Preview
Filing # 130801521 E-Filed 07/16/2021 11:56:01 AM
IN THE CIVIL COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
WANGWEIL YIN and SISI FENG,
Plaintiffs,
V. Case No. 2020-CA-1958
Division: 20
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC,
Defendant.
/
VERIFIED MOTION TO SET ASIDE CLERK’S DEFAULT
Defendant, Magic Village 3, LLC (“MV3”), by and through the undersigned counsel,
moves to set aside the September 14, 2020 Clerk’s Default and, in support hereof, states as follows:
1. Counsel for Plaintiff knew MV3 was represented by counsel at the time it filed
this lawsuit and failed to notify MV3’s counsel of the filing of the lawsuit or the
seeking of the default,
1. First, the Clerk’s Default should be set aside because Plaintiff’s counsel had actual
knowledge that the defendant was represented by the undersigned and intended to defend the
lawsuit. As stated in U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Lloyd, 981 So.2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008):
When a plaintiff with actual knowledge that the defendant
is represented by counsel and intends to defend the lawsuit makes an ex parte
application for a clerk's default, the effect is to insure that the defendant
does not have a reasonable opportunity to correct what was obviously an
administrative error. See Ole, Inc., 566 So.2d at 814 (discussing the decision
in Gulf Maint., 543 So.2d 813). A default entered in violation of the due process
notice requirement of rule 1.500(b) must be vacated without regard to whether the
defendant can establish a meritorious defense or whether the defendant can
demonstrate inadvertence or excusable neglect under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540(b). See Int'l Energy Corp. v. Hackett, 687 So.2d 941, 943 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1997); Gulf Maint., 543 So.2d at 817.
2. On or about February 19, 2020, Benjamin Weissman, Esq. of David Chico Law
Group corresponded with MV3, making a demand for a return of the Plaintiffs’ deposit held
1
pursuant to the Purchase Contract, not attached to the Complaint. A true and correct copy of said
correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3. On February 26, 2020, the undersigned counsel responded on behalf of MV3,
rejecting the demand for the return of the deposit. A true and correct copy of said correspondence
is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4, On March 4, 2020, attorney Weissman responded to the undersigned counsel’s
February 26, 2020 correspondence. A true and correct copy of said correspondence is attached
hereto as Exhibit C.
5. Clearly, attorney Weissman knew and understood that the undersigned represented
MV3 and would defend MV3 in any legal proceeding as demonstrated by the attachments to the
March 4, 2020 correspondence from attorney Weissman.
6. In those attachments are a Motion to Dismiss filed by the undersigned on behalf of
MV3 ina case filed in early 2019 involving a purchase contract for a unit in MV3 bya citizen of
China.
I. Failure to attach the Purchase Contract requires this Court to set aside the
Clerk’s Default.
7. The Clerk’s Default must be set aside as a matter of law, irrespective of excusable
neglect or meritorious defenses because Plaintiffs have failed to attach the Purchase Contract,
which forms the basis of the Complaint. Contractors Unlimited, Inc. v. Nortrax Equipment Co.
Southeast, 833 So.2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
2
Ill. Defendant had excusable neglect, meritorious defenses, and acted with due
diligence upon learning of the default.
8. On or about August 20, 2020, the undersigned counsel received a copy ofthe instant
lawsuit from MV3.
9. Pursuant to its policies and procedures, the undersigned counsel provided a copy of
said lawsuit to an assistant, who is no longer employed by the firm, and requested that the time for
response be calendared and a new file opened in the system.
10. Those processes were foiled when the assistant failed to open the file and calendar
the response date.
11. This is the classic case of “out of sight, out of mind,” as the undersigned counsel is
involved in hundreds of lawsuits at any particular time and relies on his calendar in conducting his
law practice.
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is an Answer and Affirmative Defenses, establishing
the meritorious defenses.
13. The undersigned counsel acted with due diligence, as this Motion and the Answer
and Affirmative Defenses are being filed within 36 hours of the undersigned learning that the
default had been entered.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Magic Village 3, LLC requests that the Court to set aside the
Clerk’s Default, to deem the Exhibit D Answer and Affirmative Defenses filed as of the date of
the Order setting aside the Default, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just.
3
VERIFICATION yjif avi
Under the penalties of perjury, J declare that I have read the foregoing’Motion to Set Aside
Clerk’s Default and the attachments and that the facts stated in it are yl _
StygetTayLevine, Esq.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE o/
I] HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing has been furnished via
the Florida e-Filing Portal to all attorneys of record on this 15th day of July, 2021.
DEGRAVE
/s/ Stuart Jay Levine
Stuart Jay Levine, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 835994
slevine@walterslevine.com
601 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite 720
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 254-7474 (telephone)
Attorneys for Defendant
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC
4
| spotouitaserean falvin & Mee kM (Caer 807 Celebration Avenue
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ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS.
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Christopher
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ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS.
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Christopher Mack BenjaminWeissman
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J wwwdaridchicolaw.com
| Although the Purchase Agreement is carefully and intentionally drafted to attempt to avoid
| any claim regarding fraudulent representation, Centaline’s misrepresentations are not controverted
| by any statement in the Purchase Agreement and therefore are actionable under Florida law. This
| renders the entire agreement void because it was induced by fraud, and the other various
J misrepresentations provided to Plaintiffs throughout the sales process actionable. Additionally, the
| context of Magic Village One and Two being sued for violations of ISLA previously and the
i wording of Section Four together demonstrate the intent of Magic Village to promise construction
/ of the premises within two years for the express purpose of avoiding coverage by the ISLA. This
| would render Magic Village covered by ISLA regardless of the language to the contrary in Section
i Four ofthe Purchase Agreement.
Plaintiffs desire to resolve this matter amicably and confidentially and demand the return of
| all payments tendered in lieu of suing in court to rescind the Purchase Agreement on the basis of
| fraudulent inducement, failures to disclose under the ISLA, and/or recession premised on the
| Plaintiffs’ unilateral mistake in believing that Centaline could aid in remitting funds to Magic
i Village on behalf of Plaintiffs. Ifyou have any questions or require clarification, please contact our
| office at (407) 933 7703.
| Best regards,
|
a
Benjamin M. Weissman, Esquire
/ Florida Bar Number #120770
| EXHIBIT A
ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
SARASOTA «© TAMPA * CHICAGO
STUART JAY LEVINE 601 BAYSHORE BOULEVARD
stevine @watierstevine.com February 26, 2020 SUITE 720
www. waiterstevine.com TAMPA, FLORIDA 33606
(813) 254-7474
VIA E-MAIL (B13) 254-7341 FAX
Ben@davidchicolaw.com
Benjamin M. Weissman, Esq.
David Chico Law Group
607 Celebration Avenue
Celebration, FL 34747 ,
Re: Magic Village Resort 3 Purchase Contract with Wangwei Yin and Sisi Feng
Dear Mr. Weissman:
Please be advised the undersigned counsel represents Magic Village Resort 3, LLC
(“Magic Village”). I am in receipt of your letter dated February 19. 2020.
It appears that your clients, Ms. Yin and Ms. Feng knew or should have known about the
laws in China. The fact that your clients have now learned there was an impediment to pay
money to the U.S. for investment real estate, is not a defense to this contract. The case of Leon
County v. GJ Glusenkamp, 873 So.2d 460 (i DCA 2004) stands for the proposition that a
government decree or order can be a defense to a contract performance if the order or decree
oceurs after the contract is executed. In the current situation, the alleged impediment existed at
the time that the contract was signed and not after it was executed. As a result, the demand for
the return of all payments made is rejected.
No fraud has been committed and no unilateral mistake supported by Florida law would
survive a Motion to Dismiss, much less a Motion for Summary Judgment. While we appreciate
your clients’ predicament, the request is not supported by fact or law.
Should you wish to discuss this matter, kindly contact me at your convenience.
Very truly yours, -
WALTERS LEVINE/LOZANO Aor
& DeGRAVE
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Lf"
4,
Sart Jay “ink
SJL:de
Enclosure
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EXHIBIT B
CH snes ster © David M. Chiec 607 Celebration Avenue
Foe LAW GROUP Christopher Mack Henjamin Weissman 7Pani
J ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS.
AT LAW _ Sk. cane one
7 Bryana Connors fp) 407-082-7708
/ icine ta (f) 407-983-7713
J we Jay ich eGiaw car
| March 4, 2020
J VIA EMAIL
y MAGIC VILLAGE THREE, LLC,
q Attn: Stuart Jay Levine, Esq.
. Walters Levine Lozano & DeGrave
| 601 Bayshore Boulevard
7 Suite 720
7 Tampa, FL 33606
J slevine@walterslevine.com
|
| Re: Magic Village Resort 3 Purchase Contract
dl Dear Mr. Levine:
- Thank you for your response to Ms. Yin and Ms. Feng’s Demand Letter. Although your
_ response addressed allegations regarding Impossibility of Performance, it failed to substantively
a
J respond to the allegations regarding Fraudulent Inducement, Unilateral Mistake, and violations
|
| of Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (“ILSA.”) Except for allegations regarding ISLA,
_ Osceola Circuit Court Case 2019-CA-000374, Yannah Zhou v. Magic Village 3, Inc., (the “Zhou
J case’’) alleged similar factual and legal theories to those alleged in our Demand Letter. In the Zhou
| case, the Court ruled on your Motion To Dismiss, granting relief for the Impossibility to Perform
J Count, but denying relief for the analogous legal theories of Fraudulent Inducement and Unilateral
|
J Mistake. Please find attached to this correspondence the relevant filings in the Zhou case for your
|
7 convenience.
q Considering that the same circuit court that would adjudicate this matter previously upholds
] analogous legal theories, is your client inclined to discuss settlement or is your position that Ms.
] Yin and Ms. Feng’s allegations are factually insufficient. If your client has any interest in
q settlement, please contact our office at (407) 933- 7703. Otherwise, Ms. Yin and Ms. Feng intend
i to file suit, and please let me know ifyou are authorized to accept service on their behalf.
| Best regards,
J Benjamin M. Weissman, Esquire
7 Florida Bar Number #120770
J Enclosures
- EXHIBIT C
Filing # 86298565 E-Filed 03/13/2019 09:58:47 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
YANNA ZHOU,
Plaintiff,
v. CASENO: 2019-CA-000374
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC,
Defendant. .
MOTION TO DISMISS
COMES NOW, Defendant, MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC (“Magic Village”), by and
through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to the applicable Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereby serve this, its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the Plaintiff, YANNA ZHOU
(“Plaintiff”) and states as follows:
1. The Complaint arises out of the purchase of a townhome by the Plaintiff from
Magic Village. A true and correct copy of the Purchase Agreement is attached as Exhibit “A” to
the Complaint.
2. Plaintiff has brought a four count Complaint, Count I — Rescission for
Impossibility of Performance; Count If ~ Fraudulent Inducement; Count I] — Rescission for
Unilateral Mistake; and Count IV — Unjust Enrichment.
L Florida law not Chinese law governs the performance of the Contract.
3. The factual premise as alleged in the Complaint for each cause of action is that
under the laws of the country of China, as they existed at the time that the contract was executed,
Chinese individuals could not exchange and remit in excess of $50,000 per year for the purchase
of any properties in the United States of America.
EXHIBIT C
4, Plaintiff essentially alleges that it was precluded from performing the Contract to
purchase the townhome by the operation of Chinese law and therefore should have a judgment in
the Plaintitf’s favor finding it was excused form performance of the Contract.
5. First, paragraph 27 of the Contract is clear and unambiguous that the parties
agreed that only Florida law will govern the performance of the Contract:
“Choice of Law and Forum: Governing Law, Waiver of Jury Trial The
local laws of the State of Florida, without regard to Florida’s choice of law
rules, will exclusively govern the interpretation, application, enforcement,
performance of, or any other matter related to this Contract.”
6. Accordingly, since Chinese law was not the law governing performance of the
Contract, reliance on Chinese law to avoid performance of the Contract is misplaced and
inconsistent with the parties Contract.
7. Therefore the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Impossibility of performance based upon an act of government is only available if
the act complained occurred after the contract was executed
8. The law in the state of Florida is clear, only after a contract is made, a party’s
performance is made impractical without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
nonoccutrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract made, his duty to render
that performance is discharged, unless the language or circumstances indicates to the contrary.
Leon County y. Gluesenkamp, 873 So.2d 460,463 (Fla. 1° DCA 2004).
9. In other words, if the legal impediment exists at the time of the making of the
contract, the doctrine of impossibility, unilateral mistake, rescission, or fraudulent inducement
cannot form the basis of discharging a party’s obligation pursuant to a written agreement.
10.‘ Therefore, the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
2
EXHIBIT C
If. The Count Il for Fraud in the Inducement fails to state a cause of action as a
matter of law
11. Based upon the same faulty factual premise, in Count II, Plaintiff alleges that a
broker/agent for Magic represented that the laws of China did not preclude the performance of
the Contract.
12. This allegation that the broker/agent verbally represented to Plaintiff that Chinese
law allowed Plaintiff to perform her obligations of payment required by the Contract are
inconsistent with by paragraph 27 of the Contract(above) and are inconsistent with the merger
provision contained in paragraphs 12 and 13.
13. ‘If there is an inconsistency between the general allegations of material facts in the
complaint and the specific facts revealed by the exhibit attached or referred to in the complaint
they have the effect of neutralizing each allegation as against the other, thus rendering the
pleading objectionable. Hillcrest Pacific Corporation v. Yamamura, 727 So.2d 1053, 1055 ( Fla.
4" DCA 1999).
14. ‘Finally, a party cannot recover in fraud for alleged oral misrepresentations that are
adequately covered or expressly contradicted in a later written contract. Jd 1056.
15. Clearly, the law governing the performance the Contract is specifically set forth in
paragraph 27. Florida law governs performance of the Contract not Chinese law.
16. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiff could not have reasonably relied upon
the alleged misrepresentation that Chinese law would allow Plaintiff's performance.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC, respectfully requests an Order
dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and awarding its costs and fees for having responded to
Plaintiff's Complaint.
3
EXHIBIT C
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished
via the Florida e-Filing Portal to all attorneys of record on this 13th day of March, 2019,
WALTERS LEVINE LOZANO &
DEGRAVE
és/ Stuart Jay Levine
Stuart Jay Levine, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 835994
slevine@walterslevine.com
Jamie A. Cummings, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 103267
jcunmmines(@wallersievine.com
601 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite 720
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 254-7474 (telephone)
Attorneys for Defendant
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC
4
EXHIBIT C
Filing # 91362704 E-Filed 06/19/2019 03:42:45 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
YANNA ZHOU,
an individual,
Plaintiff,
VS. Case No.: 2019-CA-000374
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC, a Florida
limited liability company,
Defendant.
/
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, Yanna Zhou (“Ms. Zhow”), by and through her undersigned counsel responds in
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”) filed by Defendant, Magic Village 3, LLC
(“Magic Village”).
INTRODUCTION
The Complaint filed by Ms. Zhou (the “Complaint”) sets fourth four separate and valid
causes of action that stem from Magic Village’s tortious actions in marketing and selling the
Contract Townhome (as defined in the Complaint) to Ms. Zhou. The Complaint lays out the
actions of Magic Village, through its agent, Shenzhen Ausin Investment Consulting Company
Limited (“Ausin China”), intended to dupe Ms. Zhou into entering into the Magic Village Resort
3 Purchase Contract (the “Contract’”).
The Motion fails to set forth any viable basis for the dismissal ofeither the Complaint itself
or any of the counts therein. The Motion’s simplistic view of choice-of-law considerations and
the law surrounding fraud in the inducement, while wholly ignoring certain causes of action in the
EXHIBIT C
Complaint, breaks down under scrutiny. As a result, the Motion should be denied, and this case
should proceed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Choice Of Law Provision In The Contract Does Not Control The Analysis Of
Impossibility Or Unilateral Mistake.
The Motion states that because the Contract contains a choice of law provision, this Court
should only consider if the Contract would be impossible to perform in Florida. This argument
ignores the relief sought in the Complaint, which is rescission of the Contract for, inter alia,
impossibility of performance. See generally, Complaint. The effect of rescission would be to void
the Contract and place the parties in status quo ante. See, e.g., Willis y. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 59
(Fla. 1931) (“the prime object of rescission or cancellation is to undo the original transaction and
restore former status”) (superseded on other grounds by Fla. Stat. § 672.711). Because rescission
serves to eliminate the contract in question, any provision contained therein is logically not
enforceable. Cf Harper v. EJ. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 802 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001) (“plaintiffs were bound by choice-of-law provision because they elected to affirm the
contract instead of seeking rescission’) (citing Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. EI. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 761 So. 2d 306, 313 (Fla. 2000)). Consequently, Magic Village’s choice-of-law-based
argument is invalid and not a basis for the dismissal of the Complaint because Ms. Zhou is seeking
rescission of the Contract.
Though the Motion is silent on Ms. Zhou’s claim for unilateral mistake, the general content
of the Motion suggests that Magic Village will rely on similar grounds in seeking the dismissal of
Count IIL. Unilateral mistake is an equitable cause of action that seeks the rescission of a contract
as a result of a mistaken understanding of a material fact by one party to a contract. Maryland
EXHIBIT C
Casualty Company v. Krasnek, 174 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 1965). Thus, just as with Count I, Ms.
Zhou is not affirming the Contract, she is seeking to set it, and all its provisions, aside. As a result,
the choice-of-law provision in the Contract, as well as all other provisions thereof, are not
enforceable. Consequently, Magic Village has failed to set forth a basis for the dismissal of Count
Il of the Complaint and the Motion should be denied.
Il. The Merger Provision Of The Contract Does Not Apply To Ms. Zhou’s Fraudulent
Inducement Claim.
As with Magic Village’s choice-of-law-based argument, its argument premised on the
“merger provision contained in paragraphs 12 and 13” of the Contract misses the mark. When a
contract is induced through fraud, as is set forth in the Complaint, “the fraudulent
misrepresentation vitiates every part of the contract.” D&M Jupiter, Inc. v. Friedopfer, 853 So.
2d 485, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In Friedopfer, defendant claimed that a tort claim was barred
by an “as is” clause in the contract at issue. /d. The Court found that the “as is” clause would not
be enforceable if the contract itself was procured by fraud. /d.
Similarly, the existence of the Contract stems from the fraudulent misrepresentations made
to Ms. Zhou by Magic Village’s agents. Because the fraudulent statements go to the creation of
the Contract itself, the “merger provision” contained in the Contract is not enforceable because the
whole of the Contract is subject to rescission. See id.
Furthermore, the “merger provision” Magic Village appears to be relying upon, though it
does not provide the language thereof in the Motion, is buried in Paragraph 13 of the Contract and
states:
This Contract represents the entire agreement between the parties and
supersedes all prior memoranda, correspondence, conversations, and
negotiations between the parties to this Contract. With the exception of
the Disclosure Summary provided to Purchaser, there are no oral or
EXHIBIT C
written understandings, warranties, or representations between the parties
that are not expressly contained in this Contract.
Contract, ¥ 13.
This boilerplate, non-specific “merger provision” does not relate to the specific fraudulent
statements made by Magic Village’s agent that induced Ms. Zhou into entering in the Contract. It
does not expressly relate to the legality of Ms. Zhou performing the Contract from China nor does
it relate to the fraudulent statement that Magic Village’s agent would facilitate the necessary
transfer of funds to Magic Village, if Ms. Zhou entered into the Contract. These are the very
statements that induced Ms. Zhou’s execution of the Contract and the “merger provision” is far
too general to adequately deal with those fraudulent statements and Ms. Zhou’s reliance thereon.
CONCLUSION
The Motion has failed to set forth any basis for the dismissal of theComplaint. The Motion
only directly addresses two of the four counts set forth in the Complaint, and tangentially one other
count, As described above, the Motion fails to set forth a basis for the dismissal of any of the
counts of the Complaint, and, therefore, the Motion must be denied.
Respectfully Submitted,
David A. Meek I
Florida Bar No.: 59314
Losey PLLC
1420 Edgewater Dr.
Orlando, FL 32804
Primary Email: dmeek@losey.law
Secondary Email: docketine@@losey
law
Attorney for Plaintiff
EXHIBIT C
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed
electronically with the Clerk of Court using the Court’sCM /ECF system which will cause a
copy to be served on all parties of record, on this 19% day of June 2019.
David Meek II, Esquire
EXHIBIT C
Filing # 88524093 E-Filed 04/25/2019 12:48:07 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
YANNA ZHOU,
Plaintiff,
v. CASENO: = 2019-CA-000374
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC,
Defendant.
NOTICE OF HEARING
(Confirmation #: 457999)
TO: David Meek, Esq.
Losey PLLC
450 South Orange Avenue
Suite 550
Orlando, FL 32801
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing in the above-captioned matter has been scheduled
as follows:
DATE: June 24, 2019
TIME: 1:30 p.m. (30 minutes reserved)
BEFORE: The Honorable Margaret H. Schreiber
LOCATION: 2 Courthouse Square
Kissimmee, FL 34741
Hearing Room 6-A
SUBJECT: — Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(filed March 13, 2019)
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.
EXHIBIT C
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished
via the Florida e-Filing Portal to all attorneys of record on this 25th day of April, 2019.
WALTERS LEVINE LOZANO & DEGRAVE
és/ Stuart Jay Levine
Stuart Jay Levine, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 835994
slevine@walterslevine.com
Jamie A. Cummings, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 103267
jcummings@walterslevine.com
601 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite 720
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 254-7474 (telephone)
Attorneys for Defendant
Magic Village 3, LLC
EXHIBIT C
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA 2 . pe &.
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YANNA ZHOU, S5= & Soh
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MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC,
Defendant.
ee
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFE’S COMPLAINT
THIS CAUSE, coming on to be heard upon the Defendant, MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC’S
(“MAGIC”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the Plaintiff, YANNA ZHOU, and the Court
having heard arguments of counsel, having reviewed the Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss, the
Response to the Motion to Dismiss, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, does
hereby
ORDER AND ADJUDGE as follows:
1. The Motion to Dismiss as to Count I is GRANTED without prejudice.
2. With respect to Counts II, II and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED.
3. Defendant shall have twenty (20) days in which to file an answer to Plaintiffs
Complaint.
EXHIBIT C
< a
4. Plaintiff shall have twenty (20) days in which to file an Amended Complaint.
DONEANDORDEREDthis v dayof pts ,2019.
MARGARET H. SCHREIBER
Circuit Court Judge
Conformed copies to:
Counsel of Record . es
Stuart vaysq
David meet, Levine,| [4 . Conformed and Mailed
JUL 0.9 agi9
EXHIBIT C
IN THE CIVIL COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
WANGWEIL YIN and SISI FENG,
Plaintiffs,
V. Case No. 2020-CA-1958
Division: 20
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC,
Defendant.
/
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Magic Village 3, LLC (“MV3”), by and through the undersigned counsel,
responds to the Complaint in this action as follows:
ANSWER
1. Admitted for the purposes ofjurisdiction.
2. Admitted for the purposes ofjurisdiction.
3. Without knowledge.
4. Without knowledge.
5. Admitted.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
6. Admitted that MV3 is the developer of the Project in which Plaintiffs entered into
an agreement. Otherwise, denied.
7. Admitted.
8. The Purchase Contract speaks for itself.
9. Denied.
10. Denied.
1
EXHIBIT D
11. Admitted that MV3 utilized the services of others in China to market the MV3
Project. Otherwise, denied.
12. Admitted that MV3 utilized the services of others in China to market the MV3
Project. Otherwise, denied.
13. — Denied.
14. Denied.
15. | Admitted that Plaintiffs were provided brochures of the Project. Otherwise, denied.
16. Admitted that Plaintiffs were provided brochures of the Project. Otherwise, denied.
17. Denied.
COUNT I: VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C §1703
18. MYV3 reavers, realleges, and incorporates herein by reference its response to
paragraph 1 through 17 as if fully set forth herein.
19. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
20. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
21. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
2
EXHIBIT D
22. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
23. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
24. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
25. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
26. Although the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the Complaint, when it is, it
will establish that, pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Agreement is exempt from the Interstate
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Magic Village 3, LLC requests that the Court enter judgment
in its favor and against Plaintiffs, including awarding an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in
defending this proceeding.
COUNT I: FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT
27. | MV3 reavers, realleges, and incorporates herein by reference its response to
paragraph 1 through 17 as if fully set forth herein.
28. Denied.
29. Denied.
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30. Denied.
31. Denied.
32. Denied.
33. Denied.
34. Denied.
35. Denied.
36. Denied.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Magic Village 3, LLC requests that the Court enter judgment in its
favor and against Plaintiffs, including awarding an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in defending
this proceeding.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS TO COUNT I
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have failed to attach the Purchase Contract, which forms the basis of Count I.
Pursuant to Rule 1.130, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, “All bonds, notes, bills of exchange,
contracts, accounts, or documents on which action may be brought or defense made, or a copy
thereof or a copy of the portions thereof material to the pleadings, must be incorporated in or
attached to the pleading.” The Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Contractors Unlimited, Inc. v. Nortrax Equipment Co. Southeast, 833 So.2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA
2002).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Purchase Contract is not attached to the Complaint, but when it is, it will establish that,
pursuant to paragraph 4, this Purchase Contract is exempt from the Interstate Land Sale Full
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Disclosure Act, including 15 U.S.C. § 1703. A copy of the page on which paragraph4 exists is
attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS TO COUNT I
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have failed to attach the Purchase Contract, which forms the basis of Count II.
Pursuant to Rule 1.130, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, “All bonds, notes, bills of exchange,
contracts, accounts, or documents on which action may be brought or defense made, or a copy
thereof or a copy of the portions thereof material to the pleadings, must be incorporated in or
attached to the pleading.” The Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Contractors Unlimited, Inc. v. Nortrax Equipment Co. Southeast, 833 So.2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA
2002).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The allegations contained in paragraphs 8, 13 and 16 of the Complaint are inconsistent with
paragraphs 11.b., 12, and 13 of the Purchase Contract (which is not attached to the Complaint).
Paragraph 11.b. states as follows:
b. Purchaser represents to Declarant that Purchaser has not relied upon any prior
agreements, representations, understandings, or oral statements (including
renderings or representations contained in sales brochures, advertising or sales
materials and oral statements of sales representatives), which are not specifically
stated in this Contract, and Exhibits to this Contract, or in an Addendum attached
to this Contract.
Paragraph 12 states:
12. Contract. This Contract and any Addenda or Exhibits attached hereto constitute
the entire agreement between the parties. Except as set forth in this Contract, this
Contract may not be modified or amended except in writing signed by both
Purchaser and Declarant
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Paragraph 13 states:
13. Binding Effect; Entire Contract... With the exception of the Disclosure
Summary provided to Purchaser, there are no oral or written understandings,
watranties, or representations between the parties that are not expressly contained
in this Contract. ...
A copy of the relevant pages of the Purchase Contract are attached hereto as Exhibit “B”’.
If there is an inconsistency between the general allegations of material facts in the
complaint and the specific facts revealed by the exhibit attached or referred to in the complaint
they have the effect of neutralizing each allegation as against the other, thus rendering the pleading
objectionable. Hillcrest Pacific Corporation v. Yamamura, 727 So.2d 1053, 1055 ( Fla. 4th DCA
1999). Further, a party cannot recover in fraud for alleged oral misrepresentations that are
adequately covered or expressly contradicted in a later written contract. Jd. 1056
Therefore, Count II should be dismissed.
DEMAND FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
MV3 has retained the undersigned counsel to represent it in this action and has obligated
itself to pay a reasonable fee for their services, for which Plaintiffs are liable pursuant to paragraph
3.c. of the Purchase Contract. A copy of the relevant page of the Purchase Contract is attached
hereto as Exhibit “C”.
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EXHIBIT D
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via
the Florida e-Filing Portal to all attorneys of record on this 15th day of July, 2021.
WALTERS LEVINE LOZANO &
DEGRAVE
/s/ Stuart Jay Levine
Stuart Jay Levine, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 835994
slevine(@walterslevine.com
601 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite 720
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 254-7474 (telephone)
Attorneys for Defendant
MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC
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DocuSign Envelope ID: 6CF9EOFE-880F-4D78-835F-43DB7CE3A7
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