Preview
FILED
DALLAS COUNTY
4/29/2019 8:37 AM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
Cassandra Walker
Cause No. DC-18-00169
Heather Hahn, § In the District Court
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Dallas County, Texas
§
Ad Hoc Labs, Inc. and §
John Doe, §
§
Defendants. § 162nd Judicial District
Plaintiff’s Response to John Doe’s Motion to Quash
Introduction
Before even filing an answer, defendant John Doe seeks an order from this
Court barring all discovery in the lawsuit. He also wants this Court to quash a
California court’s subpoena—served in California, on a California resident.
But Doe fails to inform this Court that the arguments he makes in support of
this motion are the very same arguments he made when asking California courts to
quash the subpoena. And those courts—both the California district court and court
of appeals—rejected Doe’s arguments and refused to quash the subpoena. This
Court should do the same.
Doe makes only three arguments in support of his motion. First, he contends
that his harassing text messages to Heather Hahn were protected by the First
Amendment. Second, he says that this means Hahn must introduce evidence of her
legal claims sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. And, finally, Doe
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 1
contends that Hahn’s claims are barred by limitations and this case thus is moot
under a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court.
As the California courts properly concluded, Doe’s arguments lack even
arguable merit. Among other defects—
• Doe’s harassing text messages were not protected by the First
Amendment. The First Amendment distinguishes between one-to-
one speech and speech made publicly. Thus, anonymous speech
on the internet is protected; anonymous harassing speech to a
particular person—which is what occurred here—is not.
• This absence of protection under the First Amendment means
Hahn does not have to introduce any quantum of evidence to
support the subpoena. Indeed, the Texarkana court that articulated
the summary-judgment test for unmasking anonymous speakers
specifically distinguished cases like this one, involving harassing
one-to-one speech.
• Hahn claims that limitations was tolled under the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment—not the discovery rule. Doe knows this
quite well, as the parties litigated this issue in California. Yet
Doe’s motion does not even contain the words fraudulent
concealment. The Glassdoor case that Doe cites deals only with
the discovery rule, says nothing about fraudulent concealment,
and applies only to pre-suit depositions under Rule 202.
• Doe seeks to have this Court quash a California court’s subpoena,
to a California resident, that was served in California (and after
the California court refused to do so). But this Court lacks any
power over that subpoena.
• Finally, Doe wants this Court to decide the issue of limitations—
including applicability of an equitable tolling doctrine—without
even filing an answer raising limitations, or a 91a motion, or any
other procedural device permitting such a determination. Doe’s
request is premature and inappropriate.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 2
Doe has contested the subpoenas in two different California courts and now
seeks to do so again in this Court. Enough is enough. Hahn is entitled to obtain
Doe’s identity and proceed with her lawsuit.
Background Facts
In April 2016, Dallas therapist Heather Hahn received the following series
of anonymous text messages from John Doe:
Heard ur an asst professor now. Funny since u used 2 be a party
favor back in the day. U don’t cover ethics in ur courses I guess.
Would be hard 4 u 2 teach that. Since ur a hustler and all. How’s
that dude u met while u were counseling in rehab. Heard he was
ur golden goose. Show u right.
Heard u got busted looking up his $ files 2. Ain’t that something.
Thought u were smart enuf not 2 get caught. Maybe not as smart
as you think. Yea. Work on that. And ur look. Does a blind
person style u? Ur ensemble makes a blind man vomit.
when is ur makeover? don’t put it off.
what will the 2nd husband do when he learns the truth about u?
the reasons why ur 1st marriage went bust cuz u were a wife no
one could trust ur lying and cheating on ron such a shame
haven’t u hurry enuf people with ur games? u worked in a flash 2
get a new husband with cash but a new home in dallas will not
give u class won’t belong before u end back up on ur ass
karma is a mutha fucka. #sameho #new areacode
#doesurshuggadaddyknow #urafreakytrailaparkho #itson
#believethat
Hahn traced the text messages to Ad Hoc Labs, Inc. (AHL) in California.
AHL’s user policy states that the purchaser agrees not to use the service to transmit
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 3
content that is “unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious . . . [or]
invasive of another’s privacy.” 1
On January 5, 2018, Hahn sued Doe for intrusion on seclusion, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and injunctive relief, and sued AHL for declaratory
relief. After Hahn’s claims against AHL were dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction, this Court approved Hahn’s request for letters rogatory to AHL to
reveal Doe’s identity.
In June 2018, the Los Angeles County Superior Court issued a subpoena
requiring AHL to produce records to Hahn’s lawyer. The subpoena required
production related to three telephone numbers from which Hahn received Doe’s
text messages. AHL notified Doe it would comply with the subpoena—and
provide information related to his “burner account”—unless he filed a motion to
quash.
Doe filed motions to quash the subpoena. Just as he does in his motion to
this Court, Doe argued in California that (1) his speech was protected by the First
Amendment, and (2) Hahn’s claims are barred by limitations and the subpoena
therefore seeks irrelevant information. Doe raised these same arguments in the
California district court.
1
See Burner Terms of Service, https://www.burnerapp.com/terms-of-service (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 4
After conducting a hearing, the California court rejected Doe’s arguments,
holding that Doe’s text messages constituted harassing conduct unprotected by the
First Amendment. But the court stayed its order to permit Doe to file a mandamus
petition.
Doe sought mandamus relief from the California Court of Appeals. Again,
Doe raised the same arguments he now makes in this Court—including his
argument about the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra
Group, L.P., No. 17-0463, 2019 WL 321934 (Tex. Jan. 25, 2019). The California
Court of Appeals denied Doe’s request for mandamus relief.
With the California trial and appellate courts having rejected his
arguments—and concluded that the discovery is appropriate—Doe now asks this
Court to quash a California subpoena and bar any further discovery.
Argument
1. Doe’s text messages are not protected by the First Amendment.
[N]o one has a [First Amendment] right to press
even “good” ideas onto an unwilling recipient.
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
Doe’s entire motion rests on his mistaken assumption that his text messages
were protected by the First Amendment. But they weren’t.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 5
Doe seems to believe that his speech is protected because it was anonymous.
But anonymity neither bestows nor precludes constitutional protection of speech,
which is determined by the speech itself. Contrary to Doe’s assumption, courts do
not “reflexively protect[] speech simply because it was written anonymously . . . .”
Sarah E. Smith, Threading the First Amendment Needle: Anonymous Speech,
Online Harassment, and Washington’s Cyberstalking Statute, 93 Wash. L. Rev.
1563, 1577–78 (2018).
Traditionally, First Amendment protection for anonymous speech turns on
the difference between “harassing ‘one-to-one’ speech made to a particular person”
and “‘one-to-many’ speech about a particular person.” Id. at 1573 (citation omitted
and emphasis added). The First Amendment generally does not protect “speech
directed at a specific individual rather than speech about a specific individual.” Id.
at 1574 (citation omitted and emphasis in original).
This approach reflects the purposes of the First Amendment. One-to-many
speech—even when posted online—enjoys protection because it promotes the
“robust exchange of ideas” involved in public discourse. See In re Anonymous
Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing “robust
exchange of ideas” in internet communication); see also Columbia Ins. Co. v.
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that anonymous
online speech fosters “robust debate”).
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 6
In contrast, harassing speech directed to just one person serves no such
purpose. “A one-to-one unwanted statement is highly unlikely to persuade or
inform anyone precisely because the listener does not want to hear it. Its only
effect is likely to be to offend or annoy. And restricting such statements leaves
speakers free to communicate to other, potentially willing listeners.” Eugene
Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws,
and “Cyberstalking,” 107 Nw. L. Rev. 731, 743 (2013) (citations omitted).
This distinction explains why the First Amendment does not limit
governmental regulation of harassing telephone calls and text messages. For
example, federal law prohibits any anonymous use of a telecommunications device
with the intent to harass. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), (E) (2012). This prohibition
does not violate the First Amendment. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787
(3rd Cir. 1978).
The United States Supreme Court upheld the only law it has considered
involving unwanted one-to-one speech. In that case, a federal law permitted an
individual to ban mailings of unwanted erotic or sexual materials to his or her
home. The Court deemed this law permissible under the First Amendment. Rowan,
397 U.S. at 738. As the Court noted, “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas
on an unwilling recipient . . . .” Id. Under Rowan, Doe lacked any First
Amendment right to press his text messages on Hahn—an unwilling listener.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 7
The Court reiterated this point in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971), striking down an injunction as violating the First Amendment
in part because the person seeking to limit the speech “[was] not attempting to stop
the flow of information into his own household, but to the public.” Id. at 420.
Thus, had the speaker been trying to restrict only messages into his own home—as
Hahn is trying to do here—no First Amendment protection would attach.
These are just two examples of decisions upholding laws regulating one-to-
one speech. “[A]ll these laws have one thing in common: In the great bulk of their
applications, they restrict what one may call ‘unwanted one-to-one’ speech—
speech said to a particular person in a context where the recipient appears not to
want to hear it . . . The laws are aimed at restricting speech to a person, not speech
about a person. And that is the context in which they have generally been upheld
against First Amendment challenge.” Volokh, 107 Nw. L. Rev. at 742 (citations
omitted).
Taking all of this into account, and after conducting an exhaustive review of
the authorities, one of the nation’s leading First Amendment scholars reached
exactly the same conclusion as the California courts—that the First Amendment
does not protect “one-to-one speech that is addressed to an unwilling listener and
that can be restricted without blocking communications to willing listeners.” Id. at
750. That is precisely the situation here. Doe sent his text messages only to Hahn,
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 8
an unwilling listener. The messages can be enjoined without affecting Doe’s ability
to make the same statements to other, willing listeners. There is no First
Amendment protection for Doe’s private messages to Hahn.
Separately, the First Amendment does not protect personal abuse. “Resort to
. . . personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution . . ..” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Doe’s text messages to Hahn—accusing her of being a “party favor,”
insulting her clothes, telling her to get a makeover, and calling her a “ho” and
“trailapark ho”—are nothing more than personal abuse. Not even Doe can argue
otherwise. And anonymous or not, these messages lack First Amendment
protection. The California courts properly saw Doe’s text messages for what they
were—unprotected harassment.
2. No predicate showing is required absent First Amendment protection.
Doe argues that Hahn cannot meet the predicate showing of being able to
survive summary judgment to obtain discovery required by the Texarkana Court of
Appeals in In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, orig.
proceeding). But in that case, the Texarkana court made clear that the rule would
not apply in a case like this one involving direct, non-public, harassing text
messages.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 9
The Texarkana court explicitly recognized the difference—explained by
Hahn in the preceding section—between one-to-one harassing messages and one-
to-many internet speech. Does 1–10 involved efforts to unmask a public blogger.
All statements at issue were posted publicly. Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d at 820. In
enunciating the summary-judgment standard for obtaining discovery, the
Texarkana court distinguished a Pennsylvania case involving purely private text
messages and emails—noting that, in the other case, “a type of harassment was
involved.” Id. (citing Polito v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CIV. A. 03cv3218, 2004
WL 3768897 (Pa. D. & C. Jan. 28, 2004).
The standard set by Does 1–10 applies where the speech occurs in a one-to-
many internet context. By its own analysis, it does not apply to one-to-one
harassing text messages. Thus, no predicate showing is required due to lack of First
Amendment protection. As a result, neither the merits nor the timeliness of Hahn’s
claims is at issue in this proceeding. Doe may argue those points on the merits. But
he may not rely upon them to resist the subpoena.
3. Even if Hahn must present prima facie evidence of her claims, she has
done so.
In a single footnote, Doe contends that Hahn did not present a prima facie
case for her claims in California. But the California courts rejected this argument.
And with good reason. Doe’s complaints really go to Hahn’s ability to prevail on
her claims—not whether she presented a prima facie case.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 10
The elements of a claim for intrusion on seclusion under Texas law are: (1)
the defendant intentionally intruded on the plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, or private
affairs; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3)
the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the defendant’s intrusion. Valenzuela v.
Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993). This claim supports her request for
injunctive relief against Doe. See Donnel v. Lara, 703 S.W.2d 257, 258–59 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Kramer v. Downey, 680 S.W.2d 524,
525 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Contrary to Doe’s contention that some physical invasion or eavesdropping
is required, two Texas appellate courts have upheld jury verdicts awarding
damages for intrusion on seclusion based on harassing telephone calls. Household
Credit Servs. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 84–85 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet.
denied); Donnel, 703 S.W.2d at 259.
The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Texas are: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; (3) the defendant’s conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (4) the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the
plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (5) no alternative cause of action would provide
a remedy for this emotional distress. See Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d, 462, 468
(Tex. 2017); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 11
2004). If reasonable people could disagree about whether the conduct at issue is
extreme and outrageous, the issue presents a matter of fact for the jury.
Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. 2005).
Texas courts have found extreme and outrageous conduct may be based on
threats and harassment using the telephone, or making lewd comments. See, e.g.,
Driscol, 989 S.W.2d at 82; Clayton v. Wisener, 190 S.W.3d 685, 694 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2005, no pet.); Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 942 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.). Additionally, a continuing course of harassment
may be extreme and outrageous, even where each individual communication might
not be. GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616–17 (Tex. 1999). Here, Doe’s
repeated harassment presents a prima facie case for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
4. Hahn’s claims are not barred by limitations.
As he did unsuccessfully in California, Doe contends that Hahn’s claims are
barred by limitations under the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Glassdoor. But
Hahn claims equitable-estoppel tolling under the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment, while Glassdoor concerns only discovery of operative facts under the
discovery rule. Glassdoor has nothing to do with tolling in this case.
Texas law tolls limitations under both the discovery rule and the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment. The discovery rule turns on the substance and timing of
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 12
the plaintiff’s knowledge. See Glassdoor, 2019 WL 321934, at *5. Unlike the
discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as it relates to limitations is
founded on equitable estoppel. Autry v. Dearman, 933 S.W.2d 182, 192 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
Here, had Doe not paid for—and misused in violation of the terms of use—a
program to conceal his identity, Hahn would have known it and been able to name
him as a defendant. Moreover, Hahn filed suit within the statute of limitations. Had
Doe not sought to quash the subpoena, Hahn would have discovered his identity —
and amended her Texas pleading to name him—before the expiration of
limitations.
At least one Texas appellate court has held that tolling under equitable
estoppel applies where a party actively conceals its identity. That case involved the
Texas procedural rule concerning suit against corporate entities. But the underlying
principle, according to the court, was that a defendant should not be able to “lay
behind the log” and hamper efforts at identification, yet then claim limitations as a
defense. See Continental Trailways, Inc. v. Hilland, 516 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev’d on other grounds by Continental
Southern Lines, Inc. v. Hilland, 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975).
Doe has taken active steps to conceal his identity every step of the way.
Even when confronted with a subpoena, Doe decided to “lay behind the log” and
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 13
see if he could run out the clock on limitations. Thus, Doe is equitably estopped
from (1) taking affirmative steps to contest and delay Hahn’s discovery of his
identity, and then (2) raising limitations as a defense to her claims after he “ran out
the clock.” At the very least, Hahn should be entitled to obtain Doe’s identity and
obtain discovery concerning his knowledge of the claims—including all steps he
took to conceal his identity and obstruct the subpoenas after knowing of the
claims—before this Court resolves the issue of fraudulent concealment against her.
This is especially true because the concealment of Doe’s identity may also
be concealing the existence of legal claims. In determining whether conduct is
extreme and outrageous, and thus sufficient to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the relationship between the parties matters. Thus,
Doe’s identity could actually trigger the existence of the claim.
“In determining whether certain conduct is extreme and outrageous conduct,
courts consider the context and the relationship between the parties.” GTE Sw., 998
S.W.2d at 612; (citations omitted). “Conduct considered extreme and outrageous in
some relationships may not be so in other relationships.” Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d
262, 261 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); see also Fields v. Teamsters
Local Un. No. 988, 23 S.W.3d 517, 530 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied); Tiller v. McClure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2003). A person’s motive
also may be a factor in determining extreme and outrageous conduct. Texas Farm
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 14
Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 612 (Tex. 2002).
Thus, Doe’s concealment of his identity also may be concealing the
existence of facts supporting—or even creating—Hahn’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. What, for example, if the person sending the
messages is a member of Hahn’s family? Or a patient? Or a fiduciary? This could
matter in determining the existence of the cause of action. And concealment of
facts giving rise to a legal claim always tolls limitations in Texas. See Ponder v.
Brice & Mankoff, 889 S.W.2d 637, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
writ denied).
Finally, Glassdoor does not apply to this case. Again, it only addressed the
discovery rule—not the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Doe’s actions in
concealing, contesting, and delaying discovery of his identity should estop him, as
a matter of equity, from relying on limitations. Doe himself is the reason Hahn did
not possess the information before the expiration of limitations. And Glassdoor
does not address estoppel or fraudulent concealment.
Glassdoor also is distinguishable because the plaintiff filed only a petition to
take a pre-suit discovery deposition under Rule 202 rather than filing an actual
lawsuit and seeking discovery (as Hahn did here). As the Texas Supreme Court
held: “[Plaintiff] could have filed suit and conduct discovery about those identities,
but chose instead to proceed under Rule 202, thereby risking the timeliness of its
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 15
potential claims.” Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
Hahn did exactly as the Texas Supreme Court instructed—she filed suit and
sought discovery as to Doe’s identity. See id. The Supreme Court’s statement—
distinguishing a pre-suit discovery petition from an actual lawsuit with subsequent
discovery—strongly suggests that it would toll limitations in a case like this one,
where the plaintiff did file suit and seek discovery.
Additionally, the holding in Glassdoor was expressly limited to only Rule
202 proceedings in which the statute of limitations ran on the claims being
investigated during those proceedings. The Court specifically stated that:
We recognize that the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, and we do not hold that a claim is moot when barred by
limitations. Rather, we hold that where the statute of limitations
runs on a claim as a matter of law while a Rule 202 petition
seeking to investigate that claim is being litigated, the Rule 202
proceeding is rendered moot.
Id. n.3 (emphasis added). As he did in the California Court of Appeals, Doe again
fails to acknowledge that the holding was limited to Rule 202 proceedings. Doe’s
reliance on Glassdoor is misplaced.
5. Under principles of federalism and comity, the California courts are
charged with protecting Doe’s legal rights against the subpoena.
With respect to his request for an order quashing the subpoena, Doe cites no
legal authority supporting his startling proposition that this Court has the power to
quash a California court’s subpoena, directed to a California entity, and served in
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 16
California. No Texas court has the power to do that.
With respect to Doe’s request for an order barring all discovery, the Texas
Supreme Court has made clear that principles of comity require deferring to the
California courts on matters related to protecting Doe’s legal rights, while this
Court should rule only on relevance and materiality.
A century ago, the Supreme Court held that in the context of multi-state
discovery, the state where the underlying lawsuit is pending should decide matters
of materiality and relevance while the state where the discovery is sought should
protect the legal rights of the resisting party. See Ex parte Taylor, 220 S.W. 74, 75
(Tex. 1920). Thus, matters like privilege or scope of discovery are reserved to the
state where the discovery is sought. See In re Issuance of Subpoenas Depositions
of Bennett, 502 S.W.3d 373, 377–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig.
proceeding).
Under these principles, this Court would address only the materiality and
relevance of the discovery sought. And Doe’s identity is both material and
relevant. All of Doe’s other complaints are reserved to the California courts—
which have rejected them.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 17
Exhibits
The following Exhibits are attached hereto and are incorporated herein by
this reference:
Exhibit 1 John Doe’s Memorandum in Support of Petition to Quash Subpoena
filed August 31, 2018 (without attachments)
Exhibit 2 Opposition to Petition to Quash Subpoena filed October 22, 2108
(without attachments)
Exhibit 3 Superior Court Minute Order with adopted tentative ruling entered
November 21, 2018
Exhibit 4 John Doe’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed December 26, 2018
Exhibit 5 Bennet Kelley’s letter to the California Court of Appeal dated
February 4, 2019 re: Glassdoor opinion (without attachment)
Exhibit 6 California Court of Appeal Order denying Petition for Writ of
Mandamus entered March 15, 2019
Conclusion
The California courts properly concluded that Hahn is entitled to discover
Doe’s identity. The motion for protection should be denied.
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 18
Respectfully Submitted,
HAHN LAW FIRM, P.C.
/s/ Derrick J. Hahn
Derrick J. Hahn
dhahn@hahnlawfirm.com
Texas Bar No: 24026920
Corey R. Herrick
crherrick@hahnlawfirm.com
Texas Bar No. 24059940
900 Jackson Street; Suite 180
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 744-3200
(214) 744-3202 Fax
Chad Baruch
chad@jtlaw.com
Texas Bar No.: 01864300
Johnston Tobey Baruch, PC
Post Office Box 215
Addison, Texas 75001-0215
Telephone: (214) 741-6260
Facsimile: (214) 741-6248
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 19
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing has, on this 29th day of April, 2019,
been served on Defendant via electronic service to the following:
Email address: amanda.crawford-steger@bowmanandbrooke.com
Amanda Crawford-Steger
BOWMAN AND BROOKE, LLP
5830 Granite Parkway, Suite 1000
Plano, TX 75024
Tel. (972) 616-1700
Fax. (972) 616-1701
ATTORNEY FOR JOHN DOE
/s/ Derrick J. Hahn
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 20
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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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Preview
FILED DALLAS COUNTY 4/29/2019 8:37 AM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK Cassandra Walker Cause No. DC-18-00169 Heather Hahn, § In the District Court § Plaintiff, § § v. § Dallas County, Texas § Ad Hoc Labs, Inc. and § John Doe, § § Defendants. § 162nd Judicial District Plaintiff’s Response to John Doe’s Motion to Quash Introduction Before even filing an answer, defendant John Doe seeks an order from this Court barring all discovery in the lawsuit. He also wants this Court to quash a California court’s subpoena—served in California, on a California resident. But Doe fails to inform this Court that the arguments he makes in support of this motion are the very same arguments he made when asking California courts to quash the subpoena. And those courts—both the California district court and court of appeals—rejected Doe’s arguments and refused to quash the subpoena. This Court should do the same. Doe makes only three arguments in support of his motion. First, he contends that his harassing text messages to Heather Hahn were protected by the First Amendment. Second, he says that this means Hahn must introduce evidence of her legal claims sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. And, finally, Doe Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 1 contends that Hahn’s claims are barred by limitations and this case thus is moot under a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court. As the California courts properly concluded, Doe’s arguments lack even arguable merit. Among other defects— • Doe’s harassing text messages were not protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment distinguishes between one-to- one speech and speech made publicly. Thus, anonymous speech on the internet is protected; anonymous harassing speech to a particular person—which is what occurred here—is not. • This absence of protection under the First Amendment means Hahn does not have to introduce any quantum of evidence to support the subpoena. Indeed, the Texarkana court that articulated the summary-judgment test for unmasking anonymous speakers specifically distinguished cases like this one, involving harassing one-to-one speech. • Hahn claims that limitations was tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment—not the discovery rule. Doe knows this quite well, as the parties litigated this issue in California. Yet Doe’s motion does not even contain the words fraudulent concealment. The Glassdoor case that Doe cites deals only with the discovery rule, says nothing about fraudulent concealment, and applies only to pre-suit depositions under Rule 202. • Doe seeks to have this Court quash a California court’s subpoena, to a California resident, that was served in California (and after the California court refused to do so). But this Court lacks any power over that subpoena. • Finally, Doe wants this Court to decide the issue of limitations— including applicability of an equitable tolling doctrine—without even filing an answer raising limitations, or a 91a motion, or any other procedural device permitting such a determination. Doe’s request is premature and inappropriate. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 2 Doe has contested the subpoenas in two different California courts and now seeks to do so again in this Court. Enough is enough. Hahn is entitled to obtain Doe’s identity and proceed with her lawsuit. Background Facts In April 2016, Dallas therapist Heather Hahn received the following series of anonymous text messages from John Doe: Heard ur an asst professor now. Funny since u used 2 be a party favor back in the day. U don’t cover ethics in ur courses I guess. Would be hard 4 u 2 teach that. Since ur a hustler and all. How’s that dude u met while u were counseling in rehab. Heard he was ur golden goose. Show u right. Heard u got busted looking up his $ files 2. Ain’t that something. Thought u were smart enuf not 2 get caught. Maybe not as smart as you think. Yea. Work on that. And ur look. Does a blind person style u? Ur ensemble makes a blind man vomit. when is ur makeover? don’t put it off. what will the 2nd husband do when he learns the truth about u? the reasons why ur 1st marriage went bust cuz u were a wife no one could trust ur lying and cheating on ron such a shame haven’t u hurry enuf people with ur games? u worked in a flash 2 get a new husband with cash but a new home in dallas will not give u class won’t belong before u end back up on ur ass karma is a mutha fucka. #sameho #new areacode #doesurshuggadaddyknow #urafreakytrailaparkho #itson #believethat Hahn traced the text messages to Ad Hoc Labs, Inc. (AHL) in California. AHL’s user policy states that the purchaser agrees not to use the service to transmit Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 3 content that is “unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious . . . [or] invasive of another’s privacy.” 1 On January 5, 2018, Hahn sued Doe for intrusion on seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and injunctive relief, and sued AHL for declaratory relief. After Hahn’s claims against AHL were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court approved Hahn’s request for letters rogatory to AHL to reveal Doe’s identity. In June 2018, the Los Angeles County Superior Court issued a subpoena requiring AHL to produce records to Hahn’s lawyer. The subpoena required production related to three telephone numbers from which Hahn received Doe’s text messages. AHL notified Doe it would comply with the subpoena—and provide information related to his “burner account”—unless he filed a motion to quash. Doe filed motions to quash the subpoena. Just as he does in his motion to this Court, Doe argued in California that (1) his speech was protected by the First Amendment, and (2) Hahn’s claims are barred by limitations and the subpoena therefore seeks irrelevant information. Doe raised these same arguments in the California district court. 1 See Burner Terms of Service, https://www.burnerapp.com/terms-of-service (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 4 After conducting a hearing, the California court rejected Doe’s arguments, holding that Doe’s text messages constituted harassing conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. But the court stayed its order to permit Doe to file a mandamus petition. Doe sought mandamus relief from the California Court of Appeals. Again, Doe raised the same arguments he now makes in this Court—including his argument about the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Group, L.P., No. 17-0463, 2019 WL 321934 (Tex. Jan. 25, 2019). The California Court of Appeals denied Doe’s request for mandamus relief. With the California trial and appellate courts having rejected his arguments—and concluded that the discovery is appropriate—Doe now asks this Court to quash a California subpoena and bar any further discovery. Argument 1. Doe’s text messages are not protected by the First Amendment. [N]o one has a [First Amendment] right to press even “good” ideas onto an unwilling recipient. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). Doe’s entire motion rests on his mistaken assumption that his text messages were protected by the First Amendment. But they weren’t. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 5 Doe seems to believe that his speech is protected because it was anonymous. But anonymity neither bestows nor precludes constitutional protection of speech, which is determined by the speech itself. Contrary to Doe’s assumption, courts do not “reflexively protect[] speech simply because it was written anonymously . . . .” Sarah E. Smith, Threading the First Amendment Needle: Anonymous Speech, Online Harassment, and Washington’s Cyberstalking Statute, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 1563, 1577–78 (2018). Traditionally, First Amendment protection for anonymous speech turns on the difference between “harassing ‘one-to-one’ speech made to a particular person” and “‘one-to-many’ speech about a particular person.” Id. at 1573 (citation omitted and emphasis added). The First Amendment generally does not protect “speech directed at a specific individual rather than speech about a specific individual.” Id. at 1574 (citation omitted and emphasis in original). This approach reflects the purposes of the First Amendment. One-to-many speech—even when posted online—enjoys protection because it promotes the “robust exchange of ideas” involved in public discourse. See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing “robust exchange of ideas” in internet communication); see also Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that anonymous online speech fosters “robust debate”). Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 6 In contrast, harassing speech directed to just one person serves no such purpose. “A one-to-one unwanted statement is highly unlikely to persuade or inform anyone precisely because the listener does not want to hear it. Its only effect is likely to be to offend or annoy. And restricting such statements leaves speakers free to communicate to other, potentially willing listeners.” Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 Nw. L. Rev. 731, 743 (2013) (citations omitted). This distinction explains why the First Amendment does not limit governmental regulation of harassing telephone calls and text messages. For example, federal law prohibits any anonymous use of a telecommunications device with the intent to harass. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), (E) (2012). This prohibition does not violate the First Amendment. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme Court upheld the only law it has considered involving unwanted one-to-one speech. In that case, a federal law permitted an individual to ban mailings of unwanted erotic or sexual materials to his or her home. The Court deemed this law permissible under the First Amendment. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738. As the Court noted, “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient . . . .” Id. Under Rowan, Doe lacked any First Amendment right to press his text messages on Hahn—an unwilling listener. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 7 The Court reiterated this point in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), striking down an injunction as violating the First Amendment in part because the person seeking to limit the speech “[was] not attempting to stop the flow of information into his own household, but to the public.” Id. at 420. Thus, had the speaker been trying to restrict only messages into his own home—as Hahn is trying to do here—no First Amendment protection would attach. These are just two examples of decisions upholding laws regulating one-to- one speech. “[A]ll these laws have one thing in common: In the great bulk of their applications, they restrict what one may call ‘unwanted one-to-one’ speech— speech said to a particular person in a context where the recipient appears not to want to hear it . . . The laws are aimed at restricting speech to a person, not speech about a person. And that is the context in which they have generally been upheld against First Amendment challenge.” Volokh, 107 Nw. L. Rev. at 742 (citations omitted). Taking all of this into account, and after conducting an exhaustive review of the authorities, one of the nation’s leading First Amendment scholars reached exactly the same conclusion as the California courts—that the First Amendment does not protect “one-to-one speech that is addressed to an unwilling listener and that can be restricted without blocking communications to willing listeners.” Id. at 750. That is precisely the situation here. Doe sent his text messages only to Hahn, Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 8 an unwilling listener. The messages can be enjoined without affecting Doe’s ability to make the same statements to other, willing listeners. There is no First Amendment protection for Doe’s private messages to Hahn. Separately, the First Amendment does not protect personal abuse. “Resort to . . . personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution . . ..” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Doe’s text messages to Hahn—accusing her of being a “party favor,” insulting her clothes, telling her to get a makeover, and calling her a “ho” and “trailapark ho”—are nothing more than personal abuse. Not even Doe can argue otherwise. And anonymous or not, these messages lack First Amendment protection. The California courts properly saw Doe’s text messages for what they were—unprotected harassment. 2. No predicate showing is required absent First Amendment protection. Doe argues that Hahn cannot meet the predicate showing of being able to survive summary judgment to obtain discovery required by the Texarkana Court of Appeals in In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding). But in that case, the Texarkana court made clear that the rule would not apply in a case like this one involving direct, non-public, harassing text messages. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 9 The Texarkana court explicitly recognized the difference—explained by Hahn in the preceding section—between one-to-one harassing messages and one- to-many internet speech. Does 1–10 involved efforts to unmask a public blogger. All statements at issue were posted publicly. Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d at 820. In enunciating the summary-judgment standard for obtaining discovery, the Texarkana court distinguished a Pennsylvania case involving purely private text messages and emails—noting that, in the other case, “a type of harassment was involved.” Id. (citing Polito v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CIV. A. 03cv3218, 2004 WL 3768897 (Pa. D. & C. Jan. 28, 2004). The standard set by Does 1–10 applies where the speech occurs in a one-to- many internet context. By its own analysis, it does not apply to one-to-one harassing text messages. Thus, no predicate showing is required due to lack of First Amendment protection. As a result, neither the merits nor the timeliness of Hahn’s claims is at issue in this proceeding. Doe may argue those points on the merits. But he may not rely upon them to resist the subpoena. 3. Even if Hahn must present prima facie evidence of her claims, she has done so. In a single footnote, Doe contends that Hahn did not present a prima facie case for her claims in California. But the California courts rejected this argument. And with good reason. Doe’s complaints really go to Hahn’s ability to prevail on her claims—not whether she presented a prima facie case. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 10 The elements of a claim for intrusion on seclusion under Texas law are: (1) the defendant intentionally intruded on the plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the defendant’s intrusion. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993). This claim supports her request for injunctive relief against Doe. See Donnel v. Lara, 703 S.W.2d 257, 258–59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Kramer v. Downey, 680 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Contrary to Doe’s contention that some physical invasion or eavesdropping is required, two Texas appellate courts have upheld jury verdicts awarding damages for intrusion on seclusion based on harassing telephone calls. Household Credit Servs. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 84–85 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied); Donnel, 703 S.W.2d at 259. The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Texas are: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; (3) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (4) the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (5) no alternative cause of action would provide a remedy for this emotional distress. See Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d, 462, 468 (Tex. 2017); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 11 2004). If reasonable people could disagree about whether the conduct at issue is extreme and outrageous, the issue presents a matter of fact for the jury. Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. 2005). Texas courts have found extreme and outrageous conduct may be based on threats and harassment using the telephone, or making lewd comments. See, e.g., Driscol, 989 S.W.2d at 82; Clayton v. Wisener, 190 S.W.3d 685, 694 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2005, no pet.); Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 942 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.). Additionally, a continuing course of harassment may be extreme and outrageous, even where each individual communication might not be. GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616–17 (Tex. 1999). Here, Doe’s repeated harassment presents a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4. Hahn’s claims are not barred by limitations. As he did unsuccessfully in California, Doe contends that Hahn’s claims are barred by limitations under the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Glassdoor. But Hahn claims equitable-estoppel tolling under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, while Glassdoor concerns only discovery of operative facts under the discovery rule. Glassdoor has nothing to do with tolling in this case. Texas law tolls limitations under both the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The discovery rule turns on the substance and timing of Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 12 the plaintiff’s knowledge. See Glassdoor, 2019 WL 321934, at *5. Unlike the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as it relates to limitations is founded on equitable estoppel. Autry v. Dearman, 933 S.W.2d 182, 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Here, had Doe not paid for—and misused in violation of the terms of use—a program to conceal his identity, Hahn would have known it and been able to name him as a defendant. Moreover, Hahn filed suit within the statute of limitations. Had Doe not sought to quash the subpoena, Hahn would have discovered his identity — and amended her Texas pleading to name him—before the expiration of limitations. At least one Texas appellate court has held that tolling under equitable estoppel applies where a party actively conceals its identity. That case involved the Texas procedural rule concerning suit against corporate entities. But the underlying principle, according to the court, was that a defendant should not be able to “lay behind the log” and hamper efforts at identification, yet then claim limitations as a defense. See Continental Trailways, Inc. v. Hilland, 516 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev’d on other grounds by Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Hilland, 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975). Doe has taken active steps to conceal his identity every step of the way. Even when confronted with a subpoena, Doe decided to “lay behind the log” and Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 13 see if he could run out the clock on limitations. Thus, Doe is equitably estopped from (1) taking affirmative steps to contest and delay Hahn’s discovery of his identity, and then (2) raising limitations as a defense to her claims after he “ran out the clock.” At the very least, Hahn should be entitled to obtain Doe’s identity and obtain discovery concerning his knowledge of the claims—including all steps he took to conceal his identity and obstruct the subpoenas after knowing of the claims—before this Court resolves the issue of fraudulent concealment against her. This is especially true because the concealment of Doe’s identity may also be concealing the existence of legal claims. In determining whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, and thus sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the relationship between the parties matters. Thus, Doe’s identity could actually trigger the existence of the claim. “In determining whether certain conduct is extreme and outrageous conduct, courts consider the context and the relationship between the parties.” GTE Sw., 998 S.W.2d at 612; (citations omitted). “Conduct considered extreme and outrageous in some relationships may not be so in other relationships.” Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 262, 261 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); see also Fields v. Teamsters Local Un. No. 988, 23 S.W.3d 517, 530 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Tiller v. McClure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2003). A person’s motive also may be a factor in determining extreme and outrageous conduct. Texas Farm Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 14 Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 612 (Tex. 2002). Thus, Doe’s concealment of his identity also may be concealing the existence of facts supporting—or even creating—Hahn’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. What, for example, if the person sending the messages is a member of Hahn’s family? Or a patient? Or a fiduciary? This could matter in determining the existence of the cause of action. And concealment of facts giving rise to a legal claim always tolls limitations in Texas. See Ponder v. Brice & Mankoff, 889 S.W.2d 637, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Finally, Glassdoor does not apply to this case. Again, it only addressed the discovery rule—not the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Doe’s actions in concealing, contesting, and delaying discovery of his identity should estop him, as a matter of equity, from relying on limitations. Doe himself is the reason Hahn did not possess the information before the expiration of limitations. And Glassdoor does not address estoppel or fraudulent concealment. Glassdoor also is distinguishable because the plaintiff filed only a petition to take a pre-suit discovery deposition under Rule 202 rather than filing an actual lawsuit and seeking discovery (as Hahn did here). As the Texas Supreme Court held: “[Plaintiff] could have filed suit and conduct discovery about those identities, but chose instead to proceed under Rule 202, thereby risking the timeliness of its Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 15 potential claims.” Id. at *5 (citation omitted). Hahn did exactly as the Texas Supreme Court instructed—she filed suit and sought discovery as to Doe’s identity. See id. The Supreme Court’s statement— distinguishing a pre-suit discovery petition from an actual lawsuit with subsequent discovery—strongly suggests that it would toll limitations in a case like this one, where the plaintiff did file suit and seek discovery. Additionally, the holding in Glassdoor was expressly limited to only Rule 202 proceedings in which the statute of limitations ran on the claims being investigated during those proceedings. The Court specifically stated that: We recognize that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and we do not hold that a claim is moot when barred by limitations. Rather, we hold that where the statute of limitations runs on a claim as a matter of law while a Rule 202 petition seeking to investigate that claim is being litigated, the Rule 202 proceeding is rendered moot. Id. n.3 (emphasis added). As he did in the California Court of Appeals, Doe again fails to acknowledge that the holding was limited to Rule 202 proceedings. Doe’s reliance on Glassdoor is misplaced. 5. Under principles of federalism and comity, the California courts are charged with protecting Doe’s legal rights against the subpoena. With respect to his request for an order quashing the subpoena, Doe cites no legal authority supporting his startling proposition that this Court has the power to quash a California court’s subpoena, directed to a California entity, and served in Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 16 California. No Texas court has the power to do that. With respect to Doe’s request for an order barring all discovery, the Texas Supreme Court has made clear that principles of comity require deferring to the California courts on matters related to protecting Doe’s legal rights, while this Court should rule only on relevance and materiality. A century ago, the Supreme Court held that in the context of multi-state discovery, the state where the underlying lawsuit is pending should decide matters of materiality and relevance while the state where the discovery is sought should protect the legal rights of the resisting party. See Ex parte Taylor, 220 S.W. 74, 75 (Tex. 1920). Thus, matters like privilege or scope of discovery are reserved to the state where the discovery is sought. See In re Issuance of Subpoenas Depositions of Bennett, 502 S.W.3d 373, 377–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding). Under these principles, this Court would address only the materiality and relevance of the discovery sought. And Doe’s identity is both material and relevant. All of Doe’s other complaints are reserved to the California courts— which have rejected them. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 17 Exhibits The following Exhibits are attached hereto and are incorporated herein by this reference: Exhibit 1 John Doe’s Memorandum in Support of Petition to Quash Subpoena filed August 31, 2018 (without attachments) Exhibit 2 Opposition to Petition to Quash Subpoena filed October 22, 2108 (without attachments) Exhibit 3 Superior Court Minute Order with adopted tentative ruling entered November 21, 2018 Exhibit 4 John Doe’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed December 26, 2018 Exhibit 5 Bennet Kelley’s letter to the California Court of Appeal dated February 4, 2019 re: Glassdoor opinion (without attachment) Exhibit 6 California Court of Appeal Order denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus entered March 15, 2019 Conclusion The California courts properly concluded that Hahn is entitled to discover Doe’s identity. The motion for protection should be denied. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 18 Respectfully Submitted, HAHN LAW FIRM, P.C. /s/ Derrick J. Hahn Derrick J. Hahn dhahn@hahnlawfirm.com Texas Bar No: 24026920 Corey R. Herrick crherrick@hahnlawfirm.com Texas Bar No. 24059940 900 Jackson Street; Suite 180 Dallas, TX 75202 (214) 744-3200 (214) 744-3202 Fax Chad Baruch chad@jtlaw.com Texas Bar No.: 01864300 Johnston Tobey Baruch, PC Post Office Box 215 Addison, Texas 75001-0215 Telephone: (214) 741-6260 Facsimile: (214) 741-6248 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 19 Certificate of Service I certify that a true copy of the foregoing has, on this 29th day of April, 2019, been served on Defendant via electronic service to the following: Email address: amanda.crawford-steger@bowmanandbrooke.com Amanda Crawford-Steger BOWMAN AND BROOKE, LLP 5830 Granite Parkway, Suite 1000 Plano, TX 75024 Tel. (972) 616-1700 Fax. (972) 616-1701 ATTORNEY FOR JOHN DOE /s/ Derrick J. Hahn Attorney for Plaintiff Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Quash – Page 20 COPY Bennet G. Kelley (SBN 177001) 1 INTERNET LAW CENTER ~UNFORM 2 100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 700 ORIOIN ') uperlor Co eo Copy Al FllEO Santa Monica, CA 9040 l .... ur.f of CI '"'•mty of Lo5 a1 tornta 3 Telephone: (310) 452-0401 Angeles Facsimile: (702) 924-8740 4 bkelley@intemetlawcen ter.net AUG 3·72018 Slier' Ii 5 r~'. i.a11er, f1eeu11ve OlfJcer/Cle1to1 Co11 I Attorney for Petitioner . . v.Carlog Hidalgo D r 6 JOHNDOE • epufy 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 9 CIVIL UNLIMITED .