Judgment: Conti, John R Vs Unknown Spouse Of John R Conti

Case Number: 23LBCV01545 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Arkas, LLC filed this action against Defendants, Elizabeth Richter and all unknown occupants, tenants, and subtenants for unlawful detainer on 8/15/23. Defendant filed a response to the complaint on 9/01/23. 2. Trial The Court called this matter for a non-jury trial on 12/06/08 and concluded trial on 12/08/23. Plaintiff appeared through an attorney, Defendant appeared and represented herself. The Court found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. On 12/20/23, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The judgment is for possession only, and does not include an award of monetary damages. 3. Post-Trial Proceedings Defendant has filed numerous post-trial motions and applications. On 12/20/23, she filed an ex parte application for order staying execution of judgment, which was denied. On 1/12/24, at Plaintiffs request, the Court issued a writ of possession. On 2/09/24, Defendant filed a 170.6 challenge to judicial officer, which was denied. On 2/16/24, Defendant filed a motion to set aside and vacate judgment. It appears this is the motion on calendar today, though Defendant failed to indicate the date for hearing on her moving papers; the motion will be discussed further below. On 5/17/24, Defendant filed an ex parte application to vacate judgment, which was denied. On 5/28/24, Defendant filed an ex parte application for arrest of Sam Ostayon and parties involved in fraud upon the court, which was denied; she also filed an ex parte application to set aside the judgment and quash any writ of possession, which was also denied. 4. Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment CCP §663a a. Grounds for Motion As noted above, on 2/16/24, Defendant filed a motion to set aside/vacate judgment CCP §663a. There is no notice of motion, and no hearing date. There is, however, a reservation ID number, and it appears Defendant reserved the motion for hearing on 7/11/24. The caption of the motion indicates it is brought per U.S.C.S. Ct. App. 9 th Cir., Appx R 8001(d)-1. This is a California state court, and state courts are not governed by federal law. Defendants motion indicates she seeks relief because Sami Mikhael Ostayan falsely stated, under oath, that Arkas is a non-profit company, when it is in reality a for-profit company. Additionally, she contends properties subject to foreclosure are reported to the attorney general for verification of eligible bidders, but Defendants property has not been registered with the AG. Finally, she contends Ostayan was sworn into court under oath as MR. STEIN. b. Summary of Opposition Defendant contends the motion was not timely filed, and because the time limit for ruling on a motion to vacate judgment has expired, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Defendant contends the motion is moot because the sheriffs department completed the lock-out process in May. Defendant contends Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence to support any of her contentions. c. Analysis Per CCP §663a(b), the time for the Court to rule on the motion has expired. The Code makes clear that the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment shall expire 75 days&after service upon the moving party by any party of written notice of entry of judgment. Plaintiff served written notice of entry of judgment on 12/21/23. The time limit is jurisdictional. See Advanced Building Maintenance v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393-94. The motion to vacate judgment is therefore denied. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 9, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT JUSTIN LUU, XIAO WU DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action as to the moving defendants. Plaintiff must also allege tender or facts supporting an exception from the tender rule. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Motion for Interlocutory Judgment for CVPS2304994 BODINE vs LIEM Partition and Appointment of Referee by WILLIAM P. BODINE Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. Hearing will be conducted on Monday July 15, 2024 8:30 a.m. Department PS2.

Case Number: 23TRCV01708 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B SMBD INVESTMENTS, LP, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV01708 vs. [Tentative] RULING COCOS RESTAURANTS, LLC, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Attorney Phillip Allan Trajan Perez and Benjamin P. Tarczy at Miller Nash LP, attorney for defendants Responding Party: None Motions to Be Relieved as Counsel The Court considered the moving papers. RULING The motions are GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendants, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the clients. BACKGROUND On May 30, 2023, plaintiff SMBD Investments, LP filed a complaint against Cocos Restaurants, LLC, Sharis Management Corporation, and Fri-M, LLC for breach of lease and account stated. On August 7, 2023, defendants filed an answer. LEGAL STANDARD The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 398. CRC Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). DISCUSSION Defendants attorneys, Phillip Allan Trajan Perez and Benjamin P. Tarczy at Miller Nash LP seek to be relieved as counsel. Counsel Tarczy states in his declaration that defendants have not complied with their engagement agreement with Miller Nash LP by failing to pay outstanding attorneys fees and costs it has incurred. Starting in August 2023, counsel has made several requests that defendants become current on their outstanding fees and costs. Counsel also states that defendants have consented to Miller Nash LPs withdrawal as counsel but have not found new counsel. The Court finds that the attorney submitted a declaration establishing that the service requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362, have been satisfied. The Court also finds that the attorney has shown sufficient reason why the motion to be relieved as counsel should be granted. The motion is GRANTED. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendants, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the clients. Moving counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

SCV-265714, County of Sonoma v. Castagnola Appearances required.

Delage, et al. v. Wall, et al. – Case No. 2023-12309 5/16/24 – Demurrer Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant JOSHUA DELAGE filed a Demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant MARK WALL’s Amended Answer on April 11, 2024. Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant DELAGE also filed a Reply on May 8, 2024. The Reply refers to an Opposition, however no Opposition was filed with the Court. It appears it may have been served, but not filed. As such, the Court continues Demurrer to July 16, 2024 at 9:00 am in Dept. 10B. Defendant/Cross-Complainant is ORDERED to file the Opposition served on Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant. No further briefing is allowed without leave of Court. Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCV02455 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 IVAN D. RODRIGUEZ, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. EVARISTO RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ; LENEICE WHITE; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV02455 Hearing Date: 7/12/24 Trial Date: None set [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants Demurrer and Motion to Strike. Facts Plaintiff Ivan Rodriguez rented the property located at 3280 Folsom Street Los Angeles, California 90063 to Defendants. On or around December 28, 2023, plaintiff listed the property for sale to which defendants disagreed. On or around January 17, 2024, real estate agent Jesse Uribe conducted a title search and discovered a grant deed recorded on December 29, 2023. The deed, identified as instrument number 20230919365 grants defendant a 50% interest in the property as joint tenants with plaintiff who claims he was unaware of the forged deed until informed by Uribe on January 17, 2024. On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for: 1. Quiet Title 2. Cancellation of Instrument 3. Declaratory Relief 4. Negligence 5. Payment on Bond. Defendant Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez (Defendant) demurs to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action on three grounds: (1) that the pleadings are vague and the complaint is based on information and belief as to matters for which Defendant does not have superior knowledge; (2) as to the first cause of action for quiet title, the complaint must be amended to reflect the date as of which the determination is sought and the pleadings are vague and unintelligible; and (3) as to the second cause of action for cancellation of instrument, the complaint fails to allege how Plaintiff knows that Defendant forged the purported grant deed when Plaintiff has possession of the driver license that was presented to the notary public, the pleadings are vague and unintelligible such that Defendant cannot respond to such allegations of ultimate facts made on information and belief that are not within his superior knowledge, and Defendant is in essence investigating the facts that Plaintiff should have discovered prior to bringing the action. The Court analyzes each ground in turn. Meet and Confer The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement for this motion has been satisfied. (See Graham Decl., ¶ 2.) Demurrer Analysis : The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer challenges only legal sufficiency of complaint, not truth or accuracy of its factual allegations or plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations. ( Assurance Co. of Am. v. Haven (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 78, 82.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP § 430.30(a).) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. ( Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence." ( Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc . (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.) Quiet Title A plaintiff alleges a quiet title action where they allege that [1] the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land and [2] that the defendant claims an interest therein [3] adverse to him. ( South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 740; see also Gray v Walker (1910) 157 Cal. 381, 384 [the complaint contains a statement of all the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action. It avers that plaintiff is the owner and in possession of certain land, that defendant claims an interest therein adverse to plaintiff, and that such claim is without right.].) However, generally, the holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet title action against the legal owner. ( Lewis v. Superior Ct. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1866; see also Staffor v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 294-95 [It has been held consistently that the owner of an equitable interest cannot maintain an action to quiet title against the owner of the legal title.]) There is a limited exception to this rule, in the case where legal title was acquired through fraud. (See Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 114.) Legal title does not have a strict legal meaning. ( Solomon v. Walton (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 381, 386.) The term legal title has been defined as one cognizable or enforceable in a court of law, or one which complete and perfect so far as regards the apparent right of ownership and possession, but which carries no beneficial interest in the property, another person being equitably entitled thereto. . . ( Parkmerced Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1094-95.) Defendant argues that the claim for quiet title action fails because Plaintiff failed to plead the date as of which the determination is sought and failed to provide the information which he relied upon to believe that Defendant committed forgery. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for quiet title as the complaint alleges that Defendant obtained title by fraud. Since Plaintiff seeks to establish title against the adverse claims of Defendant, he argues that the claim for quiet title is the appropriate remedy. Defendant provides no arguments in reply. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of real property located at 3280 Folsom Street Los Angeles, California 90063 (Compl. ¶ 6), that a forged deed purports to grant Defendant a 50% gift interest in the subject property (Compl. ¶ 10), and that Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against all adverse claims as of December 29, 2023 as they are without any right whatsoever. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The Court finds that these constitute sufficient facts to support a cause of action for quiet title. Cancellation of Instrument To prevail on a claim to cancel an instrument, a plaintiff must prove (1) the instrument is void or voidable due to, for example, fraud; and (2) there is a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alteration of one's position. ( Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 1180, 1193-94.) Defendant argues that the complaint fails to provide the information which led Plaintiff to believe that Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez committed forgery. Defendant also asserts that the complaint fails to allege tender, to the extent that Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez is the equitable owner, and Plaintiff holds title as constructive trustee with no authority to list the property for sale out from under Defendant. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for cancellation of instrument as he is attacking the forged deed and is seeking an order to cancel the forged deed. Defendant provides no arguments in reply. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Grant Deed recorded on December 29, 2023 is a forged deed that is void or voidable and that said grant deed will cause Plaintiff serious injury as he is being deprived of his 100% ownership in the subject property. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-21.) The Court finds that these constitute sufficient facts to support a cause of action for cancellation of instrument. Declaratory Relief Plaintiff argues that he is seeking a judicial determination that he is the 100% owner of the subject property and that Defendant has no interest in the subject property. Plaintiff states he is seeking a judicial declaration that the forged deed is invalid. Defendant provides no arguments as to why the claim for declaratory relief fails as a matter of law. The complaint requests declaratory relief in the form of a judicial declaration that Plaintiff is 100% owner of the subject property and Defendant holds no interest in the Subject Property. The Court finds this is sufficient. Accordingly, the demurrer OVERRULED. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Case Number: 21GDCV00154 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 2 Date: 7/12/2024 Case No: 21 GDCV00154 Case Name: Nayar, et al. v. Foldi, et al. MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Moving Party: Plaintiffs Vinod Nayar and Wendy K. Hammond Responding Party: Defendants Jozsef Ferencz Foldi and Ma Victoria Yess Foldi RELIEF REQUESTED: Order enforcing the terms of the settlement between the parties. SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiffs Vinod Nayar and Wendy K. Hammond allege that they are the owners of property in Pasadena, and that defendants Jozsef Ferencz Foldi and Ma Victoria Yess Foldi own neighboring property which is on the property line of the plaintiffs property. The FAC alleges that the roots of defendants trees have been encroaching onto the subject property and causing damage, and that plaintiffs have notified defendants, but defendants have failed to take proper action to cure the defect. The FAC alleges that as a result of defendants trees plaintiffs have suffered loss of use of their backyard, damage to their garage, damage to the subject property and an increase in expenses of maintenance. The FAC alleges causes of action for trespass, private nuisance and negligence. Defendants have filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs as cross-defendants alleging that the roots of cross-defendants trees have been encroaching on cross-plaintiffs property and that the encroaching tree was planted by the prior owners of cross-defendants property, and is encroaching onto both properties, but despite the possible joint ownership and responsibility for the tree, cross-defendants have sought to place the entire burden of the encroaching tree on cross-plaintiffs. The cross-complaint also alleges that cross-defendants have removed an existing fence and replaced it with a new fence further into cross-plaintiffs property, installed walls which interfere with cross-plaintiffs use and enjoyment of their land and access from the front and back yards, and which destroyed a hibiscus tree, and have caused damage to cross-plaintiffs property. On July 26, 2023, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement of the Entire Case. ANALYSIS: Plaintiffs Vinod Nayar and Wendy K. Hammond seek to enforce the settlement entered between the parties. CCP § 664.6 provides, in pertinent part: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court...for settlement of the case,... the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. In this case, plaintiffs indicate that at a Judicial Mandatory Settlement Conference Program, the parties agreed in writing and entered into a settlement agreement. [Hemming Decl., para. 2]. Plaintiffs submit a Settlement Agreement which was signed by the parties outside the presence of the court. [Ex. 1]. The matter has not yet been dismissed, and the court still has jurisdiction over the matter. The Second District in Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal. App.4th 793 held that a trial court may on a section 664.6 motion receive evidence, determine disputed facts and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, but may not create the material terms of a settlement as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves agreed to. Weddington, at 810. The trial courts determination with respect to interpretation of the settlement agreement will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Skulnick v. Roberts Express, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 884, 889. As an initial matter, defendants in opposition argue that they were not served with written notice of the current hearing date for the motion, but current counsel was served with the motion giving notice of the hearing on April 26, 2024. [Torres Decl., paras. 2, 3]. It appears from the file that no written notice of the hearing date being continued has been filed, although a minute order from April 26, 2024, the original noticed hearing date, indicates that Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the OSC re dismissal was continued to July 12, 2024. The declaration of counsel makes it clear that counsel for defendants has all along been aware of the continued hearing date. [Torres Decl., para. 3]. Defendants in opposition also address the motion on its merits. It is held that insufficient or defective notice may be waived if opposing counsel argues the merits of the motion. Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984, 2nd Dist) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7; Carlton v. Quint (2000, 2nd Dist.) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697. While it is concerning that written notice was not properly served and filed here, given that defendants have timely responded to the motion on its merits for the scheduled hearing date, the court will reluctantly deem the notice irregularity waived and will consider the motion on its merits. The motion seeks enforcement of the term of the settlement pursuant to which defendants agreed to remove a tree. Plaintiffs indicate that the settlement amount in the sum of $90,865.00 has been paid in full, so there is no monetary judgment to be entered. [Hemming Decl., para. 4]. The Settlement Agreement indicates that the matter is settled on the following terms and conditions: Defendants to completely remove the avocado tree within 90 days of settlement at their cost. [Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement, para. 1]. Plaintiffs indicate in the declaration of counsel that The Defendants have breached the settlement agreement, by not removing the stump or the roots of the avocado tree. [Hemming Decl., para. 3]. It appears that the agreement was for defendants to completely remove the tree, so that a breach of the agreement has been established. Defendants in the opposition indicate that the motion on this issue is now moot, as on April 12, 2024, defendants completed further removal of the tree, an inspection was conducted, and it has been agreed that the removal of the remaining tree stump is sufficient. [Torres Decl., para. 9, Ex. C]. The photographs attached do not clearly indicate to the court that the stump has been completely removed. [See Ex. C]. The court will hear argument concerning whether there remains a continuing need to enter the term concerning tree removal as judgment in this case. The terms and conditions also include a term that money be paid, and specific terms concerning a garage rebuild, evidently to be performed by plaintiffs. While the moving papers indicate that the money has been paid, there is no mention in the moving papers of the garage rebuild terms. Defendants in opposition indicate that they believe plaintiffs have made no repairs to the structure at issue. It is the courts practice when entering judgment enforcing the settlement agreement to also include in the judgment the terms agreed to by the parties in connection with that aspect of the settlement. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement provides: The garage rebuild shall be in compliance with all required ordinances, building codes and permits of the City of Pasadena building and safety and Pasadena Planning Department (collectively referred to as, Code sections"). If there are any violations of the Code sections noted or cited, Plaintiffs must cure (bring into compliance with the Code sections) within a reasonable time no more than one year from the date of the settlement agreement, unless unfeasible within the given time frame. If the time frame for completion and/or correction is not feasible, the parties shall meet and confer to reach a mutually acceptable time frame. Defendants to dismiss counter complaint. Parties to mutually cooperate with the tree removal and garage construction by communicating through email in a reasonable manner and time frame. Response to the email shall be given no more than 72 hours after the email has been sent. The time frame for response does not apply to emergency situations. If a matter is urgent it should be noted in the subject line of the email. The email communication should be sent to Josef Ferencz Foldi II at Joeyfoldi@gmail.com, Vinod Nayar at Timnayar@gmail.com and Wendy Hammond at wendyk8@gmail.com. [Settlement Agreement, para. 1]. This term will also be included in the judgment unless at the hearing sufficient evidence is presented that the garage rebuild is fully complete. Plaintiffs also seek attorneys fees for the cost of bringing this motion. The Settlement Agreement states that while each party shall bear their own costs and fees arising from or related to the action: The party obtaining enforcement of this settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees. [Settlement Agreement, para. 5]. The motion accordingly seeks $2,560 in attorneys fees. The declaration in support of the motion indicates that counsels fee is $300 per hour and counsel has spent 8.5 hours on the motion, including the time counsel anticipates spending to prepare for and appear at the hearing. [Hemming Decl., para. 5]. This amount actually totals $2,550, not $2,560. Defendants in the opposition argue that no attorneys fees should be awarded because at the time the motion was filed the parties were in meet and confer discussions concerning plans for further removal. Defendants indicate that counsel for plaintiffs sent a demand on January 4, 2024 seeking compliance by further removal of the existing tree stump, advising of an intent to file a motion and setting a deadline of January 17, 2024, and that on January 16, 2024, counsel for defendants sent an email advising that defendants had acted to retain a company for further removal and requesting plaintiffs availability in the event access to their property was needed. [Torres Decl., paras. 7, 8]. There was no response to this email or information sent on January 26, 2024, but this motion was filed on February 13, 2024. [Torres Decl., para. 8]. No copies of this email or correspondence is attached to the opposition. Under the circumstances, it appears that the tree removal was not completed within the agreed upon timeframe, that the filing of this motion appeared necessary at the time, but that the relief sought in the moving papers is essentially unnecessary, so that plaintiffs will not be parties who have successfully obtained enforcement of the settlement terms they sought to enforce. RULING: Has the tree stump removal been satisfactorily completed? Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 664.6. The Court finds that parties to pending litigation stipulated to the settlement of the case in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court. Judgment accordingly is entered in conformity with the Settlement Agreement executed by the parties dated June 12, 2023, except there will be no money judgment entered as the monetary settlement sum has already been paid. Specifically, the terms remaining to be performed are as follows: (If necessary) Defendants to completely remove the avocado tree within 90 days of settlement at their cost. The garage rebuild shall be in compliance with all required ordinances, building codes and permits of the City of Pasadena building and safety and Pasadena Planning Department (collectively referred to as, Code sections"). If there are any violations of the Code sections noted or cited, Plaintiffs must cure (bring into compliance with the Code sections) within a reasonable time no more than one year from the date of the settlement agreement, unless unfeasible within the given time frame. If the time frame for completion and/or correction is not feasible, the parties shall meet and confer to reach a mutually acceptable time frame. Defendants to dismiss counter complaint. Parties are to mutually cooperate with the tree removal and garage construction by communicating through email in a reasonable manner and time frame. Response to the email shall be given no more than 72 hours after the email has been sent. The time frame for response does not apply to emergency situations. If a matter is urgent, it should be noted in the subject line of the email. The email communication should be sent to Josef Ferencz Foldi II at Joeyfoldi@gmail.com, Vinod Nayar at Timnayar@gmail.com and Wendy Hammond at wendyk8@gmail.com. Attorneys fees requested are DENIED. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.