Motion for Summary Judgment in TAELOR BOURGEOIS VS. LIZA NAVARRO ET AL| Trellis.Law

On May 26, 2017 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Bourgeois, Taelor, and Does 1 To 20, Inclusive, Navarro, Liza, Wag Labs, Inc. Dba Wag!, for PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - NON-VEHICLE RELATED in the District Court of San Francisco County.

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1 JAMES R. PICKER, ESQ. (SBN 237851)
PHILIP M. ANDERSEN & ASSOCIATES
2 Employees of the Law Department
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ELECTRONICALLY
3 6210 Stoneridge Mall Road, Suite 550 F I L E D
Pleasanton, CA 94588 Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco
4 Telephone: (925) 225-6838
Facsimile: (855) 732-9437 10/04/2019
5 Clerk of the Court
BY: YOLANDA TABO-RAMIREZ
Attorneys for Defendants Deputy Clerk
6 Liza Navarro
7

8
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO / UNLIMITED JURISDICTION
10

11 TAELOR BOURGEOIS, NO. CGC-17-559206
12 Plaintiffs, REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
13 v. DEFENDANT LIZA NAVARRO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14 LIZA NAVARRO,
WAG LABS, INC. DBA WAG!, AND Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Teri
15 DOES 1 THROUGH 20, INCLUSIVE, Jackson
Dept. 206
16
Defendants.
17

20 I. INTRODUCTION

21 As a matter of law, Plaintiff TAELOR BOURGEOIS's ("Plaintiff") complaint is barred

22 under the assumption of risk doctrine. Plaintiff attempts to overcome the motion for

23 summary judgment of Defendant LIZA NAVARRO ("Defendant" or "Navarro") by arguing

24 that her dog, Mowgli, a Labrador/Pit Bull mix was aggressive, relying on Plaintiff's

25 veterinarians and one neighbor. As set forth in greater detail below, Larry Phan, counsel

26 for Plaintiff, spends the majority of his declaration improperly adding his own personal

27 views of the case into his declaration, which is not evidence. That should be stricken.

28 However, if this Court accepts the admissible portion of the depositions and declarations

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 as true, all Plaintiff has shown is that Mowgli could, at times, be aggressive during

2 veterinarian treatment.

3 This fact actually further supports Defendant Navarro's argument that the

4 assumption of risk doctrine applies in this case to bar Plaintiff's claims. The undisputed

5 facts in this case are that Plaintiff read the bio of Mowgli and had access to his picture.

6 [Undisputed Fact #10.] Plaintiff had an opportunity to speak with Defendant Navarro

7 before walking the dog and was offered an opportunity to meet the dog before the actual

8 walk. [Undisputed Fact #11.] Plaintiff declined the offer and said she was comfortable

9 accepting a job walking big dogs such as Pitbulls. [Undisputed Fact #13.] Plaintiff also

10 told Defendant Navarro had she had just walked two Lab/Pits the week before and did not

11 feel the need for Defendant Navarro to be present at the initial meeting. [Undisputed Fact

12 #14.] Plaintiff worked as a dog walker for a company called Wag! [Undisputed Fact #3.]

13 In order to become a dog walker, Plaintiff had to pass tests on her dog walking ability.

14 [Undisputed Fact #5.]

15 Assumption of risk, as a legal doctrine, holds that in certain circumstances, based

16 on the virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the

17 plaintiff assumed a risk and therefore defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff

18 from the inherent risks of an activity. See, i.e. Knight v. Jewett (1981) 3 Cal.4th 296. 314-

19 315. [Undisputed Facts #3-5.] As a dog walker, being bitten by a dog was an inherent

20 risk of the activity and the primary assumption of risk has been applied in similar

21 circumstances under the veterinarian rule for animal handlers. See Priebe v. Nelson

22 (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1112. Plaintiff's failure to see the dog for an initial visit before the walk

23 is further support that she assumed the risks of a potential dog bite by walking Mowgli.

24 The pure legal question before this Court is whether the assumption of risk doctrine covers

25 the risk of dog bites by dog walkers. The answer is in the affirmative. Plaintiff is a dog

26 walker for Wag!, a dog walking app, and has been trained as such. Since the assumption

27 of risk doctrine applies in this case, Defendant is not liable to Plaintiff as she assumed the

28 risk of walking Mowgli. Defendant made no misrepresentation and even offered for

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Plaintiff to meet with Mowgli and herself a few days before the accident, an offer that

2 Plaintiff declined. Accordingly, plaintiff's causes of actions are barred as a matter of law,

3 and this Court should grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

4 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

5 A. Paragraphs 2 to 11 of the Declaration of Larry Phan Should Be Stricken

6 In Paragraphs 2 to 11 of the Declaration of Larry Phan, Plaintiff's counsel engages

7 in a personal rendition of his thoughts and analysis of this case. A declaration of an

8 attorney that merely summarizes and discusses the case is not evidence and has no

9 evidentiary value. C.L. Smith Co. v. Roger Ducharme, Inc., (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 735,

10 740. Paragraphs 2 to 11 of the Declaration of Larry Phan should be stricken in its entirety

11 for multiple evidentiary grounds. One, Mr. Phan lacks personal knowledge of the

12 statements made in those paragraphs. "[T]he testimony of a witness concerning a

13 particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter." Evid.

14 Code § 702(a). Mr. Phan has no personal knowledge of the accident and any prior or

15 subsequent history of the dogs in this case. Two, the statements of Mr. Phan reiterating

16 statements of other constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Evid. Code §§ 1200, et seq. Three,

17 Mr. Phan is not an expert and cannot opine on the evidence in a declaration. Evid. Code

18 § 720. While Mr. Phan's personal thoughts and feelings may be appropriate in a

19 memoranda of points and authorities as argument, they are not evidence in a declaration.

20 Accordingly, Paragraphs 2 to 11 of the Declaration of Larry Phan, however, should be

21 stricken by this Court.

22 B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Addresses All Causes of Action

23 Plaintiff's complaint contains supposedly three causes of action: (1) Strict Liability;

24 (2) Negligence and (3) Negligence - Failure to Warn. Essentially there are two causes of

25 action as the cause of action for negligence is one single cause of action for negligence.

26 Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to address the second and third causes of action but

27 that argument fails. Defendant's argument that the assumption of risk applies would bar

28 all of Plaintiff's causes of action. Assumption of risk "provides a complete defense to an

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 action for negligence." Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339, 354. Assumption of risk is

2 also a bar to recovery in a strict liability action. See, i.e. Lipson v. Superior Court (1982)

3 31 Cal. 3d 362, 375-376 (internal citations omitted). In Defendant's Separate Statement,

4 the same facts are used to address all three causes of action. When the same legal issue

5 would bar all of Plaintiff's causes of action, there is no legal requirement that a

6 memorandum of points and authorities be divided into three sections for three causes of

7 action merely to repeat the same arguments. Since the assumption of risk doctrine is

8 applicable in this case, all of Plaintiff's causes of action, whether framed in negligence or

9 in strict liability, are barred as a matter of law. As such, summary judgment in this case is

10 warranted.

11 C. Assumption of Risk Doctrine Applies to Strict Liability Cause of Action

12 Defendant's argument that the assumption of risk doctrine should not bar a claim

13 for common law strict liability fails for numerous reasons. One, Plaintiff's complaint bases

14 the strict liability cause of action on Civil Code section 3342. (Plaintiff's Complaint, § 7.)

15 For Plaintiff to attempt to rewrite their complaint to allege a purported "common law strict

16 liability" cause of action should be rejected. Two, claiming that the assumption of risk

17 doctrine does not apply to a "common law strict liability" cause of action is incorrect and

18 directly contrary to the case law. 1 In Priebe v. Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1112, 1120-1121,

19 the California Supreme Court specifically held that the assumption of risk doctrine applies

20 generally to strict liability actions. The logic of the assumption of risk doctrine applies

21 equally to strict liability actions as well as negligence actions by holding that, when a

22 plaintiff assumes a risk, the defendant is under no legal duty to protect the plaintiff. Knight,

23 3 Cal.4th at 308. If there is no legal duty owed to the plaintiff under the assumption of risk

24 doctrine, there can be no breach of a duty, whether under a negligence theory or strict

25 liability theory. Even a common law strict liability doctrine imposes some form of legal duty

27
1
Plaintiff's citation to Hillman v. Garcia-Ruby (1955) 44 Cal.2d 625 is of no support
28
to Plaintiff as that case relates to jury instructions and not the assumption of risk doctrine.
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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 on the defendant, which is absent when the assumption of risk doctrine applies, such as

2 in this case.

3 D. Primary Assumption of Risk Doctrine Applies to Dog Walkers

4 California courts have consistently held that the assumption of risk doctrine applies

5 to those who handle animals. See, i.e. Cohen v. McIntyre (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 650;

6 Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 709; Priebe v. Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1112). In

7 arguing that dog walkers should not be covered by the assumption of risk doctrine, Plaintiff

8 cites Gregory v. Cott (2014) 59 Cal.4th 996, a case which expanded the scope of the

9 assumption of risk doctrine to preclude lawsuits by in-home caregivers injured while taking

10 care of their patients. This California Supreme Court shows the willingness of the

11 California Supreme Court in expanding the assumption of risk doctrine in appropriate

12 cases such as this one.

13 In Gregory and Priebe, the California Supreme Court set forth the rationale for the

14 assumption of risk doctrine, all of which are applicable here. First is the nature of the

15 profession where an owner entrusts a dog to the care of a trained professional and is no

16 longer in charge. Gregory, 59 Cal.4th at 1003; Priebe, 39 Cal.4th at 1129-1130. The

17 professional determines how best to manage the animal and is in the best position to take

18 protective measures against being bitten. Id. This applies to dog walkers, especially in

19 this case where Plaintiff herself chose to walk the dog herself without first having a chance

20 to meet the dog with the owner. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.] Plaintiff is a trained

21 professional. [Undisputed Facts #3-5.] Second is the contractual relationship between

22 Plaintiff and Defendant for a service that necessarily includes the safe handling of the dog.

23 Gregory, 59 Cal.4th at 1003; Priebe, 39 Cal.4th at 1130-1131. In this case, Plaintiff

24 accepted an assignment through Wag! to walk Plaintiff's dog, an assignment that

25 necessarily includes the safe handling of Plaintiff's dog. [Undisputed Facts #3-9.]

26 The final factor is the social utility of the activity. Gregory. 59 Cal.4th at 1003;

27 Priebe, 39 Cal.4th at 1131. In this case, such as the case with kennel workers in Priebe

28 and in-home caretakers in Gregory, there is social activity in having dog walkers be

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 allowed to walk dogs without the constant risk of lawsuits for dogs doing what dogs

2 sometimes do, which is bite, an inherent risk in the profession of dog walking.

3 It does not matter whether plaintiff had an appreciation of the possible danger

4 involved in walking dogs, rather the proper and relevant inquiry is whether it can be said

5 that Defendant breached a legal duty of care to Plaintiff. The California Supreme Court

6 held that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precludes claims unless there is a

7 showing of intentional concealment or misrepresentation. Priebe, 39 Cal.4th at1130-1131.

8 There is no such evidence in this case. In this case, Defendant did not engage in

9 intentional concealment or misrepresentation to obtain Plaintiff’s services. This was the

10 first time she was using a dog walking service so there were never any prior issues with

11 Mowgli being walked through a service. Defendant offered Plaintiff an opportunity to meet

12 Mowgli with Defendant present, an opportunity she declined. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.]

13 Plaintiff would be able to evaluate Mowgli's interaction with her directly and for herself.

14 [Undisputed Facts #11-14.]

15 The cases cited by Plaintiff are inapplicable. In Davis v. Gaschler (1992) 11 Cal.4th

16 1392, 1395-1396, the plaintiff was helping an animal that was injured by the road when it

17 bit her. The plaintiff in that case was not being retained to perform services relating to a

18 dog or to take care of the dog. This is easily distinguishable from the case at bar where

19 Plaintiff was retained to walk Mowgli and had the opportunity to first visit and meet Mowgli

20 with Defendant Navarro and chose not to. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.]

21 Prays v. Perryman (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1133 is not applicable here and in the

22 language of the case itself, specifically states it does not answer the question of whether

23 the assumption of risk doctrine applies to pet groomers. Id. at 1137. In Prays, the dog

24 bite happened while the dog was stillin the control of the defendant and no agreement

25 had been reached to hand over control of the dog to the plaintiff for grooming. Id. Prays

26 left open the door for the assumption of risk doctrine to apply to pet groomers and therefoer

27 to dog walkers as well. The logic in this case supports extension of the assumption of risk

28 doctrine. Plaintiff was in exclusive control of the situation, by her own choice, when she

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 accepted the assignment and choosing not to meet Mowgli first with his owners.

2 [Undisputed Facts #11-14.]

3 Plaintiff's attempt to argue that there was no contractual relationship because

4 Defendant Navarro had agreed to a free trialis deeply flawed. The fact that Defendant

5 Navarro had not paid Wag! because Wag! was attempting to gain a customer does not

6 eliminate the fact that Wag! and Defendant Navarro had entered into an agreement where

7 Wag! would be responsible for walking Defendant's dog. Plaintiff, by accepting the

8 assignment, was acting as an agent for Wag! The entirety of the veterinarian rule would

9 be eviscerated, a rule which includes veterinarian assistants and kennel workers, required

10 separate contracts between the agent and the hirer to apply. The key issue is that Plaintiff

11 had accepted a dog walking assignment, for pay, in which a dog bite was an inherent risk

12 of that assignment.

13 D. Plaintiff's Purported Evidence Should Be Carefully Scrutinized

14 Plaintiff's declaration and attached exhibits should be carefully scrutinized as

15 Plaintiff's recitation of "supposed facts" does not accurately reflect the testimony being

16 provided. This is further addressed in Defendant Navarro's response to Plaintiff's separate

17 statement. On several occasions, Plaintiff describes events that are alleged to have

18 occurred, but relies on the testimony of a veterinarian who was not present to support that

19 supposed description. Specifically, on several occasions, Plaintiff relies on the testimony

20 of Dr. Navdeep Bhakhri and Dr. Sarabjeet Grewal to claim Mowgli was aggressive based

21 on hearsay medical records of veterinarians other than those who were actually there at

22 the veterinarian visit. Evid Code §§ 702, 1200. The fact that a dog growls while at the

23 veterinarian does not prove that a dog has a "vicious propensity." Plaintiff, as a dog walker,

24 knowing the inherent risks of dog walking, had the opportunity to evaluate Mowgli's

25 propensity herself and chose not to. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.] In addition, a neighbor

26 provides testimony alleging that "dogs" were aggressive towards her and the house

27 cleaner. There is no foundation laid for her testimony about the house cleaner. Evid.

28 Code §702. Her own testimony fails to identify which dog was supposedly pulling towards

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1 her, Mowgli or Simba. Plaintiff also includes irrelevant statements that they "thinkin"

2 Mowgli was guarding the house. This is not admissible evidence and does not show a

3 "vicious propensity." Again, Plaintiff had the opportunity to evaluate all of this herself.

4 [Undisputed Facts #11-14.] Finally, the testimony of any events after the accident at issue

5 in this case, such as the supposed bite of Park Davis, is irrelevant as that involved a

6 subsequent incident and therefore cannot be used to show any knowledge on the part of

7 Defendant Navarro.

8 E. Defendant Has Met Her Burden Of Proof and Plaintiff Has Failed to Meet Hers

9 1. Plaintiff Assumed the Risk of Walking Mowgli

10 There is no triable issue of material fact regarding Mowgli's alleged vicious

11 propensity. In an assumption of risk case, the issue is not regarding any particular vicious

12 propensities of the dog but on the assumption of the risks being accepted by the plaintiff.

13 Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709, 714. The facts in this case, for purposes of this

14 motion for summary judgment, are undisputed. Plaintiff's claim that Mowgli would growl

15 and be muzzled while at the veterinarian or that one neighbor had bad experiences with

16 Mowgli and Simba does not overcome the application of the assumption of risk doctrine in

17 this case. Defendant Navarro gave Plaintiff an opportunity to visit the dog with Defendant

18 Navarro present prior to the dog walk so Plaintiff could get her own opinion of the dog's

19 propensity. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.] Plaintiff declined. The fact that Mowgli would

20 growl and be unhappy at a veterinarian is not uncommon for dogs. Plaintiff had every

21 opportunity to evaluate and determine the personality of Mowgli before she chose to

22 accept full responsibility over Mowgli but she chose not to.

23 Evidence of a dog pushing, barking and jumping at a fence is not evidence of a

24 vicious or dangerous propensity. See, i.e. Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149,

25 164; Nava v. McMillan (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 262, 265. “In any event, even if the dogs

26 had been barking or jumping against the fence which separated them from the sidewalk,

27 such activities are quite common for a dog.” Nava, 123 Cal.App.3d at 265. “[T]hose are

28 harmless activities ordinarily associated with, and expected from, dogs. Id. at 267.

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1 Dangerous propensities cannot be inferred from the breed of a dog or the name of a dog.

2 Lundy v. California Realty (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 813, 821-822; see also Chee, 143

3 Cal.App.4th at 1371-1372. The fact that a dog is confined or fenced is not evidence of any

4 vicious or dangerous propensity. See, i.e. Nava, 123 Cal.App.3d at 267; Yuzon, 116

5 Cal.App.4th at 165-166. Even evidence of a dog running out the door when it was open

6 and scaring people, as a matter of law, does not support an inference that a dog is

7 dangerous. Yuzon, 116 Cal.App.4th at 166. “If that were the case, then all dogs would

8 be deemed dangerous, as a matter of law, and no reasonable landlord would ever permit

9 dogs on rental property for fear of liability.” Id.

10 Defendant Navarro had set forth evidence showing that Plaintiff accepted the

11 inherent risk of a dog bite by accepting an assignment through Wag! to be a dog walker

12 for Mowgli. By law, dogs barking and even growling are normal activities of dogs and do

13 not show a vicious propensity. Regardless, the undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff had

14 an opportunity to evaluate Mowgli herself before accepting full responsibility of the dog

15 and chose not to do so. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.) Whether or not Mowgli had a "vicious

16 propensity" is not relevant to this determination since Plaintiff assumed the risks of a dog

17 bite by choosing to walk Mowgli without doing a personality evaluation herself. Nelson,

18 165 Cal.App.3d at 714. As such, the assumption of risk doctrine applies to bar all of

19 Plaintiff's claims in this case.

20 2. Plaintiff Was Retained to Walk Defendant Navarro's Dog

21 Plaintiff's claim that there is a triable issue of fact over whether there was a contract

22 regarding Plaintiff taking full responsibility over Mowgli fails. Plaintiff relies on the Prays

23 v. Perryman (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1133 case, in which defendant walked into a plaintiff's

24 grooming business with a growling dog and plaintiff was still deciding whether or not to

25 accept the business. Custody and responsibility of the dog had not passed from the

26 defendant to the plaintiff in that case. Plaintiff worked for Wag! and had gone through the

27 process of being certified as a Wag! dog walker. [Undisputed Facts #3-5.] Plaintiff used

28 Wag! to get assignments. [Undisputed Fact #6.] Plaintiff was paid by Wag! [Undisputed

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1 Facts #7-8.] Plaintiff was therefore an agent of Wag! and accepted an assignment from

2 Wag! to walk Mowgli. [Undisputed Fact #9.]

3 Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Navarro was using a promotional "free walk" does

4 not change the nature of the relationship between Wag! and Defendant Navarro. Wag!

5 had still agreed to enter into a contractual relationship with Defendant Navarro to walk her

6 dog. Plaintiff had agreed to act as an agent, for pay, to walk Defendant Navarro's dog. In

7 order to form a contract, all that is necessary is mutual agreement on terms, consideration

8 and a lawful object. Civ. Code § 1550. Plaintiff agreed to serve as a dog walker for Wag!

9 for money. Defendant Navarro agreed to let Wag! walk her dog in exchange for signing

10 up as a potential customer. There was nothing uncertain or improper about this

11 contractual relationship.

12 Finally, whether or not there was a formal contract between Plaintiff and Defendant

13 Navarro does not matter as it relates to the assumption of risk doctrine. Plaintiff accepted

14 a dog walking assignment, for pay, with the knowledge that a dog bite was an inherent risk

15 of the profession. [Undisputed Facts #11-14.] As soon as the agreement was reached,

16 she had assumed full responsibility and was in the best position to control the situation to

17 avoid a dog bite. She could have insisted on a first visit with Mowgli to perform an

18 evaluation. She could have asked that Mowgli be muzzled until she had made the decision

19 to remove the muzzle. Plaintiff's own evidence shows that Mowgli's veterinarians had

20 muzzled Mowgli. Plaintiff had full responsibility for Mowgli when custody and control was

21 handed over to her. She therefore assumed the risk of a dog bite from the dog walking

22 assignment. Defendant Navarro's motion for summary judgment should be granted and

23 judgment entered in favor of Defendant Navarro on all of Plaintiff's causes of action.

24 III. CONCLUSION

25 Since all of Plaintiff's causes of action are barred as a matter of law by the

26 assumption of risk doctrine, this Court should grant Defendant Navarro's motion for

27 summary judgment in its entirety.

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Dated: October 3, 2019 PHILIP M. ANDERSEN & ASSOCIATES
2

3
James R. Picker
4 Attorneys for Defendants
LIZA NAVARRO
5
Electronic signature pursuant to Civil Code §1633.7(d).
6

9
10

20
21

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REPLY BRIEF ISO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 Bourgeois v. Navarro, et al.
San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-17-559206
3
I, the undersigned, declare that I am a resident of the United States; employed in
4 the City of Pleasanton and County of Alameda, State of California; over the age of 18
years; not a party to the within entitled cause; and my business address is 6210
5 Stoneridge Mall Road, Suite 550, Pleasanton, CA 94588.
6 On October 4, 2019, I served the within document(s),
7 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LIZA NAVARRO'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
8
on the interested parties in this action as follows:
9
Lauren J. Koblitz, Esq.
10 Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP
2185 N. California Blvd., Suite 300
11 Walnut Creek, CA 94596
12 Christopher W. Wood, Esq.
Dreyer Babich Buccola Wood Campora, LLP-SAC
13 20 Bicentennial Circle
Sacramento, CA 95826
14
Larry Q. Phan, Esq.
15 Dreyer Babich Buccola Wood Campora, LLP
20 Bicentennial Circle
16 Sacramento, CA 95826
17
[ ] [By Facsimile Machine (FAX)] By use of facsimile machine telephone number (855) 732-
18 9437, I served a true copy of the aforementioned document(s) on the parties in said action by
transmitting by facsimile machine to the numbers as set forth above on this date before 5:00
19 p.m.

20 [ ] [By mail] I am familiar with my employer’s practice for the collection and processing of
correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service and that each day’s mail is
21 deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of
business. On the date set forth above, I served the aforementioned document(s) on the
22 parties in said action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with
postage thereon fully prepaid, for collection and mailing on this date, following ordinary
23 business practices, at Pleasanton, California, addressed as set forth above.

24 [ ] [By Personal Service] By personally delivering a true copy thereof to the office of the
addressee above.
25
[ ] [By Courier] By causing a true copy and/or original thereof to be personally delivered to the
26 office of the addressee above via the following courier service: _____________.

27 [ x ] [By Express Mail] By depositing copies of the above documents in a box or other facility
regularly maintained by United Parcel Service in an envelope or package designated by
28 United Parcel Service with delivery fees paid or provided.

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Proof of Service
1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on October 4, 2019, at
2 Pleasanton, California.
3
Grace Reyes Pabon
4

9
10

20
21

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Proof of Service

Case Info

Judge

Samuel K. Feng Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

October 04, 2019

Case Filing Date

May 26, 2017

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Parties

BOURGEOIS, TAELOR Plaintiff
DOES 1 TO 20, INCLUSIVE Defendant
JONES, NICOLE L. Attorney for the Defendant
KLOBITZ, LAUREN J. Attorney for the Defendant
MELTON, DAVID A Attorney for the Defendant
NAVARRO, LIZA Defendant
PICKER, ESQ., JAMES R. Attorney for the Defendant
RENN, KERRY A Attorney for the Defendant
TRIMBLE, TRACY A Attorney for the Defendant
WAG LABS, INC. DBA WAG! Defendant
WOOD, CHRISTOPHER W Attorney for the Plaintiff
Larry Phan Attorney
Taylor Rhoan Attorneys for Defendants
Nicholas Lowe Attorney

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Motion-Secondary: TAELOR BOURGEOIS VS. LIZA NAVARRO ET AL

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