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  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
  • Audra Schmitt v. The New York State Teachers' Retirement SystemSpecial Proceedings - CPLR Article 78 document preview
						
                                

Preview

FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY ________________________________________________ In the Matter of the Application of AUDRA SCHMITT, -against- THE NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS’ Index No.: ___________ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, RJI No.: _____________ Respondent. ________________________________________________ PETITIONER’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE VERIFIED PETITION 1 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 1 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 Table of Contents PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................................... 3 STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.............................................. 4 ARGUMENT AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................... 4 POINT I: THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, IRRATIONAL, AND MADE IN ERROR OF LAW AND MUST BE RESCINDED ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................12 2 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 2 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT In this Article 78 proceeding, the Petitioner seeks to annul a final determination of the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System (“Respondent” or “NYSTRS”) denying her pension credit for salary payments made to her by the Livonia Central School District (the “District”) for the period May 19, 2020 through her retirement date of April 21, 2022, while she was sick and out of work on an approved medical leave. Petitioner challenges that NYSTRS’ determination was “arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful and contrary to the [law].” CPLR §7803(3). In addition, Petitioner seeks an order compelling Respondent to reinstate Petitioner’s pension credit in a manner consistent with the New York Retirement and Social Security Law (“RSSL”). CPLR §7803(1). Petitioner contends that Respondent’s review of her case was haphazard and NYSTRS overlooked the fact that from the period December 12, 2019 and continuing until her retirement date of April 20, 2022 she was on an approved medical leave of absence, utilizing sick leave accruals that were available to her, and that she had a legal right to this leave under federal and state anti-discrimination laws because she was an individual with a disability. NYSTRS’ Final Determination erroneously concluded that Petitioner was “not working” due to “an agreement not to work.” The basis for the Final Determination is fatally flawed because Petitioner was out of work on a documented and approved sick leave beginning December 12, 2019. Somewhat separately, and only because the Superintendent had sought to illegally terminate Petitioner while she was on a medical leave of absence, Petitioner entered into a separation agreement with the District to resolve claims that she had against the Superintendent. Petitioner was not the problem employee—the record makes it quite clear that the Superintendent was the problem employee. That separation agreement did not change Petitioner’s protected medical leave status, which is an erroneous assumption built into NYSTER’ Determination, but not substantiated by any facts 3 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 3 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 in the record or by any law. In fact, the erroneous assumption is contrary to NYSTER’ own regulations. The entire basis for the Final Determination is fatally flawed because Petitioner was out of work on sick leave beginning December 12, 2019 and continued to be sick (disabled) until her retirement. Perseverating on its standard procedures utilized when it reviews settlement agreements that involve resignations, NYSTRS jumped to conclusions in Petitioner’s pension review and disregarded the facts of Petitioner’s case. In doing so, NYSTRS has failed to adhere to the law regarding the pensionability of paid sick leave. NYSTRS also failed to take into account that it would have been unlawful for the District to require Petitioner to work when she was not medically fit to perform her job duties as documented by her medical provider (which documentation was approved and adopted by the District). There is no dispute in the record that Petitioner was disabled and on a medical leave— yet inexplicably, NYSTRS denies Petitioner of that status simply because Petitioner also agreed to a certain retirement date as part of a separation agreement. The separation agreement was never intended to be about her retirement, it was about avoiding litigation and keeping confidential the unlawful acts of the Superintendent because his acts, if exposed, would have been disastrous for the District and the Board of Education members. In her Verified Petition and Affidavit, Petitioner has offered a valid argument as to why NYSTRS’ determination should be annulled pursuant to CPLR §7803(3) and her full pension restored. NYSTRS’ disregard of the facts led to an error of law. Accordingly, the Respondent respectfully requests that the Court grant her the relief requested in the Petition. 4 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 4 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Petitioner respectfully refers the Court to the accompanying Affidavit of Audra Schmitt (“Schmitt Aff.”), for a complete account of the relevant facts and record in this proceeding. That Affidavit and its accompanying Exhibits will be referenced herein as relevant. ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN A PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO CPLR 7803(3). An Article 78 proceeding is available to review whether an agency “determination was made in violation of lawful procedure … or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” CPLR §7803(3). The standard of review for an agency determination pursuant to CPLR 7803(3) is limited to whether there is a rational basis for the action, or whether the action is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. See generally, Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 230-31 (1974); Matter of Peckham v. Calogero, 12 N.Y.3d 424, 431 (2009). A determination is arbitrary and capricious if it is without sound basis in reason and is made in disregard of the facts. Id.; see also, Matter of Colton v. Berman, 21 N.Y.2d 322 (1967); Matter of Thompson v. Jefferson County Sheriff John P. Burns, 118 A.D.3d 1276 (4th Dept. 2014). When an administrative entity’s determination is rendered without a hearing, the review “is limited to whether [the determination] is arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis’.” Matter of Porco v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 140 A.D.3d 1457, 1458 (3d Dep’t 2016) (quoting Matter of Maillard v. NYS Teachers’ Retirement System, 57 A.D.3d 1299, 1300 (3d Dep’t 2008)). “An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts.” Matter of Peckham, 12 N.Y.3d at 431 (citing Pell, 34 N.Y.2d at 231). In the instant case, Petitioner has demonstrated that NYSTRS’s Determination was arbitrary, capricious, without a rational basis, and in error of its own regulations. 5 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 5 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 POINT I THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, IRRATIONAL, AND MADE IN ERROR OF LAW AND MUST BE RESCINDED. Although the scope of the judicial role is narrow when reviewing the determination of an administrative agency or entity pursuant to CPLR §7803, it is not completely non-existent as NYSTRS’ slipshod attention to the facts of this case and disregard of the law would suggest it believes. The record demonstrates that NYSTRS’ determination was not supported by record evidence, did not have a sound and rational basis, was arbitrary and capricious, and affected by an error of law. A. NYSTRS’ Determination Was In Error Of Law. The benefits provided to teachers with a NYSTRS membership date after July 27, 1976— Tier 4 members—which is the case of Petitioner, are governed by Article 15 of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law (“RSSL”). Service Credit is governed by RSSL §609; Service Retirement is governed by RSSL §604; and Early Retirement Reductions are governed by RSSL §603(i). The New York State Retirement System (the “System”) has promulgated rules and regulations implementing various provisions of law applicable to the System. See generally, 21 New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (“NYCRR”) Parts 5000 et. seq. By its own rules and regulations, NYSTRS is required to credit members with service credit for certain leaves of absence. Section 5001.1(h)(1) states: “[T]he number of days of service credit earned in a given school year … shall be determined using the actual number of paid days (or parts thereof) of service a teacher worked as a member and days of leave as determined pursuant to Section 5001.3 hereof….” Section 5001.3 specifically protects a member’s leave of absence. Section 5001.3(a), which applies to Petitioner’s situation, states: “A member who is on a leave of absence and earning at least half pay for the period of his or her leave may be granted full-service credit, or, service 6 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 6 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 credit at half the full rate, whichever is more beneficial.” This regulation is in keeping with the federal and state anti-discrimination laws, which prevent employers from negatively impacting the terms and conditions of employment of employees with disabilities. See generally, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law §296. NYSTRS failed to follow its own regulation when it refused to credit Petitioner for all of the time that she was paid by the District through payroll while on an approved medical leave of absence due to a disabling condition. Petitioner was utilizing paid time off with the District’s approval. (Schmitt Aff. at ¶¶ 45, 51-52). Of significance, the District accepted Petitioner’s medical substantiation for her need for a medical leave of absence. (Schmitt Aff. at ¶ 11). The record contains absolutely no dispute that Petitioner was an individual with a disability beginning on December 12, 2019 and continuing until her date of retirement. (Schmitt Aff. at a¶ 26; Ex. D). A leave of absence was the reasonable accommodation the District offered to Petitioner because the District would not or could not otherwise accommodate her disability. (Schmitt Aff. at ¶ 11). Notably, Petitioner was on a medical leave of absence for five months before a settlement agreement was even contemplated. NYSTRS unilaterally, and without any basis to do so, decided that a settlement agreement that Petitioner signed ended her medical leave of absence. There is no rational basis for that assumption. Petitioner continued to be an employee with a disabling medical condition entitled to a leave of absence until the day of her retirement on April 20, 2022. (Schmitt Aff. at ¶ 20). Given Petitioner’s medical condition and undisputed right to remain on a leave of absence and utilize her sick accruals, as provided for in the settlement agreement and pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law §296, NYSTRS erred in failing to apply 21 NYCRR §5001.3 to Petitioner’s 7 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 7 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 retirement assessment. Of note, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, leave is a reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities. See, EEOC Publication, Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act (May 9, 2016). In the instant matter, since the District was unwilling to remove the Superintendent from the work environment, and since Petitioner could not work in the same environment as the Superintendent without suffering dangerous health consequences, the District had no option other than to offer a leave of absence to Petitioner as the mechanism to accommodate her disability. NYSTRS cannot disregard these important statutes that protect individuals with disabilities from negative employment consequences. Ultimately, Respondent needed apply Section 5001.3 because Petitioner was on an approved FMLA/ADA/NYSHRL protected leave of absence before she entered into a settlement agreement with the District and she had been on the approved leave of absence since December 19, 2019. NYSTRS did not apply Section 5001.3 solely because of the existence of the settlement agreement. NYSTRS became hyper-focused on the settlement agreement and its interpretation of the agreement, which was divorced from all other facts and circumstances. Petitioner’s leave of absence pre-dated the agreement and therefore this was not the typical type of circumstance where a member receives a payment or receives paid sick leave in exchange for entering into a resignation agreement. Petitioner’s continuation of employment was being guaranteed to her in the agreement. The purpose of the District’s action to promise to continue Petitioner’s employment, was to protect her from the actions of the Superintendent, who was trying to terminate her employment in retaliation for Petitioner’s protected activity. 8 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 8 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 B. Respondent’s “Investigation” Was Slipshod. NYSTRS’s Final Determination states: “Audra Schmitt did not earn the at-issue salary payments as a teacher or for teaching services but rather received them in exchange for her to cease such services, irrevocably resign, and for a mutual waiver of potential claims and causes of action between her and the District.” This statement completely disregards all the facts of the case. Petitioner’s case included very unique facts and circumstances that required NYSTRS’ attention. If NYSTRS is in the business of interpreting settlement agreements, it needs to do so thoroughly and properly. As detailed in the Schmitt Aff., NYSTRS’ hasty email communication with the District was not enough due diligence to revise Petitioner’s retirement payments. (See Schmitt Aff. at ¶¶ 51- 52; Ex. O). Although Petitioner’s sick leave was paid for by use of her existing sick leave accruals, spread over a period of years, and had originally been reported as such by the District to NYSTRS, NYSTRS accepted an email from the District stating that Petitioner was actually not utilizing accruals. This was incorrect. NYSTRS relied on this erroneous statement almost exclusively in denying Petitioner two years of service credit, causing a massive retirement reduction. In making such a serious decision, reliance on an informal answer in a brief email exchange seems irresponsible. NYSTRS seemingly makes its decision while emailing back and forth with the District. (See, Schmitt Aff. Ex. K). Thereafter, NYSTRS did absolutely no fact checking or follow- up with Petitioner. NYSTRS’ process to review Petitioner’s service credit and final average salary consisted of a few short emails exchanged with the District without any separate verification process or thorough review of the facts. The “investigation” was performed so carelessly that it could be considered to have been performed in bad faith. NYSTRS’ inadequate “investigation” caused the agency to disregard or overlook critical facts that would have led NYSTRS to the correct conclusion regarding Petitioner’s pension calculation. 9 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 9 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 C. Respondent’s Reliance on Matter of Hall and Matter of Hadley-Luzerne Is Misplaced. The Final Determination states: Audra Schmitt did not earn the at-issue salary payments as a teacher or for teaching services but rather received them in exchange for her to cease such services, irrevocably resign, and for a mutual waiver of potential claims and causes of action between her and the District. This type of payment falls squarely within the rule of law established in Matter of Hadlev-Luzerne Central School District v. NYSTRS and Matter of Hall v. NYSTRS. In each of the foregoing cases, the employer procured the participant's resignation by agreeing to pay a certain sum of money. In each case, the court sustained the System's determination that such payments, not being ascertainable by reference to the collective bargaining agreement, constituted buy- outs of the members' tenure rights — not compensation in exchange for teaching services as required by Education Law § 501.11(a). Such payments in lieu of litigation and/or in exchange for resignation do not constitute compensation earned as a teacher, or for teaching services, and are therefore not NYSTRS pension eligible. These cases cited by NYSTRS in its Final Determination are quite distinguishable from Petitioner’s circumstances. If NYSTRS had not decided to disregard the circumstances leading up to Petitioner’s settlement with the District, it would have known that these cases are inapposite. Note, in its Final Determination, NYSTRS stated: “[I]t is not NYSTRS’ role to judge the circumstances leading up to the execution of a separation or settlement agreement, nor the parties’ intentions in entering into an agreement.” However, NYSTRS needed to assess the facts of Petitioner’s case to make a valid determination. NYSTRS’s assertion that it divorced the facts from the law, is arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, once NYSTRS was informed there was a settlement agreement, it became solely focused on the agreement, admittedly, separating the agreement completely from its context. Matter of Hall and Matter of Hadley-Luzerne are cases regarding Final Average Salary calculations, not calculation of years of service credit. Second, those cases are about extra payments made to district employees in exchange for the withdrawal of the employees’ tenure 10 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 10 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 rights. That is not similar to Petitioner’s circumstance because she was an untenured administrator at the time of the agreement and was not paid extra payments as part of the agreement—in fact, her annual salary was reduced. In Matter of Hall, 697 N.Y.S.2d 763 (3d Dept. 1999), the Court determined that a payment of $40,000 to the Petitioner was above and beyond anything that he was owed by the District, and therefore, the amount could not be included in his Final Average Salary. The record in Hall also showed that while the parties tried to argue that the $40,000 payment was paid in exchange for previously earned accruals, the record showed that no such accruals were ever due to Mr. Hall. Since there was no valid purpose for the payments, the Court determined that NYSTRS’ assessment that the payment was only in exchange for Mr. Hall’s resignation was rationale. In Petitioner’s case, her agreement was not about ending her employment—it was about continuing her employment. Recall, the Superintendent was poised to unlawfully terminate Petitioner, she send letters to the Board of Education members seeking help and alerting the Board to the Superintendent’s actions, and the Board immediately halted her termination. The Board recognized Petitioner’s right to continue in her position. The issue that NYSTRS ignored is that Petitioner needed to stay out on leave because she was not medically able to work under the Superintendent, and since the Board, at that time, was not prepared to terminate the Superintendent, Petitioner had no choice but to remain out on leave. Contrary to the circumstances of the petitioners in Hall and Hadley-Luzerne, Petitioner did not earn more money as a result of entering into the settlement—her pay was substantially reduced. Essentially, Petitioner had to spread her remaining sick accruals over a two year period, and so her salary was reduced to account for the value of the accruals she had available to her at the time of the settlement agreement. The entire spirit of the agreement was to allow petitioner to continue to utilize her sick days until she was eligible to retire without a reduction in pension benefits. 11 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 11 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 NYSTRS’ Final Determination is in complete contravention to the intent of the settlement agreement. CONCLUSION In view of all of the foregoing, the Verified Petition should be granted in its entirety; together with such other and further relief as the Court may deem it appropriate to award the Petitioner. Dated: March 30, 2023 By: Karlee S. Bolaños Pittsford, New York Bolaños Lowe PLLC 16 S. Main Street Pittsford, New York 14534 (585) 643-8444 kbolanos@bolanoslowe.com 12 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 12 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION In accordance with 22 NYCRR §202.8-b(c), the undersigned hereby certifies that the total number of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law is 3,123 in compliance with the word count limit set forth by 22 NYCRR §202.8-b(a). /s/ Karlee S. Bolaños Karlee S. Bolaños 13 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 13 of 14 FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 03/31/2023 10:47 AM INDEX NO. 902786-23 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/31/2023 14 4863-9775-2410, v. 1 14 of 14