Preview
1 Michael C. Parme (Bar No. 261719)
mparme@hbblaw.com
2 Stevie B. Baris (Bar No. 287708)
sbaris@hbblaw.com
3 HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP
edocs@hbblaw.com
4 402 West Broadway, Suite 1850
San Diego, CA 92101
5 Telephone: 619.595.5583
Facsimile: 619.595.7873
6
7 Attorneys for Defendant
JACOB JOHN SONGER dba
8 INFERNO GUARD
9
10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 COUNTY OF NAPA
12
13 JAMES RAYMOND, Case No. 21CV001225
an individual,
14 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF JAMES RAYMOND’S
15 MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO
v. EXCLUDE USE OF THE PHRASE
16 “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM
JACOB JOHN SONGER, an individual, dba USE AT TRIAL
17 INFERNO GUARD and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,
18 Judge: Hon. Cynthia P. Smith
Defendants. Date: August 24, 2023
19 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: A
20
Action Filed: August 24, 2021
21 Trial Date: August 28, 2023
22
23 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant Jacob John Songer dba Inferno Guard
25 (“defendant”) submits this Opposition to plaintiff James Raymond’s (“plaintiff”) Motion in
26 Limine No. 4 to Exclude Use of the Phrase “Alternative Property” from Use at Trial (plaintiff’s
27 “Motion”).
28 \\\
1
NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO
14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL
1 1.
2 INTRODUCTION
3 This lawsuit is nothing more than an attempt by plaintiff to take advantage of a defendant
4 who made an innocent mistake, and to extract from that defendant a monetary gain where no
5 cognizable damages exist. This Court should deny plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4 because
6 plaintiff fails to provide any basis for his conclusory statement that the use of the term
7 “Alternative Property” is irrelevant, misleading, confusing or unduly prejudicial. (Motion at 3:17-
8 3:21.)
9 2.
10 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
11 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, following the 2020 Glass Fire, defendant entered onto
12 plaintiff’s property located at 101 Oak Street, St. Helena, CA 94574, and removed nine (9) trees.
13 Throughout discovery, defendant has alleged that any entrance by or on behalf of defendant onto
14 the 101 Oak Street property was conducted under a belief that it was instead a property on which
15 defendant had been retained to remove dead trees and/or plant matter following the Glass Fire.
16 Plaintiff’s property has been referred to as the “Subject Property,” while the property address
17 where defendant believed he was entering and had permission to enter and remove trees and/or
18 plant matter therefrom, has thus, at times, been referred to as the “Alternative Property.”
19 Plaintiff’s Motion claims “the fact that [d]efendant was at the wrong property is irrelevant
20 to the claims involved,” without providing any background, foundation or support for this
21 conclusory opinion. (Motion at 4:2-4:3.) In practice, however, the distinction between the
22 Subject Property and the Alternative Property forms the basis for, and is at the very core of,
23 defendant’s mental state at all times relevant to the Complaint, and is thus directly relevant to
24 those causes of action, and alleged damages, set forth by way of plaintiff’s Complaint, as well as
25 defendant’s defenses and evidence with respect thereto.
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NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO
14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL
1 3.
2 THIS COURT SHOULD DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF
3 FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY FACTUAL CONTEXT
4 “A motion in limine . . . is designed to preclude the presentation of evidence deemed
5 inadmissible and prejudicial by the moving party.” (Schweitzer v. Westminster Investment,
6 Inc.(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1214, citing People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188.) “It
7 serves the same function as a motion to exclude under Evidence Code section 353 by allowing the
8 trial court to rule on a specific objection to particular evidence in advance of its introduction.”
9 (Schweitzer, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at 1214.) Thus, a motion in limine to exclude evidence is not
10 a sufficient objection unless it was directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence and was
11 made at a time when the trial court could determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate
12 context. (Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 187.) “The reason for the requirement is manifest: a
13 specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error.” (Id.) As
14 such, “until the evidence is actually offered, and the court is aware of its relevant in context, its
15 probative value, and its potential for prejudice, matters related to the state of the evidence at the
16 time an objection is made, the court cannot intelligently rule on admissibility.” (Kelly v. New West
17 Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 671, citing People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963,
18 975, fn. 3.)
19 Plaintiff’s Motion fails to provide the court with sufficient context to rule on the motion.
20 For example, the basis for plaintiff’s argument that the term “Alternative Property” should be
21 prohibited from use at trial rests on his unfounded assertions that “the fact that [d]efendant was at
22 the wrong property is irrelevant to the claims involved,” and that “[d]efendant’s going to the
23 incorrect property to cut trees is irrelevant to the issues in this case . . .” (Motion at 4:2-4:3; 4:16-
24 4:17.)
25 Plaintiff cites to no statute, nor any case law precedent, supporting his conclusory opinion
26 that this evidence is somehow “irrelevant” for the very simple reason that the evidence fails to
27 support any such conclusion. Even a mere preliminary overview of plaintiff’s Complaint reveals
28 that plaintiff’s allegations against this defendant are replete with accusations that defendant’s entry
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NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO
14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL
1 upon the Subject Property was done “intentionally, negligently, and/or recklessly.” (See
2 Complaint at 4:17.) These allegations are directly connected to defendant’s mental state at the
3 time(s) of entry onto the Subject Property—the very mental state plaintiff’s Motion now seeks to
4 exclude.
5 As such, this Court should deny plaintiff’s Motion for his failure to provide the court with
6 adequate information to evaluate the merits of the Motion, including but not limited to the direct
7 relevance of defendant’s mental state at times relevant to the Complaint and thus the necessity of
8 drawing a cognizable distinction between the “Subject Property” and the “Alternative Property.”
9 4.
10 CONCLUSION
11 For the reasons set forth above, defendant respectfully requests this Court deny plaintiff’s
12 Motion in Limine No. 4 to Exclude Use of the Phrase “Alternative Property” from Use at Trial.
13
14 DATED: August 17, 2023 HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP
15
16 By:
17 Michael Parme
Stevie B. Baris
18 Attorneys for Defendant
JACOB JOHN SONGER dba INFERNO GUARD
19
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NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO
14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL
1
2 PROOF OF SERVICE
James Raymond v. Jacob John Songer
3 Case No. 21CV001225
4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
5 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I
am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is
6 505 Sansome Street, Suite 1701, San Francisco, CA 94111.
7 On August 17, 2023, I served true copies of the following document(s) described
as:
8
DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF JAMES RAYMOND’S
9 MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO EXCLUDE USE OF THE PHRASE
“ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL
10
on the interested parties in this action as follows:
11
Michael W. Rupprecht, Esq. T: 707-252-9000 / F: 707-252-0729
12 GVM LAW, LLP MRupprecht@gvmlaw.com
1000 Main Street, Suite 300 Cathy@gvmlaw.com
13 Napa, CA 94559
Attorneys for Plaintiff, JAMES
14 RAYMOND
15 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the
document(s) to be sent from e-mail address pjohnson@hbblaw.com to the persons at the
16 e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after
the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was
17 unsuccessful.
18 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
19
Executed on August 17, 2023, at San Francisco, California.
20
21
22 Paula M. Johnson
23
24
25
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27
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NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO
14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL
Preview
1 Michael C. Parme (Bar No. 261719) mparme@hbblaw.com 2 Stevie B. Baris (Bar No. 287708) sbaris@hbblaw.com 3 HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP edocs@hbblaw.com 4 402 West Broadway, Suite 1850 San Diego, CA 92101 5 Telephone: 619.595.5583 Facsimile: 619.595.7873 6 7 Attorneys for Defendant JACOB JOHN SONGER dba 8 INFERNO GUARD 9 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 COUNTY OF NAPA 12 13 JAMES RAYMOND, Case No. 21CV001225 an individual, 14 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF JAMES RAYMOND’S 15 MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO v. EXCLUDE USE OF THE PHRASE 16 “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM JACOB JOHN SONGER, an individual, dba USE AT TRIAL 17 INFERNO GUARD and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 Judge: Hon. Cynthia P. Smith Defendants. Date: August 24, 2023 19 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: A 20 Action Filed: August 24, 2021 21 Trial Date: August 28, 2023 22 23 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant Jacob John Songer dba Inferno Guard 25 (“defendant”) submits this Opposition to plaintiff James Raymond’s (“plaintiff”) Motion in 26 Limine No. 4 to Exclude Use of the Phrase “Alternative Property” from Use at Trial (plaintiff’s 27 “Motion”). 28 \\\ 1 NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO 14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL 1 1. 2 INTRODUCTION 3 This lawsuit is nothing more than an attempt by plaintiff to take advantage of a defendant 4 who made an innocent mistake, and to extract from that defendant a monetary gain where no 5 cognizable damages exist. This Court should deny plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4 because 6 plaintiff fails to provide any basis for his conclusory statement that the use of the term 7 “Alternative Property” is irrelevant, misleading, confusing or unduly prejudicial. (Motion at 3:17- 8 3:21.) 9 2. 10 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 11 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, following the 2020 Glass Fire, defendant entered onto 12 plaintiff’s property located at 101 Oak Street, St. Helena, CA 94574, and removed nine (9) trees. 13 Throughout discovery, defendant has alleged that any entrance by or on behalf of defendant onto 14 the 101 Oak Street property was conducted under a belief that it was instead a property on which 15 defendant had been retained to remove dead trees and/or plant matter following the Glass Fire. 16 Plaintiff’s property has been referred to as the “Subject Property,” while the property address 17 where defendant believed he was entering and had permission to enter and remove trees and/or 18 plant matter therefrom, has thus, at times, been referred to as the “Alternative Property.” 19 Plaintiff’s Motion claims “the fact that [d]efendant was at the wrong property is irrelevant 20 to the claims involved,” without providing any background, foundation or support for this 21 conclusory opinion. (Motion at 4:2-4:3.) In practice, however, the distinction between the 22 Subject Property and the Alternative Property forms the basis for, and is at the very core of, 23 defendant’s mental state at all times relevant to the Complaint, and is thus directly relevant to 24 those causes of action, and alleged damages, set forth by way of plaintiff’s Complaint, as well as 25 defendant’s defenses and evidence with respect thereto. 26 \\\ 27 \\\ 28 \\\ 2 NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO 14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL 1 3. 2 THIS COURT SHOULD DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 3 FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY FACTUAL CONTEXT 4 “A motion in limine . . . is designed to preclude the presentation of evidence deemed 5 inadmissible and prejudicial by the moving party.” (Schweitzer v. Westminster Investment, 6 Inc.(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1214, citing People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188.) “It 7 serves the same function as a motion to exclude under Evidence Code section 353 by allowing the 8 trial court to rule on a specific objection to particular evidence in advance of its introduction.” 9 (Schweitzer, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at 1214.) Thus, a motion in limine to exclude evidence is not 10 a sufficient objection unless it was directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence and was 11 made at a time when the trial court could determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate 12 context. (Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 187.) “The reason for the requirement is manifest: a 13 specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error.” (Id.) As 14 such, “until the evidence is actually offered, and the court is aware of its relevant in context, its 15 probative value, and its potential for prejudice, matters related to the state of the evidence at the 16 time an objection is made, the court cannot intelligently rule on admissibility.” (Kelly v. New West 17 Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 671, citing People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 18 975, fn. 3.) 19 Plaintiff’s Motion fails to provide the court with sufficient context to rule on the motion. 20 For example, the basis for plaintiff’s argument that the term “Alternative Property” should be 21 prohibited from use at trial rests on his unfounded assertions that “the fact that [d]efendant was at 22 the wrong property is irrelevant to the claims involved,” and that “[d]efendant’s going to the 23 incorrect property to cut trees is irrelevant to the issues in this case . . .” (Motion at 4:2-4:3; 4:16- 24 4:17.) 25 Plaintiff cites to no statute, nor any case law precedent, supporting his conclusory opinion 26 that this evidence is somehow “irrelevant” for the very simple reason that the evidence fails to 27 support any such conclusion. Even a mere preliminary overview of plaintiff’s Complaint reveals 28 that plaintiff’s allegations against this defendant are replete with accusations that defendant’s entry 3 NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO 14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL 1 upon the Subject Property was done “intentionally, negligently, and/or recklessly.” (See 2 Complaint at 4:17.) These allegations are directly connected to defendant’s mental state at the 3 time(s) of entry onto the Subject Property—the very mental state plaintiff’s Motion now seeks to 4 exclude. 5 As such, this Court should deny plaintiff’s Motion for his failure to provide the court with 6 adequate information to evaluate the merits of the Motion, including but not limited to the direct 7 relevance of defendant’s mental state at times relevant to the Complaint and thus the necessity of 8 drawing a cognizable distinction between the “Subject Property” and the “Alternative Property.” 9 4. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons set forth above, defendant respectfully requests this Court deny plaintiff’s 12 Motion in Limine No. 4 to Exclude Use of the Phrase “Alternative Property” from Use at Trial. 13 14 DATED: August 17, 2023 HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP 15 16 By: 17 Michael Parme Stevie B. Baris 18 Attorneys for Defendant JACOB JOHN SONGER dba INFERNO GUARD 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO 14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL 1 2 PROOF OF SERVICE James Raymond v. Jacob John Songer 3 Case No. 21CV001225 4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 5 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 6 505 Sansome Street, Suite 1701, San Francisco, CA 94111. 7 On August 17, 2023, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as: 8 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF JAMES RAYMOND’S 9 MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO EXCLUDE USE OF THE PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL 10 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 11 Michael W. Rupprecht, Esq. T: 707-252-9000 / F: 707-252-0729 12 GVM LAW, LLP MRupprecht@gvmlaw.com 1000 Main Street, Suite 300 Cathy@gvmlaw.com 13 Napa, CA 94559 Attorneys for Plaintiff, JAMES 14 RAYMOND 15 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address pjohnson@hbblaw.com to the persons at the 16 e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was 17 unsuccessful. 18 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 19 Executed on August 17, 2023, at San Francisco, California. 20 21 22 Paula M. Johnson 23 24 25 26 27 28 NW08-0000074 DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO 14663448.1 EXCLUDE USE OF PHRASE “ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY” FROM USE AT TRIAL