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  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
  • HUNTER BRIANet al vs. D'ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MDet alMEDICAL MALPRACTICE document preview
						
                                

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FILED 4/14/2023 12:06 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Jeremy Jones DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-23-01657 HUNTER BRIAN and SHELBY SCOTT, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT individually and as next friends of § L.F.B., a Minor, § § Plaintiffs, § § vs. § § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS D’ANDRA D. BINGHAM, M.D.; § COLLOM & CARNEY CLINIC § ASSOCIATION; CHRISTUS HEALTH § ARK-LA—TEX d/b/a CHRISTUS ST. § MICHAEL HEALTH SYSTEM; § CHRISTUS HEALTH; SUSAN § ELIZABETH KEENEY, M.D.; and § PEDIATRIX MEDICAL SERVICES, § INC. d/b/a PEDIATRIX MEDICAL § GROUP OF TEXAS, § § Defendants. § 134th JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN TS COLLOM & CARNEY CLINIC ASSOCIATION AND D’ANDRA D. BINGHAM. M.D.’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Plaintiffs Hunter Brian and Shelby Scott, individually and as next friends and parents of L.F.B., a Minor, file this response to the motion to transfer venue filed by Defendants Collom & Carney Clinic Association and D’Andra D. Bingham, M.D. (collectively “Bingham”), and would show the Court as follows: ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES It is undisputed that Dallas County is a permissible venue for this case. If venue is proper as to one defendant, it is proper for all the defendants. Bingham has not challenged the fact that Defendant CHRISTUS Health has its principal place of business in Dallas County. Movants have not otherwise met their burden in seeking a PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 1 1 33 752 7 transfer to Bowie County based on convenience. Bingham has provided no evidence to this Court to support their contention that Bowie County would be more convenient or that maintaining this suit in Dallas County will impose an economic and personal hardship on them. A. Venue is proper in Dallas County because CHRISTUS Health has its principal places of business in Dallas County. None of the mandatory or specific permissive venue provisions apply in this case, so venue here is governed by the general venue rule contained in section 15.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas pursuant to TeX. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002 because Defendant CHRISTUS Health has its principal place of business in Dallas County. Dallas County is in fact a proper venue under section 15.002(a)(2), which provides that venue is proper “in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person.” TeX. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 15.002(a)(3). In a suit involving multiple defendants, like this one, when a plaintiff establishes proper venue against one defendant, venue is proper for all defendants as long as the claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.005; American Home Prods. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2000). While Bingham correctly notes that “the incident made the basis of this suit” occurred in Bowie County, that is not relevant because venue is also proper in Dallas County under section 15.002(a)(2). Because CHRISTUS Health has its principal place of business in Dallas County and the claims against all the defendants, including PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 2 1 33 752 7 Bingham, arise from the same incident, venue is proper in Dallas County. In asserting that venue is not proper in Dallas County, Bingham states in their motion that CHRISTUS Health “has been improperly named in this case.” (Motion at 1] 3). In doing so, Bingham challenges the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, something that is not permitted when moving to transfer venue. Rule 87 makes it clear that “it shall not be necessary for a claimant to prove the merits of a cause of action, but the existence of a cause of action, when pleaded properly, shall be taken as established as alleged by the pleadings.” TeX. R. Civ. P. 87 (b). Bingham therefore cannot claim that Plaintiffs have no causes of action against a different defendant in challenging venue. Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, CHRISTUS Health is presumed to be a proper party, and because CHRISTUS Health has its principal place of business in this County, Dallas County is a proper venue. B. Movants have the burden of demonstrating the need for transfer based on convenience. Texas law places the burden squarely on a party who seeks to challenge a plaintiffs chosen venue based on convenience. Section 15.002(b) allows transfer to another county of proper venue for convenience only “where the court finds” all three of the following have been established by the movant: (1) maintenance of the action in the county of suit would work an injustice to the movant considering the movant's economic and personal hardship; (2) the balance of interests of all the parties predominates in favor of the action being brought in the other county; and (3) the transfer of the action would not work an injustice to any other party. PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 3 1 33 752 7 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(b). Bingham’s bald assertions that convenience is served by litigation in Bowie County instead of Dallas County do not satisfy the showing required by the statute. In the absence of weighty evidence in favor of those contentions, the Court ought not to transfer — and cannot be questioned on appeal if it does not. Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36, 39 (TeX. 2004). The standard for transfer for convenience under the Civil Practice and Remedies Code essentially tracks the federal version of non conveniens transfers. See Abel v. Surgitek, 975 S.W.2d 30, 41 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 1998), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Surgitek, Bristol Meyers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1999) (“By adopting [section 15.002(b)], the legislature provided defendants with a means to address the fairness and convenience of trying a suit in different counties in Texas in the traditional non conveniens sense.”)1 “[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the movant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Scheidt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 965 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P. C., 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other considerations”). To overcome the heavy bias in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of appropriate forum, the movant “must show that the original forum is inconvenient for it and that plaintiff would not be substantially inconvenienced by a transfer. It is not enough for defendant to argue only that plaintiffs choice of forum is inconvenient for the plaintif .” 15 1 When the legislature adopted the 1995 amendments to the venue provisions, it also added section 15.002(b), which a commentator referred to as the “county non PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 4 1 33 752 7 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3849; see also Mullins v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 2006 WL 1214024, *6 (E.D. Va. 2006), citing American Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 333, 338 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (“The defendant cannot assert plaintiffs inconvenience in support of a motion to transfer.”); James v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (“The defendant cannot assert plaintiffs inconvenience in support of a motion to transfer. Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff has inconvenienced herself in this case, she may do so if she so desires”) In deciding a motion to transfer venue, the Court must “determine Whether the balance of convenience clearly weighs in favor of a transfer.” DermaMed, Inc. v. Spa de Soleil, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Natl. Paintball Supply, Inc. v. Cossio, 996 F. Supp. 459, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1998). “Moreover, such motions are not to be liberally granted as the Plaintiffs’ choice of venue is not to be lightly disturbed.” DermaMed, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 783. C. Bingham has not demonstrated the requisite economic and personal hardship needed to justify changing venue for convenience. Bingham has proffered no evidence whatsoever of any economic and personal hardship that could possibly justify transferring the case based on convenience. In their motion, Bingham broadly asserts that it would be more convenient for all the parties and Witnesses to litigate in Bowie County. In support of this general statement, Bingham provides only general assertions about distance and witnesses, but Bingham does not bother to present evidence of any purported economic and personal hardship conveniens” provision. See J. Patrick Hazel, Jurisdiction and Venue in Texas, State Bar of Texas, Advanced Personal Injury Law Course B—13—14 (1997). PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 5 1 33 752 7 they are under by maintaining the suit in Dallas County. The statute requires Bingham to demonstrate that they would suffer “economic and personal hardship” by maintaining this suit in Dallas County. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(b)(1). No such showing has been or can be made here. Whether the suit is tried in Dallas or Bowie County, depositions of witnesses will likely take place in attorney’s offices or other locations convenient for the witnesses. Out-of-town experts will often be able to take advantage of widely available direct flights to Love Field or DFW Airport, in contrast to having to take connecting flights to Texarkana. Trial in Dallas County will not be significantly more inconvenient for the Defendants than a trial in Bowie County. While some parties live, work, or are headquartered in Bowie County, others are located here in Dallas County. Bingham proffers no evidence of true “economic and personal hardship involved” for any of the Defendants. Bingham’s time and resources will be affected whether the venue is in Dallas or Bowie County, and having to travel even a substantial distance is rarely grounds for granting a motion to transfer based on convenience. Parties must frequently travel to the venue of the suit. In Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1392 (S.D. Tex. 1992), a federal court considered a motion to transfer a case from Galveston to Fort Worth for the alleged convenience of the parties and witnesses. U.S. District Judge Sam Kent colorfully rejected mere distance as a factor supporting the requested transfer, noting that “the Galveston Division courthouse is not that far from the Northern District, it is not as if the key witnesses will be asked to travel to the wilds of Alaska or the furthest reaches on the Continental United States.” Id. at 1397. PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 6 1 33 752 7 Bingham simply has provided no evidence that they will suffer any particular economic and personal hardship should the case be tried in Dallas. Without the mandatory showing of economic and personal hardship, Plaintiffs’ choice of venue should be respected, and the motion should be denied. At the very least, should Bingham actually proffer purported evidence of hardship, the Court should continue the hearing to allow Plaintiffs to conduct discovery regarding such allegations. Conclusion Plaintiffs ask the Court to deny the Motion to Transfer Venue in full and grant them such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled. Respectfully Submitted, MILLER WEISBROD OLESKY, L.L.P. /s/ Matt Adair LES WEISBROD State Bar No. 21104900 lweisbrodeillerweisbrod.com CLAY MILLER State Bar No. 00791266 cmillerf@millerweisbrod.com CARRIE LYNN VINE State Bar No. 24128671 cvine@millerweisbrod.com MATTHEW ADAIR State Bar No. 24084471 madair@millerweisbrod.com 11551 Forest Central Drive Forest Central II, Suite 300 Dallas, Texas 75243 (214) 987-0005 (Telephone) (214) 987-2545 (Facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 7 1 33 752 7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the following attorneys of record on this the 14th day of April, 2023, as follows: Kevin W Yankowsky HAND DELIVERY kvin.vankowskv@nortonrosefulbright.com CERTIFIED MAIL Betty Feng FACSIMILE bettV.feng@nortonrosefulbrightcom FIRST CLASS MAIL Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP ELECTRONIC X Fulbright Tower 1301 McKinney, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 7 7 101-3095 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS D’ANDRA D. BINGHAM, MD. COLL 0M & CARNEY CLINIC ASSOCIATION Elizabeth D. “Lisa” Alvarado HAND DELIVERY lalvarado@smfadlaw.com CERTIFIED MAIL Shannon, Martin, Finkelstein, Alvarado & FACSIMILE Dunne, P.C. FIRST CLASS MAIL _ 1001 McKinney Street, Suite 560 ELECTRONIC X Houston, Texas 7 7002 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS CHRISTUS HEALTH ARK-LA- TEX /b /a CHRISTUS ST. MICHAEL HEAL TH SYSTEM Jon W. Stephenson HAND DELIVERY ionstephenson@steedlawf1rm.com CERTIFIED MAIL Casey Cashion FACSIMILE caseycashion@steedlawfirm.com FIRST CLASS MAIL — Steed Dunnill Reynolds Bailey Stephenson, ELECTRONIC X LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 2950 Dallas, Texas 75201 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS CHRISTUS HEALTH ARK-LATEX /b /a CHRISTUS ST. MICHAEL HEALTH SYSTEM PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 8 1837527 Russell W. Schell HAND DELIVERY rschell@schellcoolev.com CERTIFIED MAIL Michelle G. Obach FACSIMILE mobach@schellcoolev.com FIRST CLASS MAIL Schell Cooley Campbell LLP ELECTRONIC 16415 Addison Road, Suite 700 Addison, Texas 75001 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS ELIZABETH KEENEY, MD. PEDIATRIX MEDICAL SERVICES, INC. d/ b / a PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP 0F TEXAS /s/ Matt Adair MATTHEW ADAIR PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 9 1837527 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Bianca Trejo on behalf of Les Weisbrod Bar No. 21104900 btrejo@millenNeisbrod.com Envelope ID: 74693143 Filing Code Description: Response Filing Description: PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Status as of 4/17/2023 1:16 PM CST Associated Case Party: HUNTER BRIAN Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Francine Ly fly@dallascourts.org 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Michelle Obach mobach@schellcooley.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Vera Brumley vbrumley@schellcooley.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT LES WEISBROD Iweisbrod@millerweisbrod.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Lori Slywka Iorislywka@steedlawfirm.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT C. Holloway Yvetteholloway@steedlawfirm.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Kathy Dorsey kathydorsey@steedlawfirm.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Russell Schell rschell@schellcooley.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM ERROR Associated Case Party: COLLOM & CARNEY CLINIC ASSOCIATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liane Hunt |iane.hunt@nortonrosefulbright.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Kevin W.Yankowsky kevin.yankowsky@nortonrosefulbright.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Betty Feng Betty.Feng@Nortonrosefulbright.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jon Wayne Stephenson 24041973 jonstephenson@steedlawfirm.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Matthew Adair 24084471 madair@millerweisbrod.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Charles Clayton Miller 791266 cmiller@millerweisbrod.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Casey Cashion 24103775 caseycashion@steedlawfirm.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Bianca Trejo on behalf of Les Weisbrod Bar No. 21104900 btrejo@millenNeisbrod.com Envelope ID: 74693143 Filing Code Description: Response Filing Description: PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Status as of 4/17/2023 1:16 PM CST Case Contacts Carrie Lynn Vine 24128671 cvine@millenlveisbrod.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Associated Case Party: CHRISTUS HEALTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Elizabeth D. (Lisa)Alvarado lalvarado@smfadlaw.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Sherry EKeIIy skelly@smfadlaw.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Carlos Mattioli cmattioli@smfadlaw.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT Debra Boyd dboyd@smfadlaw.com 4/17/2023 9:28:35 AM SENT