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  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
  • Mushtaq Grant v. 1137 E. 223rd Corp. D/B/A Faith Christian Academy, Envision Design & Construction Llc And, Robert L. Knight Torts - Other (Assault) document preview
						
                                

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FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF BRONX ----------------------------------------------------------------------------X MUSHTAQ GRANT, Index No: 27619/2018E Plaintiff, AFFIRMATION IN -against- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1137 E. 223RD CORP d/b/a FAITH CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, FOR LEAVE TO REARGUE ENVISION DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION LLC and ROBERT L. KNIGHT, Assigned to: Hon. Andrew J. Cohen Defendants. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------X DAVID P. LESCH, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of New York State, affirms the truth of the following statements under penalties of perjury: 1. I am a member of the law firm of Lesch & Lesch, P.C., attorneys for plaintiff Mushtaq Grant in the above-captioned action. I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances of this action from my review of the file maintained by my office in connection with this case. 2. I submit this affirmation in opposition to the motion of defendant 1137 E. 223rd Corp d/b/a Faith Christian Academy (hereinafter “the Academy” or “defendant”) for leave to reargue the motion practice that resulted in this Court’s Decision and Order, dated October 26, 2022, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment. A. Preliminary Statement 3. As shown herein, in denying the Academy’s motion for summary judgment, this Court correctly concluded that defendant failed to eliminate all material issues of fact bearing on its liability for the violent assault perpetrated against plaintiff Mushtaq Grant 1 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 when he was on defendant’s premises. The Academy has shown no reason for this Court to revisit and reconsider that decision. 4. Based on the proof and arguments presented by the Academy, this Court correctly concluded that defendant failed to satisfy its prima facie burden as movant “due to the lack of sufficient evidence” (see, Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, NYSCEF Doc. No. 96, Decision and Order, dated October 26, 2022, p. 2). Although the Academy claimed that it could not be held responsible for the actions of the assailant, defendant Robert Knight, because he was purportedly not employed by the Academy, the Court determined that defendant failed to eliminate all material questions of fact on that issue (Id.). 5. Not only has the Academy failed to show error in the Court’s rationale, as stated in its Decision and Order, but the defendant is silent as to its failure to provide adequate security at its premises, which, as shown in plaintiff’s prior opposition, would have also served as appropriate grounds for the denial of defendant’s motion. As was the case on the Academy’s summary judgment motion, the Academy again does not refute that it can be held liable for failing to protect the safety of Mr. Grant, who was lawfully on Academy grounds when he was assaulted. Indeed, defendant does not address any of the case law cited in plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment which shows that the Academy may be held liable for failing to provide adequate security at its premises (see, Exhibit 3 to Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, NYSCEF Doc. No. 104, Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, paras. 26, 28). 6. As it did when unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment, defendant again adopts an unjustifiably limited view of the evidence, merely focusing on what Academy owner Rose Donna Taylor claims to have seen or known about Mr. Knight before he perpetrated 2 2 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 his second assault of Mr. Grant on Academy grounds. Defendant again ignores the proof showing that Academy employee Norman Davis recommended Mr. Knight to work at the premises and he oversaw the work performed by Mr. Knight. The Academy similarly overlooks that Mr. Davis had verbal altercations with Mr. Knight before the assault at issue. What is more, Academy employee Norman Davis witnessed Mr. Knight’s violent actions toward Mr. Grant prior to the assault at issue. Defendant has again overlooked the proof regarding Mr. Davis’s knowledge of Mr. Knight’s prior acts of hostility and violence. That evidence raises factual questions as to the foreseeability of the assault perpetrated against Mr. Grant on Academy grounds and also as to the inadequacy of defendant’s security measures. 7. Given Mr. Davis’s indisputable awareness of Mr. Knight’s prior act of violence, defendant again fails to justify summary judgment by merely claiming that Academy Director, Rose Taylor, had not previously observed violent behavior by Mr. Knight. Given that Mr. Davis had witnessed Mr. Knight strike Mr. Grant prior to the assault at issue, defendant does not show that reargument is warranted and does not show grounds for dismissal of the complaint by focusing on only Ms. Taylor’s claim that she was not aware of the prior incident when Mr. Knight struck Mr. Grant in the face (Affirmation in Support of Motion to Reargue, paras. 10, 23; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, pp. 2, 5). Defendant’s claim that “The Academy did not have knowledge of any violent propensities on the part of Robert L. Knight and did not have any reason to know of the same” ignores that Academy employee Mr. Davis knew of Mr. Knight’s prior act of violence against Mr. Grant on Academy premises. 8. As the evidence shows, although Academy employee Norman Davis was aware of Mr. Knight’s prior incident of violence, the Academy did nothing to protect Mr. Grant 3 3 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 from further violence at the Academy premises. The Academy did not fire Mr. Knight, nor was he escorted off the premises. The Academy did not even call the police to prevent additional acts of violence. The Academy’s motion for summary judgment did not account for those facts and circumstances. Indeed, defendant’s motion did not refute that Mr. Davis’s awareness that Mr. Knight previously struck Mr. Grant raises issues of fact as to the foreseeability of the assault at issue, the inadequacy of the security measures on Academy premises and whether the Academy’s failure to provide sufficient security was a proximate cause of the assault at issue on Mr. Grant. 9. What is more, as this Court correctly recognized, factual issues underlying the Academy’s duty of care toward Mr. Grant preclude summary judgment for the defendant (Decision and Order, dated October 26, 2022, p. 2). Conflicting deposition testimony from Mr. Grant and Ms. Taylor as to the location of the assault at issue undermines defendant’s claim that it did not owe a duty of care to Mr. Grant. As the record supports a conclusion that the assault at issue occurred on the Academy’s premises, defendant is again wrong in asserting that it did not owe a duty to Mr. Grant as a matter of law. B. The Assault on Plaintiff at Defendant’s School 10. On September 8, 2017, plaintiff Mushtaq Grant was working for Envision Design as a carpenter on a renovation project at the Faith Christian Academy in Bronx County (Exhibit E to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No. 76, Plaintiff’s Deposition, pp. 17-18, 23, 25, 27, 53, 54). Defendant Robert Knight is the owner of Envision Design (Id., p. 23). Mr. Grant had previously worked for Mr. Knight years earlier (Id., p. 36). The project at the Academy involved knocking out walls, putting in new bathrooms, installing 4 4 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 new classroom floors and plumbing repair (Id., p. 54). As many as six tradesmen were involved in the renovation work depending on the day (Id., p. 53). 11. While working on the renovation project, Mr. Grant interacted with Academy employee Norman Davis (Id., p. 58). Mr. Grant also interacted with the Academy Director Rose Taylor (Id., pp. 58-59, 60). Mr. Grant identified Mr. Davis as the husband of the Academy’s director (Id., p. 58).1 Mr. Grant testified that Mr. Davis and Ms. Taylor oversaw the renovation project and they would ask him directly to do certain tasks before others (Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 62). In describing one of these instances, Mr. Grant testified: “Norman came to me and he said to me he would like me to get that door in for the kitchen because school is going to be open Monday and they’re going to need the kitchen, so he would like me to put in the door” (Id., p. 61). 12. Additional testimony from Mr. Grant established Mr. Davis’s significant role in supervising the renovation project on behalf of the Academy. Mr. Grant testified that prior to the assault at issue, while he was working on the third floor of the school, Mr. Davis approached him and brought Mr. Grant downstairs to the kitchen (Id., p. 66). The kitchen renovations had not been completed and Mr. Davis requested that Mr. Grant “make it happen” before the school re-opened (Id., pp. 66-67). 13. On September 8, 2017, Mr. Grant arrived for work at the Academy at approximately 9:00 a.m. (Id., pp. 63-64). He was upset that Mr. Knight had not paid him for work previously performed (Id., p. 64). Mr. Grant put his tool belt on and he noticed that Mr. Knight was standing right in front of him. Mr. Grant asked for the long screws which he had 1 Ms. Taylor testified that Mr. Davis is her fiancé (Exhibit D to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No. 75, Taylor Deposition, p. 29). 5 5 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 requested the day before and Mr. Knight began to shout at him, “What the F are you asking me for screws” (Id., pp. 64-65). At that moment, Mr. Davis entered the area and reassured Mr. Grant that he could speak to him (Mr. Davis) if he hadn’t been getting paid. Mr. Davis told Mr. Grant, “I need you here” (Id., p. 65). 14. Mr. Knight started cursing at Mr. Grant when he saw Mr. Davis talking to him (Id.). Mr. Grant was prepared to leave the worksite, but Mr. Davis again said to him, “I need you here…I’ll pay you” and Mr. Grant chose to stay at the Academy to continue the work (Id.). 15. Shortly after Mr. Grant arrived at the school that day, he saw Mr. Davis and Mr. Knight have a “big argument” (Id., pp. 76, 80). Mr. Davis and Mr. Knight were “loud” and Mr. Knight was yelling and cursing (Id., pp. 80, 81). After the ten minute argument Mr. Knight “bolted out of the building and left” (Id., pp. 76, 81). 16. Later that day, Mr. Knight questioned Mr. Grant why he was installing a door and Mr. Grant explained that Norman Davis had asked him to install the door (Id., p. 86). After Mr. Knight left the area, Mr. Davis asked Mr. Grant what he and Mr. Knight were talking about. When Mr. Grant responded, Mr. Davis told Mr. Grant to “just do what you’re doing” (Id., p. 86). Mr. Davis then confronted Mr. Knight about problems with his performance at the jobsite, including his non-payment of the workers (Id., p. 87). 17. After Mr. Davis confronted Mr. Knight, Mr. Knight went over to Mr. Grant and punched him in the face (Id., p. 88). Mr. Knight struck Mr. Grant in the forehead “for no reason” (Id.). Norman Davis was present when Mr. Knight struck Mr. Grant in the forehead (Id., p. 92). Mr. Knight left the area after he hit Mr. Grant in the face (Id., pp. 92-93). 6 6 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 18. Mr. Knight then came back inside and told Mr. Grant to leave the jobsite (Id., p. 89). Mr. Grant insisted that he be paid for the work he had performed (Id.). At that time, Academy Director, Ms. Taylor, came to the area and told Mr. Knight: “I’m not giving you another dime until the work is completed, and so far I’ve given you over 100,000” (Id., p. 89). Mr. Knight didn’t say anything, but just left the area (Id., p. 91). 19. A couple of minutes later, when Mr. Grant went outside, he saw Mr. Knight in the school yard (Id., pp. 90-91). The two began to discuss payment for his work (Id., p. 93). Mr. Grant said he wanted to be paid in cash and did not want a check (Id.). Mr. Grant then got a telephone call and he spoke on the phone briefly (Id.). 20. As soon as Mr. Grant ended his call, he was struck in the right ear “real hard” by Mr. Knight (Id., p. 94). 21. Mr. Grant testified that Ms. Taylor told him she had witnessed that assault. Ms. Taylor informed Mr. Grant that she saw Mr. Knight knock him to the ground and begin to strike him in the face (Id., p. 98). Mr. Grant further testified: “And she said (an) electrician who ran outside pulled his screwdriver from his waist and got him off of me… And (Mr. Knight) started running down the block” (Id.). 22. Mr. Grant testified that he recalls that the assault occurred “in the driveway to the school” (Id., p. 111). He described that the incident occurred in the Academy’s “yard space” (Id.). Mr. Grant testified that he knows “I was standing right there in the yard” (Id., p. 110). 23. Mr. Knight was subsequently apprehended and he pled guilty to misdemeanor assault (Id., pp. 107, 111). 7 7 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 24. As a result of the assault at issue, Mr. Grant sustained head trauma, a broken nose, on-going migraine headaches, and he has undergone eye surgeries (Id., pp. 113- 114). C. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Negligence Against the Academy 25. This action was commenced on behalf of plaintiff Mushtaq Grant to recover for the physical injuries he sustained in the assault perpetrated against him while lawfully on the Academy’s premises to perform construction work (see, Exhibit A to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No. 72, Summons and Verified Complaint). 26. Plaintiff’s verified bill of particulars alleges, in part, that the Academy should be held liable for the assault on Mr. Grant due to its negligence in failing to provide adequate security for workers within the Academy premises and in failing to take suitable and proper precautions for the safety of persons within Academy premises (see, Exhibit C to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No. 74, Plaintiff’s Verified Bill of Particulars, para. 5). D. This Court’s Denial of the Academy’s Motion for Summary Judgment_________________________ 27. In its Decision and Order, dated October 26, 2022, this Court denied the Academy’s motion for summary judgment. In explaining the basis for its determination, the Court stated that defendant did not meet its prima facie burden of proof “due to the lack of sufficient evidence” (Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102, Decision and Order, dated October 26, 2022, p. 2). 8 8 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 28. In denying the Academy’s motion for summary judgment, the Court further reasoned: Defendant contends they did not employ Mr. Knight, but rather they entered into an arms-length contractual relationship with him. Any contract between the parties regarding the renovations are significant to determine the relationship, if any, of employer, employee, contractor and sub-contractor. Here, Defendant failed to submit such contract to the court and there is conflicting deposition testimony from Plaintiff and the Academy owner. Therefore, material issues of fact exist as to whether Defendant had a duty towards Plaintiff and, alternatively, whether Defendant breached such a duty (Id.). E. Defendant Has Not Shown Any Grounds for This Court to Grant Leave to Reargue to Reconsider its Prior Determination That Defendant Failed to Satisfy its Prima Facie Evidentiary Burden With Respect to its Claim that Assailant Robert Knight Was Not an Employee of the Academy___________________ 29. As the record establishes, and as this Court previously found, when moving for summary judgment, the Academy failed to satisfy its prima facie burden of proof. Defendant has not demonstrated any basis for this Court to revisit its prior determination on reargument. The Academy has fundamentally failed to show any error by this Court in denying the Academy’s prior motion. See, Matter of Carter v Carter, 81 AD3d 819 (2d Dept 2011); Matter of Hill v New York City Tr. Auth., 68 AD3d 866 (2d Dept 2009); William P. Pahl Equip. Corp. v Kassis, 182 AD2d 22 (1st Dept 1992); Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558 (1st Dept 1979). 30. In V. Veeraswamy Realty v Yenom Corp., 71 AD3d 874 (2d Dept 2010), the court made clear: “A motion for leave to reargue ‘shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion’ (CPLR 2221 [d] [2])… [A] 9 9 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 motion for leave to reargue ‘is not designed to provide an unsuccessful party with successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided’ (citations omitted).” Id. 31. In Matter of Silver v Frieden, 12 Misc3d 1181(A) (Sup Ct, New York County 2006), the court instructed: “‘A motion for reargument is not just a repetitious application by a disappointed lawyer, who feels he ought to have as much further reconsideration as he chooses’… Likewise a motion to reargue is not an opportunity ‘to allow counsel to rehash questions already decided’ (citations omitted).” Id. 32. In Matter of Hill v New York City Tr. Auth., 68 AD3d 866 (2d Dept 2009), the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting a motion for leave to reargue “since the Supreme Court did not overlook or misapprehend the facts or law in its initial determination, or mistakenly arrive at its earlier determination.” Id. at 867. Here, too, the Academy has not demonstrated any grounds for reargument. Accordingly, it is submitted that this Court should adhere to its denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 33. Defendant contends that reargument is warranted because the evidence it submitted in support of its summary judgment motion was sufficient to show that Mr. Knight was not an Academy employee and that there was a lack of an employment relationship between Mr. Knight and the Academy. However, defendant neglects to consider that its summary judgment motion wholly ignored the allegations of negligence stated in plaintiff’s bill of particulars (see, Exhibit C to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No., 74, Verified Bill of Particulars, para. 5). Moreover, in offering its narrow ground for reargument, the Academy conveniently neglects that it did not affirmatively offer any proof to establish as a matter of law that Mr. Knight and the Academy did not share an 10 10 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 employee/employer relationship. Defendant is under the erroneous impression that vague testimony from Ms. Taylor as to the mere existence of a contract with Mr. Knight satisfied the Academy’s prima facie burden of proof. 34. Contrary to defendant’s mistaken view, Ms. Taylor’s testimony that she “hired Mr. Knight and signed a contract with him” does not establish as a matter of law that Mr. Knight was not an employee of the Academy (Taylor Deposition, p. 16). Nor does such testimony address the duties assumed by the Academy and the scope of Mr. Knight’s responsibilities when he was hired. The Academy is unable to point to any evidence regarding the terms of its contract with Mr. Knight. As this Court correctly observed, the Academy’s failure to submit the written agreement it signed with Mr. Knight leaves unresolved the nature of the relationship between those parties. 35. Unable to acknowledge the absence of adequate proof in support of its summary judgment motion, the Academy oddly suggests that it was incumbent upon Mr. Grant to know and testify about the nature of the relationship between Mr. Knight and the Academy. In adopting that untenable and irrational argument, the Academy improperly seeks to avoid its prima facie evidentiary burden as movant. See, CPLR §3212; Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 (1986). 36. Attempting to mask the insufficiency of its evidentiary showing on its summary judgment motion, the Academy asserts that “Plaintiff did not testify that Knight was an employee of the Academy” (Affirmation in Support of Motion to Reargue, para. 41). Given that the Academy did not submit its written agreement with Mr. Knight and did not establish as a matter of law that he was not an Academy employee, defendant did not satisfy its prima facie evidentiary burden by taking issue with what plaintiff knew about the Academy’s relationship 11 11 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 with Mr. Knight. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied due to its failure to satisfy its initial evidentiary burden regardless of its belief as to the adequacy of plaintiff’s opposition. See, Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, supra, 68 NY2d 324. 37. It is irrefutable that the Academy’s motion for summary judgment was unsupported by its written agreement with Mr. Knight. It is likewise indisputable that, as the Court recognized, “Any contract between the parties regarding the renovations are significant to determine the relationship, if any, of employer, employee, contractor, and subcontractor” (Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102, Decision and Order, dated October 26, 2022, p. 2). Consequently, this Court was unquestionably correct in concluding that the Academy did not satisfy its prima facie burden of proof “due to the lack of sufficient evidence” (Id.).2 38. Having failed to submit sufficient proof to satisfy its burden of proof on the limited argument it raised, the Academy attempts to hide its evidentiary deficiency through citation to irrelevant case law. Contrary to defendant’s erroneous and misleading characterization, Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469 (2d Dept 1998), and Sanabria v Borges, 117 AD3d 1024 (2d Dept 2014), do not stand for the proposition that the absence of a written contract never matters when considering the existence of an employment relationship (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, p. 10). Neither case 2 Ms. Taylor’s deposition testimony showed that she retained Mr. Knight personally, as she stated that she “hired Mr. Knight and had a contract with him” (Taylor Deposition, p. 16). Her affidavit in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment contradicted that testimony. When moving for summary judgment, Ms. Taylor stated in her affidavit that she “retained the services of Envision Design & Construction LLC” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 78, Affidavit of Rose Donna Taylor, para. 4). That material testimonial conflict from defendant’s own witness further negates any claim from the Academy that it proffered sufficient evidence to satisfy its prima facie burden of proof. Ms. Taylor’s own contradictory statements highlight why this Court was correct in concluding that defendant’s failure to submit its written agreement with Mr. Knight compels the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 12 12 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 excuses or obviates the Academy’s failure to submit its written agreement with Mr. Knight when moving for summary judgment. 39. In Murphy, supra, the court concluded, based on the evidence there presented, that factual questions remained as to whether plaintiff was an employee or independent contractor, even though she was described as an “independent contractor” in the written agreement at issue. In Sanabria, supra, the court observed that “While the existence of a contract designating a person as an independent contractor is not dispositive, it is a factor to be considered” when determining whether one is an independent contractor or employee. 117 AD3d 1026. 40. The issues and conclusions in Murphy and Sanabria do not demonstrate any error by the Court here when denying the Academy’s motion for summary judgment. In the case at bar, the Academy relied on the mere existence of a written agreement with Mr. Knight, without any showing as to its terms, scope, obligations and requirements. As this Court properly determined, the contract itself is needed to determine the relationship between the Academy and Mr. Knight. Having failed to submit the contract, as well as any evidence regarding its salient language, the Academy did not satisfy its prima facie burden that it cannot be held liable for Mr. Knight’s misconduct. 41. Not only did the Academy fail to satisfy its prima facie burden with respect to its claim that Mr. Knight was not an Academy employee, but defendant also did not establish as a matter of law that Mr. Knight was acting outside the scope of his employment. As case law holds, “An act is considered to be within the scope of employment if it is performed while the employee is engaged generally in the business of the employer” (Pinto v Tenenbaum, 105 AD3d 930, 931 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 25 NY3d 913 [2015]; see also, Fika Midwifery 13 13 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 PLLC v. Independent Health Assn., Inc., 208 AD3d 1052, 1055 [4th Dept 2022]). “Whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment is generally a question of fact for the jury” (Uy v Hussein, 186 AD3d 1567, 1570 [2d Dept 2020]). 42. In the case at bar, the facts show that the assault at issue occurred when Mr. Knight and Mr. Grant were discussing Mr. Grant’s continued work at the Academy directly after Mr. Davis and Ms. Taylor had each confronted Mr. Knight about problems with his performance at the jobsite (Id., pp. 86-89, 93). This evidence raises a material issue of fact as to whether Mr. Knight was engaged generally in his work at and on behalf of the Academy when the assault at issue occurred. 43. In this regard, defendants are wrong in asserting that “an assault is outside of the scope of the employment as a matter of law” (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, p. 11). Defendant’s citation to cases in which, on the facts there presented, an assault was held to be outside of the scope of a particular employee’s employment does not give credence to defendant’s proposed rule of law that an assault may never be found to be within the scope of an employee’s employment. Cf., Salem v MacDougal Rest. Inc., 148 AD3d 501, 502 (1st Dept 2017) (In action brought by bar patron following assault by defendant’s employee, affirming denial defendant’s motion for summary judgment because “On this record, it cannot be concluded, as a matter of law, that the bouncer was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the assault”). 14 14 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 F. In Moving for Reargument, Defendant Does Not Refute its Liability for Failing to Provide Adequate Security to Prevent the Foreseeable Assault of Mr. Grant Which Occurred on the Premises of the Academy____________ 44. In addition to failing to show error in the Court’s stated grounds for the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Academy also does not refute that denial of its motion would have been warranted for another reason. When claiming an entitlement to summary judgment, defendant failed to refute as a matter of law that its employee, Norman Davis, knew of the violent actions of Robert Knight before he again assaulted Mr. Grant on Academy premises. As plaintiff argued in opposition to summary judgment, the Academy’s comprehensive failure to demonstrate as a matter of law that it provided adequate security to prevent a foreseeable act of violence on its premises compelled the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see, Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Exhibits, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 89, 90). 45. Testimony from Mr. Grant established that prior to the assault at issue, Academy employee Norman Davis supervised Mr. Knight; Mr. Davis got into a loud and heated altercation with Mr. Knight, and Mr. Davis witnessed Mr. Knight strike Mr. Grant in the face (Plaintiff’s Deposition, pp. 61-62, 65-67, 76, 80, 81, 86, 92). Thus, contrary to defendant’s ill- conceived claim, plaintiff need not have established that the Academy knew of Mr. Knight’s violent tendencies when it hired him because Mr. Davis, on behalf of the Academy, unquestionably knew that Mr. Knight had already assaulted Mr. Grant on Academy premises prior to the assault at issue, which also occurred on Academy premises (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reargue, p. 14). 15 15 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 46. It is for this reason that defendant’s reliance on Johnson v Cummings, 205 AD3d 614 (1st Dept 2022), is misplaced. There, unlike the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the assailant had previously assaulted the plaintiff in front of an employee of the defendant. In Johnson, unlike the case at bar, there was no proof to raise an issue of fact as to the adequacy of defendant’s security in light of its knowledge that the assailant had previously struck the plaintiff on its premises. 47. The unrefuted evidence at bar establishing that Academy employee Norman Davis was aware that Mr. Knight violently struck Mr. Grant prior to the assault at issue raises factual issues as to defendant’s liability for the violent conduct which caused Mr. Grant’s injuries. That is so regardless of defendant’s assertion that Mr. Knight was not an Academy employee. See, D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 (1987) (“Landowners in general have a duty to act in a reasonable manner to prevent harm to those on their property… In particular, they have a duty to control the conduct of third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity to control such persons and are reasonably aware of the need for such control [citations omitted]”); Vetrone v Ha Di Corp., 22 AD3d 835, 839 (2d Dept 2005) (“[I]ntervening criminal acts may still give rise to liability under ordinary principles of negligence where there is a sufficient underlying legal relationship between the parties…and where the acts are ‘a reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances created by the defendant’ [citations omitted]”); Watson v Adirondack Trailways, 45 AD2d 504 (3rd Dept 1974) (Affirming judgment after trial for plaintiff who was assaulted at a bus terminal by a passenger who had been swinging his arms in a violent manner and had not been permitted to board a bus). 48. What is more, defendant again neglects to properly account for the fact that Mr. Davis recommended Mr. Knight for the construction and renovation project at issue 16 16 of 22 FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2023 02:50 PM INDEX NO. 27619/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 109 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2023 (Exhibit D to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, NYSCEF Doc. No. 75, Taylor Deposition, p. 16). Thus, what Mr. Davis knew about Mr. Knight and his past experiences with him are central to defendant’s claim that the assault on Mr. Grant was not foreseeable. Despite that, however, defendant has ignored Mr. Davis’s knowledge and awareness of Mr. Knight and his prior acts of violence – omissions which underscore the inadequacy of defendant’s evidentiary showing in support of its motion. Despite the considerable proof showing Mr. Davis’s significant involvement with Mr. Knight and the events leading up to the assault of Mr. Grant, defendant conveniently chose not to submit any testimony from Norman Davis. 49. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was silent with respect to Mr. Davis’s knowledge of the prior violent actions of Robert Knight perpetrated on Academy grounds. Defendant’s motion did not refute that Mr. Davis’s awareness that Mr. Knight previously struck Mr. Grant raises issues of fact as to the foreseeability of the assault at issue, the inadequacy of the security measures on Academy premises and whether the Academy’s failure to provide sufficient security was a proximate cause of the assault at issue on Mr. Grant. Defendant’s omissions in this regard provided additional grounds for the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Rotz v New York, 143 AD2d 301, 304 (1st Dept 1988) (“Issues of negligence, foreseeability and proximate cause involve the kinds of judgmental variables which have traditionally, and soundly, been left to the finders of fact to resolve even where the facts are essentially undisputed”); Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp., 249 AD2d 164, 165 (1st Dept 1998) (“Clearly, whether a risk is foreseeable under a specific set of circumstances is generally a question best left to a trier of fact”). 50. In addition to overlooking the salient proof, when moving for summary