arrow left
arrow right
  • Margo Mixon  vs.  Austin Bridge & Road, LP, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • Margo Mixon  vs.  Austin Bridge & Road, LP, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • Margo Mixon  vs.  Austin Bridge & Road, LP, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • Margo Mixon  vs.  Austin Bridge & Road, LP, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
						
                                

Preview

' FILED Shirley Montgomery DALLAS COUNTY 3/25/2019 1:13PM FELICIA PITRE CAUSE NO. DC-18-05064 DISTRICT CLERK MARGO MIXON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT PLAINTIFF, § § VS. § 44TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § AUSTIN BRIDGE & ROAD, LP d/b/a § AUSTIN BRIDGE & ROAD SERVICES, § LP; STATE FARM MUTUAL § AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § COMPANY; DAVID JACKSON § WILBURN 11, As REPRESENTATIVE § 0F THE ESTATE 0F ANASTACIO § ROSAS; AND TRP CONSTRUCTION § GROUP, LLC, § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANTS. DEFENDANT TRP CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC’S TRADITIONAL AND NO- EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, TRP Construction Group, LLC (“TRP”), Defendant in the above-styled and numbered cause, and files this itsTraditional and No-EVidence Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims and Intervenor Robert Crider’s claims, in accordance with the Texas Rules 0f Civil Procedure. In support 0f this Motion, the Defendant respectfully shows the Court the following: I. BACKGROUND TRP was a highway pavement striping subcontractor 0n a TXDOT Highway resurfacing project 0n State Highway 78 in Collin County. The Plaintiff’s accident and injuries occurred ata particular location 0n Hwy 78 prior t0 When TRP conducted or was required to conduct any activities at that location or in that area, before any TRP duties or responsibilities arose, and when the area was under the exclusive control 0f parties other than TRP. TRP is entitled t0 Summary Judgment for the following reasons: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page - 1 1. TRP did not, and was not supposed to, begin any of its work UNTIL AFTER the accident in question. TRP was not, and was not supposed to be, present or conduct any work in the area 0f the accident before it happened. Lack 0f any duty, lack 0f any breach 0f duty and lack of any proximate causation of any damages is established as a matter of law. 2. TRP was not in charge 0f project scheduling. Scheduling was the SOLE RESPONSIBILITY 0f others unrelated t0 TRP. Again, lack 0f any duty, lack of any breach 0f duty and lack 0f any proximate causation of any damages is established as a matter of law. 3. TRP had n0 responsibility for traffic control, construction zone safety, warning signs or any other responsibilities until after the accident in question. Again, lack 0f any duty, lack of any breach 0f duty and lack of any proximate causation of any damages is established as a matter 0f law. 4. TRP was not responsible for either the placement 0r maintenance 0f temporary raised markings (center tabs) at any time 0r at any point on the project in question. TRP does not d0 that 0n projects. TRP only removed the center tabs (placed by others) AFTER the accident in question. Again, lack of any duty, lack of any breach 0f duty and lack of any proximate causation of any damages isestablished as a matter of law. 5. TRP performed all 0f its relevant work in compliance With the TXDOT contract. There is n0 evidence that TRP was not in full compliance with the TXDOT contract requirements in any relevant part. Thus, TRP is immune from liability under Chapter 97, Tex. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code. 6. There is n0 evidence 0f one 0r more essential elements of the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff and Intervenor. These parties have asserted solely negligence causes 0f action. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-2 There is no evidence that TRP owed them any legal duty, no evidence of any breach of duty, and n0 evidence 0f any damages proximately caused by any breach 0f duty. 7. Plaintiff and Intervenor should have asserted a premises liability case but haven’t, but there is no evidence of any elements of premises liability causes of action. II. EVIDENCE In addition to the pleadings on file herein, TRP relies upon the following evidence: 1. Exhibit A -Affidavit of Rod Pekumey with attachments thereto. 2. Exhibit B — Officer Hill deposition excerpts and exhibits. III. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES A. Standard and Review for No-Evidence Motion for Summarv Judgment (TRCP 166mm” In accordance With the amended Rule 166(a) ofthe Texas Rules 0f Civil Procedure, a party may file a “No-EVidence” Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: No-EVidence Motion. After adequate time for discovery, a party Without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment 0n the ground that there is n0 evidence of one or more essential elements 0f a claim 0r defense 0n Which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The motion must state the elements as t0 Which there is no evidence. The Court must grant the motion unless the respondent raises summaryjudgment evidence raising a genuine issue 0f material fact. Tex. R. CiV. P. 166a(i) A no-eVidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a pre-trial directed verdict governed by the same standard of review as a directed verdict and courts apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-eVidence motion for summary judgment as applied in reviewing a directed verdict. Moore v. K-Mart Corp, 981 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Ina, 979 S.W.2d 68, 7O (TeX. App.—Austin 1998). A DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-3 no-evidence motion for summary judgment is properly granted if less than a scintilla of evidence exists. Bomar v. Walls Regional Hospital, 983 S.W.2d 834, 840 (TeX. App.-Waco 1998, n.w.h.); K-Mart Corp, 981 S.W.2d at 269. In the context 0f a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court has noted: Less than a scintilla 0f evidence exists where the evidence is “so weak as t0 d0 n0 more than create a mere surmise 0r suspicion” 0f a fact, and the legal affect is that there is n0 evidence. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Ina, 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (TeX. 1983). Furthermore, if the evidence is not significantly probative or simply shows that some “metaphysical doubt” exist as t0 the facts, the fact is not “genuine” and isnot “material”. K—Mart Corp, S.W.2d at 269. “Some suspicion linked t0 other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence.” Browning—Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 927 & n.3 (TeX. 1993) B. Standard 0f Review for Motion for Summarv Judgment The defendant's burden 0f proof in a summary judgment ist0 show as a matter of law that the plaintiff has no cause of action against him. Citizens First National Bank v. Cinco Exploration C0,, 540 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. 1976). The defendant may accomplish this by proving that there is n0 genuine issue of fact as to at least one 0f the essential elements 0f the plaintiffs cause 0f action. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991). C. Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s Negligence claims against TRP Construction Group. LLC Ms. Mixon’s tragic accident happened 0n Sunday, June 5, 2016 at approximately 9:11 pm. on State Highway 78, near Copeville, Collin County, TX. (See PLT. Original Pet, Para. 5: EX. B, Hill dep. p. 12, 1. 14-25 and ex. 1 thereto). Defendant Rosas was traveling atan extremely high rate 0f speed (9O + MPH), was intoxicated and cocaine impaired, crossed over into the Mixon DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-4 vehicle lane of traffic and struck the car that Ms. Mixon was riding in as a passenger head on (EX. B, Hill dep. P. 12, 1 14 — p. 19, 1 25; p. 22, 1.22 — 24, 1.12; p. 25, 1.25 — 25, 1.7; p. 28, 1.3 — p. 30, 1. 10; and exhibits 1 and 2 thereto). No one knows, and indeed n0 one can ever know With any degree of reasonableness, Why Mr. Rosas veered into the vehicle Mr. Crider’s vehicle in which Ms. Mixon was riding. But the parties can and have established what did not happen related to TRP. There was n0 active road or construction work activities contemporaneous With the accident, because this happened 0n a Sunday evening outside 0f work hours. Prior t0 that time, SH 78 was being resurfaced under a contract between the Texas Dept. of Transportation (TXDOT) and Austin Bridge and Road (“Austin”) (PLT Or. Pet, para. 5-6; EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 2 and ex. B thereto). Austin 0r others under itscontrol (unrelated t0 TRP) had placed the new asphalt overlay road surface and related traffic control features such as reflective temporary raised markers (tabs) intended to demarcate the roadway center, lanes and edges. (EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). Both Plaintiff and Intervenor have asserted equivalent claims as t0 both Austin and TRP under allegations that: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-5 Defendant TRP Cansu'lmtian Group,LLC owed a duty to act reasonably and pmdeufljr in file cunsmlcfiau and maintenmoe ofthe roadway in questinu. Defiendant breached these dnfies by,among other acts and omissions: l. Using improper constucfion techniques resulting in 111a center lines notbeing timely roadway in question; almlind to the 2. on file roadway Failing to pain: the cenIEI lines in qmsfion: 3. am! maintain proper warning signs amifur othar protective Failing to adequately install devices advising motorists of the dangers associated wifll m: omneI lines; 4. prowl? place and maintain naming siys: Failing to '5.Failingtoconstructthemadwayin queslion in coufiurmity wimflmrelevant conslmclion contract: 6. Mnrmaintainme tempoIaIy raised matings at 20-foot inten'als (+I- Failing to install Dmmtmem of Transportation Project Plans; and 6 inches), in accurdanne will: the Texas 7. marhngs Failing to use andlur maintain temporary raised thathad suficient reflective Each 0f these actsde'DI omissions uf Defendant TRP Cumstrtmtinu Group, LLC' were definedbjr law andwas a proximate cause ofthe negligent, as thattermis injuriesanddamages sufia'ed bryMs. Mixnn. The conclusive summary judgment evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue 0f material regarding any 0f the above assertions or any element of the negligence (or any other) cause of action against TRP and TRP isentitled t0 judgment as a matter 0f law. TRP’s only connection to the resurfacing project was through its Master Subcontract Agreement and related “Exhibit AA — Work Order (subcontract) With Austin (Ex. A Pekurney aff. p. 2 and exhibits A and B thereto) Those were the sole documents that governed the TRP duties and responsibilities. The TRP scope 0f work was defined by Exhibit D to the Work Order as: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page—6 EXHIBIT D - Article 13.00 SPECIAL CONDITIONS, INCL USIONS AND EXCLUSIONS WORK ORDER N0: 415012TRP1 Subcontractor Name: TRP Construction Group, LLC Contract Items \ Scheduie of Values Item Contract Item Description UM Quantity Unit PriceExtended Price Retainage 96 1 0150381003 WK ZN PAV MRK N0N7REMOV (WJ4IN(5LD) 112,545.00 LF s 0.20 s 22,509.00 2 0160381003 WKZN PAV MRK NON-REMOV {YMIMSLD} 110,905.00 LF 5 0.20 S 22,181.00 __ 0170.881003 REMOVE TABS 5,546.00 EA s 0.50 s 2,773.00 4 0180.831003 REFL PAV MRKTY (W}8lN{SLD)(100MILI l 3,095.00 LF S 0.90 S 2,785.50 5 0190.881003 REFL PAV MRKTYI(W)12[N(SLD}[100MIL) 372.00 LF S 2.50 5 930.00 __ 6 020(1881003 MRKTY REFL PAV I(W)2dJN{SLD](lUOMJL) 372.00 LF S 5.50 S 2,046700 7 0210,881003 REFLPAV MRK TYI [WI{ARRDW)(1OUMIL] 16.00 EA S 100.00 S LEOCLOD 8 0220.881003 REFL PAV MRKTv‘ I(WHWORDMIGOMIL) 16.00 EA 110.00 $ $ 1,760.00 9 0230881003 RE PM W/RET REQTY (W)4|N(5LD)(100MIL}110,387.00 LF 0.30 E $ S 33,116.10 10 0240381003 RE PM WIRET REQ TY(Yl4lN(BRK)(1UDMIL) 10,800.00 LF 0.35 l 5 $ 3,780.00 11 0250381003 RE PM W/RET REQ TY(Y)4IN(SLD)(100MI L)62,820.00 LF 0.30 | $ S 18,846.00 12 0260381003 REFL PAVMRKR TYIic 65.00 EA 4.00 260.00 ‘ S S 13 0270381003 REFL PAVMRKR TYIl-A-A 2,028.00 EA 5 3.00 S 6,084.00 Total: S 118,670.60 While TRP had performed its work on other unrelated portions 0f the proj ect on other stretches 0f SH78, TRP had not performed any work in the area 0f the accident and in fact had not even been present on any portion for months. (EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 2 and exhibits A and B thereto). Traffic control for work zone markings and general traffic control duties were specifically excluded from the TRP scope ofwork (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 2 -3).. Also, the project Progress Schedule was specifically “not included” as a part of the TRP scope of work or the applicable Work Order or contract documents (See Ex. A Pekurney aff. p. 2 -3).. TRP had no role or responsibility regarding the above project’s timing, progress 0r scheduling of specific activities or work in general or specifically about When TRP was to perform its activities (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). As a subcontractor on this project, TRP was not responsible for the construction techniques used by the Prime Contractor (Austin) (See Ex. A Pekurney aff. p. 3); furthermore, TRP is not responsible for developing the project schedule and/or re-evaluation of original schedule as changes occur on the project (See Ex. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). TRP’s contractual obligations are very clear. TRP is t0 perform the work in accordance With instructions from the DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-7 Prime Contractor (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). This makes sense because the work progress can ad in most cases does change based on many seen and unseen factors. The Prime Contractor, Austin Bridge & Road, created, changed and maintained the Project schedule and was the party responsible for scheduling and instructing TRP when TRP was to perform itspavement marking duties. TRP worked When it was scheduled by Austin t0 work (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). TRP was scheduled into the above project for the location and portion of Highway 78 at issue in this lawsuit, to begin itswork on Monday, June 6, 2016, by Austin Bridge & Road (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3);. This was the day AFTER Plaintiff’s accident. TRP crews showed up on the morning of June 6, 2016 and started/completed their work as per scheduled and subcontract (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). Prior t0 the June 6, 2016 mobilization, TRP last had personnel on the project 0n April 12, 2016 (performing retro readings for work completed 0n a separate stretch of Highway 78 0n March 29, 2016). (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). Austin Bridge & Road, as the Prime Contractor, had SOLE responsibility 0f construction techniques and SOLE responsibility for scheduling (develop, change, and maintain) (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). TRP was not responsible for the scheduling/timing of the painting of the highway centerline (See Ex. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). The applicable Work Order confirms: IT E 1.IflflSCH EDU LE 1 .fl 1 me wnrk Subcunlmctor i5 required ta perform Inamordanm with the Project Schedule, and as may he modified i: by the Ennlractnr as the wan: pmgressas. (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3) Austin Bridge & Road (the Contractor) scheduled TRP (the Subcontractor) t0 begin its work 0n June 6, 2016 (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). TRP met this obligation as per the subcontract (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3). There were no delays 0r modifications 0n the scheduled June 6th requested start t0 TRP’S work (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 3-4). That was when Austin Bridge and DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-8 Road direct TRP to begin its work (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). Thus, TRP was not present, had not been present for over two months, nor had any responsibilities for the stretch of highway 78 at issue until June 6, 2016, the day after Ms. Mixon’s accident. (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4) TRP’S contractual responsibility is clearly stated. TRP is not responsible for the strategic development 0f the schedule (sequence) (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4); TRP is only responsible for meeting its scheduled obligations placed 0n it by the PRIME CONTRACTOR (See EX. A Pekumey aff. p. 4). Again, Austin told TRP to begin performing the final striping 0n the roadway section in question on June 6, 20 1 6 (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). TRP crews met this obligation. (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4) TRP also expressly excluded the placement and maintenance 0f any temporary raised markings or tabs. See Work Order (Exhibit B hereto), Exhibit D — Article 13.00 “Special Conditions, Inclusions and Exclusions; Item # 3, Contract Item 0170.881003 is for REMOVE TABS on1y(See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4 and EX. B thereto). Austin Bridge & Road had the SOLE RESPONSIBILITY for the placing and maintaining 0f the temporary raised marking (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4) s. TRP had NO responsibility or role in maintaining any tabs 0r temporary raised markings in general, 0r any reflective qualities 0f those devices (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). TRP had NO contractual obligation t0 place, maintain, or test the reflective quality oftemporary markings (See Ex. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). TRP’S only contractual 0r other obligation was t0 remove the temporary markings (tabs) as it installed the permanent and final markings . ..which TRP did (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). TRP was also not responsible for traffic control for work zone markings, but instead expressly excluded traffic control for work zone markings (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). This exclusion (0n page 4 0f 5, Item 12.02 0f project work order), addresses this directly (See EX. A DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page-9 Pekurney aff. p. 4 and EX. B thereto). TRP has NO contractual responsibility for the signage or any other means 0f “protective devices” during the work zone phase 0f the project (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4), in other words, before itbegan itswork. This would be the SOLE responsibility of the PRIME CONTRACTOR and/or his TRAFFIC CONTROL subcontractor (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). On and prior t0 June 5, 2016, TRP was not responsible for placing or maintaining any warning signs (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4). TRP simply was not there, was not required t0 be there and was not supposed t0 be doing anything on the relevant stretch of Highway 78 0n 0r prior t0 June 5, 2016 (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 4-5) .Thus, ithad no duty to Plaintiff, Intervenor 0r anyone else related t0 this stretch 0f highway before June 6, 2016, after the accident in question. In summary, TRP had n0 responsibility and/or knowledge 0f any events leading up t0 the incident on June 5, 2016 (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 5). TRP had n0 contractual responsibility for any traffic control, warning signs and/or other protective devices PRIOR to its crew’s arrival 0n the project June 6, 2016 (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 5). Furthermore, TRP crews had no contractual responsibility and/or knowledge of the placement and maintenance oftemporary raised markings leading up t0 the incident (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 5). TRP’S sole contractual responsibility regarding the temporary raised markings was t0 remove the temporary raised markings IN CONJUNCTION with TRP installing the final markings, which it did BEGINNING on the morning 0f June 6, 2016, the day after Ms. Mixon’s accident (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 5). TRP fully complied With its contractual obligations 0n this Texas Department 0f Transportation project (See EX. A Pekurney aff. p. 5). Since TRP had not been 0n the proj ect for 2 months 0r had anything to d0 With placing the new road surface and associated features like the temporary raised markings, TRP did not create DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page -10 10 any dangerous or other conditions present on the date of the accident. Those conditions were created by or at the request 0f Austin by parties unrelated to TRP. Because TRP has conclusively established that TRP was not present, was not required to be present, did not have any duties 0r responsibilities before it was present, had no knowledge or role in creating pre-existing conditions and fully complied with the TXDOT contract in the relevant respects, then there isn0 genuine issue 0f material fact that TRP did not have any duty, breach any duty or cause the accident in question, and is immune from liability under Chapter 97, TeX. R. CiV. P.. Thus, TRP is entitled t0 summary judgment that Plaintiff and Intervenor take nothing herein, for which TRP prays. IV. NO EVIDENCE MOTION Both Plaintiff and Intervenor have asserted only a negligence cause 0f action against TRP. Since there was n0 contemporaneous activity, this is not a negligent activity case and Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s causes 0f action should be dismissed for that reason alone. In any event, the elements 0f a negligence cause 0f action are: 1. Existence 0f a duty 2. Breach of that duty 3. Which proximately causes the claimant’s damages TRP asserts that there isno evidence 0f any 0f the above elements and thus states there is no evidence of elements 1, 2, 0r 3 0f the asserted cause of action. Even if Plaintiff and Intervenor had properly asserted a premises liability/premises condition cause 0f action, neither party has any evidence 0f any of the essential elements of such a cause of action. T0 recover, Plaintiff and Intervenor must establish: 1. That TRP was an owner/operator 0r party in control 0f premises; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page -11 11 2. That TRP had actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises; 3. The condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; 4. TRP did not exercise reasonable care t0 reduce 0r eliminate the risk; and 5. TRP Construction Group, LLC’S failure t0 such care proximately caused the Plaintiff s injuries. See, Keetch v.Kroger, C0._, 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (TeX. 1992). In the instant case, Plaintiff and Intervenor cannot bring forth any evidence to satisfy elements 1, 2, 3, 4, 01'5 0f their premises liability case. This is especially true given the fact that TRP was not present at the location in issue until after the accident, was not in control 0r had any right of control of the location and had no knowledge 0f what had happened 0r What any conditions were like until after the accident. V. CONCLUSION Since TRP has conclusively established that Plaintiff and Intervenor cannot show any genuine issue of material fact on the necessary elements of their causes of action , have not and cannot present any evidence 0f the threshold requirements in a negligence or premises liability case as set forth above, TRP is entitled t0 Summary Judgment that Plaintiff and Intervenor take nothing from TRP. Because Plaintiff and Intervenor cannot meet their burden, summary judgment for TRP isrequired under TRCP 166 and TRCP VI- w 166(a)(i). WHEREFORE, TRP Construction Group, LLC, prays that this Court enter a judgment in favor of TRP Construction Group, LLC, pursuant to TRCP 166 and TRCP 166(a)(I) and for any and all other relief that the Court deems just. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page -12 12 Respectfully Submitted, AYIK & ASSOCIATES /S/ Wesley W. Chambers WESLEY W. CHAMBERS Texas Bar N0. 04083500 1301 E. Collins B1Vd., Suite 490 Richardson, TX 75081 Direct Telephone: 214-570-6288 Telephone: 214-570-6300 Facsimile: 214-570-6262 Email: wwchambe@travelers.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT TRP CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is t0 certify that, on this the 22nd day 0f March, 2019, a true and correct copy 0f the foregoing document was forwarded to all counsel of record as follows: Andrew B. Sommerman Hand Delivery Jody L. Rodenberg Facsimile Sommerman, MCCaffity & Quesada, L.L.P. Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Suite 1400 Receipted Commercial Delivery Dallas, TX 75219 Regular U.S. Mail Email: andrew@textrial.com X E-service Attorney for Plaintiff, Margo Mixon Thomas W. Fee Hand Delivery William M. Toles Facsimile Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P. Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested Three Galleria Tower Receipted Commercial Delivery 13155 Noel Road, Suite 1000 Regular U.S. Mail Dallas, Texas 75240 X E-service Email: tfee@feesmith.comwtoles@feesmith.com Attorney for Defendant, Austin Bridge & Road, LP d/b/a Austin Bridge & Road Services, LP DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page- 13 13 Adam LeCrone Hand Delivery John W. Breeze Facsimile Mark A. Teague Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested Hillary Luckett Clark Receipted Commercial Delivery Michaels. Kelly Regular U.S. Mail Clinton B. Sloan X E-service Trevor J. Beaty Alexandria Kay Carpenter Rhonda D. Holcomb The LeCrone Law Firm, PC Wall Street Plaza 123 North Crockett Street, Suite 200 Sherman, Texas 75090 Tel: 903.813.1900 eservice@lecronelavv.com Attorney for Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile David Jackson Wilburn II Hand Delivery Attorney and Counselor Facsimile State Bar Card No. 24042 1 56 Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 2340 E. Trinity Mills Road, Suite 300 Receipted Commercial Delivery Carrollton, Texas 75006 Regular U.S. Mail Email: j ack@j ackwilburn.com x E-service Attorney for Defendant, Anastacio Rosas J.Kermit Hill Hand Delivery Verner Brumley Mueller Parker, P.C. Facsimile 121 S. Tennessee Street Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested McKinney, Texas 75069 Receipted Commercial Delivery Email: firmgaj gvemerbrumleyfiom Regular U.S. Mail Attorney for Intervenors, Robert J. Crider, x E-service Individually and as Representative of Estate of Robert Jackson Crider II, and Robert Jackson Crider III /S/ Wesley W. Chambers WESLEY W. CHAMBERS DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page- 14 14 I CAUSE NO. DC-18-05064 MARGO MIXON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT PLAINTIFFS, § § VS. § 44TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § AUSTIN BRIDGE & ROAD , LP d/b/a § AUSTIN BRIDGE & ROAD SERVICES, § LP; STATE FARM MUTUAL § AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § COMPANY; DAVID JACKSON § WILBURN H, as representative of the § Estate of ANASTACIO ROSAS; AND § TRP CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, § DEFENDANTS. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS AFFIDAVIT OF ROD PEKURNEY COUNTY OF STATE OF TEXAS 7 ^ ^W7 /Z ^ § § § Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Rod Pekumey, who being duly sworn by me, deposed and testified as follows: I am over the age of twenty-one (21), of sound mind and am fully competent to testify.I have never been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 1 have personal knowledge of the facts set forthin this Affidavit, and said facts are true and correct, based on my personal knowledge gained because of my duties and responsibilities with TRP Construction Group, LLC (“TRP”). 1 am currently the owner and president of TRP and have been so since the inception of TRP in December 2010. In and as a result of my above capacities and positions with TRP, I am a custodian of records and have gained personal knowledge of TRP records in general and specifically regarding