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DOCKET NO: UWY-CV23-6068806-S
RETURN DATE 01/24/2023 SUPERIOR COURT
MICHAEL FESTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
WATERBURY
TOWN OF WATERTOWN
WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; and
WATERTOWN POLICE CHIEF BERNEGGER,
In his official capacity JUNE 8, 2023
MOTION TO AMIMEND MOTION FOR TEMPORY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The Plaintiff in the above entitle action hereby respectfully requests this Honorable Court grant its
permission to amend his Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief, based on the following:
1. On April 20, 2023, the Defendants filed a Request to Revise, indicating their need for revisions to
more accurately respond to the allegations of the Plaintiff,
2. On May 26, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Revised Complaint, which provides a comprehensive
account of the complete circumstances, including the time periods from January 27, 2023, to
the present. The Revised Complaint highlights numerous additional actions orchestrated by the
Defendants against him, which were not originally utilized or pleaded in the original Complaint
or Request for Temporary injunctive Relief.
3. This amendment is crucial to ensure that all relevant information is presented before the Court,
allowing for a fair and complete evaluatian of the Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief.
Moreover, no party involved in this case will be aggrieved by the proposed amendment. All
parties will have an opportunity to respond to the revised allegations and present their
respective arguments,
Granting this amendment will serve the interests of justice by ensuring equal treatment and a
thorough examination of all relevant facts, which is essential to protect the rights of all
interested parties.
Based on the above, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grants the Plaintiff permission to
amend its Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief. This amendment will enabie a more accurate and
comprehensive presentation of the circumstances surrounding thls case, thereby assisting the Court in
reaching a just and equitable resolution. Although this case has been set for a hearing, the Defendants
will not be prejudiced by this Amendment.
A copy of the Proposed Amended Motion for Injunctive Relief is attached hereto.
THE PLAINTIFF,
fh
ael E Festa
690 Main Street
Oakville, CF 06779
{203)-463-4723
festa. ael.e@gmail.com
CERTIFICATION
| hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was electronically transmitted by email, fax or mailed,
postage prepaid, on this 8th day of June 2023 ta:
James H Golicz esq
GORDON & REES LLP
9S Glastonbury Boulevard Suite 206
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Jgolicz@grsm.com
THE PLAINTIFF,
Michael E Festa
690 Main Street
Oakville, CT 06779
(203}-463-4723
festa.michael.e@gmail.com
DOCKET NO: UWY-CV23-6068206-S
RETURN DATE 01/24/2023 SUPERIOR COURT
MICHAEL FESTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
WATERBURY
TOWN OF WATERTOWN
WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; and
WATERTOWN POLICE CHIEF BERNEGGER,
In his official capacity June 8, 2023
AMMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pursuant to CT Practice Book § 17-41 the Plaintiff in the above captioned action hereby moves the this
Honorable Court grant a Pretiminary injunction Restraining and Enjoining the Defendant Town of
Watertown, Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Berenger, their agents,
servants, and or employees from ordering or requiring the Plaintiff to Release Motor Vehicles towed by
Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat, § 14-145, or by interjecting In the Release
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 {b) (b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 14-145, by specifically demanding that the Plaintiff accept an open Title, and/ or a Title and
Bil of Sale, and/or the release of a vehicle with an active registration to someone other than the
registered owner that held an open Title and/ or a Title and Bill of Sale, and/or a simple auto finance
agreement listing individuals name and corresponding VIN number of the subject vehicle, and/or in the
cases of Rental Cars to someone other than the owner or the authorized representative or face personal
arrest for larceny for the reasons set forth below and in the attached Memorandum of Law.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Plaintiff, Michael Festa, is the sole member and the managing member of Myhoopty.com LLC, a
used car dealer authorized to do nonconsensual towing in the State of Connecticut. The Plaintiff
is also a bailee of motor vehicles towed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 {b) (b}, which are
in the care, custody, and control of Myhoopty.com LLC.
Myhoopty.com LLC is a Connecticut Limited Liability Corporation that had, by Resolution,
adopted an Operating Agreement. The Operating Agreement outlines the structure,
management, and operation of a Limited Liability Company {LLC}. The purpose of the operating
agreement is to establish the rights and responsibilities of the members, as well as to provide a
framework for the operation of the LLC and in this case, specifically that of Myhoopty.com LLC.
In accordance with Paragraph 5. Powers of Member (iii), “the Manager shall have the right to
file suit on behalf of the company in its name. However, the Managing Member shail also have
the right to file suit on behalf of the company in their own name, and any and all proceeds from
such suit shall be given to the company.
3. The Plaintiff maintains a Commercial General Liability Policy (CGL) for his business operations,
but the CGL does not provide satisfactory coverage for the care, custody, and control exposure
created by a bailee to a bailor.
Defendant Town of Watertown is a municipality located in Litchfield County, Connecticut.
Defendant Watertown Police Department is the Police Department for the Defendant Town of
Watertown.
Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Sernegger is the Chief of Police for the Defendant
Watertown Police Department
There have been controversies between the Plaintiff and the Defendants Tawn of Watertown,
Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger since May 8,
2015, subject to and highlighted in CT Civil Case UWY-CV21-6062791-S.
8. The basis of this lawsuit stems from threats of arrest made by the defendants, specifically
agents, servants, employees and representatives of the defendants Town of Watertown, Town
of Watertown Police Department and Town of Watertown Police Chief, Joshua Bernegger. These
threats were directed towards the Plaintiff, in his individual capacity, regarding the Release
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 {b) (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145. The actions and conduct of the defendants have directly affected
and implicated the personal rights and liabilities of the Plaintiff, necessitating this legal action in
his own name.
On or about April 20, 2023 the Defendants filed a Request for the Plaintiff to Revise his
complaint to “request that the Plaintiff revise the Complaint to specify how each Count relates
to a specific Defendant”.
10 On or about May 26, 2023, the Plaintiff revised his complaint.
11 As recent as May 12, 2023 a Watertown Folice Sergent required the Plaintiff to Release a 2017
Maserati to someone other than the registered owner after that person presented a Bank
Statement with his name and the corresponding VIN Number to the vehicle. The vehicle had no
recorded lien, pusuant to CGS 42a-9-303 “Law governing perfection and priority of security
interests in goods covered by a certificate of title. The actual lienholder, which was recorded on
DMV Records, and which is not the company listed on the Bank Statement the Sergent directed
us to accept as “proof of ownership” is actively looking for that vehicle.
12. This Amended Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief more accurately addresses the Revised
Complaint while considering the interests of justice and the efficient adjudication of ail claims
and controversies,
13. After the Plaintiff served the Writ, Summons, and Complaint against the Defendants, the
Defendants, through their agents, began the creation of a manufactured crisis in the form of a
campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff. The campaign included personally
attacking the Plaintiff individually by interjecting in the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §
14-145 (b} (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn, Gen, Stat, § 14-145,
by specifically demanding that the Plaintiff accept an open Title, and/ or a Title and Bill of Sale,
and/or the release of a vehicle with an active registration to someone other than the registered
owner that held an open Title and/ or a Title and Bill of Sale, and/or a simple auto finance
agreement listing individuals name and corresponding VIN number of the subject vehicle,
and/or in the cases of Rental Cars to someone other than the owner or the authorized
representative or face personal arrest for larceny.
14. The manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff
by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertawn
Police Chief Joshua Bernegger by interjecting personally against the Plaintiff in the Release
pursuant te Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b} (b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.cam LLC pursuant
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 had and continues to have the potential of exposing the Plaintiff to
a Criminal and Civil Tort Liability by forcing the Plaintiff to violate State Statue under the threat
of personal arrest by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police
Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger of the Plaintiff.
15. The Plaintiff, in an attempt to defuse this manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of
personal persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of
Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger by interjecting in
the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com
LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145, caused the Plaintiff on March 15, 2021, ta seek
approval by the Department of Motor Vehicles of certain Release Procedures to address the
“constructed concerns” of the Defendants. (See Attached Schedule A)
16. In response to the Plaintiff's request for approval, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, by
letter, dated March 25, 2021; advised tie Plaintiff that he was expected to “abide by current
towing statues (e.g., 14-145, at. Seq. and 14-150) to release vehicles Towed by Myhaopty.com
LLC pursuant to Conn, Gen. Stat. § 14-145. (See Attached Schedule B)
17, The Plaintiff, in an attempt to defuse this manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of
personal persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of
Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger by interjecting in
the Release pursuant to Cann. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b} (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com
LLC pursuant te Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145, caused the Plaintiff on March 23, 2021, to send the
Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger certain Release Procedures to address the
*constructed concerns" of the Defendants. (See Attached Schedule C}
18. In response to the Plaintiff's letter, the Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger, by
letter, dated May 10, 2021; advised the Plaintiff in part that the release policies contradicted
CGS 145 {(b) (b) to release vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §
14-145. (See Attached Schedule D)
19. The manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal Persecution against the Plaintiff
by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown
4
Police Chief Joshua Bernegger through their agents to interject in the Release pursuant to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) {b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-145 continued, becoming increasingly aggressive, burdensome, and a consumer of vast
amounts of time energy and at a great emotional cost for the Plaintiff.
20. As a result of the actions of the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police
Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger and their agents, the Plaintiff has
suffered economic damages and has suffered irreparable emotional and financial injury, harm,
and public goodwill.
21 The campaign by the Defendant Town of Watertown, the Defendant Watertown Police
Department, and the Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger through their agents,
was in whole ar in part constructed to place the Plaintiff in a false light by causing him to violate
State Statue under the threat of personal arrest with the purpose of leveraging a positive
position as defendants in the other Case in which he is a Co-Piaintiff.
;
22. The actlons of the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and
Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger caused the Plaintiff to suffer significant reputational
harm because he was forced to violate State Statue under the threat of arrest in contradiction
to the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com
LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 thereby damaging his goodwill, standing and
reputation within the community.
23 The Defendant Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown
Police Chief joshua Bernegger actions were intentional, and they knew or should have known
that their actions would piace the Plaintiff in a false light, cause the Plaintiff to suffer significant
reputational harm, damage his goad will, standing and reputation within the community, and
cause him great emotiona/ harm and business harm, As a result of the Defendant Town of
Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua
Bernegger’s actions, the Plaintiff has suffered significant emotional distress and financial harm
and is entitled to damages as a result.
24 The Plaintiff after unsuccessfully being able to mediate or prevent the further escalation of this
manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff by
the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department, and Watertown
Police Chief Joshua Bernegger , sought a declaratory ruling from the State of Connecticut States
5
Ethics Commission. The States Ethics Commission notified the Plaintiff by letter stating it lacked
jurisdiction over the matter. (See Attached Schedule E)
25 At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff continued to attempt to resolve the personal attacks
against the Plaintiff in the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b) of vehicles
Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn, Gen, Stat. § 14-145. with various
representatives, agents and servants of the Defendant Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown
Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger , imploring no interjection or
deprivation of his Statutory Rights, but to no avail.
26. On September 28, 2022, during a meeting with Defendant Watertown Police Chief toshua
Bernegger, the Plaintiff discussed case law and on the same day emailed Defendant Watertown
Police Chief Joshua Bernegger supporting the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b)
(b} vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LEC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145., which defines
“owner” as any person having title to a motor vehicle.
27. Directly after that meeting, the manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal
persecution against the Plaintiff regarding the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b}
(b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Cenn, Gen. Stat. § 14-145. the
Defendant Town of Watertown, acting in concert with the Defendant Watertown Police
Department and Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger, continued to escalate
the relentless interjection by personally attacking the Plaintiff, of civil matters in a manner so
intense, any reasonable person would take offense to such political actions and police abuse of
discretionary authority, both of which were and continue to be contrary to public policy and
legislative intent.
28. As a result of the actions of the Defendants and their employees, servants and agents, the
Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer econamic damages and has suffered and continues
to suffer irreparable emotional, financial injury, harm, and public goodwill.
FACTS
29. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-165 Definitions (6) describes Owner as “a person, other than a lienholder,
having the property in or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and
possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest by another person but excludes a lessee
under a lease not intended as security,”
30. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-169 provides when a Certificate is Required “(a) Except as provided in
section 14-166, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all motor vehicles at the time of
initial registration or when a change of registration is required under the provisions of section
14-16 by reason of a sale for consideration.”
31. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-169 further provides that “(c) The commissioner shall note on the face of
the registration of each vehicle for which a certificate of title has been issued a statement to
that effect”.
32. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14- 171 provides the manner, methad and forms that the Application fora
Certificate of Title require, including but not limited to “{a) The application for 2 certificate of
title of a vehicle in this state shal! be on a form prescribed by the commissioner and contain
information provided by the owner or acquired through one or more databases used by the
commissioner. Such application shall include: (1) The name, residence and mail address of the
owner;”
23. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-173 provides for the after effect of the Issuance of the Certificate “(a) The
commissioner shall file each application received and, when satisfied as to its genuineness and
regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title, shall issue a
certificate of title of the vehicle. (b) The commissioner shall maintain at his central office a
record of all certificates of title issued by him: (1) Under a distinctive title number assigned to
the vehicle; (2) under the identification number of the vehicle; (3) alphabetically, under the
name of the owner; and, in the discretion of the commissioner, by any other method he
determines.”
34 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14- 174 provides for Information in Certificate. Prima facie evidence {a) Each
certificate of title issued by the commissioner shail contain: (1) The date issued; (2) the name
and address of the owner; (3} the names and addresses of any lienhalders, in the order of
priority as shown on the application or, if the application is based on a certificate of title, as
shown on the certificate; {4} the title number assigned to the vehicle; (5) a description of the
vehicle including, so far as the following data exists, its make, model, identification number,
type of body, number of cylinders, whether new or used, and, if a new vehicle, the date of the
first sale of the vehicle for use; (6) the mileage reading as shown on the application; and {7} any
other data the commissioner prescribes.
35. Cann. Gen. Stat. § 14-145b. references the Storage and release of motor vehicles that have been
towed or rendered immovable states (b} When a vehicle has been towed or removed pursuant
to sections 14-145 to 14-145¢, inclusive, it shall be released to its owner, a lending institution or
a person authorized by the owner or lending institution to regain possession, upon demand,
provided the demand is made between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through
Friday or at a reasonable time an Saturday, Sunday or holidays and the owner or authorized
person presents proof of registration and pays the costs of towing or removal and of storage.
36. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-1(a)(60} defines "owner" as any person having title to a motor vehicle.
37 Section 246 1 (74), the definition of “registration” includes the Certificate of Motor Vehicle
Registration and the number plates or plates used in cannection with such registration”.
38. Individuals that do not comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145b, do not have a Statutory Right to
gain possession of a Motor Vehicle that was towed pursuant te Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-66.
39. The Defendant Town of Watertown, the Defendant Watertown Police Department and the
Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger or their agents do not have Statutory
Authority to determine and or record ownership of a Motor Vehicle that do not comply with
Conn, Gen. Stat. § 14-145b.
40. The Watertown Police Department's incorrect interpretation of a statute is causing Plaintiff
significant irreparable harm, including fear of arrest or prosecution, loss of income and
opportunities, damage to reputation, and severe emotional distress. Specifically, the Defendants
are giving the Plaintiff a choice of either following State Statue and facing arrest and/or
prosecution or avoiding the threat of arrest and/or prosecution for violating a State statute. This
has created a significant amount of stress and anxiety and has had a chilling effect on Plaintiff's
exercise of his Constitutional Rights. Additionally, this harm has jed to the loss of income and
loss business opportunities, damage to Plaintiff's reputation, and significant and severe
emotional duress.
41 The threat of arrest or prosecution for violating State Statutes governing the Release of Motor
Vehicles towed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14 -145 et seq has damaged the Plaintiff's
reputation in the community, even if Plaintiff is ultimately vindicated in court. This damage to
reputation can have long-lasting effects on Plaintiff's personal and professional life, including
potential harm to Plaintiff's ability to obtain future employment or other business opportunities.
Furthermore, the fear of arrest or prosecution, combined with the other forms of harm listed
above, has caused Plaintiff significant and severe emotiona! duress that cannot be easily
quantified or compensated with money. This emotional harm ts not easily reversible and could
have long-lasting effects on Plaintiff's mental health and well-being, requiring ongoing medical
treatment.
42 Given the urgency of the situation and the potential for angoing harm, Plaintiff respectfully
requests that this court grant a preliminary injunction to prevent the Watertown Police
Department from continuing to threaten Plaintiff with arrest or prosecution for following State
statute. Such an injunction would help to alleviate Plaintiff's fear of arrest or prosecution,
prevent further loss of incame and opportunities, and protect Plaintiff's reputation, emotional
well-being and Constitutional Rights as fully set forth in the attached Memorandum of Law and
Affidavit.
THE PLAINTIFF,
Michael E Festa
690 Main Street
Oakville CT 06779
Office: (203) 463-4723
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED/TESTIMONY REQUIRED
Schedule A
Myhoopty.com 1LC — U82607
690 Main Street
Oakville, CT 06779
Telephone: 203-528-0324 Facsimile: 860-540-1063
March 15, 2021
‘ ‘on: inner of Motor Vehicles
agtbiur:
& ve of Cararecticat
Deparincal of Merer Vehicles:
GD) State Street
Wethersfield, CF (6081
Dear Cummissioner Magubane.
The purpose of this letter #5 to tequest formal adoption of the following procedure for the Release of Motor Vehiwles,
wich have been impounied a st result of a non-consensual tow by our firm.
My hovpty.ca! .C eontinaes to grow in the Private Property enforcement aspect of towing. which is auhorized
pursuant 1a CC 5 14-145 Section 3.
AAs a result, we have and continue to recover stolen vehicles. On several occasions, these vehicles were par Motan.
days and weeks aft : the impoundment. On one specific occasion, the person who had the stolen vehicie in pis pussessta
empted te rely ve it, Qn another occasion, a vehicle sat in our impoundment for several months whee it was epurieil
stolen ine ate juristiction that was notified pursuant to the aforementioned Title Law and Subsevtion newer zniered the:
notification in te NMVTIS (National Motor vehicle Title Information System. which as yor are avaire. tg ad
protect coulsumers [rum Dieud and unsafe vehicles and to kvep stolea vehicles fram being zesolil. We have at accel ai
wpliek in fabricecenl und counterfeit temporary plates,
‘Asa result, sur Birra requests wo have the following forrually accepted ax our siandardin place.
Bs required for Release af a Mator Vehicle:
t, A valid Registration alang with the Motor Vehicle bearing said plate, or
22 The sanic owner: pip documents required for Registration of a Motor Vehicle in the State 0.4 ater Vite
and accompanying supplenents verifying chain of ownership.
One standard fas always cen the above. Often times however, there is 5 segment of the population vs hice kes say
ei guimentative with our Rel ise Requirements which adds additional labor to our company, Ihe DMY by liliny
congplainis, and Molice Juri ictions; all of which we believe is un-necessary.
We now farmaliy reyues) the Department of Motor Vehicle approve this request as we believe by formally adapting: wis
standard. the vehicle wil! pltunately be retumed to the rightful owner and the standard is cut and dry, nun bh bike the
alterlwurs release fee that wa: wthotized by your office on October 1, 2020.
IF you should need to conuser ine my direct line is (203) - 463 — 4723.
Respectfully, RECEIVED
Myboupgycom LLC
hal B AIS Mon TOR VEHICLES
vy ie event S$ OFFICE
NGCOEN: syPi 1 Bewniia
Schehule &
8. STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
60 State Street, Wethersfield, CT 0616!
Btip://et.gov/dmy
ae
Some
sce
March 25, 2021
Myheoopty.com LLC
690 Main St
Oakville, CT 06779
Re: Release of Motor Vehictes for Non-Consensual Tows
Dear Michael Festa,
Thank you for contacting the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Your request has been
reviewed by our Legal Department and we provide the following reply:
The DMV Commissioner cannot approve your ‘procedures’, We also remind you that you must
abide by current towing statutes (¢.g., 14-145, et. Seq. and 14-150) and all applicable regulations.
If you seek advice on the law and regulations as they are written, you should contact your own
attorney for guidance.
Thankyou,
1O} iné Dominique
rogram Coordinator
Dealers and Repairers Unit
cc. DMV Commissioner’s Office
encl; Initial Request
Seat Belts Do Save Lives
Additionally, we believe the Departments interference has & continues to undermine our ability to meet our contractual
obligations to ertforce the parking regulations of the complexes in the toughest neighborhoods due to repeated bad
judgement calls of the Watertown Police Department. This cmboldens some peopleto assume the right to breakrules. Las
well as my staffhave been subjected to violence and outbursts. This violence and outbursts have been supported by these
individuals using the Watertown Police Department as leverage in a Civil dispute. This subsequently places the complex
representatives, our employees, and the Watertown Police in which respond, at an un-necessary risk. It also places the
Town atan un-necessary liability. This should be highly disturbingto amy reasonable person or entity.
To avoid un-necessary civil liability under HB6004 to you, and/or our fine officers that haye earned our respect, please
advise them of our policy and train them to not engage in matters that are Civil in nature at cur facility.
Our office has no interest whatsoever in the Watertows PoliceDepartment arbitrating civil calls at our facility. Our
Attomeys utilize the American Arbitration Association on our behalf for that purpose.
Notwithstanding the above, should the Watertown Police Department decide to conduct a criminal investigation of
Myhoopty.com LLC or its employees, please contact Attomey Peter C Bowman at 203-562-0900 or Attorney John
Kaloidis 203-597-0010 as they are our representatives in such matters and could advise your department accordingly.
Respectfully,
Myhoopty.com LLC
B
Ce: file
Attorney Peter C Bowman,
Attorney John Kaloidis
Schebule C
Myhcopty.com LLC -U8207
690 Main Street
Oakville, CT 06779
Telephone: 203-528-0124 Facsimile: 860-540-1063
Town of Watertown March 23,2025
Police Department
424 French Street
Watertown, CT 06795
Attention: Joshua Bernegger
Dear Mr Bernegger,
As you are aware, multiple disputes, which have been Civil in nature, have caused numerous calls for service by
individuals to the Watertown Police Department for service at our facility, whichis private property.
The purpose of this letter is to advise you, as a Representativeof the Watertown Police Department, and forewam your
employees in writing; of our formal adoption
of the following procedure for the Release of Motor Vehicles, which have
been impounded as a result of a non-consensual towby ow fim.
Documents required to substantiate ownership for Release of a Motor Vehicle:
o A valid Permanent Registration along with the Motor Vetiicle bearing said plate (hereinafter referred to as
registration), or
The same ownership documents required for Registration of a Motor Vehicle in the State of Connecticut, ie Title
and accompanying supplements verifying chain of ownership (hereinafter cofeired to as Title Documents). in
mirror of the State of Connecticut Department of Maior Vehicles, we do not accept photos or copits of any
of the ownership documents, only originals.
Acceptable forms of identification to substantiate the person whe is the registrant and or ewner via Titled
Bocuments:
° A Valid & Unexpired US or State Government issued form of identification: ie a valid Drivers License, State ID
oc US Passport
In mirror of the State of Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, we do not accept photos or copies of any of the
above, except in cases where the State of Connecticut has issued 4 paper copy, pending the driver receipt of their re-
newed license,
Furthermore, we will no longer discuss with representatives of the Watertown Police Department matters which are civil
and which they do not have jurisdiction over.
As you are aware, on June 3, 2020, at the “alleged hearing” that was conducted
via zoom, you expressed “great
concern” with the number of Police Calls to our Private Propetty for matters that were again Civil im nature. Because of
that you should welcome this.
ees Schektule D ele x
ree
pera WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT
cA x 195 FRENCH STREET cA
—
Ey
‘J WATERTOWN, CT 06795 i
Ch at
860-945-5200 yaa
Joshua N. Bernegger
Chief of Police
a
May 10, 2021
Myhoopty.com LLC
Attn: Michael Festa
690 Main Street
Oakville, CT 06779 aa
RE: Myhoopty.com LLC and Watertown Police Department
Dear Mr. Festa:
Please be advised that this Department is in receipt of your correspondence dated March
23, 2021 (“Letter”). Your Letter (1) “forewarns” the Watertown Police Department
(Department”) of your new policies regarding releasing towed vehicles; (2) claims that you will
refuse to cooperate with the Department for matters that you consider “civil:” (3) alleges that the
Department supports violence; and (4) threatens to use a House Bill against myself and members
of this Department.
According to your Letier, Myhoopty.com LLC will only release vehicles upon presentation
of a “valid permanent registration along with the motor vehicle bearing said plate” or “the same
ownership documents required for Registration of a Motor Vehicle in the State of Connecticut, i.e.
Title and accompanying supplements verifying chain of ownership.” Further, it appears you will
only accept identification from the “registrant and or owner” which is “valid and unexpired.”
Your new policy contradicts Connecticut General Statute §14-145b(b) and Governor
Lamont’s Executive Orders, extending identification credentials. A copy of Statute §14-145b(b)
is attached here for your convenience:
(b) When a vehicle has been towed or removed pursuant to sections 14-145 to 14-145c. inclusive.
it shall be released to its owner. a lending institution or a person authorized by the owner or lending
institution to regain possession, upon demand, provided the demand is made between the hours of
8:60 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday throu Friday or at a reasonable time on Saturday, Sunday or
holidays and the owner or authorized person presents proof of registration and pays the costs of
towing or removal and of storage.
Insofar as your letter states that you will refuse to cooperate with the Department for
matters that you consider “civil,” I must caution you that if the Watertown Police Department
Teceives a call to your establishment, we will, in the interest of proper police policy, continue to
Sears
rargy WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT
eyes
Pata WA
A rr 195 FRENCH STREET 4
EN aS
a WATERTOWN, CT 06795 -.
Co asi
860-945-5200
Joshua N. Bernegger
Chief of Police
dispatch officer(s). We expect that, in the interest of being a good corporate citizen, you will
cooperate with the officer(s) on scene. The on-scene officer(s) will ultimately determine whether
a matter is purely civil, and that determination will control the on-scene disposition of the case,
subject to later review.
To the extent that you claim that you and your staff have been subjected to violence and
outbursts, 7 would strongly urge that you contact the Department if any such interactions should
occur. Self-help in those situations is seldom the best course of action. Regarding the claims,
allegations, and threais in the remainder of your letter, this Department categorically denies them.
The Department will in all cases act in accordance with longstanding Departmental policies.
Regarding the police tow list, please be advised that the Watertown Police Commission
has reinstated MyHoopty.com to the Town of Watertown Towing List for the limited purpose of
receiving the revised Regulations and Procedures for Governing Police Towing of Certain Motor
Vehicles (“Regulations”), and the opportunity to voluntarily apply to the new Towing List under
these revised Regulations. The revised Regulations will be sent by the Police Commission to al!
businesses on the Towing List along with an application.
Regards,
Joshua N.
“y
megger
Chieflof Police
Watertown Police Department
Schedule €
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
OFFICE OF STATE ETHICS
--
BEFORE THE CITIZEN’S ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD
In the matter of the petition fora declaratory ruling of: §
§
§ No.
§ (Assigned by OSE}
Michael E Festa Petitioner §
P ION FOR DECLARATORY RULING
Michael E Festa Petitions the Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board
to issue a declaratory ruling in this matter,
The faclual background of the issue is as follows:
Note: if you require additions
space you may attach separate pages wal ay supperthig docmicetation to the pettian,
This Petition is filed regarding release of a Motor Vehicle towed pursuant to CGS 14-145 as
Release Authority within accompanying statues are ambiguous lending to an unclear
interpretation of what is required for the release of the same,
There is a conflict of interpretation between 14-145h, the definition of a “Registration
Credential” as referenced in CGS 14-145b, CGS 14-63-37, and 246-1 (74). The statues are
contradictory, and do not state if the custodian tower ofa vehicle towed pursuant to CGS 14-
145 (1), (2), (3) is entitled to judge who is the person legally entitled to custody of a towed
vehicle, if said person is someone other than the registered owner.
Absent this information, Connecticut Towers may be placed in a Tort Liability for the wrongful
release of 4 Motor Vehicle.
The question upon which Petitioner sacks a ruling is as follows:
Note: Fyouraquére additional spnce vor may attach separate pages and any supporting docuatertiticn to the petizon form.
1) Definition of "Registration Credential” including what determines that Registration
:
Credential ta be Valid.
2) Definition ofa “Credential” as stated ih CGS 14-63-37
3) Declaratory Ruling on whatis considered a valid registration for purposes of releasing
a vehicle as quoted in CGS 246-1-(74}
4) Declaratory Ruling on if the custodian tower ofa vehicle towed pursnantto CGS 14-
145 (3), (2), (3) is entitled to judge who is the person legally entitled to custody ofa
towed vehicle, if said person is someone other than the registered owner.
Phone (860) 263-2400 Fax (860) 263-2402
143 Capito) Avcnwy, Suite 1200 - Harrfard, Connecticut 06106
ww wt goiel
liios
sla Equal Gnportininy Suyptayer
Petitionfar Declaratory Ruling
Page 2 af 3
Petitioner's position with respect.to the question is as follows:
Note: [fyou require additional
space you muy attach separste pages sed aay supporting documentation 10 the petition form.
Questions 1&2
A Registration Cradentlal Is the ottly valid document as an ownership credential witen the registration is
made with the Department of Motar Vehicle Registry and is the only wayte establish ownership under
Connecticut Law. If an owner does not comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-16 by registering a certificate of
title thet had been transferred to them with the department of motor vehictes, the owner fails to establish
that they are, in fact, the "owner" of the Vehicle; therefore, they would lack standing to redeem a vehicle
from a tower's custody,
Question 3
An expired registration is a valid credential as the owner's vehide, being unregistered by virtue of
the expired registration, could not be lawfully operated on the public highways, however the
ownership of sald vehicle did not end with the expiration of the registration credentials, onty the
rightto operate that vehicle on Connecticut Highways has terminated,
Question 4
The custodian tower of a vehicle towed pursuant to CGS 14-145 (1), (2b (3) ts entitled to judge
who is the person legally entitled to custedy of a towed vehicle, if said person is someone other
than the registered owner,
Petitioner’s argument (if any) in support of his or her position (with such legal citations as are
considered appropriate) is as follows:
Nato: Ifyou require additionot svace you may attach sapanate payres end oy sapportiag documentationto tie petition forut.
[ Hiestion 1.
Gadbout v. Price-Bekech, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 402, 2012 WL595490 The court found, inter
alia, that the owner did not comply with Conn. Gan. Stat. § 14-16 by registering a cartificata of title
that had bean transferred to him with the department of motor vehicles. Therefore, ha failed to
establish that he was, in fact, the “owner” of the vehicle.
State v. Smale The registration certificate is for purpose of identification and revenue.
In the contextof vehicle ownership, our courts have noted that while vehicle registration and title
are the clearest indica of ownership; see Budris v, Allstate insurance Company, supra, 44
Conn.App. 58 {noting persuasive evidentiary value of vehicle registration and tite recards [n
establishing ownership);
tion 1-4
Central Auto & Transport v Luxury Limo Bux, ELC 2069 Conn. Super LEXIS 2420
Phows (860) 263-2408 Fax (860) 263-2402
163 Capitol Ayonua, Sulta 1200- Hartford, Connection 06106.
ue Euat Dppormty Epler
Petition for Declaratory Rating
Page 3 af 3
General Statutes § 14-145 ef seq provides thai if a vehicle is towed pursuant to the statue the
towing company is to release the car only upon verification of the owner's registration and after
recelpt of payment for the towing and storage costs.
The rights and obligations of Myhaopty.com LLC are governed by General Statutes § 14-145 et
seg. provides that if a vehicle is towed pursuant to the statue the towing company is to release
the car only upon verification of the owner's registration and after receipt of payment for the
towing and storage costs.
Wherefore, petitioner requests that the Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board grant this petition and
issue a declaratory ruling in this matter.
_—
k ——
joner’s Signaty re
bine 15,2022
Date
690 Main Street
Matling Address
Oakville, CT 06779
City, State, Zip Code
203-463-4723
Daytime Phone No.
Deliver or Mail bo:
Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board
Office of State Ethics
165 Capitol Avenue, Suite 1200
Hartford, CT 06106
Phone (880) 263-2400 Fax (860) 263-2402
165 Capitol Avcauc. Sustc |200—Hartfasel Connecticut 06] 06
An Equal a ‘Enployer
DOCKET NO: UWY-CV23-6068806-S
RETURN DATE 01/24/2023 SUPERIOR COURT
MICHAEL FESTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
WATERBURY
TOWN OF WATERTOWN
WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; and
WATERTOWN POLICE CHIEF BERNEGGER,
In his official capacity June8s, 2023
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCTION
The Plaintiff in the above captioned matter respectfully files the attached Affidavit pursuant to
C.G.S. § 52-471 (b) in support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
THE PLAINTIFF,
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abhors rulings on technicalities and with the matter fully briefed, no resulting prejudice is seen
by the delay in the amendment. Punitive Damages are correctly stricken until the 3COA and
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Edwards, et al. vs. General Motors LLC
Jul 12, 2024 |
22CV-0200334
EDWARDS, ET AL. VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC
Case Number: 22CV-0200334
Tentative Ruling on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs: Plaintiffs David and Stephanie
Edwards filed this action alleging violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Act”)
against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) and Taylor Motors, Inc. (“TMI”) on August 4, 2022.
Following extensive motion practice, primarily concerning discovery issues, the parties settled the
matter on May 7, 2024. Pursuant to the Act, and the terms of the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs
are the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs seek a total
of $319,464.80 in attorney fees and costs. This request consists of $149,773.50 in attorney fees
for 269.3 hours of work litigating this matter from August 5, 2022 to the present, a 2.0 multiplier,
and $19,917.80 in costs.
Objections to Evidence: Plaintiffs have raised 10 Objections to portions of the Declaration of
Cameron Major on the grounds that certain statements and supporting exhibits are improper
argument, lack foundation, are conclusory, and lack personal knowledge. The Objections are
OVERRULED.
Song-Beverly: The Song-Beverly Act contains a cost-shifting provision that specifically allows
prevailing buyers to recover their costs, including attorney’s fees. Civ. C. § 1794(d). The
attorney’s fee award is limited to the amount the court determines was reasonably incurred by the
buyer in commencing and prosecuting the action, based on actual time expended. The prevailing
buyer has the burden of proving the fees were both reasonably necessary to conduct the litigation
and reasonable in amount. Civil Code § 1794(d); Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of
California, Inc., (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 785. The lodestar method applies to determining
attorney’s fees under the Song-Beverly Act. Id. at 817. When determining a reasonable attorney's
fee award, using the lodestar method, the judge begins by deciding the reasonable hours the
prevailing party's attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the prevailing hourly
rate for private attorneys in the community who conduct non-contingent litigation of the same
type. Doppes v Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 CA4th 967, 998. Plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated at rates that reflect the reasonable market value of their services in the community.
Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643. In determining the amount of attorney's fees to
which a litigant is entitled, an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional
services rendered in his or her court. Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 738, 752.
Reasonableness of Hours: The court has discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the
attorneys were reasonably spent on litigation. Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115,
133. The predicate of any attorney fee award is the necessity and usefulness of the conduct for
which compensation is sought. Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819,
846. The court’s focus in evaluating the fee request should be to provide a fee award reasonably
designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided. The starting point for this
determination is the attorney’s time records. Absent clear indication they are erroneous, verified
time records are entitled to credence. Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397.
Plaintiffs seek a total of $149,773.50 in attorney’s fees associated with 269.3 hours of work
performed by four attorneys and one unknown individual. Plaintiffs have submitted detailed time
records to support their request. Defendant challenges numerous specific entries. (Opposition pp.
8 – 11.) The Court has reviewed the billing records in detail, as well as Defendant’s objections.
Counsel billed a total of 269.3 hours to this litigation, which commenced August 4, 2022. The
parties engaged in extensive law and motion practice over 22 months of litigation. The matter
settled on the eve of trial for the maximum possible recovery under the law. The Court finds the
time spent was reasonably expended, with the following exceptions: 1) time billed by Erika
Kavicky – no information regarding this attorney’s qualifications and experience has been
provided, a total of 0.6 hours will be stricken for Ms. Kavicky’s time, and 2) time billed by Angela
Mason – no information regarding this individual’s position, qualifications or experience has been
provided, a total of 1.7 hours will be stricken for Ms. Mason’s time. The billing records Plaintiffs
provided show the following hours were reasonably expended: 133.9 by Deborah Horowitz, 115.4
by Joseph Kaufman and Associates, and 18.4 for the Kaufman and Kavicky firm. The total hours
reasonably expended on this matter are therefore 267.7.
Reasonableness of Rates: A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the prevailing rate charged
to attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. See PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. However, the court may also consider the attorney’s skill
and expertise, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s
customary billing rates. Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 632.
A plaintiff seeking to recover hourly rates for out-of-town counsel that are higher than the local
rates must show (1) a good faith effort to find local counsel, and (2) demonstrate that hiring local
counsel was impracticable. Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1243.
The Court is the best judge of the value of professional services provided and may use its discretion
to apply rates in line with the market rates for the services provided. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132. This Court has extensive experience in presiding over Song Beverly actions
including motions for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses under Song Beverly. As such this Court
is aware of the reasonable hourly rates charged in actions of this nature. It is also aware of the
prior hourly rates found to be reasonable. Based on the Court’s extensive knowledge and
experience, it finds that reasonable hourly rates are $400 per hour for the partners, and $350 per
hour for the associate (Isaac Agyeman - 10 years of experience). The Court notes that Plaintiff
Anthony Edwards has submitted a Declaration indicating that he made a good faith effort to find
local counsel but was unable to do so. The Court has reviewed this voluminous case file, which
contains numerous discovery motions supported by attorney declarations regarding fees. It
appears that Plaintiff has not previously submitted a declaration regarding inability to find local
counsel in support of hourly rates above reasonable local rates. The Court has previously,
consistently, found a rate of $400 per hour a reasonable rate for partners in this matter. In the
interest of consistency within this case, and fairness to Defendants who have previously been
ordered to pay sanctions at the rate of $400 per hour, the Court will again find that $400 per hour
is a reasonable rate for partners in this matter. The Court finds that $350 per hour is a reasonable
rate for the associate in this matter. The Court notes that the billing records submitted do not break
out total hours billed by each individual partner and associate. Considering the large number of
billing entries, it is impractical for the Court to recalculate the correct billing at the approved rates.
Plaintiffs are ordered to submit recalculated totals using the Court’s approved rates.
Multiplier: Plaintiffs seek a 2.0 multiplier based on the results obtained and the contingent risks.
Adjustment factors that may be considered in awarding a multiplier include: 1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, 2) the skill displayed in presenting them, 3) the extent to which
the litigation precluded other employment, 4) the contingent nature of the fee award. Komarova
v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 348. Plaintiff has not
demonstrated a multiplier is warranted in this case. The issues involved in this litigation were
neither novel nor difficult. Counsel have demonstrated they are specialists, who are experienced
and skilled in this area of law, but this case involved routine issues under Song-Beverly. This
litigation precluded other employment to the extent any litigation would. The matter was taken on
a contingent fee basis as is all Song-Beverly litigation. The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’
Counsel obtained the maximum award for the client. However, simply obtaining a positive result
in a factually and legally standard Song-Beverly case does not warrant a multiplier.
Costs and Expenses: The Song-Beverly Act provides that the court will award a successful
plaintiff a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, which have been determined
to have been reasonably incurred. Civil Code § 1794(d). Plaintiffs have requested an award of
costs and expenses in the amount of $19,917.80. However, the declarations submitted in support
of the moving papers only include itemized costs for a total of $16,247.81. The discrepancy is
addressed only in the Reply materials. (Plaintiffs submitted a Supplemental Declaration of Isaac
Agyeman which attaches a record of costs of $3,730 as Exhibit 6.) GM did not have the
opportunity to review and oppose those costs, as they were raised for the first time in the Reply
brief. Therefore, they will not be awarded. The remaining amount of $16,247.81 appears
reasonably incurred with the following exceptions, which will be stricken: 1) $602.26 for
Plaintiff’s mistakenly filing the Complaint twice, 2) $304.99 for Plaintiff’s “Re-Filing” Motion for
Leave to Amend, as it is a duplicate entry without explanation, 3) $180.16 and $592.73 for
Plaintiff’s Notice of Association of Counsel and Substitution of Attorney, respectively, as they are
business expenses of Counsel, not proper litigation expenses.
As for costs related to Taylor Motors, the Court notes the parties’ settlement agreement is between
and among David Edwards and Stephanie Edwards (“Plaintiffs”) and General Motors LLC and
Taylor Motors, Inc (“Defendants”). The agreement provides “Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs
attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single
noticed motion…” (Decl. Kaufman Ex. 1.) The Court finds the parties’ agreement contemplates
that Plaintiffs’ costs related to Taylor Motors would be included in the instant motion for fees and
costs. The total costs and expenses reasonably incurred are $14,567.67.
The Motion for Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part, as detailed above. Plaintiff is ordered to
prepare a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling. Plaintiff is also ordered to file and
serve a declaration which includes the recalculated totals for attorney fees using the Court-
approved rates detailed above. This matter is set for Monday August 12, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in
Department 64 for review regarding the supplemental declaration and proposed order. If a
satisfactory supplemental declaration and proposed order are submitted at least five court days
prior to the continued date, the hearing may be vacated.
P.J. MCAULIFFE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, L.P. VS. THE
TESTATE OR INTESTATE SUCCESSORS OF NORA
Ruling
Maria Castilo vs. Fairfield Investor 1, LLC, a limited liability company et al
Jul 10, 2024 |
CU23-03783
CU23-03783
Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel
TENTATIVE RULING
The Parties are to appear. Plaintiff’s Counsel is to update the Court on whether each of
the Plaintiffs have been provided notice of the hearing date on July 12, 2024 for
Defendant’s Motions to Compel Discovery. If notice has been provided, Plaintiffs’
Counsel is to submit proof to the Court. (The Court notes that in Plaintiffs Counsel’s
declaration in support of motion the be relieved, Plaintiffs were only provided notice of
the Case Management Conference date of June 26, 2024.)
Ruling
MARY ELIZABETH LEMASTERS VS. SCHOENBERG FAMILY LAW GROUP P.C. ET AL
Jul 09, 2024 |
CGC22600572
Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 4. PLAINTIFF MARY LEMASTERS' MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD. Hearing required. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
RAUL RUBIO, ET AL. VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 |
24TRCV00451
Case Number:
24TRCV00451
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
8
Tentative Ruling
HEARING DATE:
July 10, 2024
CASE NUMBER:
24TRCV00451
CASE NAME:
Raul Rubio; Noemi Rubio
v.
American Honda Motors Co., Inc., et
al.
MOVING PARTY:
Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY:
Plaintiffs, Raul and Noemi Rubio
TRIAL DATE:
Not Set.
MOTION:
(1) Demurrer
Tentative Rulings:
(1)
SUSTAIN with leave to amend.
More than mere conclusions are required for a successful assertion of the discovery rule to overcome a demurrer based on the statute of limitations where the suit alleges an event more than four years before the suit was filed but lacks any detail on what happened thereafter and when.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs, Raul Rubio and Noemi Rubio (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and DOES 1 through 10. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5).
Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (AHM) now files a demurrer to the FAC.
B. Procedural
On May 20, 2024, AHM filed its Demurrer. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On July 2, 2024, AHM filed a reply brief.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (
Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. (
C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist.
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (
Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (
Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, [a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (
Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿
B.
Discussion
Preliminarily, this Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition brief does not argue against AHMs contention that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts for each cause of action, but only addresses the statute of limitations issue.
i.
Meet and Confer Requirement
The declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault, Esq., is offered in support of counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Vault declares that she met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiffs counsel regarding the demurrer. However, Vault contends that the parties respective counsels were unable to come to an agreement regarding the grounds for which AHM brings this demurrer. (Declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault (Vault Decl.), ¶
¶ 2-3.) Thus, this Court finds that the meet and confer requirements have been met.
ii.
Statute of Limitations
AHM first argues that each of Plaintiffs Song-Beverly claims are time barred.
T
he statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty of merchantability is four years. (CCP § 337, Comm. Code § 2725,
Montoya v. Ford Motor Co.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495;
Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306
.) A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (Comm. Code § 2725(b).)
While the Song-Beverly Act supplements rather than supersedes the provisions of the UCC, the same four-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under either statute.
(
Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc.
(1991) 234 Cal.App.3rd 205, 213-24.)
The discovery rule of Section 2725(2) also applies to claims under the SBA, such that a cause of action accrues not on the date of sale, but rather when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the warrantor or its authorized repair facility was unable to fix the warranty-covered defects after a reasonable number of attempts.
(
Krieger, supra,
234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.)
Plaintiffs allege they purchased the 2017 Acura ILX on October 31, 2016. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until February 7, 2024, and did not file this FAC until April 19, 2024. As such, AHM argues that on its face, all four causes of action are time-barred. The FAC attaches the Honda warranty, which includes a 5-year, 60,000-mile warranty on the powertrain, which per page 10 of the warranty booklet includes the engine and internal parts of the transmission.
The FAC alleges two specific repair history events in paragraphs 22 and 23, both of which mention powertrain concerns at 16,585 and 53,701 miles respectively.
Both of these events were alleged to have occurred within the first 3 years after sale, but are more than four years before this lawsuit was filed
In their opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not begin to run from the date of the sale of the subject vehicle, but instead, is tolled.
Californias discovery rule delays the start of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or is on inquiry notice (i.e., has reason to discover) facts supporting a cause of action. (
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc
. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry or if they have the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation. (
Id
. at 808; fn. 2 provides: At common law, the term injury, as used in determining the date of accrual of a cause of action, means both a person's physical condition and its negligent cause. (emphasis in original).) The discovery rule applies to Lemon Law claims.
(
Krieger, supra,
234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.)
In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, [a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (
Fox, supra
, 35 Cal.4th at 808, citing (
McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc.
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 (superseded on limited grounds by Code Civ. Proc. § 340.8(c))(emphasis in original).) When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a case of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in this case, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable conclusion. (
Broberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 912, 921.) In this Courts view, Plaintiffs have failed to allege (as
Fox
and
McKelvey
require) the specific facts to show the time and manner of discovery and the inability to have earlier discovered the elements of their cause of action.
Here, Defendant argues that the alleged Song-Beverly causes of action occurred at the time of the sale of the Subject Vehicle, on or about October 31, 2016, and that Plaintiffs did not file this action until February 7, 2024. Defendants argument ignores the discovery rule, the allegations of two powertrain complaints within the first 5 years and 60,000 miles after sale, and the conclusionary allegation that Plaintiffs did not discover Defendants wrongful conduct until shortly before filing this Complaint
. . . .
Plaintiffs included vague and conclusionary statements in their FAC that the discovery rule, Class Action Tolling, and the Repair Doctrine delayed the accrual of their Song-Beverly causes of action. The Class Action tolling allegations in FAC ¶27 contend that the filing of
Conti v. American Honda,
Case No. 2:19-cv-2160 on March 22, 2019 tolled the statute of limitations here.
However, the FAC contains absolutely no details whatsoever as to whether a class was or was not certified, what type of class action was alleged there, as to what claimed defect or defect, and how that other lawsuits pendency bears on the allegations in this case.
The Court thus does not base its tentative ruling on the threadbare assertion of the words class action tolling without any specific factual allegations to support that assertion such as when the purported class certification was denied which would of course ended the claimed tolling period.
However, Plaintiff has provided at least some factual allegations as to the discovery rule and repair doctrine, as discussed below.
The FAC alleges that AHMs Song-Beverly violations occurred, not only at the time of the sale, but also AHMs violations continued as Plaintiffs continued to experience symptoms of the defects despite Defendants representations that the various defects were repaired. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs further allege that they discovered Defendants wrongful conduct alleged in the FAC shortly before filing the Complaint in February of 2024, as the subject vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following AHMs unsuccessful attempts to repair them. (FAC, ¶ 26.)
But the FAC lacks details as to what happened between October 18, 2019 when Plaintiffs presented the subject vehicle for a powertrain complaint and the filing of suit more than four years later.
For example, the FAC lacks any allegation as to what it was that occurred shortly before suit was filed that caused them to discovery AHMs alleged wrongful conduct.
The FAC fails to allege the date and circumstances of the claimed belated discovery.
The FAC fails to address whether the same alleged defect or symptom reappeared on a particular date or whether that was or was not brought to AHMs or its dealers attention.
Instead, the FAC in ¶24 vaguely alleges that Plaintiffs continued to experience symptoms of the defects.
If Plaintiffs experienced those symptoms on or before February 8, 2020, more than four years before suit was filed, Plaintiffs will need considerably more and different allegations to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations.
If plaintiffs allege they had no such symptoms for four years, until shortly before suit was filed, they will need to make more specific allegations as to how a claimed ongoing defect did not manifest symptoms for such a long period of time such that AHM should be responsible for failing to repurchase an apparently long-repaired vehicle.
iii.
Sufficiency of Allegations
AHM also argues that Plaintiffs causes of action are not alleged sufficiently.
Plaintiff alleges basic facts bearing on the core Lemon Law duty that if a manufacturer or representative does not service or repair the vehicle to conform with the express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer or representative must replace the vehicle or reimburse the buyer. (Civ. Code, §
1793.2
, subd. (d).)
Here, the FAC alleges that the subject vehicle suffered transmission defects and engine defects that were unable to be conformed by AHM or its representatives, but that despite this, AHM failed to replace the vehicle or reimburse Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶
¶ 22-26.)
AHM argues that the allegations are pled in a conclusory way. The Court agrees as discussed above.
The FAC is barely one step removed from a lawsuit that merely recites the elements of a cause of action by quoting CACI.
Because the Court will be requiring Plaintiffs to amend its suit to plead the tolling allegations with greater specificity, the Court encourages Plaintiffs to include a greater factual development of what occurred in the subject vehicles repair history after October of 2019 to support the four causes of action that are pleaded in a vague and conclusionary way.
.
I
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, AHMs demurrer is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend. AHM is ordered to give notice of the ruling unless notice is waived.
Ruling
Miguel Aguilar vs General Motors, LLC.
Jul 10, 2024 |
23CV-03969
23CV-03969 Michael Aguilar v. General Motors, LLC
Demurrer by General Motors, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action
for Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment) because (1) It is barred by the statute of limitations,
(2) Fails to state facts sufficient to establish a cause of action, and (3) Fails to allege a
transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose.
The Demurrer by General Motors, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint’s Fifth
Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment) because (1) It is barred by the
statute of limitations, (2) Fails to state facts sufficient to establish a cause of action, and
(3) Fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose is
SUSTAINED ON ALL GROUNDS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to provide Plaintiff with an
opportunity to (1) Plead around the statute of limitations, (2) Plead fraudulent inducement
with specificity, and (3) Establish a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. The
Second Amended Complaint will be filed by November 29, 2024, to give Plaintiff sufficient
time to conduct discovery to obtain the facts necessary for Plaintiff to amend.
Motion by Defendant General Motors, LLC too Strike Punitive Damages Claim
The Motion by Defendant General Motors, LLC too Strike Punitive Damages Claim is
SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state a cause of action that supports a claim for
punitive damages and to allege the facts necessary to establish a punitive damages
claim. The Second Amended Complaint will be filed by November 29, 2024, to give
Plaintiff sufficient time to conduct discovery to obtain the facts necessary for Plaintiff to
amend.
Ruling
JEWELERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS R PURNELL JEWELERS, ET AL.
Jul 15, 2024 |
23STCV30720
Case Number:
23STCV30720
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Dept:
50
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 50
JEWELERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
,
Plaintiff,
vs.
R PURNELL JEWELERS
,
et al.
,
Defendants.
Case No.:
23STCV30720
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Hearing Time:
10:00 a.m.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Jewelers Mutual Insurance Company (Plaintiff) requests entry of default judgment against Defendants R Purnell Jewelers, Richard Joseph Purnell, and Valerie M. Purnell (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiff seeks judgment against each of the Defendants in the total amount of $24,775.77, comprising $24,102.32 in damages and $673.45 in costs.
The Court notes a few defects with the requests for default judgment.
First, n
o proposed judgment (Form JUD-100) was submitted with any of the requests. Pursuant to
¿
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd
¿
. (a)(6), the request must include
¿
[a] proposed form of judgment.
¿
Second, the requests for court judgment (Forms CIV-100) pertaining to R Purnell Jewelers and Richard Joseph Purnell do not appear to have been filed. Rather, these documents show that they were electronically received on March 1, 2024.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiffs requests for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss further proceedings with Plaintiff at the hearing.
DATED:
July 15, 2024
________________________________
Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court
Ruling
Tpine Leasing Capital L.P. vs. Jarnail Multani
Jul 10, 2024 |
23CECG03197
Re: Tpine Leasing Capital L.P. v. Jarnail Multani
Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03197
Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501)
Motion: by Defendant to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
Tentative Ruling:
To deny the motion to set aside default and default judgment without prejudice.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
Explanation:
No Copy of Proposed Pleading
Application for relief from a judgment or court order must be filed timely (within six
months of the judgment or order) and must be accompanied by a copy of the answer
or other proposed pleading to be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 subd. (b).)
Here, defendant’s default was taken October 19, 2023, and judgment was
entered against him on March 21, 2024. Defendant filed this motion on April 22, 2024.
Defendant’s application was timely. However, defendant did not provide a proposed
responsive pleading pursuant to code.
No Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise or Excusable Neglect
A judgment may be vacated and so may the entry of default that preceded it.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473 subd. (b).) The court is empowered to relieve a party “upon any
terms as may be just … from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” (Id.) This decision lies in the discretion of the court, and can only be exercised
if the moving party establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure, and
within the time limits. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)
Here, defendant did not demonstrate that his failure to respond was due to
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. He stated that he learned of the
default entered against him but “was not aware of the nature of any pending litigation.”
(Multani Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant incorrectly stated that the default should be “set aside
due to his mistake…in not responding to the lawsuit.” (Id.) He described no specific
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect that led to him not responding.
Defendant briefly stated that he was improperly served, however did not establish it as a
valid reason for not responding to the Complaint.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure
section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order
adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk
will constitute notice of the order.
Tentative Ruling
Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 .
(Judge’s initials) (Date)
Preview
DOCKET NO: UWY-CV23-6068806-S RETURN DATE 01/24/2023 SUPERIOR COURT MICHAEL FESTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY TOWN OF WATERTOWN WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; and WATERTOWN POLICE CHIEF BERNEGGER, In his official capacity JUNE 8, 2023 MOTION TO AMIMEND MOTION FOR TEMPORY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The Plaintiff in the above entitle action hereby respectfully requests this Honorable Court grant its permission to amend his Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief, based on the following: 1. On April 20, 2023, the Defendants filed a Request to Revise, indicating their need for revisions to more accurately respond to the allegations of the Plaintiff, 2. On May 26, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Revised Complaint, which provides a comprehensive account of the complete circumstances, including the time periods from January 27, 2023, to the present. The Revised Complaint highlights numerous additional actions orchestrated by the Defendants against him, which were not originally utilized or pleaded in the original Complaint or Request for Temporary injunctive Relief. 3. This amendment is crucial to ensure that all relevant information is presented before the Court, allowing for a fair and complete evaluatian of the Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief. Moreover, no party involved in this case will be aggrieved by the proposed amendment. All parties will have an opportunity to respond to the revised allegations and present their respective arguments, Granting this amendment will serve the interests of justice by ensuring equal treatment and a thorough examination of all relevant facts, which is essential to protect the rights of all interested parties. Based on the above, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grants the Plaintiff permission to amend its Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief. This amendment will enabie a more accurate and comprehensive presentation of the circumstances surrounding thls case, thereby assisting the Court in reaching a just and equitable resolution. Although this case has been set for a hearing, the Defendants will not be prejudiced by this Amendment. A copy of the Proposed Amended Motion for Injunctive Relief is attached hereto. THE PLAINTIFF, fh ael E Festa 690 Main Street Oakville, CF 06779 {203)-463-4723 festa. ael.e@gmail.com CERTIFICATION | hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was electronically transmitted by email, fax or mailed, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of June 2023 ta: James H Golicz esq GORDON & REES LLP 9S Glastonbury Boulevard Suite 206 Glastonbury, CT 06033 Jgolicz@grsm.com THE PLAINTIFF, Michael E Festa 690 Main Street Oakville, CT 06779 (203}-463-4723 festa.michael.e@gmail.com DOCKET NO: UWY-CV23-6068206-S RETURN DATE 01/24/2023 SUPERIOR COURT MICHAEL FESTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY TOWN OF WATERTOWN WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; and WATERTOWN POLICE CHIEF BERNEGGER, In his official capacity June 8, 2023 AMMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Pursuant to CT Practice Book § 17-41 the Plaintiff in the above captioned action hereby moves the this Honorable Court grant a Pretiminary injunction Restraining and Enjoining the Defendant Town of Watertown, Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Berenger, their agents, servants, and or employees from ordering or requiring the Plaintiff to Release Motor Vehicles towed by Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat, § 14-145, or by interjecting In the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 {b) (b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145, by specifically demanding that the Plaintiff accept an open Title, and/ or a Title and Bil of Sale, and/or the release of a vehicle with an active registration to someone other than the registered owner that held an open Title and/ or a Title and Bill of Sale, and/or a simple auto finance agreement listing individuals name and corresponding VIN number of the subject vehicle, and/or in the cases of Rental Cars to someone other than the owner or the authorized representative or face personal arrest for larceny for the reasons set forth below and in the attached Memorandum of Law. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1. Plaintiff, Michael Festa, is the sole member and the managing member of Myhoopty.com LLC, a used car dealer authorized to do nonconsensual towing in the State of Connecticut. The Plaintiff is also a bailee of motor vehicles towed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 {b) (b}, which are in the care, custody, and control of Myhoopty.com LLC. Myhoopty.com LLC is a Connecticut Limited Liability Corporation that had, by Resolution, adopted an Operating Agreement. The Operating Agreement outlines the structure, management, and operation of a Limited Liability Company {LLC}. The purpose of the operating agreement is to establish the rights and responsibilities of the members, as well as to provide a framework for the operation of the LLC and in this case, specifically that of Myhoopty.com LLC. In accordance with Paragraph 5. Powers of Member (iii), “the Manager shall have the right to file suit on behalf of the company in its name. However, the Managing Member shail also have the right to file suit on behalf of the company in their own name, and any and all proceeds from such suit shall be given to the company. 3. The Plaintiff maintains a Commercial General Liability Policy (CGL) for his business operations, but the CGL does not provide satisfactory coverage for the care, custody, and control exposure created by a bailee to a bailor. Defendant Town of Watertown is a municipality located in Litchfield County, Connecticut. Defendant Watertown Police Department is the Police Department for the Defendant Town of Watertown. Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Sernegger is the Chief of Police for the Defendant Watertown Police Department There have been controversies between the Plaintiff and the Defendants Tawn of Watertown, Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger since May 8, 2015, subject to and highlighted in CT Civil Case UWY-CV21-6062791-S. 8. The basis of this lawsuit stems from threats of arrest made by the defendants, specifically agents, servants, employees and representatives of the defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Town of Watertown Police Chief, Joshua Bernegger. These threats were directed towards the Plaintiff, in his individual capacity, regarding the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 {b) (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145. The actions and conduct of the defendants have directly affected and implicated the personal rights and liabilities of the Plaintiff, necessitating this legal action in his own name. On or about April 20, 2023 the Defendants filed a Request for the Plaintiff to Revise his complaint to “request that the Plaintiff revise the Complaint to specify how each Count relates to a specific Defendant”. 10 On or about May 26, 2023, the Plaintiff revised his complaint. 11 As recent as May 12, 2023 a Watertown Folice Sergent required the Plaintiff to Release a 2017 Maserati to someone other than the registered owner after that person presented a Bank Statement with his name and the corresponding VIN Number to the vehicle. The vehicle had no recorded lien, pusuant to CGS 42a-9-303 “Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title. The actual lienholder, which was recorded on DMV Records, and which is not the company listed on the Bank Statement the Sergent directed us to accept as “proof of ownership” is actively looking for that vehicle. 12. This Amended Motion for Temporary Injunctive Relief more accurately addresses the Revised Complaint while considering the interests of justice and the efficient adjudication of ail claims and controversies, 13. After the Plaintiff served the Writ, Summons, and Complaint against the Defendants, the Defendants, through their agents, began the creation of a manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff. The campaign included personally attacking the Plaintiff individually by interjecting in the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b} (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn, Gen, Stat, § 14-145, by specifically demanding that the Plaintiff accept an open Title, and/ or a Title and Bill of Sale, and/or the release of a vehicle with an active registration to someone other than the registered owner that held an open Title and/ or a Title and Bill of Sale, and/or a simple auto finance agreement listing individuals name and corresponding VIN number of the subject vehicle, and/or in the cases of Rental Cars to someone other than the owner or the authorized representative or face personal arrest for larceny. 14. The manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertawn Police Chief Joshua Bernegger by interjecting personally against the Plaintiff in the Release pursuant te Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b} (b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.cam LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 had and continues to have the potential of exposing the Plaintiff to a Criminal and Civil Tort Liability by forcing the Plaintiff to violate State Statue under the threat of personal arrest by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger of the Plaintiff. 15. The Plaintiff, in an attempt to defuse this manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger by interjecting in the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145, caused the Plaintiff on March 15, 2021, ta seek approval by the Department of Motor Vehicles of certain Release Procedures to address the “constructed concerns” of the Defendants. (See Attached Schedule A) 16. In response to the Plaintiff's request for approval, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, by letter, dated March 25, 2021; advised tie Plaintiff that he was expected to “abide by current towing statues (e.g., 14-145, at. Seq. and 14-150) to release vehicles Towed by Myhaopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn, Gen. Stat. § 14-145. (See Attached Schedule B) 17, The Plaintiff, in an attempt to defuse this manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger by interjecting in the Release pursuant to Cann. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b} (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant te Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145, caused the Plaintiff on March 23, 2021, to send the Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger certain Release Procedures to address the *constructed concerns" of the Defendants. (See Attached Schedule C} 18. In response to the Plaintiff's letter, the Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger, by letter, dated May 10, 2021; advised the Plaintiff in part that the release policies contradicted CGS 145 {(b) (b) to release vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145. (See Attached Schedule D) 19. The manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal Persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown 4 Police Chief Joshua Bernegger through their agents to interject in the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) {b} of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 continued, becoming increasingly aggressive, burdensome, and a consumer of vast amounts of time energy and at a great emotional cost for the Plaintiff. 20. As a result of the actions of the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger and their agents, the Plaintiff has suffered economic damages and has suffered irreparable emotional and financial injury, harm, and public goodwill. 21 The campaign by the Defendant Town of Watertown, the Defendant Watertown Police Department, and the Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger through their agents, was in whole ar in part constructed to place the Plaintiff in a false light by causing him to violate State Statue under the threat of personal arrest with the purpose of leveraging a positive position as defendants in the other Case in which he is a Co-Piaintiff. ; 22. The actlons of the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger caused the Plaintiff to suffer significant reputational harm because he was forced to violate State Statue under the threat of arrest in contradiction to the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 thereby damaging his goodwill, standing and reputation within the community. 23 The Defendant Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief joshua Bernegger actions were intentional, and they knew or should have known that their actions would piace the Plaintiff in a false light, cause the Plaintiff to suffer significant reputational harm, damage his goad will, standing and reputation within the community, and cause him great emotiona/ harm and business harm, As a result of the Defendant Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger’s actions, the Plaintiff has suffered significant emotional distress and financial harm and is entitled to damages as a result. 24 The Plaintiff after unsuccessfully being able to mediate or prevent the further escalation of this manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff by the Defendants Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department, and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger , sought a declaratory ruling from the State of Connecticut States 5 Ethics Commission. The States Ethics Commission notified the Plaintiff by letter stating it lacked jurisdiction over the matter. (See Attached Schedule E) 25 At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff continued to attempt to resolve the personal attacks against the Plaintiff in the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Conn, Gen, Stat. § 14-145. with various representatives, agents and servants of the Defendant Town of Watertown, Town of Watertown Police Department and Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger , imploring no interjection or deprivation of his Statutory Rights, but to no avail. 26. On September 28, 2022, during a meeting with Defendant Watertown Police Chief toshua Bernegger, the Plaintiff discussed case law and on the same day emailed Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger supporting the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b) (b} vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LEC pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145., which defines “owner” as any person having title to a motor vehicle. 27. Directly after that meeting, the manufactured crisis in the form of a campaign of personal persecution against the Plaintiff regarding the Release pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145 (b} (b) of vehicles Towed by Myhoopty.com LLC pursuant to Cenn, Gen. Stat. § 14-145. the Defendant Town of Watertown, acting in concert with the Defendant Watertown Police Department and Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger, continued to escalate the relentless interjection by personally attacking the Plaintiff, of civil matters in a manner so intense, any reasonable person would take offense to such political actions and police abuse of discretionary authority, both of which were and continue to be contrary to public policy and legislative intent. 28. As a result of the actions of the Defendants and their employees, servants and agents, the Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer econamic damages and has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable emotional, financial injury, harm, and public goodwill. FACTS 29. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-165 Definitions (6) describes Owner as “a person, other than a lienholder, having the property in or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest by another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security,” 30. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-169 provides when a Certificate is Required “(a) Except as provided in section 14-166, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all motor vehicles at the time of initial registration or when a change of registration is required under the provisions of section 14-16 by reason of a sale for consideration.” 31. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-169 further provides that “(c) The commissioner shall note on the face of the registration of each vehicle for which a certificate of title has been issued a statement to that effect”. 32. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14- 171 provides the manner, methad and forms that the Application fora Certificate of Title require, including but not limited to “{a) The application for 2 certificate of title of a vehicle in this state shal! be on a form prescribed by the commissioner and contain information provided by the owner or acquired through one or more databases used by the commissioner. Such application shall include: (1) The name, residence and mail address of the owner;” 23. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-173 provides for the after effect of the Issuance of the Certificate “(a) The commissioner shall file each application received and, when satisfied as to its genuineness and regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title, shall issue a certificate of title of the vehicle. (b) The commissioner shall maintain at his central office a record of all certificates of title issued by him: (1) Under a distinctive title number assigned to the vehicle; (2) under the identification number of the vehicle; (3) alphabetically, under the name of the owner; and, in the discretion of the commissioner, by any other method he determines.” 34 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14- 174 provides for Information in Certificate. Prima facie evidence {a) Each certificate of title issued by the commissioner shail contain: (1) The date issued; (2) the name and address of the owner; (3} the names and addresses of any lienhalders, in the order of priority as shown on the application or, if the application is based on a certificate of title, as shown on the certificate; {4} the title number assigned to the vehicle; (5) a description of the vehicle including, so far as the following data exists, its make, model, identification number, type of body, number of cylinders, whether new or used, and, if a new vehicle, the date of the first sale of the vehicle for use; (6) the mileage reading as shown on the application; and {7} any other data the commissioner prescribes. 35. Cann. Gen. Stat. § 14-145b. references the Storage and release of motor vehicles that have been towed or rendered immovable states (b} When a vehicle has been towed or removed pursuant to sections 14-145 to 14-145¢, inclusive, it shall be released to its owner, a lending institution or a person authorized by the owner or lending institution to regain possession, upon demand, provided the demand is made between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday or at a reasonable time an Saturday, Sunday or holidays and the owner or authorized person presents proof of registration and pays the costs of towing or removal and of storage. 36. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-1(a)(60} defines "owner" as any person having title to a motor vehicle. 37 Section 246 1 (74), the definition of “registration” includes the Certificate of Motor Vehicle Registration and the number plates or plates used in cannection with such registration”. 38. Individuals that do not comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-145b, do not have a Statutory Right to gain possession of a Motor Vehicle that was towed pursuant te Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-66. 39. The Defendant Town of Watertown, the Defendant Watertown Police Department and the Defendant Watertown Police Chief Joshua Bernegger or their agents do not have Statutory Authority to determine and or record ownership of a Motor Vehicle that do not comply with Conn, Gen. Stat. § 14-145b. 40. The Watertown Police Department's incorrect interpretation of a statute is causing Plaintiff significant irreparable harm, including fear of arrest or prosecution, loss of income and opportunities, damage to reputation, and severe emotional distress. Specifically, the Defendants are giving the Plaintiff a choice of either following State Statue and facing arrest and/or prosecution or avoiding the threat of arrest and/or prosecution for violating a State statute. This has created a significant amount of stress and anxiety and has had a chilling effect on Plaintiff's exercise of his Constitutional Rights. Additionally, this harm has jed to the loss of income and loss business opportunities, damage to Plaintiff's reputation, and significant and severe emotional duress. 41 The threat of arrest or prosecution for violating State Statutes governing the Release of Motor Vehicles towed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14 -145 et seq has damaged the Plaintiff's reputation in the community, even if Plaintiff is ultimately vindicated in court. This damage to reputation can have long-lasting effects on Plaintiff's personal and professional life, including potential harm to Plaintiff's ability to obtain future employment or other business opportunities. Furthermore, the fear of arrest or prosecution, combined with the other forms of harm listed above, has caused Plaintiff significant and severe emotiona! duress that cannot be easily quantified or compensated with money. This emotional harm ts not easily reversible and could have long-lasting effects on Plaintiff's mental health and well-being, requiring ongoing medical treatment. 42 Given the urgency of the situation and the potential for angoing harm, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court grant a preliminary injunction to prevent the Watertown Police Department from continuing to threaten Plaintiff with arrest or prosecution for following State statute. Such an injunction would help to alleviate Plaintiff's fear of arrest or prosecution, prevent further loss of incame and opportunities, and protect Plaintiff's reputation, emotional well-being and Constitutional Rights as fully set forth in the attached Memorandum of Law and Affidavit. THE PLAINTIFF, Michael E Festa 690 Main Street Oakville CT 06779 Office: (203) 463-4723 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED/TESTIMONY REQUIRED Schedule A Myhoopty.com 1LC — U82607 690 Main Street Oakville, CT 06779 Telephone: 203-528-0324 Facsimile: 860-540-1063 March 15, 2021 ‘ ‘on: inner of Motor Vehicles agtbiur: & ve of Cararecticat Deparincal of Merer Vehicles: GD) State Street Wethersfield, CF (6081 Dear Cummissioner Magubane. The purpose of this letter #5 to tequest formal adoption of the following procedure for the Release of Motor Vehiwles, wich have been impounied a st result of a non-consensual tow by our firm. My hovpty.ca! .C eontinaes to grow in the Private Property enforcement aspect of towing. which is auhorized pursuant 1a CC 5 14-145 Section 3. AAs a result, we have and continue to recover stolen vehicles. On several occasions, these vehicles were par Motan. days and weeks aft : the impoundment. On one specific occasion, the person who had the stolen vehicie in pis pussessta empted te rely ve it, Qn another occasion, a vehicle sat in our impoundment for several months whee it was epurieil stolen ine ate juristiction that was notified pursuant to the aforementioned Title Law and Subsevtion newer zniered the: notification in te NMVTIS (National Motor vehicle Title Information System. which as yor are avaire. tg ad protect coulsumers [rum Dieud and unsafe vehicles and to kvep stolea vehicles fram being zesolil. We have at accel ai wpliek in fabricecenl und counterfeit temporary plates, ‘Asa result, sur Birra requests wo have the following forrually accepted ax our siandardin place. Bs required for Release af a Mator Vehicle: t, A valid Registration alang with the Motor Vehicle bearing said plate, or 22 The sanic owner: pip documents required for Registration of a Motor Vehicle in the State 0.4 ater Vite and accompanying supplenents verifying chain of ownership. One standard fas always cen the above. Often times however, there is 5 segment of the population vs hice kes say ei guimentative with our Rel ise Requirements which adds additional labor to our company, Ihe DMY by liliny congplainis, and Molice Juri ictions; all of which we believe is un-necessary. We now farmaliy reyues) the Department of Motor Vehicle approve this request as we believe by formally adapting: wis standard. the vehicle wil! pltunately be retumed to the rightful owner and the standard is cut and dry, nun bh bike the alterlwurs release fee that wa: wthotized by your office on October 1, 2020. IF you should need to conuser ine my direct line is (203) - 463 — 4723. Respectfully, RECEIVED Myboupgycom LLC hal B AIS Mon TOR VEHICLES vy ie event S$ OFFICE NGCOEN: syPi 1 Bewniia Schehule & 8. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES 60 State Street, Wethersfield, CT 0616! Btip://et.gov/dmy ae Some sce March 25, 2021 Myheoopty.com LLC 690 Main St Oakville, CT 06779 Re: Release of Motor Vehictes for Non-Consensual Tows Dear Michael Festa, Thank you for contacting the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Your request has been reviewed by our Legal Department and we provide the following reply: The DMV Commissioner cannot approve your ‘procedures’, We also remind you that you must abide by current towing statutes (¢.g., 14-145, et. Seq. and 14-150) and all applicable regulations. If you seek advice on the law and regulations as they are written, you should contact your own attorney for guidance. Thankyou, 1O} iné Dominique rogram Coordinator Dealers and Repairers Unit cc. DMV Commissioner’s Office encl; Initial Request Seat Belts Do Save Lives Additionally, we believe the Departments interference has & continues to undermine our ability to meet our contractual obligations to ertforce the parking regulations of the complexes in the toughest neighborhoods due to repeated bad judgement calls of the Watertown Police Department. This cmboldens some peopleto assume the right to breakrules. Las well as my staffhave been subjected to violence and outbursts. This violence and outbursts have been supported by these individuals using the Watertown Police Department as leverage in a Civil dispute. This subsequently places the complex representatives, our employees, and the Watertown Police in which respond, at an un-necessary risk. It also places the Town atan un-necessary liability. This should be highly disturbingto amy reasonable person or entity. To avoid un-necessary civil liability under HB6004 to you, and/or our fine officers that haye earned our respect, please advise them of our policy and train them to not engage in matters that are Civil in nature at cur facility. Our office has no interest whatsoever in the Watertows PoliceDepartment arbitrating civil calls at our facility. Our Attomeys utilize the American Arbitration Association on our behalf for that purpose. Notwithstanding the above, should the Watertown Police Department decide to conduct a criminal investigation of Myhoopty.com LLC or its employees, please contact Attomey Peter C Bowman at 203-562-0900 or Attorney John Kaloidis 203-597-0010 as they are our representatives in such matters and could advise your department accordingly. Respectfully, Myhoopty.com LLC B Ce: file Attorney Peter C Bowman, Attorney John Kaloidis Schebule C Myhcopty.com LLC -U8207 690 Main Street Oakville, CT 06779 Telephone: 203-528-0124 Facsimile: 860-540-1063 Town of Watertown March 23,2025 Police Department 424 French Street Watertown, CT 06795 Attention: Joshua Bernegger Dear Mr Bernegger, As you are aware, multiple disputes, which have been Civil in nature, have caused numerous calls for service by individuals to the Watertown Police Department for service at our facility, whichis private property. The purpose of this letter is to advise you, as a Representativeof the Watertown Police Department, and forewam your employees in writing; of our formal adoption of the following procedure for the Release of Motor Vehicles, which have been impounded as a result of a non-consensual towby ow fim. Documents required to substantiate ownership for Release of a Motor Vehicle: o A valid Permanent Registration along with the Motor Vetiicle bearing said plate (hereinafter referred to as registration), or The same ownership documents required for Registration of a Motor Vehicle in the State of Connecticut, ie Title and accompanying supplements verifying chain of ownership (hereinafter cofeired to as Title Documents). in mirror of the State of Connecticut Department of Maior Vehicles, we do not accept photos or copits of any of the ownership documents, only originals. Acceptable forms of identification to substantiate the person whe is the registrant and or ewner via Titled Bocuments: ° A Valid & Unexpired US or State Government issued form of identification: ie a valid Drivers License, State ID oc US Passport In mirror of the State of Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, we do not accept photos or copies of any of the above, except in cases where the State of Connecticut has issued 4 paper copy, pending the driver receipt of their re- newed license, Furthermore, we will no longer discuss with representatives of the Watertown Police Department matters which are civil and which they do not have jurisdiction over. As you are aware, on June 3, 2020, at the “alleged hearing” that was conducted via zoom, you expressed “great concern” with the number of Police Calls to our Private Propetty for matters that were again Civil im nature. Because of that you should welcome this. ees Schektule D ele x ree pera WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT cA x 195 FRENCH STREET cA — Ey ‘J WATERTOWN, CT 06795 i Ch at 860-945-5200 yaa Joshua N. Bernegger Chief of Police a May 10, 2021 Myhoopty.com LLC Attn: Michael Festa 690 Main Street Oakville, CT 06779 aa RE: Myhoopty.com LLC and Watertown Police Department Dear Mr. Festa: Please be advised that this Department is in receipt of your correspondence dated March 23, 2021 (“Letter”). Your Letter (1) “forewarns” the Watertown Police Department (Department”) of your new policies regarding releasing towed vehicles; (2) claims that you will refuse to cooperate with the Department for matters that you consider “civil:” (3) alleges that the Department supports violence; and (4) threatens to use a House Bill against myself and members of this Department. According to your Letier, Myhoopty.com LLC will only release vehicles upon presentation of a “valid permanent registration along with the motor vehicle bearing said plate” or “the same ownership documents required for Registration of a Motor Vehicle in the State of Connecticut, i.e. Title and accompanying supplements verifying chain of ownership.” Further, it appears you will only accept identification from the “registrant and or owner” which is “valid and unexpired.” Your new policy contradicts Connecticut General Statute §14-145b(b) and Governor Lamont’s Executive Orders, extending identification credentials. A copy of Statute §14-145b(b) is attached here for your convenience: (b) When a vehicle has been towed or removed pursuant to sections 14-145 to 14-145c. inclusive. it shall be released to its owner. a lending institution or a person authorized by the owner or lending institution to regain possession, upon demand, provided the demand is made between the hours of 8:60 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday throu Friday or at a reasonable time on Saturday, Sunday or holidays and the owner or authorized person presents proof of registration and pays the costs of towing or removal and of storage. Insofar as your letter states that you will refuse to cooperate with the Department for matters that you consider “civil,” I must caution you that if the Watertown Police Department Teceives a call to your establishment, we will, in the interest of proper police policy, continue to Sears rargy WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT eyes Pata WA A rr 195 FRENCH STREET 4 EN aS a WATERTOWN, CT 06795 -. Co asi 860-945-5200 Joshua N. Bernegger Chief of Police dispatch officer(s). We expect that, in the interest of being a good corporate citizen, you will cooperate with the officer(s) on scene. The on-scene officer(s) will ultimately determine whether a matter is purely civil, and that determination will control the on-scene disposition of the case, subject to later review. To the extent that you claim that you and your staff have been subjected to violence and outbursts, 7 would strongly urge that you contact the Department if any such interactions should occur. Self-help in those situations is seldom the best course of action. Regarding the claims, allegations, and threais in the remainder of your letter, this Department categorically denies them. The Department will in all cases act in accordance with longstanding Departmental policies. Regarding the police tow list, please be advised that the Watertown Police Commission has reinstated MyHoopty.com to the Town of Watertown Towing List for the limited purpose of receiving the revised Regulations and Procedures for Governing Police Towing of Certain Motor Vehicles (“Regulations”), and the opportunity to voluntarily apply to the new Towing List under these revised Regulations. The revised Regulations will be sent by the Police Commission to al! businesses on the Towing List along with an application. Regards, Joshua N. “y megger Chieflof Police Watertown Police Department Schedule € STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF STATE ETHICS -- BEFORE THE CITIZEN’S ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD In the matter of the petition fora declaratory ruling of: § § § No. § (Assigned by OSE} Michael E Festa Petitioner § P ION FOR DECLARATORY RULING Michael E Festa Petitions the Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board to issue a declaratory ruling in this matter, The faclual background of the issue is as follows: Note: if you require additions space you may attach separate pages wal ay supperthig docmicetation to the pettian, This Petition is filed regarding release of a Motor Vehicle towed pursuant to CGS 14-145 as Release Authority within accompanying statues are ambiguous lending to an unclear interpretation of what is required for the release of the same, There is a conflict of interpretation between 14-145h, the definition of a “Registration Credential” as referenced in CGS 14-145b, CGS 14-63-37, and 246-1 (74). The statues are contradictory, and do not state if the custodian tower ofa vehicle towed pursuant to CGS 14- 145 (1), (2), (3) is entitled to judge who is the person legally entitled to custody of a towed vehicle, if said person is someone other than the registered owner. Absent this information, Connecticut Towers may be placed in a Tort Liability for the wrongful release of 4 Motor Vehicle. The question upon which Petitioner sacks a ruling is as follows: Note: Fyouraquére additional spnce vor may attach separate pages and any supporting docuatertiticn to the petizon form. 1) Definition of "Registration Credential” including what determines that Registration : Credential ta be Valid. 2) Definition ofa “Credential” as stated ih CGS 14-63-37 3) Declaratory Ruling on whatis considered a valid registration for purposes of releasing a vehicle as quoted in CGS 246-1-(74} 4) Declaratory Ruling on if the custodian tower ofa vehicle towed pursnantto CGS 14- 145 (3), (2), (3) is entitled to judge who is the person legally entitled to custody ofa towed vehicle, if said person is someone other than the registered owner. Phone (860) 263-2400 Fax (860) 263-2402 143 Capito) Avcnwy, Suite 1200 - Harrfard, Connecticut 06106 ww wt goiel liios sla Equal Gnportininy Suyptayer Petitionfar Declaratory Ruling Page 2 af 3 Petitioner's position with respect.to the question is as follows: Note: [fyou require additional space you muy attach separste pages sed aay supporting documentation 10 the petition form. Questions 1&2 A Registration Cradentlal Is the ottly valid document as an ownership credential witen the registration is made with the Department of Motar Vehicle Registry and is the only wayte establish ownership under Connecticut Law. If an owner does not comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-16 by registering a certificate of title thet had been transferred to them with the department of motor vehictes, the owner fails to establish that they are, in fact, the "owner" of the Vehicle; therefore, they would lack standing to redeem a vehicle from a tower's custody, Question 3 An expired registration is a valid credential as the owner's vehide, being unregistered by virtue of the expired registration, could not be lawfully operated on the public highways, however the ownership of sald vehicle did not end with the expiration of the registration credentials, onty the rightto operate that vehicle on Connecticut Highways has terminated, Question 4 The custodian tower of a vehicle towed pursuant to CGS 14-145 (1), (2b (3) ts entitled to judge who is the person legally entitled to custedy of a towed vehicle, if said person is someone other than the registered owner, Petitioner’s argument (if any) in support of his or her position (with such legal citations as are considered appropriate) is as follows: Nato: Ifyou require additionot svace you may attach sapanate payres end oy sapportiag documentationto tie petition forut. [ Hiestion 1. Gadbout v. Price-Bekech, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 402, 2012 WL595490 The court found, inter alia, that the owner did not comply with Conn. Gan. Stat. § 14-16 by registering a cartificata of title that had bean transferred to him with the department of motor vehicles. Therefore, ha failed to establish that he was, in fact, the “owner” of the vehicle. State v. Smale The registration certificate is for purpose of identification and revenue. In the contextof vehicle ownership, our courts have noted that while vehicle registration and title are the clearest indica of ownership; see Budris v, Allstate insurance Company, supra, 44 Conn.App. 58 {noting persuasive evidentiary value of vehicle registration and tite recards [n establishing ownership); tion 1-4 Central Auto & Transport v Luxury Limo Bux, ELC 2069 Conn. Super LEXIS 2420 Phows (860) 263-2408 Fax (860) 263-2402 163 Capitol Ayonua, Sulta 1200- Hartford, Connection 06106. ue Euat Dppormty Epler Petition for Declaratory Rating Page 3 af 3 General Statutes § 14-145 ef seq provides thai if a vehicle is towed pursuant to the statue the towing company is to release the car only upon verification of the owner's registration and after recelpt of payment for the towing and storage costs. The rights and obligations of Myhaopty.com LLC are governed by General Statutes § 14-145 et seg. provides that if a vehicle is towed pursuant to the statue the towing company is to release the car only upon verification of the owner's registration and after receipt of payment for the towing and storage costs. Wherefore, petitioner requests that the Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board grant this petition and issue a declaratory ruling in this matter. _— k —— joner’s Signaty re bine 15,2022 Date 690 Main Street Matling Address Oakville, CT 06779 City, State, Zip Code 203-463-4723 Daytime Phone No. Deliver or Mail bo: Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board Office of State Ethics 165 Capitol Avenue, Suite 1200 Hartford, CT 06106 Phone (880) 263-2400 Fax (860) 263-2402 165 Capitol Avcauc. Sustc |200—Hartfasel Connecticut 06] 06 An Equal a ‘Enployer DOCKET NO: UWY-CV23-6068806-S RETURN DATE 01/24/2023 SUPERIOR COURT MICHAEL FESTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY TOWN OF WATERTOWN WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; and WATERTOWN POLICE CHIEF BERNEGGER, In his official capacity June8s, 2023 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCTION The Plaintiff in the above captioned matter respectfully files the attached Affidavit pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-471 (b) in support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. THE PLAINTIFF,