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  • Trojan Maritime Inc. v. Tpg Sixth Street Partners, Llc, F/K/A Tpg Special Situations Partners, Llc Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Trojan Maritime Inc. v. Tpg Sixth Street Partners, Llc, F/K/A Tpg Special Situations Partners, Llc Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Trojan Maritime Inc. v. Tpg Sixth Street Partners, Llc, F/K/A Tpg Special Situations Partners, Llc Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Trojan Maritime Inc. v. Tpg Sixth Street Partners, Llc, F/K/A Tpg Special Situations Partners, Llc Commercial - Contract document preview
						
                                

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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK --------------------- ---------------- X : TROJAN MARITIME INC., : IndeX No.: 655978/2016 : Plaintiff, : Motion Seq. No. 005 : - against - : : : TPG SIXTH STREET PARTNERS, LLC, f/k/a : TPG SPECIAL SITUATIONS PARTNERS, LLC : : Defendant. - - ------ _ _ ---- - -_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ ------------ X DEFENDANT TPG SIXTH STREET PARTNERS, LLC'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF TROJAN MARITIME INC.'S CROSS-MOTION FELICELLO & MELCHIONNA LLP Rosanne E. Felicello, Esq. Zofia H. Rubens, Esq. 1330 Avenue of the Americas, 12th Floor New York, NY 10019 Tel: (212) 400-6920 Attorneys for Defendant TPG Sixth Street Partners, LLC 1 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 TABLEOFCONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................... 11 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT......................................................................... 1 ........................................ BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT FACTS.......................................................... 2 ARGUMENT.............................................................................................. 3 .............................. I. Further discovery would not give rise to a triable issue of fact, justifying delaying determination of the TSSP's motion for summary .44 II. Trojan has failed to demonstrate that ithas made reasonable attempts to discover facts which itargues may give rise to a triable issue.................... 9 CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 11 I 2 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Bailey v. New York City Transit Authority, 270 A.D.2d 156, 704 N.Y.S.2d 582, 2000 N.Y. Slip (1st Op. 02770 Dept. 2000).................................................................................. .66 (2nd Cruz v. Otis Elevator Co., 238 A.D.2d 540 Dept. 1997)........................................ 7, 8 (13t Global Mins. & Metal Corp. v. Holme, 35 A.D.3d 93, 824 N.Y.S. 2d 210 Dept. 2006)....... 8 (3rd Fairbanks Co. v. Simplex Supply Co., 126 A.D.2d 882, 511 N.Y.S.2d 171 Dept. 1987)...... 4 (3rd Fleischman v. Peacock Water Co., 51 A.D.3d 1203, 858 N.Y.S.2d 421 Dept. 2008)..........7 .. Fulton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 A.D.3d 380, 788 N.Y.S.2d 349, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 00203 (1st Dept. 2005)............................................................................................... 6 Heritage Hills Soc., Ltd. v. Heritage Development Group, Inc. 56 A.D.3d 426, (2nd 867 N.Y.S.2d 149 Dept. 2008).......................................................................... .77 (3rd Ingalsbe v. Chicago Ins. Co., 287 A.D.2d 939, 731 N.Y.S.2d 782 Dept. 2001)............... 10 (2nd Kennerly v. Campbell Chain Co., 133 A.D.2d 669, 519 N.Y.S.2d 839 Dept. 1987)......... 10 (2nd Lambert v. Bracco, 18 A.D.3d 619, 795 N.Y.S.2d 662 Dept. 2005)............................ .66 (2nd Plotkin v. Franklin, 179 A.D.2d 746, 579 N.Y.S.2d 123 Dept. 1992).......................... 10 (4th Resetarits Const. Corp. v. Olmsted, 118 A.D.3d 1454, 988 N.Y.S.2d 797 Dept. 2014)...... 9 (3rd Saha v. Record, 307 A.D.2d 550, 762 N.Y.S.2d 693 Dept. 2003)............................... 3 (4th Wright v. Shapiro, 16 A.D.3d 1042, 791 N.Y.S.2d 799 Dept. 2005)............................ 9 II 3 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ("Plaintiff" "Trojan" Under the law of the case, Plaintiff Trojan Maritime Inc.'s or "Trojan") breach of contract claim is limited to the extent any of the $150,000 transferred by Trojan was ("Defendant" not used by Defendant TPG Sixth Street Partners, LLC's or "TSSP") for the intended purpose stated in the Term Sheet, i.e.to cover the costs and fees of legal, tax, technical and other professional advisers incurred in progressing the transaction. The authenticated invoices submitted in support of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment prove that the entire amount of the advanced $150,000 was used to help cover due diligence costs. Even if,arguendo, the Court did not limit Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, further discovery would not give rise to any triable issue of fact. Plaintiff argues that itneeds to depose a third-party witness as to the parties' intent with regards to the pre-funded deposit and the parties as to their understanding of parties' the Term Sheet and itsrevisions. Even assuming, arguendo, that the intent and understanding of the Term Sheet provisions are at issue, the documents that have been produced by both parties and which have been provided to the court as evidence in support of TSSP's motion for summary judgment, show that Trojan was both aware that the $150,000 due diligence funds were being spent and even approved the expenses. Further discovery, resulting in delay of determination of the TSSP's summary judgment motion, would not reveal any relevant and material evidence or raise a triable issue of fact. Moreover, Plaintiff had many opportunities to conduct discovery, including depositions, and was made aware well in advance that TSSP was planning to file a motion for summary judgment and waited until almost three weeks after receiving TSSP's motion for summary judgment to request additional time to take depositions to respond to the motion. Plaintiff should not be allowed to further delay resolution of the dispute 1 4 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 and cause additional unnecessary expenses based solely on a mere hope that further discovery may reveal the existence of a triable issue of fact. BACKGROUNDOFRELEVANTFACTS Plaintiff commenced this action on or about November 15, 2016, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. On or about March 15, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss all four causes of action. On April 25, 2017, after an oral hearing, Honorable Eileen A. Rakower, J.S.C dismissed three out of four causes of action and granted Plaintiff leave to re-plead itsbreach of contract claim consistent with the decision. See, Affirmation of Rosanne Felicello, Esq. submitted in opposition to Trojan's cross-motion ("Felicello Aff."), Exhibit A. Additionally, Hon. Rakower so-ordered the stipulation that limited discovery to the exchange of listed documents. See, Felicello Aff., Exhibit D. On or about March 30, 2017 Trojan served interrogatories on TSSP which TSSP responded to on or about April 19, 2017. On or about March 30, 2017 Trojan served document requests on TSSP to which TSSP responded in May, 2017. Trojan's counsel issued a subpoena on a third-party witness on or about March 30, 2017 and then on or about August 15, 2017. See, Felicello Aff., Exhibit C and Exhibit 3 to Trojan's subject cross-motion. On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed its Amended Complaint. On July 10, 2017 Defendant filed itsAnswer to the Amended Complaint with Counterclaim. On or about August 23, 2017, Trojan served on TSSP a second set of discovery demands virtually identical to the initial set of interrogatories and document requests. TSSP objected to responding to these additional requests and Trojan has not sought further responses from TSSP. On November 28, 2017, counsel for the parties attended a compliance conference. At the conference the parties confirmed that all document discovery has been completed. See, Felicello 2 5 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 Aff., Exhibit E. Counsel for Defendant informed both the Court and counsel for Plaintiff that Defendant was planning to file a motion for summary judgment imminently. In response to this information, Justice Crane remarked that she would set depositions to be due in April, so that the Court would have the opportunity to decide the summary judgment motion before depositions were noticed. An additional compliance conference was set for February 15, 2018. On December 1, 2017, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 19, 2017, almost three weeks after TSSP's motion for summary judgment was filed and served, Trojan's counsel requested extension of time to oppose the TSSP's motion for summary judgment as Trojan's counsel urges that depositions need to be conducted. Counsel for Defendant responded that at the compliance conference she informed both Trojan's counsel and the Court that Defendant intended to file a motion for summary judgment imminently and that the Honorable Melissa Crane specifically set the deposition deadline in April, 2018 so that she would have time to decide the motion before the parties take any depositions. Defendant's counsel also said that Trojan's counsel did not state at that time that she intended to take depositions in order to respond to the summary judgment motion. See, Felicello Aff., Exhibit B. ARGUMENT Court has discretion to grant an extension of time "upon such terms as may be just and shown." upon good cause CPLR 2004. Granting extension under CPLR 2004 in the context of summary judgment motion was either dictated by extraordinary circumstances or required establishing merits that would justify granting an extension. See, Saha v. Record, 307 A.D.2d (3rd 550, 762 N.Y.S.2d 693 Dept. 2003) (holding that trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying defendant's request for extension of time to respond to motion for summary judgment which request was based on disruptions to counsel's law practice caused by September 11, 2001 3 6 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 plaintiffs' terrorist attacks and the lead counsel being displaced from his residence in Battery (3rd Park). See, Fairbanks Co. v. Simplex Supply Co., 126 A.D.2d 882, 511 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 Dept. 1987) (holding that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying a continuance to afford defendant an opportunity to prepare for motion for summary judgment when defendant failed to set forth the merits of its defense which would have justified granting an extension of time). Trojan failed to show good cause that would justify delaying determination of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment. I. Further discovery would not give rise to a triable issue of fact, justifying delaying determination of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment. At the April 25, 2017 oral hearing on the TSSP's motion to dismiss the Court held "[a]nd they [Trojan] might have a cause of action for breach of contract if it'sshown that there were insufficient legal expenses, tax, technical and other expenses to use up the 150, in which case, according to what the complaint says, they would have been entitled to a refund of some if 150." not all of the See, Felicello Aff., Exhibit A, at p. 6 (emphasis added). The Court also stated "[a]nd I believe they have a cause of action for breach of contract. ...To the extent that the funds contract." were not depleted as per the See, Felicello Aff., Exhibit A, at p. 8. Therefore, under the law of the case, the only potential breach of contract that can be stated is limited to any balance remaining from the funds advanced for due diligence. Trojan is unable to establish that incurred expenses were less than $150,000. The authenticated invoices submitted in support of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment prove that the entire amount of $150,000, and in fact more, was used for the intended purpose, as stated in the Term Sheet, i.e.to cover the costs and fees of legal, tax, technical and other professional advisers incurred in progressing the 4 7 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 transaction. There is no issue of fact that TSSP used the whole amount of transferred $150,000 to cover the costs and fees of legal, tax, technical and other professional advisers incurred in progressing the transaction. parties' Plaintiff argues that itneeds to depose a third-party witness as to the intent with regards to the pre-funded deposit and the parties as to their understanding of the Term Sheet and parties' its revisions. Even assuming, arguendo, that the intent and understanding of the Term Sheet provisions are at issue, the documents that have been produced by both parties and which have been provided to the court as evidence in support of TSSP's motion for summary judgment, show that Trojan was both aware that the $150,000 due diligence funds were being spent and even approved the expenses. As shown in the TSSP's motion for summary judgment, Trojan decided to transfer $150,000 before a settlement agreement with a third-party was executed, Trojan was on notice of the due diligence expenses, approved the expenses and was aware that the $150,000 was being spent. Trojan argues that "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff has presented 'no evidence to support the interpretation (of the Term Sheet) urged by Plaintiff that once Plaintiff transferred the funds to TSSP they were to be held in escrow until signed.'" and unless the Settlement Agreement was However, TSSP did not state that Trojan presented no evidence, but rather that there is no evidence to support such Plaintiff's interpretation. The language of the Term Sheet does not set a condition precedent to when the funds could be used and does not impose an obligation on TSSP to hold the funds in escrow. Even assuming, arguendo, a condition could be read into the Term Sheet, contrary to established law that terms of an agreement should not be interpreted to impose a condition absent clear and unambiguous language that a condition was intended, Trojan waived the condition by 5 8 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 transferring the funds before the settlement agreement was signed. See, Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of itsMotion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No. 86, at p. 2. Moreover, as indicated above and as shown by the authenticated emails submitted in support of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment, Trojan was aware the funds ittransferred were being used to fund costs incurred in advancing the transaction and itapproved the expenses as they were incurred. Trojan has also failed to provide any evidentiary basis indicating that further discovery may reveal material and relevant evidence justifying delaying determination of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment. "Although determination of a summary judgment motion may be delayed to allow for further discovery where evidence necessary to oppose the motion is unavailable to the opponent (see CPLR 3212[fj), a determination of summary judgment cannot be avoided by a claimed need for discovery unless some evidentiary basis is offered to suggest that discovery may evidence." (2nd lead to relevant Lambert v. Bracco, 18 A.D.3d 619, 620, 795 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 Dept. 2005) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that defendant did not establish that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied pending discovery when defendant failed to provide evidentiary basis to suggest that further discovery may lead to relevant evidence. The court noted that defendant was present during the relevant events and could have submitted his own affidavit); see also,Bailey v. New York City Transit Authority, 270 A.D.2d 156, 157, 704 N.Y.S.2d (1" 582, 583, 2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 02770 Dept. 2000). "A party's mere hope that further discovery will reveal the existence of triable issues of fact is insufficient to delay determination on the issue judgment." (2nd of summary Lambert v. Bracco, 18 A.D.3d 619, 620, 795 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 Dept. 2005) (internal quotations omitted); see also, Fulton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 A.D.3d 380, 381, 788 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 00203 (1st Dept. 2005). "[W]hile summary judgment may 6 9 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 be denied when discovery has not been completed (see CPLR 3212[fj), the nonmoving party must evidence." produce some evidence indicating that further discovery will yield material and relevant (3rd Fleischman v. Peacock Water Co., 51 A.D.3d 1203, 1205, 858 N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 Dept. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). "When the nonmoving party opposing a motion for summary judgment argues that additional discovery is needed ... such an argument is unavailing where the nonmoving party has failed to produce some evidence indicating that further discovery will yield evidence." material and relevant Heritage Hills Soc., Ltd. v. Heritage Development Group, Inc. 56 (2nd A.D.3d 426, 427, 867 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 Dept. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). parties' Trojan states that testimony of the third-party witness concerning the intent with regards to the pre-funded deposit will likely give rise to a triable issue of fact but fails to provide any basis for such belief or hope. Indeed, itis hard to imagine how a third party's view of an agreement could have any bearing on whether the contract has been breached. Nor could a parties' witness's testimony be better evidence than the own emails that have been submitted in support of TSSP's motion. Trojan further states that itintends to depose the parties as to their understanding of the Term Sheet but fails to offer any evidentiary basis suggesting this testimony may reveal relevant and material evidence giving rise to triable issue of fact. In support of its cross-motion for extension, Trojan relies on Cruz v. Otis Elevator Co., (2nd 238 A.D.2d 540 Dept. 1997). In Cruz the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment when defendant submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that itdid not have control over the elevator which failure caused plaintiff to trip and fall and when affidavit of plaintiff's expert merely contained speculative conclusions that upon future examination of elevator and relevant records, he should be able to determine that defendant contributed to elevator's defect, which the Appellate Division held to be insufficient to 7 10 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 defeat motion for summary judgment. Id at 540. The Appellate Division also rejected the argument that summary judgment was premature because discovery had not occurred. Id. at 540. "A party who claims ignorance of critical facts to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [fj)must firstdemonstrate that the ignorance is unavoidable and that reasonable issue." attempts were made to discover the facts which would give rise to a triable Id. at 540. The Appellate Division held that plaintiff failed to offer any evidence why she did not examine elevator in question or any pertinent records and did not indicate what efforts were made to conduct that discovery before defendant's motion. Id. at 540-541. Here Trojan fails to offer any evidence as to why itdid not depose the third party witness or seek to compel the subpoena that itissued to the third party. Indeed, Trojan has stillnot issued any notices to depose TSSP. Trojan also cites to Global Mins. & Metal Corp. v. Holme, 35 A.D.3d 93, 824 N.Y.S. 2d (1st 210 Dept. 2006). In Global, plaintiff argued that the summary judgment motion should not have been granted because questions of fact exist as to whether defendant misrepresented material facts. Id. at *99. The Appellate Division held that even though plaintiff may be correct that questions of fact exist as to alleged misrepresentations, the summary judgment motion was properly granted as the evidence establishes that plaintiff's reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable, and itfailed to fulfill itsduty to investigate. Id. at *99. Even though plaintiff argued that itmade several unsuccessful attempts to depose defendants, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff's CPLR 3212(f) request as plaintiff failed to an essential fact which is unavailable to plaintiff. Id. at 102- identify presently 103. Similarly, even if the parties had different understandings of the Term Sheet, the material fact that Trojan approved the due diligence expenses, as evidenced by the documents in support of TSSP's motion for summary judgment, is not in dispute and is dispositive: Trojan was aware 8 11 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 that the funds were being used for due diligence expenses and cannot now demand that the funds be returned. Trojan also refers to CPLR 3212(f). However, "[m]ere hope that somehow the plaintiff will uncover evidence that will prove a case provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212(f) for motion." postponing a determination of a summary judgment Wright v. Shapiro, 16 A.D.3d (4th 1042, 1043, 791 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 Dept. 2005) (quoting Plotkin v. Franklin, 179 A.D.2d (2nd 746, 746, 579 N.Y.S.2d 123 Dept., 1992)). "The opposing party must show that the discovery sought would produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion, and that facts essential to oppose the motion were in the movant's exclusive knowledge and possession and could be discovery." obtained by Resetarits Const. Corp. v. Olmsted, 118 A.D.3d 1454, 1456, 988 — (4th N.Y.S.2d 797, 798-99 Dept. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). As explained above, Trojan fails to show that the additional evidence could be sufficient to defeat TSSP's motion for summary judgment. II. Trojan has failed to demonstrate that it has made reasonable attempts to discover facts which it argues may give rise to a triable issue. Trojan argues that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is premature because the necessary discovery has not yet been conducted. Plaintiff has had many opportunities and.time to conduct discovery, including depositions, and in fact did conduct discovery before the filing of the TSSP's motion for summary judgment. As indicated above, Plaintiff served interrogatories and document requests on Defendant to which Defendant responded. A few months later Plaintiff served a second set of virtually identical interrogatories and document requests. It has been nine months since Trojan's counsel first issued a subpoena to conduct a deposition of the third-party 9 12 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 witness that, Trojan now urges, it needs to defend against Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Trojan states that "reasonable attempts have been made, and are being made, to conduct parties." depositions of the This is not true. Trojan waited almost three weeks after being served with TSSP's motion for summary judgment to indicate that depositions and an attendant adjournment were necessary. And, to date, Trojan has not served any notices of deposition or taken any steps to compel its third party deposition. See, Ingalsbe v. Chicago Ins. Co., 287 A.D.2d 939, (3rd 940, 731 N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 Dept. 2001) (holding that the motion for summary judgment was not premature due to the lack of discovery when plaintiff failed to avail himself of a time interval of several months between court's first decision and defendant's motion for summary judgment during which discovery could have been conducted and when plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that discovery was necessary to obtain facts in the sole possession of the defendant). The fact that Trojan did not depose defendant's representatives is not dispositive. See, (2nd Plotkin v. Franklin, 179 A.D.2d 746, 746, 579 N.Y.S.2d 123, 123 Dept. 1992) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that motion for summary judgment should have been denied because plaintiff did not depose defendant when defendant met her burden of proof on her motion for summary judgment dismissing the action); Kennerly v. Campbell Chain Co., 133 A.D.2d 669, (2nd 670, 519 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 Dept. 1987) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that motion for judgment should have been denied until plaintiff had an to conduct court- summary opportunity ordered depositions when defendant met itsburden of proof on her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint). 10 13 of 14 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/02/2018 06:48 PM INDEX NO. 655978/2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/02/2018 CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons Trojan has failed to demonstrate that good cause exists to grant it extension pursuant to CPLR 2004. Therefore, Trojan's cross-motion should be dismissed in itsentirety. Dated: New York, New York January 2, 2018 Respectfully submitted, FELIC LO & MELCHIO A LLP By: Rosanne E. Felicello, Esq. Zofia H. Rubens. Esq. 1330 Avenue of the Americas, 12th Floor New York, NY 10019 Tel: (212) 400-6920 Attorneys for Defendant TPG Sixth Street Partners, LLC 11 14 of 14