Motion-Secondary: Michael Messina v. Morton Village Realty Inc., Phillips International Realty Inc.

On August 14, 2014 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Michael Messina, and Morton Village Realty Inc., Phillips International Realty Inc., for Tort in the District Court of Nassau County.

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FILED: NASSAU COUNTY CLERK 02/09/2023 10:13 PM INDEX NO. 604204/2014
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 337 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/09/2023

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NASSAU
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
MICHAEL MESSINA,

Plaintiff,
Index No: 604204/2014
--against--

MORTON VILLAGE REALTY INC. and PHILLIPS
INTERNATIONAL REALTY INC.

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
MORTON VILLAGE REALTY INC. and PHILLIPS
INTERNATIONAL REALTY INC.

Third-Party Plaintiffs,

--against--

MR. JOE’S PIZZERIA & RESTAURANTE,
RUAGO, LLC d/b/a PIZZA DELIGHT, INC.,
ANTO, INC., GUISEPPE FRANZELLA,
JOSEPH LOGLISCI, MICHAEL RUGGIERO,
DIG ENTERPRISE, INC., and PETE LAMARIANA.

Third-Party Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------------------X

MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF IN SUPPORT OF POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO CPLR §4404, §4405, and §4406

BROOKS & BERNE, PLLC
570 Taxter Road, 5th Floor
Elmsford, New York 10523

By: Candace Renee Johnson, Esq.
Allan R. Mordkoff, Esq.
Ariel Cox, Esq.

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The facts and relevant procedural background on which this motion is based are set forth

with particularity in the Affirmation of Candace Renee Johnson, dated February 9, 2023 (“Johnson

Affirmation”), submitted in support of defendants/third-party plaintiffs, MORTON VILLAGE

REALTY INC. (“Morton”) and PHILLIPS INTERNATIONAL REALTY INC. (“Phillips”)

(hereinafter “Moving Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs”) post-trial motion for an Order

(1) pursuant to CPLR §4404 1, §4405 2, and §4406 3, granting Moving Defendants/Third-Party

Plaintiffs judgment as a matter of law on their remaining third-party claims for contractual

indemnification, contribution, and breach of contract for failure to procure insurance against third-

party defendants, MR. JOE’S PIZZERIA & RESTAURANTE, RUAGO, LLC d/b/a PIZZA

DELIGHT, INC., and MICHAEL RUGGIERO (collectively hereinafter as “Ruago”), prior to the

anticipated damages trial on March 13, 2023; and (2) for such other and further relief as this

Honorable Court may deem just and proper. The material facts and procedural backgrounds are

repeated only as necessary for elucidation of the legal arguments set forth herein.

POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD ENTER POST-TRIAL JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MORTON
AND PHILLIPS ON THEIR THIRD-PARTY CLAIM
FOR CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST RUAGO

“The right to contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the

contract.” Lesisz v. Salvation Army, 40 A.D.3d 1050, 1051 (2nd Dep’t 2007) (quoting Kader v. City

1
Pursuant to CPLR §4404(a), “…after a trial of a cause of action or issue triable of right by a jury, upon the motion of any party
or on its own initiative, the court may set aside a verdict or any judgment entered thereon and direct that judgment be entered in
favor of a party entitled to judgment as a matter of…in the interest of justice. Pursuant to CPLR §4404(b), “…after a trial not triable
of right by a jury, upon the motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may set aside its decision or any judgment entered
thereon. It may make new findings of fact or conclusions of law…render a new decision and direct entry of judgment...”
2
Pursuant to CPLR §4405, “a motion under this article shall be made before the judge who presided at the trial within fifteen days
after the decision, verdict or discharge of the jury…”
3
Pursuant to CPLR §4406, “…there shall be only one motion under this article with respect to any decision by a court, or to a
verdict on issues triable of right by a jury; and each party shall raise by the motion…every ground for post-trial relief then available
to him.”

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of N.Y. Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 16 A.D.3d 461, 463 (2005)). Moreover, “a contract assuming [the

duty to indemnity]...must be strictly construed to avoid reading into it a duty which the parties did

not intend to be assumed.” Hooper Assoc. v. AGS Computers, 74 N.Y.2d 487, 491 (1989). The

intention to indemnify can be “clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire

agreement, and the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Sherry v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 67

A.D.3d 992, 995 (2nd Dep’t 2009). Furthermore, an indemnity provision within a real property

lease contract that exempts a lessor from liability for its own negligence does not violate General

Obligations Law § 5-321 and will be enforced, as long as the parties allocated the risk of liability

to third parties between themselves through the employment of insurance. Hogeland v. Sibley,

Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153, 161 (1977) 4; Jensen v. Chevron Corp. 5, 160 A.D.2d 767 (2nd

Dep’t 1990); Castano v. Zee-Jay Realty Co., 55 A.D.3d 770, 772 (2nd Dep’t 2008) 6; Campisi v.

Gambar Food Corp., 130 A.D.3d 854, 855 (2nd Dep’t 2015) 7; Spence v. Merrick Cent., LLC, 188

A.D.3d 940, 941 (2nd Dep’t 2020) 8; Schumacher v. Lutheran Cmty. Servs., Inc., 177 A.D.2d 568,

4In Hogeland, the trial court found a defendant shopping center owner and defendant store tenant jointly liable for actual negligence
in the occurrence of plaintiff customer’s accident – as both defendants were responsible for the construction and care of the subject
planter’s box as well as snow removal during the time period of said accident. As such, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant
shopping center owner was entitled to indemnification from the defendant store tenant, arising from plaintiff customer’s accident,
because the relevant lease agreement allocated the risk of liability to third parties by insurance.
5 In Jenson, the Second Department held that a defendant/third-party plaintiff property owner was entitled to indemnification from

a third-party defendant gas service station lessee, arising from plaintiff’s accident, because the relevant lease agreement allocated
the risk of liability to third parties by insurance.
6
In Castano, the trial court found a defendant property owner and a defendant commercial tenant jointly liable and “at fault in the
happening” of plaintiff’s trip and fall. As such, the Second Department held that the defendant property owner was entitled to
indemnification from the defendant commercial tenant, arising from plaintiff’s accident, because the relevant lease agreement
allocated the risk of liability to third parties by insurance.
7
In Campisi, the Second Department held that a defendant property owner was entitled to indemnification from a defendant
commercial tenant, arising from plaintiff’s trip and fall, because the relevant lease agreement allocated the risk of liability to third
parties by insurance.
8 In Spence, the Second Department held that a defendant property owner was entitled to indemnification from a defendant

commercial tenant, arising from plaintiff’s trip and fall, because the relevant lease agreement allocated the risk of liability to third
parties by insurance.

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569 (2nd Dep’t 1991) 9, also see Glielmi v. Toys R Us, Inc., 94 A.D.2d 663, 664 (1st Dep’t 1984)10.

(A copy of the Hogeland decision is annexed hereto as Exhibit “L”).

Here, Ruago leased the subject premises from Morton and Phillips at the time of Plaintiff’s

accident. See Exhibit “H”. At the outset, the subject leases were entered into by two sophisticated

business entities, Morton and Ruago. In fact, Ruago’s owner, Michael Ruggiero, testified during

the liability trial that he had an attorney review the leases prior to signing same. (A copy of the

Trial Transcript dated January 23, 2023 is annexed hereto as Exhibit “M” | See pg. 372, Line #2,

pg. 374, Line #18). Pursuant to case law, a lease or other contract entered into under such

circumstances by parties so situated is no longer to be construed as not intending indemnification

of a party for its own negligence unless that intention is set forth in specific and “unequivocal

terms”. See Hogeland at 158, 159 (see also Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 NY

36, 41 (1936)). In such cases, the court must look to the “unmistakable intent of the parties” rather

than the semantic stereotypes with which an agreement may be phrased. See Hogeland at 159 (see

also Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205, 212 (1971)).

Pursuant to the binding (and plainly worded) terms of Section 9.02H of the Lease

Agreement, Ruago was mandated to “indemnify and hold harmless” Morton and Phillips for bodily

injury claims, such as in this action. (See Johnson Aff. ¶¶13). Specifically, the subject lease states

in Section 9.02H:

9In Schumacher, the Second Department held that a defendant property owner was entitled to indemnification from a defendant
commercial tenant, arising from plaintiff’s fall, because the relevant lease agreement allocated the risk of liability to third parties
by insurance.
10 In Glielmi, the trial court found a defendant construction company, defendant property owner, and defendant store tenant jointly

liable for actual negligence in the occurrence of plaintiff employee’s accident – as all defendants “failed to furnish him with a safe
place to work.” As such, the First Department held that the defendant store tenant was entitled to indemnification from the defendant
construction company, arising from plaintiff employee’s accident, because the relevant indemnity agreement allocated the risk of
liability to third parties by insurance.

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Indemnification | Section 9.02(H) of the Lease Agreement

Tenant, during the Term, shall indemnify, and hold harmless
Landlord and any mortgagee of the Demised Premises or lessor
under any ground lease thereof from and against any and all claims
of any kind or nature arising from (i) the existence of or Tenant’s
use or misuse of the Demised Premises or the conduct of Tenant’s
business or any activity, work or things done, permitted or suffered
by Tenant in, on or about the Demised Premises, (ii) any breach or
default in the performance of any obligation on Tenant’s part to be
performed under the terms of this Lease, or arising from any
negligence or tortious act or omission of Tenant, or any of Tenant’s
agents, invitees, contractors, subcontractors, licensees, servants,
employees or sublessees, and (iii) all costs, attorney’s fees, expenses
and liabilities incurred in the defense of any such claims or any
action or proceeding brought thereon.

See Exhibit “H” at pg. 23, ⁋H.

Furthermore, according to Section 9.02(C), 9.02(E), and 9.02(F) of the Lease Agreement,

Ruago was mandated to maintain for the “mutual benefit” of itself and Morton and Phillips,

comprehensive general public liability insurance “against claims for bodily injury.”

Insurance | Section 9.02(C) of the Lease Agreement

Tenant shall, at its expense; maintain for the mutual benefit of
Landlord and Tenant and naming Landlord, Landlord’s mortgagee,
if required, and any managing agent as additional insureds,
comprehensive general public liability insurance, including
contractual liability insurance against the liability assumed under
Section 9.02H of this lease and a liquor liability or rider or
endorsement, against claims for bodily injury, death or property
damage occurring in, on or about the Demised Premises, with a Two
Million and 00/100 ($2,000,000.00) Dollars combined single limit
for bodily injury, death or property damage.

Id. at pg. 22, ⁋C.

Insurance | Section 9.02(E) of the Lease Agreement

If Tenant shall fail to procure and maintain any insurance required
to be carried by this Article 9.02, Landlord may, but shall not be
obligated to, procure and maintain the same, but at the expense of
Tenant, and Tenant shall reimburse Landlord as Additional Rent for

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the cost thereof on demand, together with interest thereon at the
highest rate permitted by law.

Id. at pgs. 22-23, ⁋E.

Insurance | Section 9.02(F) of the Lease Agreement

All insurance required pursuant to this Article shall be (i) written as
‘occurrence’ policies, (ii) written as primary policy coverage and
not contributing with or in excess of any coverage which
Landlord may carry….

Id. at pg. 23, ⁋F.

We argue that the terms are clear, and based on case law, Morton and Phillips are owed

full indemnity and reimbursement of defense costs by Ruago for this action.

In Hogeland, a plaintiff customer of a defendant store tenant sustained personal injuries

after falling over a concrete planter box, which was “obscured by unremoved snow and slush”, at

a defendant shopping center owner’s premises. The Court of Appeals in Hogeland considered

similar lease provisions, as the terms herein. Specifically, the lease terms in Hogeland state:

Pursuant to Section 1 (Indemnity) of the Hogeland lease:

The Tenant agrees to indemnify and save harmless the Landlord
from and against all claims of whatever *157 nature arising from
any act, omission or negligence of the Tenant, or Tenant's
contractors, licensees, agents, servants or employees, or rising from
any accident *** whatsoever caused to any person *** in or about
the Tenant's demised premises, or *** occurring outside of the
demised premises but within the Shopping Center development ***
where such accident *** results *** from an act or omission on the
part of Tenant *** This *** agreement shall include indemnity
against all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred in or in connection
with any such claim or proceeding brought thereon, and the defense
thereof.

Pursuant to Section 2 (Insurance) of the Hogeland lease:

The Tenant agrees upon written request of the Landlord *** to
maintain *** a policy of public liability and property damage
insurance under which the Landlord *** and the Tenants are named

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as insureds, and under which the insurer agrees to indemnify and
hold the Landlord *** harmless from and against all cost, expense
and/or liability arising out of or based upon any and all claims,
accidents, injuries and damages mentioned in Section 1 of this
ARTICLE IX

Upon the conclusion of trial, the jury found that the defendant shopping center owner and

defendant store tenant exhibited actual negligence – as both defendants were mutually responsible

for the construction and care of the planter’s box as well as snow removal during the time period

of plaintiff customer’s accident. Since the Hogeland trial court found both defendants jointly liable

of actual negligence, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant shopping center owner was

entitled to full indemnification from the defendant store tenant despite the limitations of General

Obligations Law § 5-321 – as their lease required the tenant to carry insurance for the mutual

benefit of both parties. The Court further opined that an indemnification provision in a commercial

lease “negotiated at arm’s length between two sophisticated parties” will be enforced, when “it is

coupled with an insurance procurement requirement.” Id. (see also Bacon v. 4042 Austin Blvd.,

LLC, 120 A.D.3d 727 (2nd Dep’t 2014)).

Specifically, the Hogeland Court looked to the lease agreement and analyzed the language

as it pertained to whether or not the tenant was responsible to indemnify the owner for its own

negligence, when both parties were apportioned negligence. It is important to provide that analysis

to Your Honor, in support of Morton/Phillips own claims of full indemnification and costs, as they

are similarly situated.

In Hogeland, the Court analyzed two provisions that referred only to indemnification of

tenant’s own negligence, and the Court stated:

[As] to the first and third parts of section 1 of the indemnification clauses, we note
that, though those two subsections speak only of [tenant] Sibley’s negligence,
neither expressly exempts [tenant] Sibley from its obligation to indemnify in the

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event that its negligence is shared with that of [owner] Berenson. See Hogeland at
159.

Although the Court did not make an ultimate decision as to this particular finding, it is

quite clear where the Court’s support lay. Broad indemnification agreements which encompass

more than negligence and extend to “any acts or omissions” and “any accidents” should be

construed broadly consistent with the agreed-upon lease terms.

Here, Morton/Ruago leases, also had one clause, Section 9.02(H)(ii), that spoke to Ruago’s

own negligence:

…any breach or default in the performance of any obligation on
Tenant’s part to be performed under the terms of this Lease, or
arising from any negligence or tortious act or omission of Tenant, or
any of Tenant’s agents, invitees, contractors, subcontractors,
licensees, servants, employees or sublessees…

(See Johnson Aff. ¶¶13).

However, as the Hogeland Court eluded to, this section does not expressly exempt Ruago

from its obligation to indemnify in the event that its negligence is shared with that of owner and

managing agent, Morton/Phillips. Id. As it is not set forth in specific and “unequivocal terms”

(see Hogeland at 158), this Honorable Court should not rely on “semantic stereotypes with which

an agreement may be phrased” and find that full indemnification is required under the subject

leases.

Importantly, in Hogeland, the Court interpreted broadly a clause without the delineation of

“negligence” in the clause. In that particular clause, the Court found it significant that that part

made no reference to negligence of the tenant or the owner. See Hogeland at 159. Similarly, the

Court of Appeals has held that broad indemnification clauses purporting to apply to “any and all

liability” should be construed as meaning what they say, by allowing them to cover “any and all”

liability on the part of the person being indemnified. See Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205,

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321 N.Y.S.2d 81, 269 N.E.2d 799 (1971). Indemnification provisions are enforced, despite

negligence on the part of the party being indemnified, where the provision state that they apply to

“any and all claims, suits, loss, cost and liability.” Id. Indemnification agreements, regardless of

negligence, are enforced where they apply to “any and all damage or injury of any kind.” See

Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 N.Y.2d 149, 153, 344 N.Y.S.2d 336, 297 N.E.2d 80 (1973).

The Court sets aside “semantical distinctions without a difference. See Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28

N.Y.2d 205, 269 N.Y.S.2d 799, 321 N.E.2d 81 (1971).

It is even more evident that the parties intended that Morton and Phillips would be

indemnified pursuant to the additional insurance provision, making Ruago’s policy primary and

not contributing to or in excess with Morton/Phillip’s insurance. The Lease Agreement states:

Insurance | Section 9.02(F) of the Lease Agreement

(See Johnson Aff. ¶¶14).

As stated in Hogeland, “avoidance of duplicate insurance and the absorption of any

additional premium therefor by the landlord almost indisputably proclaims a mutuality of intent to

insure rather than to negate its payment if the occasion for indemnification….should arise.” See

Hogeland at 160. Further, the Court states that “public policy is certainly not undermined by a

frank recognition of such a perfectly common and acceptable business practice by which an

entrepreneur may provide protection against its own fault.” Id. In the absence of unambiguous

contractual language to the contrary, an additional insured enjoys the same protection as the named

insured. See William Floyd School Dist. V. Maxner, 68 A.D.3d 982 (2nd Dep’t 2009).

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Thus, as in Hogeland and other New York Court of Appeals cases, it was the “unmistakable

intent of the parties” that Morton and Phillips would be indemnified by Ruago – irrespective of

any negligence imputed onto Morton and Phillips. Although the jury delineated apportionments of

actual negligence onto Morton and Phillips as well as Ruago, for the occurrence of Plaintiff’s

accident, based on the arguments above, this Honorable Court should enter judgment in favor of

Morton and Phillips on their claim against Ruago for contractual indemnification as to any

monetary judgment that may be entered in this case, and reimbursement for all costs to defend this

claim.

Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals, in Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Interior

Construction Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 412, 420, 857 N.E.2d 60, 823 N.Y.S.2d 765 (2014), has expressly

declined previous requests to overturn Hogeland and over thirty (30) years of precedent:

Finally, we decline Depository's invitation to overrule Hogeland. Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, we do not lightly depart from our precedents, particularly
those involving contractual rights or statutory interpretation—both are at stake in
this case (see Maxton Bldrs. v. Lo Galbo, 68 N.Y.2d 373, 381, 509 N.Y.S.2d 507,
502 N.E.2d 184 [1986]; Matter of Higby v. Mahoney, 48 N.Y.2d 15, 19, 421
N.Y.S.2d 35, 396 N.E.2d 183 [1979]). Commercial landlords and tenants have
relied on Hogeland for close to 30 years in negotiating their contractual
relationships and the Legislature has not seen fit to alter this rule.

The time-tested holding of Hogeland and other New York Court of Appeals cases compel

a finding that Morton and Phillips are entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on its contractual

indemnity claim concerning any monetary judgment and defense costs.

POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD ENTER POST-TRIAL JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MORTON
AND PHILLIPS ON THEIR THIRD-PARTY CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
FOR FAILURE TO PROCURE INSURANCE

To succeed on a claim for breach of contract, a party must demonstrate: (1) the existence

of a contract; (2) performance of the contract by the injured party; (3) breach by the other party;

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and (4) damages. Harris v. Seward Park House Corp., 79 A.D.3d 425, 426 (1st Dep’t 2010). Here,

there exists a valid Lease Agreement. See Exhibit “H”.

There is a well-settled distinction between an agreement to procure insurance and an

agreement to indemnify or hold harmless. Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215, 219 (1990).

Specifically, an indemnification agreement relieves the promise of liability and an insurance

procurement agreement anticipates the promisee’s continued responsibility for its own negligence,

for which the promisor is obligated to furnish insurance. Id. The Court of Appeals held that where

a promisor fails to procure insurance on behalf of the promisee and the promise is covered by

insurance, the promisee is entitled to recover for breach of contract for all out of pocket expenses

associated with maintaining its own policy of insurance including the premiums, deductibles, co-

payments and increased future premiums. Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111

(2001). Although a liability trial was conducted, “a final determination of….liability for…. failure

to procure insurance need not await a factual determination as to whose negligence, if anyone’s,

caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See DiBuono v. Abbey, LLC, 83 A.D.3d 650 (2nd Dep’t 2011).

As noted earlier, Section 9.02C of the Lease Agreement explicitly required Ruago to name

both Morton and Phillips as “additional insureds” under a “comprehensive general public liability

insurance” policy, covering the subject premises “against claims for bodily injury.” At the time of

Plaintiff’s accident, Ruago maintained an Associated Mutual Insurance Cooperative (“AMIC”)

insurance policy (“210059621”), effective December 9, 2013 to December 9, 2014, with bodily

injury and property damage limits of $2,000,000 per occurrence. (See Johnson Aff. ¶15).

Under said policy, Ruago listed Morton as an “additional insured.” Nonetheless, Ruago

erroneously (and admittedly) failed to list Phillips as an “additional insured” underneath the policy.

Since Ruago failed to procure insurance, on behalf of both Morton and Phillips, Morton and

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Phillips were forced to utilize and maintain their own insurance policy, incurring substantial

defense attorney’s fees/related costs stemming from the subject action. (See Johnson Aff. ¶16).

Therefore, due to Ruago’s failure to comply with Section 9.02C of the Lease Agreement and

expend payment to Morton and Phillips in adherence of Section 9.02E of the Lease Agreement,

this Court should enter judgment in favor of Morton and Phillips on their claim for breach of

contract for failure to procure insurance, and order damages be paid for all out of pocket expenses,

including but not limited to “all costs, attorney’s fees, expenses and liabilities incurred” in the

defense of the instant action. See Exhibit “H” at pg. 23, ⁋H(iii).

It should be noted that the parties agreed in the Lease Agreement that Ruago would pay

damages for failure to procure insurance under the Lease. Specifically, Section 9.02(E) of the

Lease Agreement states:

Id. at pgs. 22-23, ⁋E.

Ruago is no longer a Tenant at said premises, so “additional rent” is not an appropriate

remedy. As stated above, the appropriate remedy under the law is “all costs, attorney’s fees,

expenses and liabilities incurred” in the defense of the instant action. Id. at pg. 23, ⁋H(iii).

WHEREFORE, Moving Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs respectfully request that this

Honorable Court enter post-trial judgment as a matter of law against Ruago for the remaining third-

party claims for contractual indemnification, contribution, and breach of contract for failure to

procure insurance, prior to the anticipated damages trial on March 13, 2023.

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Dated: Elmsford, New York
February 9, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

BROOKS & BERNE PLLC

/s/Candace Johnson
By: _____________________________
Candace R. Johnson, Esq.
Allan R. Mordkoff, Esq.
Ariel S. Cox, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs
570 Taxter Road, 5th Floor
Elmsford, New York 10523
(914) 364-2691

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Case Info

Judge

Erica L Prager Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

February 09, 2023

Case Filing Date

August 14, 2014

County

Parties

ANDREOU, MICHAEL E. Attorney for the Defendant
BERNE, RICHARD WILLIAM Attorney for the Defendant
COX, ARIEL S. Attorney for the Defendant
DELL, JOSEPH GERARD Attorney for the Plaintiff
JOHNSON, CANDACE RENEE Attorney for the Defendant
JOHNSON, CANDACE RENEE Attorney for the Defendants
LEWIS, DARNISHA ALON Attorney for the Defendant
Michael Messina Plaintiff
Morton Village Realty Inc. Defendant
Phillips International Realty Inc. Defendant
VARISCO, NICOLE MARIE Attorney for the Defendants
VIENER, JOSEPH B Attorney for the Plaintiff
ERIC WEISS Attorney
RICHARD BERNHARD Attorneys for Defendants
MICHAEL ARMIENTI Attorney
JEROME PATTERSON Attorney
R JOHNSON Attorney
SUSAN SMODISH Attorneys for Defendants
CHRISTOPHER GRIMALDI Attorneys for Defendants
JOSEPH MUZIO Attorney
ROBERT CONBOY Attorney
ANTONIO MARANO Attorney
DARCIE PATTERSON Attorney
ARI FARKAS Attorneys for Plaintiffs
KATHY LEYDEN Attorney
THOMAS NEMIA Attorneys for Defendants
ALLAN MORDKOFF Attorneys for Defendants
SHELDON GOLDSTEIN Attorney
JOHN GENTILE Attorney
VANESSA CORCHIA Attorneys for Defendants
JOSEPH CERIO Attorney
MICHAEL PAGLINO Attorney
DAVID SCHAFFER Attorney
HOWARD GREENBERG Attorney
ARCHIE CHENG Attorney
KRISTEN SINNOTT Attorney
GILLIAN DELL Attorneys for Defendants
DAVID WORBY Attorneys for Defendants
ERIC WELSH Attorneys for Defendants
JOSEPH TRUNZO Attorney
DANIEL PATTERSON Attorney
TAO CHENG Attorney
CHRISTOPHER DEAN Attorney
ALLAN MOSTOFF Attorneys for Defendants
RICHARD DEAN Attorney
KRISTEN NG Attorney
MICHAEL SCHULTZ Attorney
GREGORY DELL Attorneys for Defendants
BRUCE BARNETT Attorney
ROBERT DEAN Attorney
CHRISTEN GIANNAROS Attorneys for Plaintiffs
MARGARET CONBOY Attorney
STANLEY LEYDEN Attorney

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Motion-Secondary: Michael Messina v. Morton Village Realty Inc., Phillips International Realty Inc.

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