Legal Document: Jan Lightfoot a/k/a Jan Christopher vs Robert Woodham, MD and Greater Houston Psychiatric Associates, P.L.L.C.

On March 09, 2021 a 6.. Robert Woodham, MD and Geater Houston Psychiatric Associates, PLLC'S TCPA - Motion (No Fee) Index # 6 was filed involving a dispute between Lightfoot, Dr. Jan Elizabeth, and Greater Houston Psychiatric Associates, P.L.L.C., Woodham, Robert, Md, for Injury or Damage Other Professional Malpractice in the District Court of Fort Bend County.

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Filed
4/22/2021 12:44 PM
Beverley McGrew Walker
District Clerk
Fort Bend County, Texas
Ashley Alaniz
CAUSE NO. 21-DCV-281435

JAN LIGHTFOOT a/k/a JAN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
CHRISTOPHER §
Vv. § FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
§
OAK BEND MEDICAL CENTER, et al. § 458" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS ROBERT WOODHAM, MD AND GREATER HOUSTON
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATES, PLLC’S
TCPA MOTION TO DISMISS & MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1 Defendants Robert Woodham, MD (“Dr. Woodham”) and Greater Houston

Psychiatric Associates, PLLC (“GHPA”) file this TCPA Motion to Dismiss & Motion for

Summary Judgment (“Motion”) pursuant to TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27 (a/k/a the

“Texas Citizens Participation Act” a/k/a the “TCPA” a/k/a “SLAPP”) and TRCP 166a(b).

Plaintiff is an individual with a long history of serious mental illness who has filed this

outlandish suit alleging that a cabal of health care providers and government officials conspired

to fraudulently commit her for psychiatric treatment. Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA also

seek dismissal as a matter of law on the claims against them based on:

(a) the common law judicial communications privilege, and

(b) the statutory privilege under TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.054 (“Jmmunity”) for
providing information to Adult Protective Services and for related purposes.

As further explained below, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA

should be dismissed because the claims are based on and in response to alleged communications

between Defendant Dr. Woodham and Adult Protective Services and related to actual or

potential judicial proceedings over a mental health warrant, and therefore Plaintiff's claims

should be dismissed because they are based on and are in response to Defendants > «6, exercise of

the right to petition” under the TCPA and are based on communications which are protected by

statutory and common law privileges/immunities.

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I, BACKGROUND & SUMMARY

2. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on 3/9/2021 alleging that starting in December 2018, a cabal of

at least a dozen different individuals including agents of the state government and several

physicians formed a cabal to wrongfully institutionalize her for unnecessary mental health

treatment. Plaintiff Jan Lightfoot is a person with a long history of serious mental illness.

Plaintiff's mental health issues have resulted in hospitalizations going back to at least late 1980s

or early 1990s. Exhibit A, 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pgs. 64:20-66:16, 72:8-74:13,

292:3-19. Plaintiff apparently disputes the extent of her mental health issues. But it is

undisputed that at least as early as 1998, Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and

dissociative identity disorder (DID) by a physician (Rahn K. Bailey, MD). Ex. A, 3/27/2019

Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pgs. 114:6-115:23, 289:12-290:24. In his report dated 2/7/2005,

Peter B. Polatin, MD chronicled Plaintiff's extensive psychiatric history including prior

psychiatric hospitalizations and “auditory hallucinosis and some visual hallucinosis.” Exhibit B,

2/7/2005 Report of Dr. Polatin, pg. 2. Dr. Polatin also noted that in 1997, Plaintiff switched

from being treated by Dr. Ravichandran to Dr. Bailey after Dr. Ravichandran terminated Plaintiff

from his care for “apparently volatile behavior demonstrated towards one of his employees and

attributable to disassociation.” Ex. B, pg. 3. In 1999, Plaintiff was hospitalized in the

psychiatric unit again and later had “auditory hallucinosis and paranoid delusions of being

‘raped by the FBI.”’ Ex. B, pg. 3. In a report by Dr. Bailey dated 2004, Dr. Bailey noted that

Plaintiffs symptoms included “visual and auditory hallucinations, disorientation, and

disassociation, spiting, out of body experiences, periods of poor reality testing, and loss of

identity.” Exhibit C, 7/2/2004 Report of Dr. Bailey, pg 3. Dr. Bailey concluded in his 2004

report that “a change in [the Plaintiff's] condition is not likely to occur. She has been ill for

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many years now and her condition has not changed.” Ex. C, pgs. 4-5. Dr. Bailey reiterated

similar conclusions in a letter dated 3/10/2008. Exhibit D, 3/10/2008 Letter from Dr. Bailey.

3 Defendant Dr. Robert Woodham is a physiatrist whose practice group is Defendant

GHPA. Defendant Dr. Woodham treated Plaintiff from around 2009 through around early 2019.

3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot. pgs. 113:4-21, 195:4-9, 216:11-22, 296:14-22.

Defendant Dr. Woodham made diagnoses similar to those of Dr. Bailey and Dr. Polatin when

Plaintiff first became a patient of Dr. Woodham in 2009. Exhibit E, Excerpts from Dr.

Woodham’s Progress Notes. The Plaintiff has continued to have psychiatric issues since 2009.

For instance, per a 3/19/2018 progress note, the Plaintiff “has occ/asional] suic[idal] ideation.”

Ex. E. Per a 4/24/2018 progress note, the Plaintiff “got excited when UPS knocked on the door,

called the police.” Ex. E. A mental health detention warrant was entered for Plaintiff by a Fort

Bend County judge on 12/24/2018. Exhibit F, 12/24/2018 Detention Warrant. Per a 1/14/2019

progress note, Defendant Dr. Woodham became concerned that the Plaintiff stopped taking all of

her medications. Ex. E. Defendant Dr. Woodham last saw Plaintiff on 2/6/2019 in a visit in

which Plaintiff was noted as being “manic, irritable” and “rambling, disconnected.” Ex. E.

4 On 3/27/2019, Plaintiff indicated in sworn deposition testimony that she was not

dissatisfied with Defendant Dr. Woodham’s care. Ex. A, 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot,

pgs. 296:14-297:3. Plaintiff has a history of filing lawsuits in which she makes outlandish

claims. Other lawsuits filed by Plaintiff include:

© Lightfoot, et al. v. Simpson, et al.; Cause No. 17-CV-1314; in the 212" District Court of
Galveston County, Texas — nearly all of the claims against one defendant have been
dismissed and the claims against the remaining defendant are in bankruptcy; and

Lightfoot v. Chick-Fil-A; Cause No. 16-JSC41-00725; in the Justice Court Precinct 4 of Fort
Bend County, Texas — this case had an extraordinarily complex litigation history for a small
claims suit and was dismissed after a motion for summary judgment was filed. See Ex. E,
8/29/2016 Progress Note (noting “went to court on Chic filet case, was thrown out”).

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5 Plaintiff's claims principally arise out of Plaintiff's hospitalization at Oak Bend Medical

Center starting around 12/24/2018, and out of related Texas Health and Human Services

Commission investigations and/or other governmental investigations and actions including

mental health warrants issued against Plaintiff by judges in Fort Bend County, Texas including

Judge Larry Wagenbach and Judge Andrew Dornberg. Plaintiff has sued 20 defendants in this

lawsuit including 12 individuals and 8 entities. Defendant GHPA is sued only on vicarious

liability grounds for alleged acts or omissions of Defendant Dr. Woodham. However, the only

specific allegations regarding alleged conduct of Defendant Dr. Woodham are in paragraphs 80,

81, 82, and 83 of Plaintiff's First Amended Petition (“Petition”). All of the specific complaints

against Defendant Dr. Woodham arise out of and are based on alleged communications which

Defendant Dr. Woodham made to Adult Protective Services in the course of and related to an

Adult Protective Services investigation. The investigation and communications allegedly related

to an attempt by Defendant Vivian Mao, an employee of “Adult Protective Services,” to

implement “another mental health warrant” for Plaintiff or to have Plaintiff “committed.”

Plaintiff's Petition, {{] 76-83, pgs. 13-14. Plaintiff's notice of claim to Defendants Dr. Woodham

and GHPA describe the Plaintiff's claim as regarding “Fort Bend County Court No. 1. Case #

18-CMH-005317 / 18-CMH-1158; FBCSD #: 18-47135; Oak Bend Hospital Visit #:

1000752830.” Exhibit G, Notice of Claim. Defendant Dr. Woodham was in fact contacted by

the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services/APS per a letter from the Defendant

Mao at the DFPS to Dr. Woodham dated 7/29/2019. Exhibit H, 7/29/2019 Letter from DFPS.

Unfortunately, Plaintiff has responded to honest efforts by her health care providers and others to

promote her wellbeing by acting in bizarre ways such as by sending the attached bizarre email on

8/25/2019 to her “security officer.” Plaintiff copied a number of individuals including the FBI.

Exhibit I, 8/25/2019 Email from Plaintiff to Her Boyfriend Copying the FBI and Others; see

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also Ex. A, 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pg. 223:4-18.' Plaintiff also sent parts of that

email chain to a variety of other individuals including the Mayor of Houston, the Internal Affairs

Department of the Houston Police Department, and Congressman Al Green. Ex. I, pg. 3.

6 Plaintiff's claims are based on and in response to Defendant Dr. Woodham re exercise of

the right to petition” as that term is broadly defined in TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001.

Therefore, all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA are subject to

dismissal under the TCPA unless Plaintiff establishes “by clear and specific evidence a prima

facie case for each essential element” of each challenged cause of action subject to dismissal.

TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). Even if Plaintiff was able to do so, Defendants Dr.

Woodham and GHPA are still entitled to dismissal as a matter of law under the TCPA and on

summary judgment grounds under TRCP 166a(b) because the claims against them are barred as a

matter of law under the affirmative defenses of:

(1) the common law judicial communications privilege which is described in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorTS § 588; and
(2) the statutory privilege under TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.054 (“Jmmunity”) for
providing information to Adult Protective Services and for related communications.

II. ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

The TCPA has a 3-step process, each step of which is discussed below:

STEP 1: The defendant/movant has the initial burden to demonstrate that the legal action
is based on the exercise of a protected right. TEX. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b).

STEP 2: The plaintiff/non-movant has the burden to establish “by clear and specific
evidence a prima facie case for each essential element” of each challenged cause of
action subject to dismissal. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c).

STEP 3 (optional): Even if the plaintiff meets the plaintiff's response burden, the
defendant is still entitled to dismissal if the defendant/movant “established an affirmative
defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d); see also TRCP 166a(b).

Plaintiff refers to Jerome Stinson, the primary recipient of her 8/25/2019 email, as “security officer.” However,
per Plaintiff's 3/27/2019 deposition testimony, Mr. Stinson is Plaintiff's boyfriend.

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A. Step 1 — THE TCPA APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS DR.
WOODHAM AND GHPA BECAUSE THE CLAIMS ARE BASED ON AND IN RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS’ EXERCISES OF THE “RIGHT TO PETITION” AS THAT TERM IS BROADLY
DEFINED IN THE TCPA.

8 Under the TCPA, “/fa legal action is based on or is in response to a party's exercise of

the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association . . ., that party may file a motion

to dismiss the legal action.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003. “Exercise of the right to

petition” is defined broadly under the TCPA, and as relevant to this Motion means:

(4) “Exercise of the right to petition” means any of the following:
(A) a communication in or pertaining to:
(i) a judicial proceeding;
(ii) an official proceeding, other than a judicial proceeding, to
administer the law;
(iii) an executive or other proceeding before a department of the
state or federal government or a subdivision of the state or federal
government;

(B) a communication in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, judicial, or other governmental body or
in another governmental or official proceeding;
(©) a communication that is reasonably likely to encourage consideration
or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, judicial, or other
governmental body or in another governmental or official proceeding;
[and]
(E) any other communication that falls within the protection of the right
to petition government under the Constitution of the United States or the
constitution of this state.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001.

The term “communication” is also defined broadly under the TCPA as including “the making or

submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written,

audiovisual, or electronic.” Id.

9 The TCPA applies to Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA.

Plaintiff repeatedly complains of acts of judges, police, and state agents and employees in

Plaintiff's First Amended _ Petition. Most of Plaintiff's claims appear to be based on her

December 2018 hospitalization at Oak Bend Medical Center. However, there is no allegation

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that Defendant Dr. Woodham treated Plaintiff at Oak Bend Medical Center or otherwise caused

or had any involvement in Plaintiffs hospitalization at Oak Bend Medical Center in December

2018. See also Ex. A, 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pgs. 195:7-9, 197:17-19, 296:6-13,

& 299:3-7 (Plaintiff discussing that Dr. Woodham’s role in her health care was limited to

providing her with medicine). The only specific factual allegations against Defendant Dr.

Woodham are for alleged communications with DFPS/APS related to alleged efforts to obtain a

“mental health warrant” and to have Plaintiff “involuntarily committed.” Plaintiff's First

Amended Petition, f§ 76-83, pgs. 13-14. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dr. Woodham

and GHPA are often confusing and at times incoherent, but it is clear that they are based on and

in response to alleged communications made by Defendant Dr. Woodham to governmental

officials and regarding judicial proceedings. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.208.

B. STEP 2 — PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN TO ESTABLISH “BY CLEAR AND SPECIFIC
VIDENCE A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR EACH ESSENTIAL ELEMENT” OF EACH CAUSE OF
ACTION SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL.

10. Plaintiff bears the burden to establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case

for each essential element” of each cause of action subject to dismissal. TEX. Cv. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 27.005(c). The only cause of action in which Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA are

specifically named is Plaintiff's claim for “Medical Malpractice.” Plaintiff's First Amended

Petition, f// 150-163, pgs. 23-25. It is undisputed that Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA

were health care providers to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dr.

Woodham and GHPA arise out of alleged departures of accepted standards for or directly related

to health care. See also Affidavit of Robert Woodham, MD. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff has

attempted to plead other causes of action against Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA, those

causes of action are merely health care liability claims for which the Plaintiff must create a fact

issue on duty, breach, and proximate cause. See Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371

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S.W.3d 171, 179-80 (Tex. 2012); Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255-56 (Tex. 2012).

Assuming for the sake of argument the Plaintiff has validly pled any other cause of action against

Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA, the Plaintiff would have to create a fact issue on each

element of each other cause of action as well.

Cc. STEP 3 — PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE JUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE, THE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE FOR REPORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO
ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES, AND THE PRIVILEGE FOR COMMUNICATIONS MADE FOR
THE PROTECTION OF THIRD PERSONS.

11. Even if Plaintiff meets Plaintiff's response burden, Defendants are still entitled to

dismissal if Defendants “establish an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving

party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §

27.005(d). This is the same standard as the standard for granting summary judgment as a matter

of law on an affirmative defense under TRCP 166a(b). Therefore, this part of Defendants’

Motion also seeks summary judgment as a matter of law.

12. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA are based on

communications made by Defendant Dr. Woodham to state government agencies and regarding

actual or contemplated mental health warrant judicial proceedings and are therefore protected the

following privileges as a matter of law:

(1) the common law judicial communications privilege which is described in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588; and
(2) the statutory privilege protecting communications with Adult Protective
Services and regarding related proceedings in TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.054
(“Immunity”).

Judicial Communications Privilege — RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588.

13. The judicial communications privilege is an absolute legal privilege/immunity that

protects communications made by actual or potential witnesses, litigants, counsel, and other

participants in actual or contemplated judicial proceedings. “Texas courts have long recognized

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that an absolute privilege extends to publications made in the course of judicial and quasi-

judicial proceedings . . .” Wilkinson v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank Trust Services, 14-13-00111-

CV, 2014 WL 3002400, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, pet. denied). “The
scope of the absolute privilege extends to all statements made in the course of the proceeding,

whether made by the . witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceeding, including

statements made in open court, hearings, depositions, affidavits, and any pleadings or other

papers on the case.” Id. at *6. This rule cannot be “circumvented merely by placing a different

label on the claim,” whether that label is “negligence,” “breach of fiduciary duty,” or some other

cause of action. See id. at *7. No degree of alleged culpability (i.e. intentional, malicious) is

sufficient to circumvent the judicial communications privilege. Whether the judicial

communications privilege applies is a question of law. Randolph v. Walker, 29 S.W.3d 271, 278

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

14. The privilege is broad in scope and applies even to voluntary communications made by

potential witnesses in relation to potential judicial proceedings. 5-State Helicopters, Inc. v. Cox,

146 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (“Even communications made

in contemplation of or preliminary to a quasi-judicial proceeding are privileged.”); Attaya v.

Shoukfeh, 962 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that

voluntarily meeting with a state government agency’s investigator and providing medical records

to the investigator were absolutely privileged acts). There is no requirement that a potential

witness actually testify, that any judicial proceeding ever actually be filed, or that the potential

witness be providing information in response to a subpoena or other legal compulsion.

15. Mental health warrants and involuntary committal proceedings are judicial proceedings.

The allegations against Defendant Dr. Woodham are indisputably made in the context of and in

relation to actual and contemplated mental health judicial proceedings regarding Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff's First Amended Petition, §] 53, 61-65, 69-70, 79 & 81-82, pgs. 9, 11-12, & 13-14; see

also Affidavit of Robert Woodham, MD § 7; Ex. G, Notice of Claim.

Adult Protective Services Privilege — TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.054 (“Immunity”).

16. Tex. Hum. Res. Code ch. 48 applies to reports regarding “a person with a disability.” Id.

at § 48.051. Although the exact nature and extent of Plaintiff's “disability” is disputed, there is

no dispute that Plaintiff has a “disability” for the purposes of Chapter 48. Plaintiff's First

Amended Petition, §j 110-115, pg. 17. TEx. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.054 says:

(a) A person filing a report under this chapter or testifying or otherwise
participating in any judicial proceeding arising from a petition, report, or
investigation is immune from civil or criminal liability on account of his or her
petition, report, testimony, or participation, unless the person acted in bad faith
or with a malicious purpose.
(b) A person, including an authorized department volunteer, medical personnel,
or law enforcement officer, who at the request of the department participates in
an investigation required by this chapter or in an action that results from that
investigation is immune from civil or criminal liability for any act or omission
relating to that participation if the person acted in good faith and, if applicable,
in the course and scope of the person's assigned responsibilities or duties.

17. As explained above, Defendant Dr. Woodham’s communications forming the basis of

Plaintiff's claims were with Defendant Vivian Mao who is a specialist at Adult Protective

Services. Plaintiff's First Amended Petition, {] 76 & 79-83, pgs. 13-14; Ex. H, 7/29/2019 Letter

from_DFPS. Adult Protective Services is a part of the Texas Department of Family and

Protective Services, which is the “department” referred to in Section 48.054. The DFPS was

conducting and investigation regarding Plaintiff Ms. Lightfoot and in the course of that

investigation specifically requested information regarding Ms. Lightfoot including “any concern

for the patient from the doctor.” Ex. H.

18. Defendant Dr. Woodham’s reports and communications to Adult Protective Services

about Plaintiff's mental health were made in good faith and without malice. Affidavit of Robert

Woodham, MD. Plaintiff apparently disputes the extent of her mental illness. But it is

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undisputed that Plaintiff has a history of hospitalizations for mental health issues going back to at

least the late 1980s or early 1990s. Ex. A, 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pgs. 64:20-

66:16, 72:8-74:13, 292:3-19. It is also undisputed that at least as early as 1998, Plaintiff was

diagnosed with bipolar disorder and dissociative identity disorder (DID) by a physician (Rahn K.

Bailey, MD) who is not a party to this lawsuit. 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pgs.

114:6-115:23, 289:12-290:24. Defendant Dr. Woodham’s care, treatment, and other actions with

respect to Plaintiff met the standard of care. It is noteworthy that on 3/27/2019, Plaintiff

indicated in sworn deposition testimony that she was not dissatisfied with Defendant Dr.

Woodham’s care. 3/27/2019 Deposition of Jan Lightfoot, pgs. 296:14-297:3. However, for the

purposes of Chapter 48, so long as Defendant Dr. Woodham was not “acting in bad faith or for a

malicious purpose,” he is entitled to the protection of the privilege even if one assumed for the

sake of argument that Plaintiff were able to create a fact issue on a breach of the standard of care.

Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA are therefore entitled to dismissal and summary judgment

as a matter of law on their TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.054 privilege/immunity affirmative

defense.

Ill. ATTORNEY’S FEES & OTHER RELIEF

19. Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA request that they be awarded their costs and

reasonable attorney’s fees under CPRC § 27.009(a)(1) and reserve the right to supplement with

further evidence of their costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

20. Given the clearly unmeritorious nature of many of Plaintiffs claims and Plaintiff's

history of filing unmeritorious suits, it is also requested that the Court consider an award of

sanctions under CPRC § 27.009(a)(2). Defendants believe that some sanction award is

appropriate but that a small sanction (i.e. $1,000.00) would be sufficient to achieve the deterrent

purposes of the law.

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PRAYER

Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA respectfully request and pray that the court set this

Motion for a hearing and order that:

ay Plaintiff take nothing from Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA and that Plaintiffs
claims against Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA be dismissed with prejudice under
CPRC § 27 and TRCP 166a(b);

(2) Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees pursuant to CPRC § 27.009(a)(1), as well as post-judgment interest; and

(G3) Defendants Dr. Woodham and GHPA be awarded sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to
CPRC § 27.009(a)(2).

Respectfully submitted,

CARDWELL & CHANG, PLLC

By OMule_
Suzan Cardwell
S.B. No. 03791300
Email: cardwell@cardwellchang.com
Noah Meek
S.B. No. 24084554
Email: meek@cardwellchang.com
511 Lovett Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77006
Phone: (713) 222-6025
Fax: (713) 222-0938

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
ROBERT WOODHAM, MD and
GREATER HOUSTON PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATES, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this 22™ day of April, 2021, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served via ProDoc E-Service upon all parties in compliance with
TRCP 21 and TRCP 21a.
/s/ Noah Meek
Noah Meek

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on 4/15/2021, I spoke to Plaintiff's counsel by phone and that I
further conferred with Plaintiff's counsel by email regarding the subject matter of this motion in
efforts to resolve it without court intervention, and that no agreement was reached.
/s/ Noah Meek
Noah Meek

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CAUSE NO. 21-DCV-281435

JAN LIGHTFOOT a/k/a JAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
CHRISTOPHER

Vv FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS

OAK BEND MEDICAL CENTER, et al. § 458™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF HARRIS §
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT WOODHAM, MD

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day appeared Robert Woodham, MD, the affiant,
a person whose identity is known to me or who was identified to me by driver’s license.
After I administered an oath to affiant, affiant testified:

i My name is Robert Woodham, MD, I am over 18 years of age, of sound mind, and
capable of making this affidavit. The matters stated in this affidavit are true and correct
and within my personal knowledge. I am a physician licensed to practice medicine in the
State of Texas and have been board certified in psychiatry since 1984. The group with
which I practice medicine is Greater Houston Psychiatric Associates, PLLC (“GHPA”).

I saw Jan Lightfoot a/k/a Jan Christopher as a psychiatric patient from around April 2009
until around February 2019. Ms. Lightfoot previously saw psychiatrist Rahn K. Bailey,
MD since 1997. It is my understanding that Ms. Lightfoot stopped seeing Dr. Bailey
after Dr. Bailey closed his practice.

Ms. Lightfoot has a long history of severe mental illness. Ms. Lightfoot has been
hospitalized for psychiatric reasons several times, with the earliest hospitalization of
which I am aware being sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Per records of Ms.
Lightfoot’s prior health care providers including Dr. Bailey, Ms. Lightfoot has had
episodes of psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, and auditory and visual hallucinations.
Ms. Lightfoot also had significant family history of mental illness including, per her
report to me, that her mother committed suicide due to psychotic depression.

Dr. Bailey diagnosed Ms. Lightfoot with serious mental health conditions including
bipolar disorder and dissociative identity disorder (“DID”). I also diagnosed Ms.
Lightfoot with those conditions when she became my patient and I provided medication
management to Ms. Lightfoot for her symptoms. Medications were helpful in managing
Ms. Lightfoot’s symptoms but did not completely eliminate them. While she was my
patient, Ms. Lightfoot would sometimes have delusions and/or bipolar or dissociative
episodes. Ms. Lightfoot reported suicidal ideations to me as recently as 3/19/2018.

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I do not have privileges at any Oak Bend facility and am not authorized to admit or
discharge patients from any hospital or other medical facility in the Oak Bend system. I
did not see or treat Ms. Lightfoot at any Oak Bend hospital or medical facility in
December 2018, January 2019, or at any other time.

In my second to last visit with Ms. Lightfoot on 1/14/2019, Ms. Lightfoot advised that
she had been committed to Oak Bend under a mental health warrant and that she had
been off one of her medications since October 2018. During my last visit with Ms.
Lightfoot on 2/6/2019, Ms. Lightfoot showed irritable, paranoid, and rambling behaviors.
This led me to become concerned about Ms. Lightfoot’s wellbeing and mental health.

On or about 7/29/2019, I was contacted regarding Ms. Lightfoot by the Adult Protective
Services unit of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. I
communicated with Vivian Mao of Adult Protective Services as a part of DFPS/APS’s
investigation into whether Ms. Lightfoot needed court-ordered mental health treatment.
On 7/29/2019, APS sent me a request for records regarding Ms. Lightfoot as a part of
their investigation, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit H to
Defendants’ Motion. The 7/29/2019 letter from DFPS/APS not only requested records,
but also asked that I provide “any concern for the patient” that I had. Given Ms.
Lightfoot’s long history of serious mental illness, the 12/24/2018 mental health warrant
issued by a judge of Fort Bend County, Texas, Ms. Lightfoot’s statement at her
1/14/2019 visit that she had been off of a medication since October 2018, Ms. Lightfoot’s
paranoid and rambling behaviors at her 2/6/2019 visit, and subsequent communications to
me from DFPS, I had genuine concern for Ms. Lightfoot’s mental health and wellbeing.
My communications regarding Ms. Lightfoot with DFPS/APS or related to any
DFPS/APS investigation were made in good faith and without malice.

The document attached as Exhibit B to Defendants Robert Woodham, MD and Greater
Houston Psychiatric Associates, PLLC’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss _& Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Motion”) is a true and correct copy of an 8 page report of Peter B.
Polatin, MD dated 2/7/2005.

The document attached as Exhibit C to Defendants’ Motion is a true and correct copy of
a 5 page report of Rahn K. Bailey, MD dated 7/2/2004.

10. The document attached as Exhibit D to Defendants’ Motion is a true and correct copy of
a | page letter from Rahn K. Bailey, MD dated 3/10/2008.

ile The document attached as Exhibit E to Defendants’ Motion are true and correct copies of
21 pages of my progress notes for Ms. Lightfoot. I am a custodian of records for my
patient records and am familiar with the manner in which these records are created and
maintained. These records were made at or near the time of the act, event, condition,
opinion, or diagnosis set forth. They have been kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity and making these records is a regular practice of that activity.

2 of 3
12. The document attached as Exhibit F to Defendants’ Motion is a true and correct copy of
a detention warrant dated 12/24/2018 which was emailed to my office by Ms. Lightfoot.

13. The document attached as Exhibit G to Defendants’ Motion is a true and correct copy of
anotice of claim from Plaintiff regarding this lawsuit.

14, The document attached as Exhibit H to Defendants’ Motion is a true and correct copy of
a letter I received from the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services dated
1129/2019,

15 The document attached as Exhibit I to Defendants’ Motion is a true and correct copy of
an email chain from Ms. Lightfoot with the last email being an 8/25/2019 email from Ms.
Lightfoot to her “security officer” Jerome Stinson which copied a number of other
individuals.

be
Lj1Wocdiolf. —
Rdbert Woodham, MD

3
Swort @aG_subscribed before me by Robert Woodham, MD in Harris C ounty,
Texas on the ——— _ day of April, 2021.

a
Notary Pu c in and for
the State o} exas
CHERYL SOWELL
Notary ID #5730925
My Commission Expires
‘May 3, 2022

3o0f3
Jan Elizabeth Lightfoot March 27, 2019

CAUSE NO. Cetio 4

JAN ELIZABETH LIGHTFOOT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
AND VINE DWELLERS
MINISTRIES, INC.,
Plaintiffs,

vs. GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

LOUIS SIMPSON, JR. AND
ST. JOHN MISSIONARY
BAPTIST CHURCH OF
GALVESTON,
Defendants. 212TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FR I I IRR I I I IR A I I I I I I I ok oo
10
ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF
a1 JAN ELIZABETH LIGHTFOOT
Maraehe e2ai, 2019
12
SO I ER IR IR II I I A IO I I Oe
aS

14 ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JAN

15 ELIZABETH LIGHTFOOT, taken on the 27th Of March, 2019,

16 from 10:59 a.m. to 8:53 p.m. before Paula A. Lucchesi,

17 CSR in and for the State of Texas, reported by machine

18 shorthand, taken at the offices of Andrew E. Lemanski &

19 Associates, 9600 Long Point Road, Suite 150, Houston,

20 Texas, 77055, pursuant to the Texas Rules of civil

21 procedure and the provisions stated on the record or

22 attached hereto.

Kim Tindall and Associates, LLC 16414 San Pedro, Suite 900 San Antonio, Texas 78232
210-697-3400 210-697-3408
Exhibit A
Jan Elizabeth Lightfoot March 27 2019
Pages 2 to 5
Page 2 Page 4
4 APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
a
ch ristop! Ree dateh ATA LO 2"
HPA
246

i fed 7/ As na ®
Fig to Pastor S
Mr. Donald Ra’ in Li rfc foot
4 LAW OFFICE GFSONALD RAY McNEAL Vs usic inistry
505 Clayworth pagers impson, undated.
5 Ballwin: Missourt “63014 -4005

(es!
Cit Police artmeni
6 636-386-2536 fax Inve Stig aon ‘eport ot Jap,
Donaldraymcneal@msn.com dated 3 pay
FOR DEFENDANT ae SIMPSON, JR.: PLF'S DESCRIPTION PAGE
Ms. Elizabeth L. andoval
10 1177 West Loop South, 10th Floor
ricul
Cur exas Vit 20 of
ecretal a Salfe bu
in Lit ightfoot 21
eC Sineas

oe Mpexas: Secretar iy
in i all 8. inqui Dwell
uston ea
629-15:
11_713-62: usiness
13-629-' 5037 t Xx a ation, well
12 Esandoval@brownsims.com
FOR DEFENDANT ST. on MISSIONARY BAPTIST
14 eal _ oy
doc eXaS,
Ofgaanucation, Taq
inc
7 Greta
avin usi ieSS
rs
15 Mr. F. New
SMEINESS. GLOVER & GROSSMAN, L.L.P.
820 ticles
Dwellers Ministries:
Incorp fr nration for Vine
corporated. 24

A
16 roe Post'Oak Place, Suite
Houston, Texas 2-E rticles oO men dent for Vine
ies
713-374-7049 fax ae wellea
Wholeness
leqFoundati
N ame ettticate for The,
18 tnewman@hou-law.com
VIDEOGRAPHER: vn the
American
Name C
ECT Es ir
xs igple, fort ling
24

it = Mas"

Case Info

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

July 26, 2021

Case Filing Date

March 09, 2021

County

Parties

George N Lawrence Attorney for the Plaintiff
Greater Houston Psychiatric Associates, P.L.L.C. Defendant
Lightfoot, Dr. Jan Elizabeth Plaintiff
Noah Meek Attorney for the Defendant
Woodham, Robert, MD Defendant
Walat Aqrawi Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Aaron Aiken Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mark Callender Attorneys for Defendants
Brett Sheneman Attorneys for Defendants
Benjamin Hamel Attorneys for Defendants

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Document for Jan Lightfoot a/k/a Jan Christopher vs Robert Woodham, MD and Greater Houston Psychiatric Associates, P.L.L.C.

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