jr. _____________________________________ WALTER J. SCHOUTEN, JR. State Bar No. 24077168 walter@toombsimel.com Attorney for STEVEN MORRISON UNSWORN DECLARATION My name is Walter J. Schouten, Jr., my date of birth is September 2, 1986, and my address is 777 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 950, Houston, Texas 77056. I am the attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff Steven Morrison. I have reviewed the foregoing motion and declare under penalty of perjury that the factual statements within the motion are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct. Executed in Harris County, State of Texas, on the 18th day of April, 2023. /s/ Walter J. Schouten, Jr. _____________________________________ WALTER J. SCHOUTEN, JR., Declarant Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 7 of 8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing document has been delivered or forwarded to all counsel and unrepresented persons listed below, [ ] by personal delivery or receipted delivery service, or [ ] by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, by depositing the same, postpaid, in an official deposit under the care and custody of the United States Postal Service, or [ ] by facsimile to the recipient’s facsimile number identified below, or [ X ] by e-service to the recipient’s email address identified below and the electronic transmission was reported as complete, on this 18th day of April, 2023, in accordance with the Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure: Via E-Service: mvarela@varela.law MARIO VARELA 8554 Katy Freeway, Suite 340 Houston, Texas 77024 (713) 684-3550 Attorney for Third-Party Defendant /s/ Walter J. Schouten, Jr. ____________________________________ WALTER J. SCHOUTEN, JR. Attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff Steven Morrison’s Response to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Page 8 of 8