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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
KHAN BUSINESS, LLC JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION & RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
, Khalid Mahmood (“Mahmood”) a
this, their Opposition and Response to Farman
Khan’s (“Khan”) Motion for Summary Judgment (the
the Court the following:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Farman Kahn (“Khan”), and Khalid
Mahmood (“Mahmood”) executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement (the “A greement”) dated May
21, 2010, wherein Khan and Mahmood would purch
Per the Agreement, Khan and Mahmood ag
Trust and Promissory Note, dated June 29, 2010, which outlined the terms for payment and
On June 29, 2010, Joseph Chau Minh Ngo and The Thi Nguyen (“Grantors”)
executed a Special Warranty DeedWarranty Deed”)(together, the
“Contract Documents”). The Special Warranty Deed was filed and recorded with the Harris
County Property Records as Instrument No. 20100280140.
Pursuant to the Contract Documents, Grantors retained legal and equitable title in
the Property until the terms of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust were satisfied in full.
Thus, at the time of trial in the Underlying Suit, Grantors still retained equitable and
legal title to the Property. However, Grantors were not parties to the Underlying Suit due to
Plaintiff's failure to properly join them.
Mahmood and Khan Business, LLC (“Khan Business”) have made all mortgage
payments, tax payments, business expenses, and general upkeep/maintenance expenses under the
Deed of Trust. On the other hand, Khan has not made a single payment towards the mortgage,
taxes, business expenses, or general upkeep/maintenance expenses of the Property. Khan’s sole
investment towards the purchase of the Property was $75,000.00 towards the down payment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2015, Khan sued Mahmood and Khan Business for breach of an
alleged partnership in Cause No. 2015-23716; Farman Khan v. Khalid Mahmood and Khan
Business, LLC; in the 164th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas (the “Underlying
Suit”). In Khan’s Original Petition, he claimed that there was a verbal partnership agreement
between himself and Mahmood to buy real property and to own and operate a convenience store
in which they would both have equal interests. Khan also claimed in his Original Petition that each
In the Underlying Suit, Khan sued Mahmood for breach of contract, trespassing,
breach of fiduciary duty, and “squeezing out”.
On May 12, 2017, Defendants filed their Amended Counterclaims against Plaintiff
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 2 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On February 28, 2019, only four days before trial, Khan filed his Second Amended
Original Petition removing all causes of action except Partition of Real Property. Khan’s
amendment of his petition caused a procedural defect, which altered the nature of the case.
Furthermore, Khan’s one remaining cause of action for partition was improperly pled since the
On March 2, 2019, Defendants asserted additional causes of action of trespass to
try title and declaratory judgment for title. The able Caroline Baker,
declined to hear the issues related to
On March 7, 2019, the Underlying Suit proceeded to trial on Plaintiff's sole issue
of Partition of Real Property, even though the evidence clearly established that the title was in
dispute. On the record and prior to the presentation of evidence, Khan nonsuited all his claims
against Khan Business. Mahmood testified that the mortgage for the Property was still being paid
at time of trial. The jury retumed a verdict that Khan and Mahmood each owned fifty percent
(50%) of the Property, despite a conflicting jury finding that Khan did not make equal contribution
After trial in the Underlying Suit, Khan moved for judgment and Mahmood filed
his objections to the entry of judgment and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
Jury Verdict
on May 17, 2019. Final Judgment has not been entered nor has the Court ruled on Mahmood’s
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
On June 6, 2019, Defendants filed their Original Petition against Farman Khan,
Joseph Chau Minh Ngo, and The Thi Nguyen asserting causes of action for trespass to try title and
equitable title; Cause No. 2019-39151; in the 189 Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 3 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(the “New Suit”). On September 13, 2019, the Underlying Suit and New Suit were consolidated
Ill.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
Defendants submit the following evidence in support of their Response to Khan's
ary Judgment:
Exhibit A Purchase and Sale Agreement
Exhibit B: Deed of Trust
Exhibit C Promissory Note
Exhibit D Special Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien
Exhibit E Excerpts of the Deposition of Farman Khan
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
At the outset, Khan presents a confusing Motion for Summary Judgment which
fails to list what type of motion
Khan fails to make any reference to his burden of proof or the requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P.
166(a) regarding summary judgment proceedings.
“After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment
evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence
of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party
would have the burden of proof grant the motion unless the
respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of
material fact.”
NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Inano-evidence summary judgment setting, the court must review the evidence “in
light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting
evidence favorable to that party, unless reasonable jurors could not.” Mack Tucks, Inc. v. Tamez
206 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tex. 2006). If the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 4 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, a no-evidence summary judgment is
improperly granted. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). More than a scintilla of evidence occurs “when
the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).
TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In a traditional summary judgment setting, the movant bears the burden to
conclusively negate at least one element of the nonmovant’s claim. Frost Nat’] Bank v. Fernandez
315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010) (“a defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the
essential elements of a cause of action or conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled
to asummary judgment.”) A matter is conclusively established when “no reasonable juror would
differ. On the same token, a genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable jurors could
HYBRID MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A motion for summary judgment must rest on the grounds expressly presented in
the motion. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R. Ranch, LP, 511 S.W.3d 538, 546-46 (Tex. 2017);
McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Westbrook
Constr. Co. v. Fid. Nat’] Bank of Dall.
The motion must state, with specificity, the grounds upon which the movant is
relying. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Brewer & Pritchard, 73 S.W.3d at 204; Stiles v. Resolution
, 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. 1993). This gives the nonmovement adequate notice for
opposing the motion by forcing the movant to define the issues. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish
S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009); see also , 858 S.W.2d at 343- 44 (stating that by requiring
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
movant to expressly set forth grounds in the summary judgment motion, the nonmovant has the
grounds for summary judgment narrowly focused and does not have to argue every ground vaguely
referred to in the motion). See, e.g., State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars
& No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013); Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d
When a party files a hybrid motion, the court addresses the no-evidence grounds
first. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). The court addresses the
e non-movant fails to produce le
is no need to analyze whether the movant met its burden under the traditional motion. Because
of this analysis, the movant should “clearly delineate” the bases in its motion. Binur v. Jacobo
135 S.W.3d 646 (Tex.2004). Because Defendants have been prejudiced by the complete lack of
differentiation in Khan’s Motion, Defendants object to any judgment in Plaintiff's favor by the
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
At the outset, it is unclear if Khan’s Motion is a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment ora traditional motion for summary judgment, as Khan only describes his Motion as a
Motion for Summary Judgment. Nor does Khan articulate the respective standards for either no-
evidence motions for summary judgment or traditional motions for summary judgment. In the
absence of notice by Khan of the nature of his to guess at the basic
nature of Plaintiffs Motion, which appears to make both non-evidentiary and evidentiary
arguments at the same time. Accordingly, the Motion cannot survive as either a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment or as traditional motion for summary judgment under applicable
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Texas precedent, as will be described below in greater detail. See Community Health Systems
525 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2017).
TO THE EXTENT KHAN’S MOTION IS A NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IT IS DEFECTVE AND SHOULD BE DENIED.
Texas is a “fair notice” jurisdiction for pleadings, requiring that an opposing party
be able to ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy. Horizon/C MS
Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i)
provides that after adequate times passed for discovery, a party without the burden of proof at time
of trial may file a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and challenge “one or more”
elements of the opponent's claims.
Community Health Systems, supra, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated
its requirements for a no-evidence motion for summary judgment:
Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a no-
evidence motion specifically state the element or elements of which there is
no-evidence. Tex.R.Civ.P 166a(i). We have called for strict enforcement
of this requirement. See Timpte Indus. Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310-
311 (Tex. 2009) (holding that a no-evidence motion must specifically
identify the challenged elements to satisfy Rule 166a(i); McConnell v.
, 858 S.W.2d 337, 339-342 (Tex. 1993). Thus a
no-evidence motion that lists each element of the plaintiff’s claim and then
asserts that the plaintiff has no evidence to support “one or more” or “any
of” those elements is insufficient to support summary judgment because this
language does not clearly identify which elements, whether some or all, are
See Jose Fuentes C. v. Alfaro, 418 S.W.3d 280, 283-86
(Tex.A pp.-Dallas 2013, pet den) (remaining cites omitted).
Rule 166a(i) mandates that the motion “must specifically state which elements of
the non-movant’s claims lack supporting evidence.” Furthermore, the rule “does not authorize
conclusory motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponents’ case.” Indeed, a no-
evidence motion that “only generally challenges the sufficiency of the non-movant’s case and fails
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to state the specific elements that the movant contends lack supporting evidence is fundamentally
defective and cannot support summary judgment as a matter of law.” Jose Fuentes Co., Inc. v.
418 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2013 pet den). Similarly, an attack on factual
theories or allegations within a claim or defense is allowed “ if the challenge to the factual
allegation is connected to a no-evidence challenge to a specified element of a claim or defense.”
Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 287 S.W.3d 809, 819 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2009,
pet. denied) (“[A] Motion for no-evidence summary judgment that only generally attacks a factual
theory, without specifying the elements of the claims being attacked, is insufficient to support a
no-evidence summary judgment.”).
Khan’s Motion does not distinguish between evidentiary and no-evidence grounds,
only mentioning elements of the causes of action in passing, but also referencing evidence in the
record. Because Khan does not presenta competent no-evidence motion under Texas Rule of Civil
Community Health Systems,
for Summary Judgment is defective as to all his claims and cannot support a no-evidence summary
judgment.
TO THE EXTENT KHAN’S MOTION IS AN EVIDENTIARY MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IT IS SIMILARLY DEFECTVE AND SHOULD BE
DENIED.
Because Khan does not articulate whether his Motion is no-evidence or traditional,
his Motion is similarly flawed as an evidentiary or traditional, motion for summary judgment, and
should accordingly be denied as a matter of law under the standard set in Community Health
However, out an abundance of caution Mahmood and Khan Business will address the
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ALL NECESSARY PARTIES WERE NOT ADDED TO THE UNDERLYING SUIT,
NOR WERE THEIR INTERESTS PRESENTED TO THE JURY.
A trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements,
or other real property. Tex. Prop. Code 22.001.
Upon hearing of the cause, the Court shall determine the share or interest of each
of the joint owners or claimants in the real estate sought to be divided, and all
the title to such land which may rise.
In a suit for partition, all parties in any way interested in the land sought to be
portioned are necessary and indispensable parties. New York & T. Land Co. v. Hyland, 8 Tex. Civ.
App. 601 (Ct. of App.— Austin, 1894). The general rule is that, before property can be partitioned,
all of the joint owners or cotenants must be made parties so that the court may determine the
interest each party has therein and make a proper distribution of the property.
Mcllhenny Co., 77 Tex. 657, 14 S.W. 240, 240 (Tex. 1890); Ward v. Hinkle, 117 Tex. 566, 8
S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1928).
In Texas, the seller of real property retains the superior legal title to the property
and the buyer merely has an equitable right to acquire title e agreement.
Bank United of Tex., FSB, 51 S.W.3d 341, 343 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
Implicit in the general rule stated in is that the owners who must be joined are the owners
of the property sought to be partitioned. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 233
(Tex. App.— Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.re.); Gilbreath v. Douglas
App.— Amarillo 1965, writ ref’d n.re.). When the sellers are not added to the partition suit, neither
a court, nor the jury have the legal power to award legal title to the Property. Collora v. Navarro
574 S.W.2d 65,70 (Tex. 1978) (holding that “because the legal title to the land still rested with the
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 9 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
seller, a party that Plaintiff failed to join, the trial court was without power to award Plaintiff a
legal title to the land”).
Khan's Motion for Summary Judgment is purely based on his contention that the
jury addressed all issues related to title in the Underlying Suit when the jury decided that Khan
and Mahmood equally share 100% of the title to the Property. As part of his argument, Khan
erroneously relegates the interest of the Grantors to a mere security interest and claims the Grantors
do not have a present possessory interest in the Property. Y et, the governing document for the title
transfer of the Property, the Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien, clearly retains superior
titled and possessory interest in the Grantors “until each note described is fully paid according to
its terms, at which time [the] deed [would] become absolute.”
At the time of trial in the Underlying Suit and jury determination of ownership
percentages, the Deed of Trust and the Special Warranty Deed with V endor’s Lien were not fully
satisfied. Accordingly, under the terms of the Special Warranty Deed, Grantors retained a secured,
interest in the Property.
Under the jury instruction, the jury was only required to determine the title interest
distribution between Khan and Mahmood. Here, since the jury did not address the secured interest
of the Grantors, their determination that Khan and Mahmood had equal percentage ownership
interests in the Property wrongfully strips the unrepresented interest of the Grantors of their legal
title to the Property without just cause or due process. Thus, Khan’s contention that all facts and
all questions of law have already been decided based on the jury findings at trial of the Underlying
Summary Judgment must be denied.
Mahmood filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based on the jury’s
decision being contrary to the evidence presented. That evidence showed that Mahmood paid all the mortgage
payments, fees, taxes, and upkeep of the Property without contribution of any kind by Khan as to these required
obligations under the Deed of Trust and Texas Law.
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 10 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
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EXISTS AS TO WHETHER TITLE HAD FULLY
TRANSFERRED FROM GRANTORS TO KHAN AND MAHMOOD.
A joint owner or claimant of real property or an interest in real property or a joint
owner of personal property may compel a partition of the interest or the property among the joint
owners or claimants. Tex. Prop. Code 23.001. However, the purchaser under a contract for
conveyance of property does not acquire equitable title to the property until he pays the purchase
price and fully performs the , 867 S.W.2d 846, 849
(Tex. App.— Texarkana 1993, no writ) (citing Johnson v. Wood, 138 Tex. 106, 157 S.W.2d 146,
Cullins v. Foster, 171 S.W.3d 521, 534 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
pet. denied). Thus, until the purchaser satisfies his obligations, he only has a potential right, not an
It is undisputed that the Deed of Trust was not fully satisfied, and equitable title
never fully vested in Khan or Mahmood at the time of jury deliberations in the Underlying Suit.
The jury was not instructed that full s or that title, or
a percentage of title, was retained by the non-party Grantors. As such, the jury’s determination did
not fully take into account the factors surrounding the distribution of equitable title amongst Khan,
Mahmood, Khan Business, or the Grantors, nor was the jury instructed to do so. Thus, Khan’s
contention that all facts and all questions of law have already been decided based on the jury
ly wrong as a matter of law; Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment must be denied.
MAHMOOD AND KHAN BUSINESS’ ACTIONS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR
THEIR TRESSPASS TO TRY TITLE CLAIM BASED ON LEGAL AND
Khan originally brought suit to partition the Property. Any right to sell, transfer, or
partition property belongs to the joint owners of the Property. Tex. Prop. Code. 23.001. Before
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 11 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
property can be partitioned, all of the joint owners or cotenants must be made parties so that the
court may determine the interest each party has therein and make a proper distribution of the
Holloway v. Mcllhenny Co., 77 Tex. 657, 14 S.W. 240, 240 (Tex. 1890); Ward v. Hinkle
117 Tex. 566, 8 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1928). There was no such determination in this matter, nor
A trespass to try title action is the necessary and proper method of determining title
to lands, tenements, or other real property. Tex. Prop. Code 22.001. Equitable title is the present
right to compel legal title. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Signature Flight Support Corp
S.W.3d 833, 840 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) Equitable title may be shown when the
plaintiff proves that he has paid the purchase price and fully performed the obligations under the
commonly understood as a financial interest in the property, a
right to obtain full ownership of the property based on the person’s financial interest in the
property. Additionally, and notably, a property occupier has standing to bring a trespass to try
Johnson v. Coppel, No. 01-09-00392-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 898 (Tex. App. Houston
1st Dist. Feb. 2, 2012). The suit is intended to address a cloud on title. Red Rock Props. 2005 v.
Chase Home Fin., L.L.C LEXIS 4783 (Tex. App. Houston
As there are five potentially interested persons in this Property. Mahmood and
Khan Business have brought claims against Grantors and Khan to determine what legal and
equitable interest each of these parties has in the Property.
Khan outlined on page 8 of his Motion for Summary Judgment the most common
“when the seller of land retains title to the land un
met by the buyer, upon which the agreement requires the seller to then
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 12 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
transfer the legal title to the buyer. Once the buyer has satisfied those
contractual conditions it has equitable title to the property because it has the
present right to compel the seller to transfer legal title to the property.”
This scenario clearly describes the transaction which forms the basis of this suit.
Mahmood and Khan Business paid Grantors all mortgage payments from the date of the sale of
the Property pursuant
to the Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien and Deed of Trust, as well
as paid all taxes, insurance, and maintenance fees associated with the Property. Mahmood and
Khan Business are entitled to this Court’s determination of their interest in the Property.
Khan appears to conflate himself with Grantors in this cause of action and attempts
to defend himself by stating Mahmood and Khan Business are trying to “strip Khan of his title to
the Property.” However, until the Deed of Trust is fully satisfied, neither Mahmood, Khan
Business, nor Khan have full legal title to the Property. As demonstrated previously, Grantors
retained this right until the lien is satisfied, upon whic sfer. By this suit, Mahmood
and Khan Business are merely establishing their equitable interest in the title to the Property.
Khan’s interest, or lack thereof, in the title to the Property is demonstrated and dependent upon
Khan’s own actions. Inasmuch as Mahmood and Khan Business have demonstrated the actions
necessary for equitable title to vest as legal title, this Court must deny Khan’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
KHAN’S OWN TESTIMONY DEMOSNTRATES HIS BELIEF THAT KHAN
BUSINESS AND MAHMOOD WERE OBLIGATED TO PAY THE GRANTORS
PURSUANT TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE BY WHICH TITLE WOULD VEST
Khan attempts to confuse this Court by comparing Mahmood and Khan Business’
actions to that of a landlord-tenant relationship, wherein a tenant paying taxes, purchasing
insurance, and paying for repairs required by a lease does not get title to the property based on
those actions alone. However, Defendants’ actions are precisely the reason why Defendants are
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
entitled to title transfer based on the Deed of Trust, Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien,
and Promissory Note: these are the contractual prerequisites for transfer of title.
Although Khan attempts to assert that K han Business had no interest in the Property
as it did not sign the contract, Khan himself testified that it was the business’ (Khan Business)
obligation, under the Promissory Note, to pay all mortgage payments, property improvements,
—___
Line 1: Q Did you make a payment for the Promissory Note,
the $1,500 a month? Did you ever make any of those
payments?
Why would I pay that if it had to be paid by
the business? I have been
Line 6: Q Where does it say that it
Where is it written that I will pay this amount
From my own pocket? Obvious!
business
—___
Line 18: Q So you have not made a
Payment, is that correct?
My answer is, again, the same. The business is
Involved, and it is for the
—___
Line 18: Q So you have not made any payments personally
the business that is responsible.
Khan cannot argue that the business (Khan Business) is obligated to pay the
mortgage, taxes, business expenses, etc. under the terms of the Promissory Note, and then say that
Khan Business is not a party to the Contract Documents and as such, cannot have a right to legal
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
and equitable title. Khan’s testimony and Mahmood and Khan Business’ actions clearly
demonstrate Mahmood and Khan Business’ equitable interest, derived from their obligations under
the Promissory Note through payment of which, title to the Property would vest.
There is nothing “novel” about this. In fact, it is the very basis of the real property
transfer system codified in the Texas Property Code and upheld time and again in a Special
Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien and accompanying Promissory Note. Thus, this Court must
Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Khalid Mahmood and Khan
Business, LLC, pray that this Court deny Farman Khan’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grant
Khalid Mahmood and Khan Business, LLC such other and further relief, to which they may be
entitled.
Respectfully Submitted,
LESLIE WM. ADAMS & ASSOCIATES
Leslie Wm. Adams
Charles I. Mumane
Caroline H. Walls
713-728-6366 (Facsimile)
info@ LeslieWmA dams.com
COUNSEL FOR KHALID MAHMOOD
AND KHAN BUSINESS, LLC
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CER TIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 11 day of November, 2019, a true copy of the foregoing was served
on each attomey of record or party in accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure by delivery by telephonic document transfer, electronic service or certified mail, retum
receipt requested, addressed as follows:
Justin Strother
TROTHER
Email: jstrother@ strotherlawfirm.com
COUNSEL DEFENDANT,
Leslie Wm. Adams
OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 16 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS KHAN BUSINESS, LLC JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION & RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: , Khalid Mahmood (“Mahmood”) a this, their Opposition and Response to Farman Khan’s (“Khan”) Motion for Summary Judgment (the the Court the following: STATEMENT OF FACTS Farman Kahn (“Khan”), and Khalid Mahmood (“Mahmood”) executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement (the “A greement”) dated May 21, 2010, wherein Khan and Mahmood would purch Per the Agreement, Khan and Mahmood ag Trust and Promissory Note, dated June 29, 2010, which outlined the terms for payment and On June 29, 2010, Joseph Chau Minh Ngo and The Thi Nguyen (“Grantors”) executed a Special Warranty DeedWarranty Deed”)(together, the “Contract Documents”). The Special Warranty Deed was filed and recorded with the Harris County Property Records as Instrument No. 20100280140. Pursuant to the Contract Documents, Grantors retained legal and equitable title in the Property until the terms of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust were satisfied in full. Thus, at the time of trial in the Underlying Suit, Grantors still retained equitable and legal title to the Property. However, Grantors were not parties to the Underlying Suit due to Plaintiff's failure to properly join them. Mahmood and Khan Business, LLC (“Khan Business”) have made all mortgage payments, tax payments, business expenses, and general upkeep/maintenance expenses under the Deed of Trust. On the other hand, Khan has not made a single payment towards the mortgage, taxes, business expenses, or general upkeep/maintenance expenses of the Property. Khan’s sole investment towards the purchase of the Property was $75,000.00 towards the down payment. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On April 24, 2015, Khan sued Mahmood and Khan Business for breach of an alleged partnership in Cause No. 2015-23716; Farman Khan v. Khalid Mahmood and Khan Business, LLC; in the 164th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas (the “Underlying Suit”). In Khan’s Original Petition, he claimed that there was a verbal partnership agreement between himself and Mahmood to buy real property and to own and operate a convenience store in which they would both have equal interests. Khan also claimed in his Original Petition that each In the Underlying Suit, Khan sued Mahmood for breach of contract, trespassing, breach of fiduciary duty, and “squeezing out”. On May 12, 2017, Defendants filed their Amended Counterclaims against Plaintiff OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 2 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT On February 28, 2019, only four days before trial, Khan filed his Second Amended Original Petition removing all causes of action except Partition of Real Property. Khan’s amendment of his petition caused a procedural defect, which altered the nature of the case. Furthermore, Khan’s one remaining cause of action for partition was improperly pled since the On March 2, 2019, Defendants asserted additional causes of action of trespass to try title and declaratory judgment for title. The able Caroline Baker, declined to hear the issues related to On March 7, 2019, the Underlying Suit proceeded to trial on Plaintiff's sole issue of Partition of Real Property, even though the evidence clearly established that the title was in dispute. On the record and prior to the presentation of evidence, Khan nonsuited all his claims against Khan Business. Mahmood testified that the mortgage for the Property was still being paid at time of trial. The jury retumed a verdict that Khan and Mahmood each owned fifty percent (50%) of the Property, despite a conflicting jury finding that Khan did not make equal contribution After trial in the Underlying Suit, Khan moved for judgment and Mahmood filed his objections to the entry of judgment and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Jury Verdict on May 17, 2019. Final Judgment has not been entered nor has the Court ruled on Mahmood’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding On June 6, 2019, Defendants filed their Original Petition against Farman Khan, Joseph Chau Minh Ngo, and The Thi Nguyen asserting causes of action for trespass to try title and equitable title; Cause No. 2019-39151; in the 189 Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 3 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (the “New Suit”). On September 13, 2019, the Underlying Suit and New Suit were consolidated Ill. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE Defendants submit the following evidence in support of their Response to Khan's ary Judgment: Exhibit A Purchase and Sale Agreement Exhibit B: Deed of Trust Exhibit C Promissory Note Exhibit D Special Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien Exhibit E Excerpts of the Deposition of Farman Khan SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS At the outset, Khan presents a confusing Motion for Summary Judgment which fails to list what type of motion Khan fails to make any reference to his burden of proof or the requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 166(a) regarding summary judgment proceedings. “After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Inano-evidence summary judgment setting, the court must review the evidence “in light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party, unless reasonable jurors could not.” Mack Tucks, Inc. v. Tamez 206 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tex. 2006). If the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 4 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, a no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). More than a scintilla of evidence occurs “when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their , 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT In a traditional summary judgment setting, the movant bears the burden to conclusively negate at least one element of the nonmovant’s claim. Frost Nat’] Bank v. Fernandez 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010) (“a defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of a cause of action or conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to asummary judgment.”) A matter is conclusively established when “no reasonable juror would differ. On the same token, a genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable jurors could HYBRID MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A motion for summary judgment must rest on the grounds expressly presented in the motion. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R. Ranch, LP, 511 S.W.3d 538, 546-46 (Tex. 2017); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Westbrook Constr. Co. v. Fid. Nat’] Bank of Dall. The motion must state, with specificity, the grounds upon which the movant is relying. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Brewer & Pritchard, 73 S.W.3d at 204; Stiles v. Resolution , 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. 1993). This gives the nonmovement adequate notice for opposing the motion by forcing the movant to define the issues. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009); see also , 858 S.W.2d at 343- 44 (stating that by requiring OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 5 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT movant to expressly set forth grounds in the summary judgment motion, the nonmovant has the grounds for summary judgment narrowly focused and does not have to argue every ground vaguely referred to in the motion). See, e.g., State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013); Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d When a party files a hybrid motion, the court addresses the no-evidence grounds first. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). The court addresses the e non-movant fails to produce le is no need to analyze whether the movant met its burden under the traditional motion. Because of this analysis, the movant should “clearly delineate” the bases in its motion. Binur v. Jacobo 135 S.W.3d 646 (Tex.2004). Because Defendants have been prejudiced by the complete lack of differentiation in Khan’s Motion, Defendants object to any judgment in Plaintiff's favor by the ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES At the outset, it is unclear if Khan’s Motion is a no-evidence motion for summary judgment ora traditional motion for summary judgment, as Khan only describes his Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment. Nor does Khan articulate the respective standards for either no- evidence motions for summary judgment or traditional motions for summary judgment. In the absence of notice by Khan of the nature of his to guess at the basic nature of Plaintiffs Motion, which appears to make both non-evidentiary and evidentiary arguments at the same time. Accordingly, the Motion cannot survive as either a no-evidence motion for summary judgment or as traditional motion for summary judgment under applicable OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 6 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Texas precedent, as will be described below in greater detail. See Community Health Systems 525 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2017). TO THE EXTENT KHAN’S MOTION IS A NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IT IS DEFECTVE AND SHOULD BE DENIED. Texas is a “fair notice” jurisdiction for pleadings, requiring that an opposing party be able to ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy. Horizon/C MS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) provides that after adequate times passed for discovery, a party without the burden of proof at time of trial may file a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and challenge “one or more” elements of the opponent's claims. Community Health Systems, supra, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated its requirements for a no-evidence motion for summary judgment: Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a no- evidence motion specifically state the element or elements of which there is no-evidence. Tex.R.Civ.P 166a(i). We have called for strict enforcement of this requirement. See Timpte Indus. Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310- 311 (Tex. 2009) (holding that a no-evidence motion must specifically identify the challenged elements to satisfy Rule 166a(i); McConnell v. , 858 S.W.2d 337, 339-342 (Tex. 1993). Thus a no-evidence motion that lists each element of the plaintiff’s claim and then asserts that the plaintiff has no evidence to support “one or more” or “any of” those elements is insufficient to support summary judgment because this language does not clearly identify which elements, whether some or all, are See Jose Fuentes C. v. Alfaro, 418 S.W.3d 280, 283-86 (Tex.A pp.-Dallas 2013, pet den) (remaining cites omitted). Rule 166a(i) mandates that the motion “must specifically state which elements of the non-movant’s claims lack supporting evidence.” Furthermore, the rule “does not authorize conclusory motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponents’ case.” Indeed, a no- evidence motion that “only generally challenges the sufficiency of the non-movant’s case and fails OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 7 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to state the specific elements that the movant contends lack supporting evidence is fundamentally defective and cannot support summary judgment as a matter of law.” Jose Fuentes Co., Inc. v. 418 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2013 pet den). Similarly, an attack on factual theories or allegations within a claim or defense is allowed “ if the challenge to the factual allegation is connected to a no-evidence challenge to a specified element of a claim or defense.” Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 287 S.W.3d 809, 819 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied) (“[A] Motion for no-evidence summary judgment that only generally attacks a factual theory, without specifying the elements of the claims being attacked, is insufficient to support a no-evidence summary judgment.”). Khan’s Motion does not distinguish between evidentiary and no-evidence grounds, only mentioning elements of the causes of action in passing, but also referencing evidence in the record. Because Khan does not presenta competent no-evidence motion under Texas Rule of Civil Community Health Systems, for Summary Judgment is defective as to all his claims and cannot support a no-evidence summary judgment. TO THE EXTENT KHAN’S MOTION IS AN EVIDENTIARY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IT IS SIMILARLY DEFECTVE AND SHOULD BE DENIED. Because Khan does not articulate whether his Motion is no-evidence or traditional, his Motion is similarly flawed as an evidentiary or traditional, motion for summary judgment, and should accordingly be denied as a matter of law under the standard set in Community Health However, out an abundance of caution Mahmood and Khan Business will address the OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 8 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ALL NECESSARY PARTIES WERE NOT ADDED TO THE UNDERLYING SUIT, NOR WERE THEIR INTERESTS PRESENTED TO THE JURY. A trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property. Tex. Prop. Code 22.001. Upon hearing of the cause, the Court shall determine the share or interest of each of the joint owners or claimants in the real estate sought to be divided, and all the title to such land which may rise. In a suit for partition, all parties in any way interested in the land sought to be portioned are necessary and indispensable parties. New York & T. Land Co. v. Hyland, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 601 (Ct. of App.— Austin, 1894). The general rule is that, before property can be partitioned, all of the joint owners or cotenants must be made parties so that the court may determine the interest each party has therein and make a proper distribution of the property. Mcllhenny Co., 77 Tex. 657, 14 S.W. 240, 240 (Tex. 1890); Ward v. Hinkle, 117 Tex. 566, 8 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1928). In Texas, the seller of real property retains the superior legal title to the property and the buyer merely has an equitable right to acquire title e agreement. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 51 S.W.3d 341, 343 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Implicit in the general rule stated in is that the owners who must be joined are the owners of the property sought to be partitioned. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. App.— Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.re.); Gilbreath v. Douglas App.— Amarillo 1965, writ ref’d n.re.). When the sellers are not added to the partition suit, neither a court, nor the jury have the legal power to award legal title to the Property. Collora v. Navarro 574 S.W.2d 65,70 (Tex. 1978) (holding that “because the legal title to the land still rested with the OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 9 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT seller, a party that Plaintiff failed to join, the trial court was without power to award Plaintiff a legal title to the land”). Khan's Motion for Summary Judgment is purely based on his contention that the jury addressed all issues related to title in the Underlying Suit when the jury decided that Khan and Mahmood equally share 100% of the title to the Property. As part of his argument, Khan erroneously relegates the interest of the Grantors to a mere security interest and claims the Grantors do not have a present possessory interest in the Property. Y et, the governing document for the title transfer of the Property, the Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien, clearly retains superior titled and possessory interest in the Grantors “until each note described is fully paid according to its terms, at which time [the] deed [would] become absolute.” At the time of trial in the Underlying Suit and jury determination of ownership percentages, the Deed of Trust and the Special Warranty Deed with V endor’s Lien were not fully satisfied. Accordingly, under the terms of the Special Warranty Deed, Grantors retained a secured, interest in the Property. Under the jury instruction, the jury was only required to determine the title interest distribution between Khan and Mahmood. Here, since the jury did not address the secured interest of the Grantors, their determination that Khan and Mahmood had equal percentage ownership interests in the Property wrongfully strips the unrepresented interest of the Grantors of their legal title to the Property without just cause or due process. Thus, Khan’s contention that all facts and all questions of law have already been decided based on the jury findings at trial of the Underlying Summary Judgment must be denied. Mahmood filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based on the jury’s decision being contrary to the evidence presented. That evidence showed that Mahmood paid all the mortgage payments, fees, taxes, and upkeep of the Property without contribution of any kind by Khan as to these required obligations under the Deed of Trust and Texas Law. OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 10 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER TITLE HAD FULLY TRANSFERRED FROM GRANTORS TO KHAN AND MAHMOOD. A joint owner or claimant of real property or an interest in real property or a joint owner of personal property may compel a partition of the interest or the property among the joint owners or claimants. Tex. Prop. Code 23.001. However, the purchaser under a contract for conveyance of property does not acquire equitable title to the property until he pays the purchase price and fully performs the , 867 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1993, no writ) (citing Johnson v. Wood, 138 Tex. 106, 157 S.W.2d 146, Cullins v. Foster, 171 S.W.3d 521, 534 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). Thus, until the purchaser satisfies his obligations, he only has a potential right, not an It is undisputed that the Deed of Trust was not fully satisfied, and equitable title never fully vested in Khan or Mahmood at the time of jury deliberations in the Underlying Suit. The jury was not instructed that full s or that title, or a percentage of title, was retained by the non-party Grantors. As such, the jury’s determination did not fully take into account the factors surrounding the distribution of equitable title amongst Khan, Mahmood, Khan Business, or the Grantors, nor was the jury instructed to do so. Thus, Khan’s contention that all facts and all questions of law have already been decided based on the jury ly wrong as a matter of law; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. MAHMOOD AND KHAN BUSINESS’ ACTIONS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THEIR TRESSPASS TO TRY TITLE CLAIM BASED ON LEGAL AND Khan originally brought suit to partition the Property. Any right to sell, transfer, or partition property belongs to the joint owners of the Property. Tex. Prop. Code. 23.001. Before OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 11 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT property can be partitioned, all of the joint owners or cotenants must be made parties so that the court may determine the interest each party has therein and make a proper distribution of the Holloway v. Mcllhenny Co., 77 Tex. 657, 14 S.W. 240, 240 (Tex. 1890); Ward v. Hinkle 117 Tex. 566, 8 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1928). There was no such determination in this matter, nor A trespass to try title action is the necessary and proper method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property. Tex. Prop. Code 22.001. Equitable title is the present right to compel legal title. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Signature Flight Support Corp S.W.3d 833, 840 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) Equitable title may be shown when the plaintiff proves that he has paid the purchase price and fully performed the obligations under the commonly understood as a financial interest in the property, a right to obtain full ownership of the property based on the person’s financial interest in the property. Additionally, and notably, a property occupier has standing to bring a trespass to try Johnson v. Coppel, No. 01-09-00392-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 898 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Feb. 2, 2012). The suit is intended to address a cloud on title. Red Rock Props. 2005 v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C LEXIS 4783 (Tex. App. Houston As there are five potentially interested persons in this Property. Mahmood and Khan Business have brought claims against Grantors and Khan to determine what legal and equitable interest each of these parties has in the Property. Khan outlined on page 8 of his Motion for Summary Judgment the most common “when the seller of land retains title to the land un met by the buyer, upon which the agreement requires the seller to then OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 12 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT transfer the legal title to the buyer. Once the buyer has satisfied those contractual conditions it has equitable title to the property because it has the present right to compel the seller to transfer legal title to the property.” This scenario clearly describes the transaction which forms the basis of this suit. Mahmood and Khan Business paid Grantors all mortgage payments from the date of the sale of the Property pursuant to the Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien and Deed of Trust, as well as paid all taxes, insurance, and maintenance fees associated with the Property. Mahmood and Khan Business are entitled to this Court’s determination of their interest in the Property. Khan appears to conflate himself with Grantors in this cause of action and attempts to defend himself by stating Mahmood and Khan Business are trying to “strip Khan of his title to the Property.” However, until the Deed of Trust is fully satisfied, neither Mahmood, Khan Business, nor Khan have full legal title to the Property. As demonstrated previously, Grantors retained this right until the lien is satisfied, upon whic sfer. By this suit, Mahmood and Khan Business are merely establishing their equitable interest in the title to the Property. Khan’s interest, or lack thereof, in the title to the Property is demonstrated and dependent upon Khan’s own actions. Inasmuch as Mahmood and Khan Business have demonstrated the actions necessary for equitable title to vest as legal title, this Court must deny Khan’s Motion for Summary Judgment. KHAN’S OWN TESTIMONY DEMOSNTRATES HIS BELIEF THAT KHAN BUSINESS AND MAHMOOD WERE OBLIGATED TO PAY THE GRANTORS PURSUANT TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE BY WHICH TITLE WOULD VEST Khan attempts to confuse this Court by comparing Mahmood and Khan Business’ actions to that of a landlord-tenant relationship, wherein a tenant paying taxes, purchasing insurance, and paying for repairs required by a lease does not get title to the property based on those actions alone. However, Defendants’ actions are precisely the reason why Defendants are OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 13 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT entitled to title transfer based on the Deed of Trust, Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien, and Promissory Note: these are the contractual prerequisites for transfer of title. Although Khan attempts to assert that K han Business had no interest in the Property as it did not sign the contract, Khan himself testified that it was the business’ (Khan Business) obligation, under the Promissory Note, to pay all mortgage payments, property improvements, —___ Line 1: Q Did you make a payment for the Promissory Note, the $1,500 a month? Did you ever make any of those payments? Why would I pay that if it had to be paid by the business? I have been Line 6: Q Where does it say that it Where is it written that I will pay this amount From my own pocket? Obvious! business —___ Line 18: Q So you have not made a Payment, is that correct? My answer is, again, the same. The business is Involved, and it is for the —___ Line 18: Q So you have not made any payments personally the business that is responsible. Khan cannot argue that the business (Khan Business) is obligated to pay the mortgage, taxes, business expenses, etc. under the terms of the Promissory Note, and then say that Khan Business is not a party to the Contract Documents and as such, cannot have a right to legal OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 14 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and equitable title. Khan’s testimony and Mahmood and Khan Business’ actions clearly demonstrate Mahmood and Khan Business’ equitable interest, derived from their obligations under the Promissory Note through payment of which, title to the Property would vest. There is nothing “novel” about this. In fact, it is the very basis of the real property transfer system codified in the Texas Property Code and upheld time and again in a Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien and accompanying Promissory Note. Thus, this Court must Summary Judgment. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Khalid Mahmood and Khan Business, LLC, pray that this Court deny Farman Khan’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grant Khalid Mahmood and Khan Business, LLC such other and further relief, to which they may be entitled. Respectfully Submitted, LESLIE WM. ADAMS & ASSOCIATES Leslie Wm. Adams Charles I. Mumane Caroline H. Walls 713-728-6366 (Facsimile) info@ LeslieWmA dams.com COUNSEL FOR KHALID MAHMOOD AND KHAN BUSINESS, LLC OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 15 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CER TIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the 11 day of November, 2019, a true copy of the foregoing was served on each attomey of record or party in accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by delivery by telephonic document transfer, electronic service or certified mail, retum receipt requested, addressed as follows: Justin Strother TROTHER Email: jstrother@ strotherlawfirm.com COUNSEL DEFENDANT, Leslie Wm. Adams OPPOSITION TO FARMAN KHAN’S Page 16 CAUSE NO. 2015-23716 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT