Motion,Ex Parte: FESTA, MICHAEL E v. WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT Et Al

MOTION TO STRIKE 2ND AMENDED CVSW2302172 MADRID VS SINGLETON COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: Technically, the moving party is correct as to the lateness of the amendment. However, the law abhors rulings on technicalities and with the matter fully briefed, no resulting prejudice is seen by the delay in the amendment. Punitive Damages are correctly stricken until the 3COA and 5COA are perfected. Again, the Attorney’s Fees is an interpretation of contract issue at the close of litigation. As such, it is not ripe. 3. MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY CVSW2309240 SPENCER VS ALVARADO JUDGMENT OF PARTITION AND APPOINTMENT OF REFEREE Tentative Ruling: With the pending MX to set aside the default set for August 1, 2024, this current hearing is continued until that date.

EDWARDS, ET AL. VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC Case Number: 22CV-0200334 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs: Plaintiffs David and Stephanie Edwards filed this action alleging violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Act”) against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) and Taylor Motors, Inc. (“TMI”) on August 4, 2022. Following extensive motion practice, primarily concerning discovery issues, the parties settled the matter on May 7, 2024. Pursuant to the Act, and the terms of the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs seek a total of $319,464.80 in attorney fees and costs. This request consists of $149,773.50 in attorney fees for 269.3 hours of work litigating this matter from August 5, 2022 to the present, a 2.0 multiplier, and $19,917.80 in costs. Objections to Evidence: Plaintiffs have raised 10 Objections to portions of the Declaration of Cameron Major on the grounds that certain statements and supporting exhibits are improper argument, lack foundation, are conclusory, and lack personal knowledge. The Objections are OVERRULED. Song-Beverly: The Song-Beverly Act contains a cost-shifting provision that specifically allows prevailing buyers to recover their costs, including attorney’s fees. Civ. C. § 1794(d). The attorney’s fee award is limited to the amount the court determines was reasonably incurred by the buyer in commencing and prosecuting the action, based on actual time expended. The prevailing buyer has the burden of proving the fees were both reasonably necessary to conduct the litigation and reasonable in amount. Civil Code § 1794(d); Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc., (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 785. The lodestar method applies to determining attorney’s fees under the Song-Beverly Act. Id. at 817. When determining a reasonable attorney's fee award, using the lodestar method, the judge begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party's attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community who conduct non-contingent litigation of the same type. Doppes v Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 CA4th 967, 998. Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated at rates that reflect the reasonable market value of their services in the community. Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643. In determining the amount of attorney's fees to which a litigant is entitled, an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court. Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 738, 752. Reasonableness of Hours: The court has discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were reasonably spent on litigation. Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115, 133. The predicate of any attorney fee award is the necessity and usefulness of the conduct for which compensation is sought. Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 846. The court’s focus in evaluating the fee request should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided. The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records. Absent clear indication they are erroneous, verified time records are entitled to credence. Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397. Plaintiffs seek a total of $149,773.50 in attorney’s fees associated with 269.3 hours of work performed by four attorneys and one unknown individual. Plaintiffs have submitted detailed time records to support their request. Defendant challenges numerous specific entries. (Opposition pp. 8 – 11.) The Court has reviewed the billing records in detail, as well as Defendant’s objections. Counsel billed a total of 269.3 hours to this litigation, which commenced August 4, 2022. The parties engaged in extensive law and motion practice over 22 months of litigation. The matter settled on the eve of trial for the maximum possible recovery under the law. The Court finds the time spent was reasonably expended, with the following exceptions: 1) time billed by Erika Kavicky – no information regarding this attorney’s qualifications and experience has been provided, a total of 0.6 hours will be stricken for Ms. Kavicky’s time, and 2) time billed by Angela Mason – no information regarding this individual’s position, qualifications or experience has been provided, a total of 1.7 hours will be stricken for Ms. Mason’s time. The billing records Plaintiffs provided show the following hours were reasonably expended: 133.9 by Deborah Horowitz, 115.4 by Joseph Kaufman and Associates, and 18.4 for the Kaufman and Kavicky firm. The total hours reasonably expended on this matter are therefore 267.7. Reasonableness of Rates: A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the prevailing rate charged to attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. However, the court may also consider the attorney’s skill and expertise, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s customary billing rates. Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 632. A plaintiff seeking to recover hourly rates for out-of-town counsel that are higher than the local rates must show (1) a good faith effort to find local counsel, and (2) demonstrate that hiring local counsel was impracticable. Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1243. The Court is the best judge of the value of professional services provided and may use its discretion to apply rates in line with the market rates for the services provided. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132. This Court has extensive experience in presiding over Song Beverly actions including motions for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses under Song Beverly. As such this Court is aware of the reasonable hourly rates charged in actions of this nature. It is also aware of the prior hourly rates found to be reasonable. Based on the Court’s extensive knowledge and experience, it finds that reasonable hourly rates are $400 per hour for the partners, and $350 per hour for the associate (Isaac Agyeman - 10 years of experience). The Court notes that Plaintiff Anthony Edwards has submitted a Declaration indicating that he made a good faith effort to find local counsel but was unable to do so. The Court has reviewed this voluminous case file, which contains numerous discovery motions supported by attorney declarations regarding fees. It appears that Plaintiff has not previously submitted a declaration regarding inability to find local counsel in support of hourly rates above reasonable local rates. The Court has previously, consistently, found a rate of $400 per hour a reasonable rate for partners in this matter. In the interest of consistency within this case, and fairness to Defendants who have previously been ordered to pay sanctions at the rate of $400 per hour, the Court will again find that $400 per hour is a reasonable rate for partners in this matter. The Court finds that $350 per hour is a reasonable rate for the associate in this matter. The Court notes that the billing records submitted do not break out total hours billed by each individual partner and associate. Considering the large number of billing entries, it is impractical for the Court to recalculate the correct billing at the approved rates. Plaintiffs are ordered to submit recalculated totals using the Court’s approved rates. Multiplier: Plaintiffs seek a 2.0 multiplier based on the results obtained and the contingent risks. Adjustment factors that may be considered in awarding a multiplier include: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 2) the skill displayed in presenting them, 3) the extent to which the litigation precluded other employment, 4) the contingent nature of the fee award. Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 348. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a multiplier is warranted in this case. The issues involved in this litigation were neither novel nor difficult. Counsel have demonstrated they are specialists, who are experienced and skilled in this area of law, but this case involved routine issues under Song-Beverly. This litigation precluded other employment to the extent any litigation would. The matter was taken on a contingent fee basis as is all Song-Beverly litigation. The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ Counsel obtained the maximum award for the client. However, simply obtaining a positive result in a factually and legally standard Song-Beverly case does not warrant a multiplier. Costs and Expenses: The Song-Beverly Act provides that the court will award a successful plaintiff a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, which have been determined to have been reasonably incurred. Civil Code § 1794(d). Plaintiffs have requested an award of costs and expenses in the amount of $19,917.80. However, the declarations submitted in support of the moving papers only include itemized costs for a total of $16,247.81. The discrepancy is addressed only in the Reply materials. (Plaintiffs submitted a Supplemental Declaration of Isaac Agyeman which attaches a record of costs of $3,730 as Exhibit 6.) GM did not have the opportunity to review and oppose those costs, as they were raised for the first time in the Reply brief. Therefore, they will not be awarded. The remaining amount of $16,247.81 appears reasonably incurred with the following exceptions, which will be stricken: 1) $602.26 for Plaintiff’s mistakenly filing the Complaint twice, 2) $304.99 for Plaintiff’s “Re-Filing” Motion for Leave to Amend, as it is a duplicate entry without explanation, 3) $180.16 and $592.73 for Plaintiff’s Notice of Association of Counsel and Substitution of Attorney, respectively, as they are business expenses of Counsel, not proper litigation expenses. As for costs related to Taylor Motors, the Court notes the parties’ settlement agreement is between and among David Edwards and Stephanie Edwards (“Plaintiffs”) and General Motors LLC and Taylor Motors, Inc (“Defendants”). The agreement provides “Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single noticed motion…” (Decl. Kaufman Ex. 1.) The Court finds the parties’ agreement contemplates that Plaintiffs’ costs related to Taylor Motors would be included in the instant motion for fees and costs. The total costs and expenses reasonably incurred are $14,567.67. The Motion for Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part, as detailed above. Plaintiff is ordered to prepare a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling. Plaintiff is also ordered to file and serve a declaration which includes the recalculated totals for attorney fees using the Court- approved rates detailed above. This matter is set for Monday August 12, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 64 for review regarding the supplemental declaration and proposed order. If a satisfactory supplemental declaration and proposed order are submitted at least five court days prior to the continued date, the hearing may be vacated. P.J. MCAULIFFE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, L.P. VS. THE TESTATE OR INTESTATE SUCCESSORS OF NORA

CU23-03783 Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel TENTATIVE RULING The Parties are to appear. Plaintiff’s Counsel is to update the Court on whether each of the Plaintiffs have been provided notice of the hearing date on July 12, 2024 for Defendant’s Motions to Compel Discovery. If notice has been provided, Plaintiffs’ Counsel is to submit proof to the Court. (The Court notes that in Plaintiffs Counsel’s declaration in support of motion the be relieved, Plaintiffs were only provided notice of the Case Management Conference date of June 26, 2024.)

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 4. PLAINTIFF MARY LEMASTERS' MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD. Hearing required. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Case Number: 24TRCV00451 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00451 CASE NAME: Raul Rubio; Noemi Rubio v. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., et al. MOVING PARTY: Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Raul and Noemi Rubio TRIAL DATE: Not Set. MOTION: (1) Demurrer Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAIN with leave to amend. More than mere conclusions are required for a successful assertion of the discovery rule to overcome a demurrer based on the statute of limitations where the suit alleges an event more than four years before the suit was filed but lacks any detail on what happened thereafter and when. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs, Raul Rubio and Noemi Rubio (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and DOES 1 through 10. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5). Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (AHM) now files a demurrer to the FAC. B. Procedural On May 20, 2024, AHM filed its Demurrer. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On July 2, 2024, AHM filed a reply brief. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, [a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿ B. Discussion Preliminarily, this Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition brief does not argue against AHMs contention that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts for each cause of action, but only addresses the statute of limitations issue. i. Meet and Confer Requirement The declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault, Esq., is offered in support of counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Vault declares that she met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiffs counsel regarding the demurrer. However, Vault contends that the parties respective counsels were unable to come to an agreement regarding the grounds for which AHM brings this demurrer. (Declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault (Vault Decl.), ¶ ¶ 2-3.) Thus, this Court finds that the meet and confer requirements have been met. ii. Statute of Limitations AHM first argues that each of Plaintiffs Song-Beverly claims are time barred. T he statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty of merchantability is four years. (CCP § 337, Comm. Code § 2725, Montoya v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495; Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 .) A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (Comm. Code § 2725(b).) While the Song-Beverly Act supplements rather than supersedes the provisions of the UCC, the same four-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under either statute. ( Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3rd 205, 213-24.) The discovery rule of Section 2725(2) also applies to claims under the SBA, such that a cause of action accrues not on the date of sale, but rather when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the warrantor or its authorized repair facility was unable to fix the warranty-covered defects after a reasonable number of attempts. ( Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.) Plaintiffs allege they purchased the 2017 Acura ILX on October 31, 2016. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until February 7, 2024, and did not file this FAC until April 19, 2024. As such, AHM argues that on its face, all four causes of action are time-barred. The FAC attaches the Honda warranty, which includes a 5-year, 60,000-mile warranty on the powertrain, which per page 10 of the warranty booklet includes the engine and internal parts of the transmission. The FAC alleges two specific repair history events in paragraphs 22 and 23, both of which mention powertrain concerns at 16,585 and 53,701 miles respectively. Both of these events were alleged to have occurred within the first 3 years after sale, but are more than four years before this lawsuit was filed In their opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not begin to run from the date of the sale of the subject vehicle, but instead, is tolled. Californias discovery rule delays the start of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or is on inquiry notice (i.e., has reason to discover) facts supporting a cause of action. ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc . (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry or if they have the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation. ( Id . at 808; fn. 2 provides: At common law, the term injury, as used in determining the date of accrual of a cause of action, means both a person's physical condition and its negligent cause. (emphasis in original).) The discovery rule applies to Lemon Law claims. ( Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.) In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, [a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at 808, citing ( McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 (superseded on limited grounds by Code Civ. Proc. § 340.8(c))(emphasis in original).) When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a case of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in this case, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable conclusion. ( Broberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 912, 921.) In this Courts view, Plaintiffs have failed to allege (as Fox and McKelvey require) the specific facts to show the time and manner of discovery and the inability to have earlier discovered the elements of their cause of action. Here, Defendant argues that the alleged Song-Beverly causes of action occurred at the time of the sale of the Subject Vehicle, on or about October 31, 2016, and that Plaintiffs did not file this action until February 7, 2024. Defendants argument ignores the discovery rule, the allegations of two powertrain complaints within the first 5 years and 60,000 miles after sale, and the conclusionary allegation that Plaintiffs did not discover Defendants wrongful conduct until shortly before filing this Complaint . . . . Plaintiffs included vague and conclusionary statements in their FAC that the discovery rule, Class Action Tolling, and the Repair Doctrine delayed the accrual of their Song-Beverly causes of action. The Class Action tolling allegations in FAC ¶27 contend that the filing of Conti v. American Honda, Case No. 2:19-cv-2160 on March 22, 2019 tolled the statute of limitations here. However, the FAC contains absolutely no details whatsoever as to whether a class was or was not certified, what type of class action was alleged there, as to what claimed defect or defect, and how that other lawsuits pendency bears on the allegations in this case. The Court thus does not base its tentative ruling on the threadbare assertion of the words class action tolling without any specific factual allegations to support that assertion such as when the purported class certification was denied which would of course ended the claimed tolling period. However, Plaintiff has provided at least some factual allegations as to the discovery rule and repair doctrine, as discussed below. The FAC alleges that AHMs Song-Beverly violations occurred, not only at the time of the sale, but also AHMs violations continued as Plaintiffs continued to experience symptoms of the defects despite Defendants representations that the various defects were repaired. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs further allege that they discovered Defendants wrongful conduct alleged in the FAC shortly before filing the Complaint in February of 2024, as the subject vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following AHMs unsuccessful attempts to repair them. (FAC, ¶ 26.) But the FAC lacks details as to what happened between October 18, 2019 when Plaintiffs presented the subject vehicle for a powertrain complaint and the filing of suit more than four years later. For example, the FAC lacks any allegation as to what it was that occurred shortly before suit was filed that caused them to discovery AHMs alleged wrongful conduct. The FAC fails to allege the date and circumstances of the claimed belated discovery. The FAC fails to address whether the same alleged defect or symptom reappeared on a particular date or whether that was or was not brought to AHMs or its dealers attention. Instead, the FAC in ¶24 vaguely alleges that Plaintiffs continued to experience symptoms of the defects. If Plaintiffs experienced those symptoms on or before February 8, 2020, more than four years before suit was filed, Plaintiffs will need considerably more and different allegations to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. If plaintiffs allege they had no such symptoms for four years, until shortly before suit was filed, they will need to make more specific allegations as to how a claimed ongoing defect did not manifest symptoms for such a long period of time such that AHM should be responsible for failing to repurchase an apparently long-repaired vehicle. iii. Sufficiency of Allegations AHM also argues that Plaintiffs causes of action are not alleged sufficiently. Plaintiff alleges basic facts bearing on the core Lemon Law duty that if a manufacturer or representative does not service or repair the vehicle to conform with the express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer or representative must replace the vehicle or reimburse the buyer. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2 , subd. (d).) Here, the FAC alleges that the subject vehicle suffered transmission defects and engine defects that were unable to be conformed by AHM or its representatives, but that despite this, AHM failed to replace the vehicle or reimburse Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ ¶ 22-26.) AHM argues that the allegations are pled in a conclusory way. The Court agrees as discussed above. The FAC is barely one step removed from a lawsuit that merely recites the elements of a cause of action by quoting CACI. Because the Court will be requiring Plaintiffs to amend its suit to plead the tolling allegations with greater specificity, the Court encourages Plaintiffs to include a greater factual development of what occurred in the subject vehicles repair history after October of 2019 to support the four causes of action that are pleaded in a vague and conclusionary way. . I II. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, AHMs demurrer is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend. AHM is ordered to give notice of the ruling unless notice is waived.

23CV-03969 Michael Aguilar v. General Motors, LLC Demurrer by General Motors, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment) because (1) It is barred by the statute of limitations, (2) Fails to state facts sufficient to establish a cause of action, and (3) Fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. The Demurrer by General Motors, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment) because (1) It is barred by the statute of limitations, (2) Fails to state facts sufficient to establish a cause of action, and (3) Fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose is SUSTAINED ON ALL GROUNDS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to (1) Plead around the statute of limitations, (2) Plead fraudulent inducement with specificity, and (3) Establish a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. The Second Amended Complaint will be filed by November 29, 2024, to give Plaintiff sufficient time to conduct discovery to obtain the facts necessary for Plaintiff to amend. Motion by Defendant General Motors, LLC too Strike Punitive Damages Claim The Motion by Defendant General Motors, LLC too Strike Punitive Damages Claim is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state a cause of action that supports a claim for punitive damages and to allege the facts necessary to establish a punitive damages claim. The Second Amended Complaint will be filed by November 29, 2024, to give Plaintiff sufficient time to conduct discovery to obtain the facts necessary for Plaintiff to amend.

Case Number: 23STCV30720 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 JEWELERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY , Plaintiff, vs. R PURNELL JEWELERS , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV30720 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Plaintiff Jewelers Mutual Insurance Company (Plaintiff) requests entry of default judgment against Defendants R Purnell Jewelers, Richard Joseph Purnell, and Valerie M. Purnell (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiff seeks judgment against each of the Defendants in the total amount of $24,775.77, comprising $24,102.32 in damages and $673.45 in costs. The Court notes a few defects with the requests for default judgment. First, n o proposed judgment (Form JUD-100) was submitted with any of the requests. Pursuant to ¿ California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd ¿ . (a)(6), the request must include ¿ [a] proposed form of judgment. ¿ Second, the requests for court judgment (Forms CIV-100) pertaining to R Purnell Jewelers and Richard Joseph Purnell do not appear to have been filed. Rather, these documents show that they were electronically received on March 1, 2024. Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiffs requests for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss further proceedings with Plaintiff at the hearing. DATED: July 15, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Re: Tpine Leasing Capital L.P. v. Jarnail Multani Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03197 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Defendant to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion to set aside default and default judgment without prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Explanation: No Copy of Proposed Pleading Application for relief from a judgment or court order must be filed timely (within six months of the judgment or order) and must be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other proposed pleading to be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 subd. (b).) Here, defendant’s default was taken October 19, 2023, and judgment was entered against him on March 21, 2024. Defendant filed this motion on April 22, 2024. Defendant’s application was timely. However, defendant did not provide a proposed responsive pleading pursuant to code. No Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise or Excusable Neglect A judgment may be vacated and so may the entry of default that preceded it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 subd. (b).) The court is empowered to relieve a party “upon any terms as may be just … from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Id.) This decision lies in the discretion of the court, and can only be exercised if the moving party establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure, and within the time limits. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.) Here, defendant did not demonstrate that his failure to respond was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. He stated that he learned of the default entered against him but “was not aware of the nature of any pending litigation.” (Multani Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant incorrectly stated that the default should be “set aside due to his mistake…in not responding to the lawsuit.” (Id.) He described no specific mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect that led to him not responding. Defendant briefly stated that he was improperly served, however did not establish it as a valid reason for not responding to the Complaint. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)