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1 BRIGIT S. BARNES & ASSOCIATES, INC.
BRIGIT S. BARNES, ESQ. CSB #122673
2 ANNIE R. EMBREE, ESQ., OF COUNSEL CSB #208591
3 3262 Penryn Road, Suite 200
Loomis, CA 95650
4 Telephone: (916)660-9555
Facsimile: (916)660-9554
5
Attomeys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs
6 PATTY JOHNSON; JOE TEIXEIRA;
7 OMAR AHMED, JR.; XIN GUO; and
CAROLYN SOARES
8
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
10
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
11
12
PATTY JOHNSON; JOE TEIXEIRA; CASE NO. 34-2016-80002493
13 OMAR AHMED, JR.; XIN GUO;
and CAROLYN SOARES, INDEX AND COPIES OF FEDERAL AND
14 OUT OF STATE AUTHORITIES CITED
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS'
Petitioners and Plaintiffs, OPPOSITIONS TO CITY OF E L K
15
v. GROVE'S DEMURRER AND REAL
16 PARTIES IN INTEREST ELK GROVE
CITY OF ELK GROVE, TOWN CENTER, LP AND HOWARD
17 HUGHES CORPORATION'S
DEMURRER TO VERIFIED AMENDED
Respondent and Defendant. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
18 AND COMPLAINT FOR
ELK GROVE TOWN CENTER, LP; DECLARATORY RELIEF
19 [CRC 3.1113(e)]
HOWARD HUGHES CORPORATION; and
20 DOES 1-20, inclusive,
Date: June 2, 2017
Time: 11:00 a.m.
21 Real Parties in Interest and Department: 24
Defendants. Judge: Hon. Shelleyanne W.L. Chang
22
/ Action Filed: November 23,2017
23 _ Trial Date: Not Set
24 BY FAX
25 TO THE HONORABLE COURT, AND TO COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR
26 RESPONDENT, DEFENDANTS, AND REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HEREIN:
27 Attached are copies of Federal authorities cited by Petitioners/Plaintiffs in support of
28 their oppositions to the demurrers of Respondent/Defendant CITY OF ELK GROVE and Real
PETITIONERS' FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ISO OPPOSITIONS TO dTY'S AND REAL PARTIES'
DEMURRERS TO AMENDED PETITION-COMPLAINT - 1
1 Parties in Interest/Defendants ELK GROVE TOWN CENTER, LP and HOWARD HUGHES
2 CORPORATION to Petitioners/Plaintiffs' Verified Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and
3 Complaint for Declaratory Relief:
4 INDEX
5 CASES:
6 L California v. Cabazon Band ofMission Indians, (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 215
7 2. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes &. Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, (1992)
8 502 U.S. 251,255
9 3. Crest-Dehesd-Granite Hills-Harbison Canyons Subregiiqnal Planning Group v. Acting
Director, Bureau Indian Affairs, 6 miA20S, 216 (20\5)
10
4. Department of Taxation and Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 71
11 (1994)
12
5. Eldee-K Rental Properties, LLC v. DIRECTV, INC., (9* Cir. 2014) 748 F. 3d 943
13
6. Friends ofRoedingParkv. City ofFresno, (2012) 848 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1165 **Also
14 cited in support of Petitioners' Motion for Rehef pursuant to C.C.P. §473
15 7. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, (2017) 187 Wash. 2d 857, 389 P. 3d 569, 573-
16 575
17 8. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner ofInternal Review, 297 U.S. 129,
134(1936)
18
9. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones. (1973) 411 U.S. 145,148-149
19
20 10. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977)
21 11. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, (1975) 532 F.2d 655
22 12. State V. Davis, 773 N.W. 2d 66, 71 -74 (Minn. 2009)
23
13. United States v. County ofHumboldt, (1980) 615 F. 2d 1260
24
14. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)
25
///
26
27 III
28 III
PETITIONERS' FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ISO OPPOSITIONS TO CITY'S AND REAL PARTIES'
DEMURRERS TO AMENDED PETITION-COMPLAINT - 2
STATUTES:
2 Code of Federal Regulations:
3 15. 25 CFR Section 1.4(a)
16. 25 CFR Section 2.6(a)
4 17. 25 CFR Section 2.7, 2.7(c)
18. 25 CFR Section 2.8
5 19. 25 CFR Section 2.9
20. 25 CFR Section 84.002
6
21. 25 CFR Section 151.10(f)
7 22. 25 CFR Section 151.12, 151.12(b), (c), (c)(2)(ii), (c)(2)(iii), (d), (d)(2)
23. 25 CFR Section 151.13
8 24. 25 CFR Section 151.14
9 United States Code:
25. 5 U.S.C. 704
10
26. 18 U.S.C. Section 1162(b)
11 27. 25 U.S.C. Section 465
28. 25 U.S.C. Section 467
12 29. 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1360
13
14 Dated: M a y / _ 2 2017 Respectfully submitted,
TES, INC.,
15 FORNIA^fcAW CORPORATION
16
17 for Petitioners/
18
19
20
21-
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PETITIONERS' FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ISO OPPOSITIONS TO CITY'S AND REAL PARTIES'
DEMURRERS TO AMENDED PETITION-COMPLAINT - 3
The Federal Authorities :within-this~docujnent have :been^^
lodged and will not be part of the scanned^imager- - -^n
NO.l
Califomia v. Cabazon Band of iMission indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083,94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225
reservations. Califomia sought to apply to the Tribes its
107 S.Ct. 1083
statute goveming the operation of bingo games. Riverside
Supreme Court of the United States
County also sought to apply its ordinance regulating
CALIFORNL^ et al., Appellants, bingo, as well as its ordinance prohibiting the playing of
V.
draw poker and other card games. The Tribes instituted
an action for declaratory relief Ln Federal District Court,
CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS et al.
which entered summary judgment for the Tribes, holding
No. 85-1708. that neither the State nor the county had ahy authority
to enforce its gambhng laws within the reservations. The
I
Argued Dec. 9,1986. Court of Appeals afllrmed.
I
Decided Feb. 25,1987. Held:
Indian tribes filed action for declaratory and injunctive 1. Although state laws may be applied to tribal Indians
relief and for damages against county, alleging that county on their reservations **1085 if Congress has expressly
had no authority to apply ordinances regulating bingo and consented. Congress has not done so here either by Pub.L.
prohibiting playing of draw poker and other card games 280 or by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
inside reservations. After state of Califomia intervened, (OCCA). Pp. 1087-1091.
the United States District Court for the Central District of
Cahfomia granted tribes' motion for summary judgment (a) In Pub.L. 280, the primary concem of which
and state and county appealed. The Court bf Appeals, 783 was combating lawlessness on reservations, Califomia
F.2d 900, affirmed. State and county again appealed. The was granted broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses
Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (I) Public Law committed by or against Indians within all Indian country
280 granting state criminal jurisdiction over reservation within the State but more limited, nonregulatory civil
did not authorize enforcement of statute regulating bingo, jurisdiction. When a State seeks to enforce a law within
since statute was a regulatory, rather than criminal law; an Indian reservation under the authority of Pub.L. 280,
(2) application of state and county gambling laws to it must be determined whether the state law is criminal
tribal bingo enterprises was not authorized by Organized in nature and thus fully appUcable to the reservation,
Crime Control Act; and (3) state's interest in preventing or civil in nature and applicable only as it may be
infiltration of tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime relevant to private ciyil litigation in state court. There
did not justify state regulation of such enterprises in light is a fair basis for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
of compelling federal and tribal interests supporting them. California's statute, which permits bingo games to be
conducted only by certain types of organizations under
Ailirmed and remanded. certain restrictions, is not a "criminal/prohibitory" statute
falling within Pub.L. 280's grant pf criminal jurisdiction,
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices but instead is a "civil/regulatory" statute not authorized
O'Connor and Scalia joined. by Pub.L. 280 to be enforced on Indian reservations. That
an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable, (as here) by
*203 criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily
convert it into a criniinal law within Pub.L. 280's meaning.
*202 **1084 Syllabus Pp. 1087-1089.
Appellee Indian Tribes (the Cabazon and Morongo Bands
of Mission Indians) occupy reservations in Riverside (b) Enforcement of OCCA, which makes certain
County, Cal. Each Band, pursuant to its federally violations of state and local gambhng laws violations of
approved ordinance, conducts on its reservation bingo federal criminal law, is an exercise of fedieral rather than
games that are open to the public. The Cabazon Band also state authority. There is nothing in OCCA indicating that
operates a card club for playing draw poker and other card the States are to have any part in enforcing the federal laws
games. The gambling games are open to the public and or are authorized to make arrests on Indian reservations
are played predominantly by non-Indians coming onto the that in the absence of OCCA they could not effect.
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225
Califomia may not make arrests on reservations and thus, Attomey General, Gerald J. Geerlings, Peter H. Lyons,
through OCCA, enforce its gambling laws against Indian and Glenn R Salter.
tiibes. Pp. 1089-1091.
Glenn M. Feldman argued the cause for appellees. With
2. Even though not expressly authorized by Congress, him on the brief were Barbara A. Karshmer and George
state and local laws may be apphed to on-reservation Forrrum.*
activities of tribes and tribal members under certain
* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
circumstances. The decision in this case turns on whether
State of Arizona et al. by Robert K. Corbin, Attorney
state authority is pre-empted by the operation of federal
General of Arizona, Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General,
law. State jurisdiction is pre-empted if it interferes or is
Ian A. Macpherson, Brian McKay, Attomey General of
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected
Nevada, and Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New
in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
Mexico; and for the State of Washington et al. by Kermeth
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. The
O. Eikenberry, Attomey General of Washington, Timothy
federal interests in Indian self-government, including the
R Malone, Assistant Attomey General, .fironjon C. La
goal of encouraging tribal self-sufllciency and economic
Follette. Attomey General of Wisconsin, mA John J.
development, are important, and federal agendes, acting
Kelly, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut.
under federal laws, have sought to implement them by
promoticig and overseeing tribal bingo and gambling Brief of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
enterprises. Such poUcies and actions are of particular Chehalis Indian Tribe et al. by Henry J. Sockbeson and
relevance in this case since the tribal games provide the Stephen V. Quesenberry; for the Jicarilla Apache Tribe et
sole source of revenues for the operation of the tribal al. by Alan R Taradash; for the Oneida Indian Nation
governments and are the major sources of employment of New York by William W. Taylor UI and Christine
for tribal members. To the extent that the State seeks to Nicholson; for the Pueblo of Sandia et al. by L. Lamar
prevent all bingo games on tribal lands while permitting Parrish, Theodore W. Barudin, Michael D. Bustamante,
regulated ofT-reservation games, the asserted state interest and Scott E. Borg; for the San Manuel Band of Mission
in preventing the infiltration of the tribal games by Indians by Jerome L. Levine and David A. Lash; and for
organized crime is irrelevant, and the state and county the Seminole Tribe of Florida et al. by Bruce S. Rogow.
laws are pre-empted. Even to the extent that the State and
county seek to regulate short of prohibition, the liaws are Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Minnesota
pre-empted since the asserted state interest is not sufficient by Hidiert H. Humphrey HI, Attomey General, and James
to escape the pre-emptive force of the federal and tribal M. Schoessler, Assistant Attomey General; for the Pueblo
interests apparent in this case. Pp. 1090-1094. of Laguna et al. by W. Richard West, Jr., Thomas W.
Fredericks, Rodney B. Lewis, Carol L. Barbero, John Bell
783 F.2d 900 (CA 9 1986), afTumed and remanded. Rodney J. Edwards and Art Bunce; and the the TulaUp
Tribe of Washington et al. by Allen H. Sanders.
WHITE, J., deUvered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN. MARSHALL. Opinion
BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, Justice WHITE deUvered the opinion of the Court.
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR and
SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. —. **1086 The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission
Indians, federally recognized Indian Tribes, occupy
reservations in Riverside County, CaUfomia.' Each
Attomeys and Law Finns
Band, pursuant to an *205 ordinance approved by the
Roderick E. Walston, Supervismg Deputy Attomey Secretary of the Interior, conducts bingo games on its
General of Califomia. argued the cause for appellants. reservation. The Cabazon Band has also opened a
With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, card club at which draw poker and other card games
Attomey General, *204 Steve White. Chief Assistant are played. The games are open to the pubUc and
Attomey General, Frederick R Millar, Jr., Supervising are played predominantiy by non-Indians coming onto
Deputy Attorney General, /iu(/o{p/i Corona, Jr., Deputy the reservations. The games are a major source of
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works,
California v. Cabazon Band of IMission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225
employment for tribal members, and the profits are the 1970, 84 Stat. 937, 18 U.S.C. § 1955. We disagree in both
Tribes' sole source of income. The State of Califomia respects.
seeks to apply to the two Tribes Cal.Penal Code Ann.
§ 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). That statute does not entirely |2] [3| In Pub.L. 280, Congress expressly granted six
prohibit the playing of bingo but permits it when the States, including CaUfomia, jurisdiction over specified
games are operated and staffed by members of designated areas of Indian country ^ within the States and provided
charitable organizations who may not be paid for their for the assumption of jurisdiction by other States. In
services. Profits must be kept in special accounts and used
§ 2, Califomia was granted broad criminal jurisdiction
only for charitable purposes; prizes may not exceed $250
over offenses committed by or against Indians within
per game. Asserting that the bingo games on the two
all Indian country within the State. ^ Section 4's grant
reservations violated each of these restrictions, Califomia
of civil jurisdiction was more limited. *208 In
insisted that the Tribes comply vrith state law. Riverside
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102,
*206 County also sought to apply its local Ordinance No.
48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), we interpreted § 4 to grant
558, regulating bingo, as weU as its Ordinance No. 331,
States jurisdiction over private civil Utigation involving
prohibiting the playing of draw poker and the other card
reservation Indians in state court, but not to grant
games.
general civil regulatory authority. Id., at 385, 388-390,
96 S.Ct., at 2109, 2110-2112. We held, therefore, that
The Tribes sued the county in Federal District Court
**1088 Minnesota could not apply its personal property
seeking a declaratory judgment that the county had no
tax within the reservation. Congress' primary concem
authority to apply its ordinances inside the reservations
in enacting Pub.L. 280 was combating lawlessness on
and an injunction against their enforcement. The State
reservations. Id., at 379-380, 96 S.Ct., at 2106-2107. The
intervened, the facts were stipulated, and the District
Act plainly was not intended to effect total assimilation
Court granted the Tribes' motion for summary judgment,
of Indian tribes into mainstream American society. Id, at
holding that neither the State nor the county had
387,96 S.Ct., at 2110. We recognized that a grant to States
any authority to enforce its gambling laws within the
reservations. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations
affirmed, 783 F.2d 900 (1986), the State and the county would result in the destmction of tribal institutions and
appealed, and we postponed jurisdiction **1087 to the values. Accordingly, when a State seeks to enforce a law
hearing on the merits. 476 U.S. 1168, 106 S.Ct. 2888, 90 vrithin an Indian reservation under the authority of Pub.L.
280, it must be determined whether the law is criminal in
L.Ed.2d 975.'' nature, and thus fully appUcable to the reservation under
§ 2, or civil in nature, and appUcable only as it may be
relevant to private civil litigation in state court.
*207 I
The Minnesota personal property tax at issue in Bryan
|1| The Court has consistently recognized that Indian was unquestionably civil in nature. The Califomia bingo
tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their statute is not so easily categorized. Califomia law permits
members and their territory," United States v. Mazurie, bingo *209 games to be conducted only by charitable
419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 and other specified organizations, and then only by their
(1975), and that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and members who may not receive any wage or profit for doing
subordinate to, only the Federal Govenmient, not the so; prizes are limited and receipts are to be segregated
States," Wa.ihingion v. Confederated Tribes of Colville and used only for charitable purposes. Violation of any
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, of these provisions is a misdemeanor. Califomia insists
2081,65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980). It is clear, however, that state that these are criminal laws which Pub.L. 280 permits it to
laws may be appUed to tribal Indians on their reservations enforce on the reservations.
if Congress has expressly so provided. Here, the State
insists that Congress has twice given its express consent: |4| FoUowing its earUer decision in Barona Group of
first in Pub.L. 280 in 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, San Diego
18 U.S.C; § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 ed. and Supp. County. Cal v. Duffy. 694 F.2d 1185 (CA 9 1982), cert.
Ill), and second in the Organized Crime Control Act in
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govemment Works.
Califomia v. Cabazon Band of Mission indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225
denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2091, 77 L.Ed.2d 301 for *211 AppeUees 47-48. Also, as the Court of Appeals
(1983), which also involved the applicabUity of § 326.5 noted, bingo is legally sponsored by many different
of the CaUfomia Penal Code to Indian reservations, the organizations and is widely played in CaUfomia. There is
Court of Appeals rejected this submission. 783 F.2d, at no effort to forbid the playing of bingo by any member of
901-903. In Barona, applying what it thought to be the the pubUc over the age of 18. Indeed, the permitted bingo
civiiycriminal dichotomy drawn in .&o^a/i v. Itasca County, games must be open to the general pubUc. Nor is there any
the Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state Umit on the number of games which eligible organizations
"criminal/prohibitory" laws and state "civil/regulatory" may operate, the receipts which they may obtain from
laws: if the intent of a state law is generaUy to prohibit the games, the number of games which a participant may
certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280's grant of play, or the amount of money which a participant may
criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits spend, either per game or in total. In light of the fact
the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be that Califomia permits a substantial amount of gambling
classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not activity, includiiig bingo, and actuaUy promotes gambUng
authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The through its state lottery, we must conclude that Califomia
shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the regulates rather than prohibits gambUng in general and
State's pubUc poUcy. Inquiring into the nature of § 326.5, bingo in particular. 10
the Court of Appeals held that it was regulatory rather
than prohibitory. ^ This was the analysis employed, with |5] |6] |7] Califomia argues, however, that high
similar results, *210 by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth stakes, unregulated bingo, the conduct which attracts
Circuit in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 organized crime, is a misdemeanor in Califomia and
F.2d 310 (1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. may be prohibited on Indian reservations. But that an
1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982), which the Ninth Circuit otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as
found persuasive. ^ well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into a
criminal law within the meaning of Pub.L. 280. Otherwise,
We are persuaded that the prohibitory/regulatory the distinction between § 2 and § 4 of that law could
distinction is consistent **1089 with Bryan's easily be avoided and total assimilation permitted. *212
constmction of Pub.L. 280. It is not a bright-line rule, This view, adopted here and by the Fifth Circuit in the
however; and as the Ninth Circuit itself observed, an Butterworth case, we find persuasive. Accordingly, we
conclude that Pub.L. 280 does not authorize Califomia
argument of some weight may be made that the bingo
to enforce Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987)
statute is prohibitory rather than regulatory. But in the
present case, the court reexamined the state law and within the Cabazon and Morongo Reservations.
reaffirmed its holding in Barona, and we are reluctant to
disagree with that court's view of the nature and intent of "'^1090 |8| Califomia and Riverside County also argue
the state law at issue here. that the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) authorizes
the appUcation of their gambling laws to the tribal
There is surely a fair basis for its conclusion. Califomia bingo enterprises. The OCCA makes certain violations
does not prohibit aU forms of gambling. Califomia of state and local gambling laws violations of federal
itself operates a state lottery, Cal.Govt. Code Ann. § law. The Court of Appeals rejected *213 appeUants'
8880 et seq. (West Supp. 1987), and daily encourages argument, relying on its earUer decisions in United States
its citizens to participate in this state-mn gambUng. V. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 1980). cert, denied, 449
Califomia also permits parimutuel horse-race betting. U.S. n i l , 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981), and
Cal.Bus. & ProfCode Ann. §§ I9400-I9667 (West 1964 Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians,
and Supp. 1987). Although certain enumerated gambling San Diego County. Cal. v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (CA 9
games are prohibited under Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1982). 783 F.2d, at 903. The court explamed that whether
330 (West Supp. 1987), games not entmierated, including a tribal activity is "a violation of the law of a state"
the card games played in the Cabazon card club, are
within the meaning of OCCA depends on whether it
permissible. The Tribes assert that more than 400 card
violates the "pubUc policy" of the State, the same test for
rooms similar to the Cabazon card club floiuish in
appUcation of state law under Pub.L. 280, and similarly
Califomia, and the State does not dispute this fact. Brief
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Califomia v. Cabazon Band of IVIission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225
concluded that bingo is not contrary to the public poUcy 845 (1958)). Our cases, however, have not established an
of Califonua. inflexible per se rule precluding *21S state jurisdiction
over tribes and tribal members in the absence of express
17
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has rejected
congressional consent. "[U]nder certain circumstances
tiiis view. United States V. Dakota, 796F.2d 186(1986). a State may vaUdly assert authority over the activities
Since the OCCA standard is simply whether the gambling of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional
business is being operated in "violation of the law of a circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-
State," there is no basis for the regulatory/prohibitory reservation activities of tribal members." New Mexico v.
distinction that it agreed is suitable in construing and Mescalero Apache Tribe. 462 U.S. 324, 331-332,103 S.Ct.
applying Pub.L. 280. 796 F.2d, at 188. And because 2378. 2385, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983) (foobiotes omitted).
enforcement of OCCA is an exercise of federal rather than Both Mae v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
state authority, there is no danger of state encroachment 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976),
on Indian tribal sovereignty. Ibid. This latter observation and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
exposes the flaw in appeUants' reUance on OCCA. That Reservation. 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10
enactment is indeed a federal law that, among other (1980), are illustrative. In those decisions we held that, in
things, defmes certain federal crimes over which the the absence of express congressional permission, a State
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction. There is could require tribal smokeshops on Indian reservations
nothing in OCCA indicating that the States *214 are to collect state sales tax from their non-Indian *216
to have any part in enforcing federal criminal laws or customers. Both cases involved nonmembers entering and
are authorized to make arrests on Indian reservations purchasing tobacco products on the reservations involved.
that in the absence of OCCA they could not effect. The State's interest in assuring **1092 the coUection of
We are not informed of any federal efTorts to employ sales taxes from non-Indians enjoying the off-reservation
OCCA to prosecute the playing of bingo on Indian services of the State was sufficient to warrant the minimal
reservations, although there are more than 100 such burden imposed on the tribal smokeshop operators 18
enterprises currentiy in operation, many of which have
been in existence for several years, for the most part [10] This case also involves a state burden on tribal
Indians in the context of their dealings with non-Indians
with the encouragement of the Federal Govemment.
since the question is whether the State may prevent the
Whether or not, **1091 then, the Sixth Circuit is right
Tribes from making available high stakes bingo games
and the Ninth Circuit wrong about the coverage of
to non-Indians coming from outside the reservations.
OCCA. a matter that we do not decide, there is no wanant
Decision in this case turns on whether state authority
for CaUfomia to make arrests on reservations and thus,
is pre-empted by the operation of federal law; and
through OCCA, enforce its gambling laws against Indian
"[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes or is
tribes.
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected
in fedieral law, imless the state mterests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."
II Mescalero. 462 U.S., at 333, 334, 103 S.Ct., at 2385,
2386. The inqiiiry is to proceed in Ught of traditional
[9| Because the state and county laws at issue here are notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional
imposed directly on the Tribes that operate the games, goal of Indian self-government, including its "overriding
and are not expressly permitted by Congress, the Tribes goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic
argue that the judgment below should be afllrmed without
development. /-3b. The ordinance further provides that no one other than the Band is authorized to sponsor a bingo game within
the reservation, and that the games shall be open to the public, except that no one under 18 years old may play. The
Morongo ordinance simiiariy authorizes the establishment of a tribal bingo enterprise and dedicates revenues to programs
to promote the health, educatton, and general welfere of tribal members. Id., at 1a-6a. It additionally provides that the
games may be conducted at any time but must be conducted at least three days per week, that there shall be no prize
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244. 55 USLW 4225
limit fbr any single game or session, that no person under 18 years old shall be allowed to play, and that all employees
shall wear identification.
3 The Tribes admit that their games violate the provision goveming staffing and the provision setting a limit on jackpots.
They dispute the State's assertion that they do not maintain separate funds for the bingo operations. At oral argument
counsel fbr the State asserts], contrary to the position talten in the merits brief and contrary to the stipulated fects in
this case. App. 65, ^ 24, 82-83. ^15, that the Tribes are among the charitable organizations authorized to sponsor bingo
games under the statute, it is therefore unclear whether the State Intends to put the tribal bingo enterprises out of business
or only to impose on them the staffing, jackpot limit, and separate fund requirements. The tribal bingo enterprises are
apparently consistent with other provisions ofthe statute: minors are not allowed to participate, the games are conducted
in buildings owned by the Tribes on tribal property, the games are open to the public, and persons must be physically
present to participate.
4 The Court of Appeals 'affirm[ed] the summary judgment and the pemianent injunctionrestrainingthe County and the
State from applying their gambling laws on the resen/ations.' 783 F.2d. at 906. The judgment ofthe District Court declared
that the state statute and county ordinance were of no force and effect within the tworeservations,that the State and
the county were without jurisdiction to enforce them, and that they were therefore enjoined from doing so. Since it Is
now sufficiently clear that the state and county laws at issue were held, as applied to the gambling activities on the two
reservations, to tie "invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws ofthe United States" within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). the case is within our appellate jurisdiction.
5 "Indian country," as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151, includes 'all land within the limits of any Indian resenration under the
jurisdiction of the United States Govemment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
mnning through the reservation." This definition applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction. DeCoteau
V. District County Coun. 420 U.S. 425. 427, n. 2. 95 S.Ct 1082.1084. n. 2.43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975). The Cabazon and
Morongo Reservations are thus Indian country.
6 Section 2(a), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). provides:
"Each ofthe States ... listed in ttie following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committBd by or against indians
in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State ... has jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State .... and the alminal laws of such State ... shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State...:
"California All Indian country within the State."
Section 4(a), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982 ed. and Supp.III) provides:
"Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over dvil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect witfiin such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State:
"Califomia All Indian country within the State."
8 The Court of Appeals questioned whether we indicated disapproval of the prohibitory/regulatory distinction In Rfce v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,103 S.Ct. 3291.77 L.Ed:2d 961 (1983). We did not. Wbrejectedin that case an asserted distinction
between stata 'substantive" law and state 'regulatory* law in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1161. which provides that certain
federal statutory provisions prohibiting ttie sale and possession of liquor wittiin Indian country do not apply "provided
such act or transaction is in confomnity botti with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with
an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country....' We noted that nothing in
the text or legislative history of § 1161 supported the asserted distinctton, and then contrasted ttiat statute witti Pub.L.
280. "In ttie absence of a context ttiat might possibly require it we arereluctantto make such a distinction. Cf Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 [96 S.Ct. 2102, 2111. 48 L.Ed.2d 710] (1976) (grant of civil jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 does not include regulatory jurisdiction to tax in light of ttadition of immunity from taxation).' 463 U.S., at 734,
n. 18,103 s et., at 3303, n. 18.
9 Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth was an action by tha Seminole Tribe fbr a declaratory judgment that the Florida bingo
statute did not apply to its operation of a bingo hall on its resenratioh. See also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan,
626 F.Supp. 245 (Conn.1986); Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin, 518 F.Supp. 712 (WD Wis.1981).
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govemment Works. 10
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083,94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225
10 Nothing inttiisopinion suggests that cock-fighting, tattoo pariors, nude dancing, and prostitution are permissible on Indian
reservations within Califomia. See post, at 1095. The applicable state laws goveming an activity must be examined In
detail beforettieycan be characterized as regulatory or prohibitory. The lower courts have not demonstaatad an inability
to identify prohibitory lav^. For example, in United States v. Marcyes. 557 F.2d 1361.1363-1365 (CA91977),ttieCourt
of Appeals adopted and applied the prohibitory/regulatory distinction in determining whether a state law goveming the
possession of fireworics was made applicable to Indianreservationsby ttie Assimilative Crimes Statute, 62 Stat 586,
18 U.S.C. § 13. The court concluded ttiat despite limited exceptions to the statute's prohibition, the firewortcs law was
prohibitory in nature. See also United States v. Fanis, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1111^ 101 S.Ct
920,66 L.Ed.2d 839 (1961). discussed in n. 13, InfTa.
11 Nor does Pub.L. 280 authorize the county to apply its gambling ordinances to the resen/ations. note initially that it
is doubtful that Pub.L. 280 authorizes ttie application of any local laws to Indianreservations.Section 2 of Pub.L. 280
provides that the criminal laws of the "State' shall have the same force and effect within Indian country as they have
elsewhere. This language seems cleariy to exclude local laws. We need not decide ttiis issue, however, because even if
Pub.L 280 does make local criminai/prohibrtory laws applicable on Indianreservations,the ordinances in question here
do not apply. Consistent with our analysis of Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987) above, we conclude that
Ordinance No. 558, the bingo ordinance. Is regulatory in nature. Atthough Ordinance No: 331 prohibits gambling on all
card games, including the games played in the Catiazon card club, the county does not prohibit municipalities within the
county from enacting municipal ordinances permitting ttiese card games, and two munidjsaiities have in fact done so. It
is dear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 331 does not prohibit these card games for purposes of Pub.L. 280.
12 OCCA. 18 U.S.C. § 1955. provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall
be fined not more that $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
"(b) As used inttiissection-
"(1) 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling business which-
"(i) is a violation ofthe law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;
"(ii) involvesfiveor more persons who conduct,finance,manage, supervise, direct, or ovim all or part of such business; and
"(iii) has been or remains In substantially continuoiK operation fbr a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue
of $2,000 In any single day." (Emphasis added.)
13 In Farris, in contrast, the court had concluded that a gambling business, featuring blackjack, poker, and dice, operated
bytalbalmembers on the Puyallup Reservation violated ttie public jsolicy of Washington; the United States, therefore,
could enforce OCCA against the Indians.
14 In Dakota, the United States sought a dedaratory judgment that a gambling business, also featuring the playing of
blackjack, poker, and dice, operated by two members of ttie Keweenaw Bay Indian Community on land controlled by ttie
community, and under a license issued by the community, violated OCCA. The Court of Appeals held that the gambling
business violated Michigan law and OCCA.
15 Titie 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides: 'The disbict courts of ttie United States shall have ordinal jurisdiction, exdushra of ttie
courts of the States, of all offenses against ttie laws of the United States."
16 See S.Rep. No. 99-493, p. 2 (1986). Federal law enforcement officers have the capability to respond to violations of
OCCA on Indianresen/ations,as is apparent firom Fanis and Dakota. This Is not a situation where the unavailability of
a federal officer at a particular moment would likely result in nonenfbrcement OCCA is directed at large-scale gambling
enterprises. If state officers discover a gambling business unknown to federal auttiorities while perfomfiing their duties
authorized by Pub.L. 280, there should be ample time for them to infbmi federal auttiorities, who woukl then determine
whether investigation or other enforcement action was appropriate. A federal police officer is assigned by the Department
ofthe Interior to patrol the Indianresen/ationsIn southern Califomia. App. to Brief for Appellees D1-D7.
17 In ttie spedal area of state taxation of Indian tiibes and bibal members, we have adopted a per se oile. In Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 105 S.Ct. 2399. 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985). we held ttiat Montana could not tax the Tribe's
royalty interests in oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees under ttie Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. We
stated: 'In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian afbirs. Congress can authorize the imposition of stata taxes on
Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, andttieCourt consistentiy has held that it willfindthe Indians'
exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do so unrnistakabiy dear." Id., at 765,
105 S.Ct, at 2403. Ws haverepeatedlyaddressed the issue of state taxation of tiibes and tibal members andttiestate,
federal, and bibal interests which it implicates. Wb have recognized ttiat the federal tradition of Indian immunity from
state taxation is very strong and that tiie state interest in taxation is conespondlngly weak. Accordingly, it is unnecessary
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters, No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11
Califomia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
107 S.Ct. 1083. 94 L.Ed.2d 244. 55 USLW 4225
torebalancethese interests in every case. In Mescalem Apache Tribe v. Jones. 411 U.S. 145,148,93 S.Ct. 1267,1270.
36 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1973). we distinguished state taxation from other assertions of state jurisdiction. W6 acknowledged
ttiat we had maderepeatedstatements 'to the effect that, even onreservations,state laws may be applied unless such
application would interfere withreservationself-govemmerit or would impair arightgranted or reserved by federal law....
Even so, In the spedal area of state taxation, absent o ^ i o n of jurisdiction or ottier federal statutes permitting it, ttiere
has been no satisfactory authority fbr taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the
boundaries oftiiereservation,and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, [411 U.S. 164. 93 S.Ct. 1257,36 L.Ed.2d
129 (1973) 1, lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding ttiat such taxation
Preview
1 BRIGIT S. BARNES & ASSOCIATES, INC. BRIGIT S. BARNES, ESQ. CSB #122673 2 ANNIE R. EMBREE, ESQ., OF COUNSEL CSB #208591 3 3262 Penryn Road, Suite 200 Loomis, CA 95650 4 Telephone: (916)660-9555 Facsimile: (916)660-9554 5 Attomeys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs 6 PATTY JOHNSON; JOE TEIXEIRA; 7 OMAR AHMED, JR.; XIN GUO; and CAROLYN SOARES 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 11 12 PATTY JOHNSON; JOE TEIXEIRA; CASE NO. 34-2016-80002493 13 OMAR AHMED, JR.; XIN GUO; and CAROLYN SOARES, INDEX AND COPIES OF FEDERAL AND 14 OUT OF STATE AUTHORITIES CITED IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' Petitioners and Plaintiffs, OPPOSITIONS TO CITY OF E L K 15 v. GROVE'S DEMURRER AND REAL 16 PARTIES IN INTEREST ELK GROVE CITY OF ELK GROVE, TOWN CENTER, LP AND HOWARD 17 HUGHES CORPORATION'S DEMURRER TO VERIFIED AMENDED Respondent and Defendant. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 18 AND COMPLAINT FOR ELK GROVE TOWN CENTER, LP; DECLARATORY RELIEF 19 [CRC 3.1113(e)] HOWARD HUGHES CORPORATION; and 20 DOES 1-20, inclusive, Date: June 2, 2017 Time: 11:00 a.m. 21 Real Parties in Interest and Department: 24 Defendants. Judge: Hon. Shelleyanne W.L. Chang 22 / Action Filed: November 23,2017 23 _ Trial Date: Not Set 24 BY FAX 25 TO THE HONORABLE COURT, AND TO COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR 26 RESPONDENT, DEFENDANTS, AND REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HEREIN: 27 Attached are copies of Federal authorities cited by Petitioners/Plaintiffs in support of 28 their oppositions to the demurrers of Respondent/Defendant CITY OF ELK GROVE and Real PETITIONERS' FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ISO OPPOSITIONS TO dTY'S AND REAL PARTIES' DEMURRERS TO AMENDED PETITION-COMPLAINT - 1 1 Parties in Interest/Defendants ELK GROVE TOWN CENTER, LP and HOWARD HUGHES 2 CORPORATION to Petitioners/Plaintiffs' Verified Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and 3 Complaint for Declaratory Relief: 4 INDEX 5 CASES: 6 L California v. Cabazon Band ofMission Indians, (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 215 7 2. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes &. Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, (1992) 8 502 U.S. 251,255 9 3. Crest-Dehesd-Granite Hills-Harbison Canyons Subregiiqnal Planning Group v. Acting Director, Bureau Indian Affairs, 6 miA20S, 216 (20\5) 10 4. Department of Taxation and Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 71 11 (1994) 12 5. Eldee-K Rental Properties, LLC v. DIRECTV, INC., (9* Cir. 2014) 748 F. 3d 943 13 6. Friends ofRoedingParkv. City ofFresno, (2012) 848 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1165 **Also 14 cited in support of Petitioners' Motion for Rehef pursuant to C.C.P. §473 15 7. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, (2017) 187 Wash. 2d 857, 389 P. 3d 569, 573- 16 575 17 8. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner ofInternal Review, 297 U.S. 129, 134(1936) 18 9. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones. (1973) 411 U.S. 145,148-149 19 20 10. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977) 21 11. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, (1975) 532 F.2d 655 22 12. State V. Davis, 773 N.W. 2d 66, 71 -74 (Minn. 2009) 23 13. United States v. County ofHumboldt, (1980) 615 F. 2d 1260 24 14. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) 25 /// 26 27 III 28 III PETITIONERS' FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ISO OPPOSITIONS TO CITY'S AND REAL PARTIES' DEMURRERS TO AMENDED PETITION-COMPLAINT - 2 STATUTES: 2 Code of Federal Regulations: 3 15. 25 CFR Section 1.4(a) 16. 25 CFR Section 2.6(a) 4 17. 25 CFR Section 2.7, 2.7(c) 18. 25 CFR Section 2.8 5 19. 25 CFR Section 2.9 20. 25 CFR Section 84.002 6 21. 25 CFR Section 151.10(f) 7 22. 25 CFR Section 151.12, 151.12(b), (c), (c)(2)(ii), (c)(2)(iii), (d), (d)(2) 23. 25 CFR Section 151.13 8 24. 25 CFR Section 151.14 9 United States Code: 25. 5 U.S.C. 704 10 26. 18 U.S.C. Section 1162(b) 11 27. 25 U.S.C. Section 465 28. 25 U.S.C. Section 467 12 29. 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1360 13 14 Dated: M a y / _ 2 2017 Respectfully submitted, TES, INC., 15 FORNIA^fcAW CORPORATION 16 17 for Petitioners/ 18 19 20 21- 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PETITIONERS' FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ISO OPPOSITIONS TO CITY'S AND REAL PARTIES' DEMURRERS TO AMENDED PETITION-COMPLAINT - 3 The Federal Authorities :within-this~docujnent have :been^^ lodged and will not be part of the scanned^imager- - -^n NO.l Califomia v. Cabazon Band of iMission indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083,94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225 reservations. Califomia sought to apply to the Tribes its 107 S.Ct. 1083 statute goveming the operation of bingo games. Riverside Supreme Court of the United States County also sought to apply its ordinance regulating CALIFORNL^ et al., Appellants, bingo, as well as its ordinance prohibiting the playing of V. draw poker and other card games. The Tribes instituted an action for declaratory relief Ln Federal District Court, CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS et al. which entered summary judgment for the Tribes, holding No. 85-1708. that neither the State nor the county had ahy authority to enforce its gambhng laws within the reservations. The I Argued Dec. 9,1986. Court of Appeals afllrmed. I Decided Feb. 25,1987. Held: Indian tribes filed action for declaratory and injunctive 1. Although state laws may be applied to tribal Indians relief and for damages against county, alleging that county on their reservations **1085 if Congress has expressly had no authority to apply ordinances regulating bingo and consented. Congress has not done so here either by Pub.L. prohibiting playing of draw poker and other card games 280 or by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 inside reservations. After state of Califomia intervened, (OCCA). Pp. 1087-1091. the United States District Court for the Central District of Cahfomia granted tribes' motion for summary judgment (a) In Pub.L. 280, the primary concem of which and state and county appealed. The Court bf Appeals, 783 was combating lawlessness on reservations, Califomia F.2d 900, affirmed. State and county again appealed. The was granted broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (I) Public Law committed by or against Indians within all Indian country 280 granting state criminal jurisdiction over reservation within the State but more limited, nonregulatory civil did not authorize enforcement of statute regulating bingo, jurisdiction. When a State seeks to enforce a law within since statute was a regulatory, rather than criminal law; an Indian reservation under the authority of Pub.L. 280, (2) application of state and county gambling laws to it must be determined whether the state law is criminal tribal bingo enterprises was not authorized by Organized in nature and thus fully appUcable to the reservation, Crime Control Act; and (3) state's interest in preventing or civil in nature and applicable only as it may be infiltration of tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime relevant to private ciyil litigation in state court. There did not justify state regulation of such enterprises in light is a fair basis for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that of compelling federal and tribal interests supporting them. California's statute, which permits bingo games to be conducted only by certain types of organizations under Ailirmed and remanded. certain restrictions, is not a "criminal/prohibitory" statute falling within Pub.L. 280's grant pf criminal jurisdiction, Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices but instead is a "civil/regulatory" statute not authorized O'Connor and Scalia joined. by Pub.L. 280 to be enforced on Indian reservations. That an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable, (as here) by *203 criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into a criniinal law within Pub.L. 280's meaning. *202 **1084 Syllabus Pp. 1087-1089. Appellee Indian Tribes (the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians) occupy reservations in Riverside (b) Enforcement of OCCA, which makes certain County, Cal. Each Band, pursuant to its federally violations of state and local gambhng laws violations of approved ordinance, conducts on its reservation bingo federal criminal law, is an exercise of fedieral rather than games that are open to the public. The Cabazon Band also state authority. There is nothing in OCCA indicating that operates a card club for playing draw poker and other card the States are to have any part in enforcing the federal laws games. The gambling games are open to the public and or are authorized to make arrests on Indian reservations are played predominantly by non-Indians coming onto the that in the absence of OCCA they could not effect. WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225 Califomia may not make arrests on reservations and thus, Attomey General, Gerald J. Geerlings, Peter H. Lyons, through OCCA, enforce its gambling laws against Indian and Glenn R Salter. tiibes. Pp. 1089-1091. Glenn M. Feldman argued the cause for appellees. With 2. Even though not expressly authorized by Congress, him on the brief were Barbara A. Karshmer and George state and local laws may be apphed to on-reservation Forrrum.* activities of tribes and tribal members under certain * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the circumstances. The decision in this case turns on whether State of Arizona et al. by Robert K. Corbin, Attorney state authority is pre-empted by the operation of federal General of Arizona, Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General, law. State jurisdiction is pre-empted if it interferes or is Ian A. Macpherson, Brian McKay, Attomey General of incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected Nevada, and Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are Mexico; and for the State of Washington et al. by Kermeth sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. The O. Eikenberry, Attomey General of Washington, Timothy federal interests in Indian self-government, including the R Malone, Assistant Attomey General, .fironjon C. La goal of encouraging tribal self-sufllciency and economic Follette. Attomey General of Wisconsin, mA John J. development, are important, and federal agendes, acting Kelly, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut. under federal laws, have sought to implement them by promoticig and overseeing tribal bingo and gambling Brief of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the enterprises. Such poUcies and actions are of particular Chehalis Indian Tribe et al. by Henry J. Sockbeson and relevance in this case since the tribal games provide the Stephen V. Quesenberry; for the Jicarilla Apache Tribe et sole source of revenues for the operation of the tribal al. by Alan R Taradash; for the Oneida Indian Nation governments and are the major sources of employment of New York by William W. Taylor UI and Christine for tribal members. To the extent that the State seeks to Nicholson; for the Pueblo of Sandia et al. by L. Lamar prevent all bingo games on tribal lands while permitting Parrish, Theodore W. Barudin, Michael D. Bustamante, regulated ofT-reservation games, the asserted state interest and Scott E. Borg; for the San Manuel Band of Mission in preventing the infiltration of the tribal games by Indians by Jerome L. Levine and David A. Lash; and for organized crime is irrelevant, and the state and county the Seminole Tribe of Florida et al. by Bruce S. Rogow. laws are pre-empted. Even to the extent that the State and county seek to regulate short of prohibition, the liaws are Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Minnesota pre-empted since the asserted state interest is not sufficient by Hidiert H. Humphrey HI, Attomey General, and James to escape the pre-emptive force of the federal and tribal M. Schoessler, Assistant Attomey General; for the Pueblo interests apparent in this case. Pp. 1090-1094. of Laguna et al. by W. Richard West, Jr., Thomas W. Fredericks, Rodney B. Lewis, Carol L. Barbero, John Bell 783 F.2d 900 (CA 9 1986), afTumed and remanded. Rodney J. Edwards and Art Bunce; and the the TulaUp Tribe of Washington et al. by Allen H. Sanders. WHITE, J., deUvered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN. MARSHALL. Opinion BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, Justice WHITE deUvered the opinion of the Court. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. —. **1086 The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians, federally recognized Indian Tribes, occupy reservations in Riverside County, CaUfomia.' Each Attomeys and Law Finns Band, pursuant to an *205 ordinance approved by the Roderick E. Walston, Supervismg Deputy Attomey Secretary of the Interior, conducts bingo games on its General of Califomia. argued the cause for appellants. reservation. The Cabazon Band has also opened a With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, card club at which draw poker and other card games Attomey General, *204 Steve White. Chief Assistant are played. The games are open to the pubUc and Attomey General, Frederick R Millar, Jr., Supervising are played predominantiy by non-Indians coming onto Deputy Attorney General, /iu(/o{p/i Corona, Jr., Deputy the reservations. The games are a major source of WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works, California v. Cabazon Band of IMission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225 employment for tribal members, and the profits are the 1970, 84 Stat. 937, 18 U.S.C. § 1955. We disagree in both Tribes' sole source of income. The State of Califomia respects. seeks to apply to the two Tribes Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). That statute does not entirely |2] [3| In Pub.L. 280, Congress expressly granted six prohibit the playing of bingo but permits it when the States, including CaUfomia, jurisdiction over specified games are operated and staffed by members of designated areas of Indian country ^ within the States and provided charitable organizations who may not be paid for their for the assumption of jurisdiction by other States. In services. Profits must be kept in special accounts and used § 2, Califomia was granted broad criminal jurisdiction only for charitable purposes; prizes may not exceed $250 over offenses committed by or against Indians within per game. Asserting that the bingo games on the two all Indian country within the State. ^ Section 4's grant reservations violated each of these restrictions, Califomia of civil jurisdiction was more limited. *208 In insisted that the Tribes comply vrith state law. Riverside Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, *206 County also sought to apply its local Ordinance No. 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), we interpreted § 4 to grant 558, regulating bingo, as weU as its Ordinance No. 331, States jurisdiction over private civil Utigation involving prohibiting the playing of draw poker and the other card reservation Indians in state court, but not to grant games. general civil regulatory authority. Id., at 385, 388-390, 96 S.Ct., at 2109, 2110-2112. We held, therefore, that The Tribes sued the county in Federal District Court **1088 Minnesota could not apply its personal property seeking a declaratory judgment that the county had no tax within the reservation. Congress' primary concem authority to apply its ordinances inside the reservations in enacting Pub.L. 280 was combating lawlessness on and an injunction against their enforcement. The State reservations. Id., at 379-380, 96 S.Ct., at 2106-2107. The intervened, the facts were stipulated, and the District Act plainly was not intended to effect total assimilation Court granted the Tribes' motion for summary judgment, of Indian tribes into mainstream American society. Id, at holding that neither the State nor the county had 387,96 S.Ct., at 2110. We recognized that a grant to States any authority to enforce its gambling laws within the reservations. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations affirmed, 783 F.2d 900 (1986), the State and the county would result in the destmction of tribal institutions and appealed, and we postponed jurisdiction **1087 to the values. Accordingly, when a State seeks to enforce a law hearing on the merits. 476 U.S. 1168, 106 S.Ct. 2888, 90 vrithin an Indian reservation under the authority of Pub.L. 280, it must be determined whether the law is criminal in L.Ed.2d 975.'' nature, and thus fully appUcable to the reservation under § 2, or civil in nature, and appUcable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state court. *207 I The Minnesota personal property tax at issue in Bryan |1| The Court has consistently recognized that Indian was unquestionably civil in nature. The Califomia bingo tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their statute is not so easily categorized. Califomia law permits members and their territory," United States v. Mazurie, bingo *209 games to be conducted only by charitable 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 and other specified organizations, and then only by their (1975), and that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and members who may not receive any wage or profit for doing subordinate to, only the Federal Govenmient, not the so; prizes are limited and receipts are to be segregated States," Wa.ihingion v. Confederated Tribes of Colville and used only for charitable purposes. Violation of any Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, of these provisions is a misdemeanor. Califomia insists 2081,65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980). It is clear, however, that state that these are criminal laws which Pub.L. 280 permits it to laws may be appUed to tribal Indians on their reservations enforce on the reservations. if Congress has expressly so provided. Here, the State insists that Congress has twice given its express consent: |4| FoUowing its earUer decision in Barona Group of first in Pub.L. 280 in 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, San Diego 18 U.S.C; § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 ed. and Supp. County. Cal v. Duffy. 694 F.2d 1185 (CA 9 1982), cert. Ill), and second in the Organized Crime Control Act in WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govemment Works. Califomia v. Cabazon Band of Mission indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225 denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2091, 77 L.Ed.2d 301 for *211 AppeUees 47-48. Also, as the Court of Appeals (1983), which also involved the applicabUity of § 326.5 noted, bingo is legally sponsored by many different of the CaUfomia Penal Code to Indian reservations, the organizations and is widely played in CaUfomia. There is Court of Appeals rejected this submission. 783 F.2d, at no effort to forbid the playing of bingo by any member of 901-903. In Barona, applying what it thought to be the the pubUc over the age of 18. Indeed, the permitted bingo civiiycriminal dichotomy drawn in .&o^a/i v. Itasca County, games must be open to the general pubUc. Nor is there any the Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state Umit on the number of games which eligible organizations "criminal/prohibitory" laws and state "civil/regulatory" may operate, the receipts which they may obtain from laws: if the intent of a state law is generaUy to prohibit the games, the number of games which a participant may certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280's grant of play, or the amount of money which a participant may criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits spend, either per game or in total. In light of the fact the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be that Califomia permits a substantial amount of gambling classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not activity, includiiig bingo, and actuaUy promotes gambUng authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The through its state lottery, we must conclude that Califomia shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the regulates rather than prohibits gambUng in general and State's pubUc poUcy. Inquiring into the nature of § 326.5, bingo in particular. 10 the Court of Appeals held that it was regulatory rather than prohibitory. ^ This was the analysis employed, with |5] |6] |7] Califomia argues, however, that high similar results, *210 by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth stakes, unregulated bingo, the conduct which attracts Circuit in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 organized crime, is a misdemeanor in Califomia and F.2d 310 (1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. may be prohibited on Indian reservations. But that an 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982), which the Ninth Circuit otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as found persuasive. ^ well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub.L. 280. Otherwise, We are persuaded that the prohibitory/regulatory the distinction between § 2 and § 4 of that law could distinction is consistent **1089 with Bryan's easily be avoided and total assimilation permitted. *212 constmction of Pub.L. 280. It is not a bright-line rule, This view, adopted here and by the Fifth Circuit in the however; and as the Ninth Circuit itself observed, an Butterworth case, we find persuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that Pub.L. 280 does not authorize Califomia argument of some weight may be made that the bingo to enforce Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987) statute is prohibitory rather than regulatory. But in the present case, the court reexamined the state law and within the Cabazon and Morongo Reservations. reaffirmed its holding in Barona, and we are reluctant to disagree with that court's view of the nature and intent of "'^1090 |8| Califomia and Riverside County also argue the state law at issue here. that the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) authorizes the appUcation of their gambling laws to the tribal There is surely a fair basis for its conclusion. Califomia bingo enterprises. The OCCA makes certain violations does not prohibit aU forms of gambling. Califomia of state and local gambling laws violations of federal itself operates a state lottery, Cal.Govt. Code Ann. § law. The Court of Appeals rejected *213 appeUants' 8880 et seq. (West Supp. 1987), and daily encourages argument, relying on its earUer decisions in United States its citizens to participate in this state-mn gambUng. V. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 1980). cert, denied, 449 Califomia also permits parimutuel horse-race betting. U.S. n i l , 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981), and Cal.Bus. & ProfCode Ann. §§ I9400-I9667 (West 1964 Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, and Supp. 1987). Although certain enumerated gambling San Diego County. Cal. v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (CA 9 games are prohibited under Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1982). 783 F.2d, at 903. The court explamed that whether 330 (West Supp. 1987), games not entmierated, including a tribal activity is "a violation of the law of a state" the card games played in the Cabazon card club, are within the meaning of OCCA depends on whether it permissible. The Tribes assert that more than 400 card violates the "pubUc policy" of the State, the same test for rooms similar to the Cabazon card club floiuish in appUcation of state law under Pub.L. 280, and similarly Califomia, and the State does not dispute this fact. Brief WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Califomia v. Cabazon Band of IVIission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225 concluded that bingo is not contrary to the public poUcy 845 (1958)). Our cases, however, have not established an of Califonua. inflexible per se rule precluding *21S state jurisdiction over tribes and tribal members in the absence of express 17 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has rejected congressional consent. "[U]nder certain circumstances tiiis view. United States V. Dakota, 796F.2d 186(1986). a State may vaUdly assert authority over the activities Since the OCCA standard is simply whether the gambling of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional business is being operated in "violation of the law of a circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on- State," there is no basis for the regulatory/prohibitory reservation activities of tribal members." New Mexico v. distinction that it agreed is suitable in construing and Mescalero Apache Tribe. 462 U.S. 324, 331-332,103 S.Ct. applying Pub.L. 280. 796 F.2d, at 188. And because 2378. 2385, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983) (foobiotes omitted). enforcement of OCCA is an exercise of federal rather than Both Mae v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, state authority, there is no danger of state encroachment 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), on Indian tribal sovereignty. Ibid. This latter observation and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian exposes the flaw in appeUants' reUance on OCCA. That Reservation. 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 enactment is indeed a federal law that, among other (1980), are illustrative. In those decisions we held that, in things, defmes certain federal crimes over which the the absence of express congressional permission, a State district courts have exclusive jurisdiction. There is could require tribal smokeshops on Indian reservations nothing in OCCA indicating that the States *214 are to collect state sales tax from their non-Indian *216 to have any part in enforcing federal criminal laws or customers. Both cases involved nonmembers entering and are authorized to make arrests on Indian reservations purchasing tobacco products on the reservations involved. that in the absence of OCCA they could not effect. The State's interest in assuring **1092 the coUection of We are not informed of any federal efTorts to employ sales taxes from non-Indians enjoying the off-reservation OCCA to prosecute the playing of bingo on Indian services of the State was sufficient to warrant the minimal reservations, although there are more than 100 such burden imposed on the tribal smokeshop operators 18 enterprises currentiy in operation, many of which have been in existence for several years, for the most part [10] This case also involves a state burden on tribal Indians in the context of their dealings with non-Indians with the encouragement of the Federal Govemment. since the question is whether the State may prevent the Whether or not, **1091 then, the Sixth Circuit is right Tribes from making available high stakes bingo games and the Ninth Circuit wrong about the coverage of to non-Indians coming from outside the reservations. OCCA. a matter that we do not decide, there is no wanant Decision in this case turns on whether state authority for CaUfomia to make arrests on reservations and thus, is pre-empted by the operation of federal law; and through OCCA, enforce its gambling laws against Indian "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes or is tribes. incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in fedieral law, imless the state mterests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." II Mescalero. 462 U.S., at 333, 334, 103 S.Ct., at 2385, 2386. The inqiiiry is to proceed in Ught of traditional [9| Because the state and county laws at issue here are notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional imposed directly on the Tribes that operate the games, goal of Indian self-government, including its "overriding and are not expressly permitted by Congress, the Tribes goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic argue that the judgment below should be afllrmed without development. /-3b. The ordinance further provides that no one other than the Band is authorized to sponsor a bingo game within the reservation, and that the games shall be open to the public, except that no one under 18 years old may play. The Morongo ordinance simiiariy authorizes the establishment of a tribal bingo enterprise and dedicates revenues to programs to promote the health, educatton, and general welfere of tribal members. Id., at 1a-6a. It additionally provides that the games may be conducted at any time but must be conducted at least three days per week, that there shall be no prize WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244. 55 USLW 4225 limit fbr any single game or session, that no person under 18 years old shall be allowed to play, and that all employees shall wear identification. 3 The Tribes admit that their games violate the provision goveming staffing and the provision setting a limit on jackpots. They dispute the State's assertion that they do not maintain separate funds for the bingo operations. At oral argument counsel fbr the State asserts], contrary to the position talten in the merits brief and contrary to the stipulated fects in this case. App. 65, ^ 24, 82-83. ^15, that the Tribes are among the charitable organizations authorized to sponsor bingo games under the statute, it is therefore unclear whether the State Intends to put the tribal bingo enterprises out of business or only to impose on them the staffing, jackpot limit, and separate fund requirements. The tribal bingo enterprises are apparently consistent with other provisions ofthe statute: minors are not allowed to participate, the games are conducted in buildings owned by the Tribes on tribal property, the games are open to the public, and persons must be physically present to participate. 4 The Court of Appeals 'affirm[ed] the summary judgment and the pemianent injunctionrestrainingthe County and the State from applying their gambling laws on the resen/ations.' 783 F.2d. at 906. The judgment ofthe District Court declared that the state statute and county ordinance were of no force and effect within the tworeservations,that the State and the county were without jurisdiction to enforce them, and that they were therefore enjoined from doing so. Since it Is now sufficiently clear that the state and county laws at issue were held, as applied to the gambling activities on the two reservations, to tie "invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws ofthe United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). the case is within our appellate jurisdiction. 5 "Indian country," as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151, includes 'all land within the limits of any Indian resenration under the jurisdiction of the United States Govemment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way mnning through the reservation." This definition applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction. DeCoteau V. District County Coun. 420 U.S. 425. 427, n. 2. 95 S.Ct 1082.1084. n. 2.43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975). The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations are thus Indian country. 6 Section 2(a), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). provides: "Each ofthe States ... listed in ttie following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committBd by or against indians in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State ... has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State .... and the alminal laws of such State ... shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State...: "California All Indian country within the State." Section 4(a), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982 ed. and Supp.III) provides: "Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over dvil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect witfiin such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State: "Califomia All Indian country within the State." 8 The Court of Appeals questioned whether we indicated disapproval of the prohibitory/regulatory distinction In Rfce v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,103 S.Ct. 3291.77 L.Ed:2d 961 (1983). We did not. Wbrejectedin that case an asserted distinction between stata 'substantive" law and state 'regulatory* law in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1161. which provides that certain federal statutory provisions prohibiting ttie sale and possession of liquor wittiin Indian country do not apply "provided such act or transaction is in confomnity botti with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country....' We noted that nothing in the text or legislative history of § 1161 supported the asserted distinctton, and then contrasted ttiat statute witti Pub.L. 280. "In ttie absence of a context ttiat might possibly require it we arereluctantto make such a distinction. Cf Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 [96 S.Ct. 2102, 2111. 48 L.Ed.2d 710] (1976) (grant of civil jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 does not include regulatory jurisdiction to tax in light of ttadition of immunity from taxation).' 463 U.S., at 734, n. 18,103 s et., at 3303, n. 18. 9 Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth was an action by tha Seminole Tribe fbr a declaratory judgment that the Florida bingo statute did not apply to its operation of a bingo hall on its resenratioh. See also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F.Supp. 245 (Conn.1986); Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin, 518 F.Supp. 712 (WD Wis.1981). WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govemment Works. 10 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083,94 L.Ed.2d 244, 55 USLW 4225 10 Nothing inttiisopinion suggests that cock-fighting, tattoo pariors, nude dancing, and prostitution are permissible on Indian reservations within Califomia. See post, at 1095. The applicable state laws goveming an activity must be examined In detail beforettieycan be characterized as regulatory or prohibitory. The lower courts have not demonstaatad an inability to identify prohibitory lav^. For example, in United States v. Marcyes. 557 F.2d 1361.1363-1365 (CA91977),ttieCourt of Appeals adopted and applied the prohibitory/regulatory distinction in determining whether a state law goveming the possession of fireworics was made applicable to Indianreservationsby ttie Assimilative Crimes Statute, 62 Stat 586, 18 U.S.C. § 13. The court concluded ttiat despite limited exceptions to the statute's prohibition, the firewortcs law was prohibitory in nature. See also United States v. Fanis, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1111^ 101 S.Ct 920,66 L.Ed.2d 839 (1961). discussed in n. 13, InfTa. 11 Nor does Pub.L. 280 authorize the county to apply its gambling ordinances to the resen/ations. note initially that it is doubtful that Pub.L. 280 authorizes ttie application of any local laws to Indianreservations.Section 2 of Pub.L. 280 provides that the criminal laws of the "State' shall have the same force and effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere. This language seems cleariy to exclude local laws. We need not decide ttiis issue, however, because even if Pub.L 280 does make local criminai/prohibrtory laws applicable on Indianreservations,the ordinances in question here do not apply. Consistent with our analysis of Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987) above, we conclude that Ordinance No. 558, the bingo ordinance. Is regulatory in nature. Atthough Ordinance No: 331 prohibits gambling on all card games, including the games played in the Catiazon card club, the county does not prohibit municipalities within the county from enacting municipal ordinances permitting ttiese card games, and two munidjsaiities have in fact done so. It is dear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 331 does not prohibit these card games for purposes of Pub.L. 280. 12 OCCA. 18 U.S.C. § 1955. provides in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more that $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. "(b) As used inttiissection- "(1) 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling business which- "(i) is a violation ofthe law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted; "(ii) involvesfiveor more persons who conduct,finance,manage, supervise, direct, or ovim all or part of such business; and "(iii) has been or remains In substantially continuoiK operation fbr a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 In any single day." (Emphasis added.) 13 In Farris, in contrast, the court had concluded that a gambling business, featuring blackjack, poker, and dice, operated bytalbalmembers on the Puyallup Reservation violated ttie public jsolicy of Washington; the United States, therefore, could enforce OCCA against the Indians. 14 In Dakota, the United States sought a dedaratory judgment that a gambling business, also featuring the playing of blackjack, poker, and dice, operated by two members of ttie Keweenaw Bay Indian Community on land controlled by ttie community, and under a license issued by the community, violated OCCA. The Court of Appeals held that the gambling business violated Michigan law and OCCA. 15 Titie 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides: 'The disbict courts of ttie United States shall have ordinal jurisdiction, exdushra of ttie courts of the States, of all offenses against ttie laws of the United States." 16 See S.Rep. No. 99-493, p. 2 (1986). Federal law enforcement officers have the capability to respond to violations of OCCA on Indianresen/ations,as is apparent firom Fanis and Dakota. This Is not a situation where the unavailability of a federal officer at a particular moment would likely result in nonenfbrcement OCCA is directed at large-scale gambling enterprises. If state officers discover a gambling business unknown to federal auttiorities while perfomfiing their duties authorized by Pub.L. 280, there should be ample time for them to infbmi federal auttiorities, who woukl then determine whether investigation or other enforcement action was appropriate. A federal police officer is assigned by the Department ofthe Interior to patrol the Indianresen/ationsIn southern Califomia. App. to Brief for Appellees D1-D7. 17 In ttie spedal area of state taxation of Indian tiibes and bibal members, we have adopted a per se oile. In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 105 S.Ct. 2399. 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985). we held ttiat Montana could not tax the Tribe's royalty interests in oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees under ttie Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. We stated: 'In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian afbirs. Congress can authorize the imposition of stata taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, andttieCourt consistentiy has held that it willfindthe Indians' exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do so unrnistakabiy dear." Id., at 765, 105 S.Ct, at 2403. Ws haverepeatedlyaddressed the issue of state taxation of tiibes and tibal members andttiestate, federal, and bibal interests which it implicates. Wb have recognized ttiat the federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and that tiie state interest in taxation is conespondlngly weak. Accordingly, it is unnecessary WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters, No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 Califomia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1083. 94 L.Ed.2d 244. 55 USLW 4225 torebalancethese interests in every case. In Mescalem Apache Tribe v. Jones. 411 U.S. 145,148,93 S.Ct. 1267,1270. 36 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1973). we distinguished state taxation from other assertions of state jurisdiction. W6 acknowledged ttiat we had maderepeatedstatements 'to the effect that, even onreservations,state laws may be applied unless such application would interfere withreservationself-govemmerit or would impair arightgranted or reserved by federal law.... Even so, In the spedal area of state taxation, absent o ^ i o n of jurisdiction or ottier federal statutes permitting it, ttiere has been no satisfactory authority fbr taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries oftiiereservation,and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, [411 U.S. 164. 93 S.Ct. 1257,36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) 1, lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding ttiat such taxation