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DOCKET NO: X06-UWY-CV-21-5028294-S_: SUPERIOR COURT
NANCY BURTON : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY
v. : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL. : NOVEMBER 29, 2022
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #347
On April 21, 2021, the plaintiff, Nancy Burton, filed this action against numerous
defendants, including Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons. In the operative pleading, the fifth
amended complaint filed on April 12, 2022, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. The
plaintiff has resided on property located at 147 Cross Highway in Redding for thirty-five years.
Throughout ker lifetime, the plaintiff has become involved in numerous environmental causes
including the antinuclear power movement. In furtherance of this objective, the plaintiff has
adopted many goats and began testing their milk in order to ascertain their radioactivity. As far
back as 2017, the plaintiff began experiencing problems with Carmody, Gibbons, and co-
defendant David Philip Mason, all of whom are the plaintiff’s neighbors. The plaintiff alleges
that the defendants began to harass her and complain about the presence of the goats on her
property. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants would, inter alia: (1) scream at
visitors to her property in an attempt to discourage them from adopting goats; (2) kick small
goats who wandered beyond the fence on her property; (3) direct laborers to dump paint debris
onto the shared stone wall of their separated properties; (4) enlist neighbors to participate in a
“hate campaign using social media” to spread false information about the plaintiff and her goats;(5) instigate the publication of defamatory falsehoods about the plaintiff and (6) encourage
others to file false police complaints against the plaintiff regarding her goats.
The plaintiff also alleges that Carmody and Gibbons made threatening remarks with
respect to her goats. For example, on August 19, 2020, Carmody anonymously sent the plaintiff
a text message which read: “Are you actually aware of how much you are abusing these goats?
They are screaming and desperate. You should be ashamed. But you will pay. With their lives.”
The plaintiff further alleges that Gibbons had told her that he would “take pleasure in having
[her] goats slaughtered for human consumption.”
On April 30, 2020, some of the plaintiff’s goats walked onto Mason’s property. In
response, Mason utilized an air horn to scare the goats and they “panicked .. . into [an]
uncontrolled stampede as he chased them in a wild frenzy galloping onto the road as if to escape
a wild predator and back onto [the] plaintiff’s property.” The plaintiff alleges that the
defendants’ collective intent was “to cause the goats to be killed or injured in a collision with
oncoming vehicles.” Subsequently, the plaintiff was arrested for animal cruelty in connection
with the supposed death of a goat during this incident. She contends that no goats were killed or
injured during the incident and that the arrest was based on false statements made to the police
by the defendants.
On February 3, 2021, co-defendant Charles DellaRocco, an animal control officer with
the state of Connecticut’s Department of Agriculture, “secreted himself” onto Carmody and
Gibbons’ property in order to conduct a surveillance operation of the plaintiff and her land. The
information thereafter gleaned eventually led to the court, D ‘Andrea, J., issuing a search warrant
for the plaintiff’s property. On March 10, 2021, agents of the state entered the plaintiff’s property
and took possession of sixty-five goats. The goats were then moved to a large animal facility inNiantic where the plaintiff alleges they have been subjected to various “acts of wilful and
deliberate abuse and cruelty to animals,” including the death of at least one pregnant goat.
Thereafter, on April 9, 2021, the court, Cobb, J., entered a temporary order placing the plaintiff’s
goats in the state’s custody in the case of State ex rel. Dunn v. Sixty-Five Goats, Superior Court,
judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X06-CV-21-6064254-S (April 9, 2021, Cobb, /.).
According to the plaintiff, the proceedings before Judge Cobb were “an elaborate and
reprehensible ruse by [the] defendants . . . to harm and humiliate [her], cause her crushing
heartbreak and despair [and to] divert her from her important public-interest endeavors... .”
The operative complaint contains eleven counts, nine of which are directed toward
Carmody or Gibbons. These are: (1) count one for defamation (as to Carmody only); (2) count
two for invasion of privacy; (3) count three for illegal search and seizure; (4) count four for
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) count six for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6)
count seven for negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) count eight for conversion; (8)
count ten for deprivation of equal rights and privileges; and (9) count eleven for intrusion upon
seclusion.
On June 10, 2022, Carmody and Gibbons filed a motion to strike all counts of the
operative complaint directed toward them besides count one. The motion was accompanied by a
memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike on
July 11, 2022. Carmody and Gibbons filed a reply memorandum on July 29, 2022. The court
took the matter under consideration on October 17, 2022.
“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations
of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188(2003). “[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently,
requires no factual findings by the trial court .. . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the
manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the
complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. . .. Moreover,
[the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly
alleged. . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a
defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the
allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and
realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v.
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). “In ruling on a
motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 253
(1997). “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit /egal conclusions or
the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.” (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588. “A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint
alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
COUNT TWO: INVASION OF PRIVACY
Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count two for invasion of privacy. “[T]he law of
privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of
four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but
otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the
right of the plaintiff to be let alone. . .. The four categories of invasion of privacy are set forth in3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652A as follows: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another; (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; (c) unreasonable publicity given to
the other’s private life; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodrich v.
Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127-28, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). Although
count two does not specify which category of invasion of privacy it is claiming, count eleven
asserts intrusion upon seclusion. Additionally, the plaintiff does not raise appropriation of name
or likeness in her opposition to the present motion. The court therefore assumes that count two is
intended to claim either unreasonable publicity to private life or false light.
A claim for unreasonable publicity of private life “tis actionable only if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concer to the public.” (Emphasis omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 133.
[A] false light invasion of privacy occurs if (a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 131.
In the present case, the plaintiff has not included any examples of statements published
by Carmody or Gibbons in the complaint. Although she alleges that Carmody and Gibbons
“spread false and malicious information about [the] plaintiff and the goats” on social media and
“instigat[ed] publication of defamatory falsehoods about [the] plaintiff and the goats,” and that
Carmody provided “false and malicious statements” about the plaintiff to a journalist, she does
not allege the substance of these statements even at the most general level. It would be
impossible for a fact finder to conclude that Carmody and Gibbons made statements that werehighly offensive to a reasonable person, a necessary clement of both unreasonable publicity and
false light, without knowing what they actually said about the plaintiff. Thus, count two does not
sufficiently state a claim for cither unreasonable publicity or false light. Accordingly, Carmody
and Gibbons’ motion to strike count two is granted.
COUNTS THREE AND FOUR: ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Carmody and Gibbons move to strike counts three and four for illegal search and seizure
and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts three and four seek monetary damages under § 1983
for violations of the plaintiff’s first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights.! Section 1983
provides in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... .” “[I]n any §'1983 action
the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are
present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of
state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Fusco v. Connecticut, 815 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1987).
Although it is true that “a private actor [may act] under color of state law when the
private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents . . . [a] merely
conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to
' Although count three does not specifically mention § 1983, the court assumes that the plaintiff
is bringing it under § 1983, as “illegal search and seizure” is not a stand-alone cause of action.
6state a § 1983 claim against the private entity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ciambriello v. Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002). “To state a claim against a
private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating
that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the only factual allegations pertaining to interaction between
Carmody and Gibbons and state actors are that they provided information to the Redding Police
Department that was used to obtain an arrest warrant and permitted DellaRocco to conduct
surveillance on the plaintiff’s land from their property. Merely providing information to police is
insufficient to allow for a conclusion that Carmody and Gibbons were acting in concert or as part
of a conspiracy with the state. See Young v. Suffolk, 922 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“the summoning of police officers or the provision of information to police officers, even if that
information is false or results in the officers taking affirmative action, is not sufficient to
constitute joint action with state actors for purposes of Section 1983”). See also Ginsburg v.
Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[t]he mere furnishing of
information to police officers does not constitute joint action under color of state law which
renders a private citizen liable under [§ 1983]” [internal quotation marks omitted]). As for
allowing DellaRocco to conduct surveillance from their property, the court does not believe that
this conduct suffices to show joint action or a conspiracy in the absence of more detailed
allegations of “‘a substantial degree of cooperative action”; Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d
1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989); or allegations that Carmody and Gibbons “exerted influence on the
[investigation].” Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 210 (Ist Cir. 1987). Thus, the operativecomplaint does not allege that Carmody and Gibbons were acting under color of state law.
Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike counts three and four is granted.?
COUNT SIX: INTENTIONAL INFLICATION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count six for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. “In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction
of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor
intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional
distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)
that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) that the emotional
distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. ... Whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to
determine. . .. Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254
Conn, 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).
“Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all
bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member
of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
Outrageous!” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 210-11.
2 Having made this determination, the court need not examine Carmody and Gibbons’ qualified
immunity or collateral estoppel arguments.In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that: (1) Carmody and Gibbons screamed
expletives at her and her guests; (2) kicked the plaintiff’s goats; (3) dumped paint onto the stone
wall separating their properties; (4) threatened to have the plaintiff arrested; and (5) made
threatening remarks regarding the plaintiff’s goats, with Carmody sending a text message that the
plaintiff would “pay with [the goats’] lives” and Gibbons informing the plaintiff that he would
take pleasure in having the goats slaughtered for human consumption.? Connecticut courts have
held that similar actions are not extreme and outrageous. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Yale University,
268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004) (defendant making disparaging remarks about plaintiff
and saying that he would “kick [the plaintiff’s] ass” held not to be extreme and outrageous);
Cassotto v. Aeschliman, 130 Conn. App. 230, 235, 22 A.3d 697 (2011) (defendant placing
plaintiff at risk of violating work rules, falsely reporting that plaintiff engaged in outbursts and
irrational behavior, becoming violently angry at plaintiff, and looking directly at plaintiff and
stating “bang bang” held not to be extreme and outrageous). The court holds that as a matter of
law, Carmody and Gibbons’ alleged conduct does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
behavior such that the plaintiff can maintain an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause
of action. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count six is granted.
COUNT SEVEN: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count seven for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. “To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional
3 The plaintiff also argues that Carmody and Gibbons were engaged in a conspiracy with Mason,
and therefore may be held liable for his conduct. Nevertheless, the operative complaint sets forth
very few factual allegations of interactions between Mason and Carmody and Gibbons which
could give rise to a finding of a conspiracy. As the complaint does not sufficiently allege a
conspiracy, the court will not address Mason’s conduct.
9distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough
that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grasso v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc., 138
Conn. App. 759, 771, 54 A.3d 221 (2012). “While the articulation of the elements of an action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress does not employ the adjectives ‘extreme’ or
‘outrageous,’ the requirement that any emotional distress complained of must be ‘severe enough
that it might result in illness or bodily harm’ establishes a standard against which the scope of
this tort might be measured.” Micek-Holt v. Papageorge, 180 Conn. App. 540, 571, 183 A.3d
1213, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 934, 183 A.3d 634 (2018).
In cases involving behavior similar to the alleged actions taken by Carmody and Gibbons,
courts have declined to find the behavior “severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily
harm.” See, e.g., Micek-Holt v. Papageorge, supra, 180 Conn. App. 570-71 (neighbor taking
photographs of plaintiff’s house, telling plaintiff's visitors that plaintiff was not paying rent, and
making offensive gestures toward plaintiff held not severe enough to support claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress); Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn. App. 459, 499-500, 154 A.3d 1093
(2017) (neighbor blocking counterclaimant’s driveway with snow, accosting counterclaimant and
his friends, insulting one of them by referring to a car accident, making a pejorative pun on the
name of another, insulting the counterclaimant for drinking episodes, telling them that he “didn’t
intend to be civil,” and referring to himself with a racial slur held not severe enough to support
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
The present case slightly differs from those cases, however, as the plaintiff also alleges
that Carmody and Gibbons made threats to kill her goats. “Our common law has never
recognized a right to sue an individual for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress
10resulting from injury to such property as a pet.” Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 402, 853
A.2d 621, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 927, 859 A.2d 582 (2004). “The only circumstances under
which our courts have recognized the sentimentality and emotional attachment to the loss of a
pet is under a claim for negligent infliction of bystander emotional distress.” (Emphasis added.)
Mulvaney v. Rodriguez, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-20-
6061430-S (April 26, 2021, Wiese, J.). Claims for negligent infliction of bystander emotional
distress are cognizable only if “the plaintiff has . . . witnessed [a] fatal injury.” Myers v.
Hartford, supra, 403.
The caselaw makes clear that even if Carmody and Gibbons had actually killed her goats,
the plaintiff would not be able to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless she
personally witnessed the slaughter of her goats. Given this, the plaintiff plainly cannot recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on threats to kill her goats. Thus, none of
Carmody and Gibbons’ alleged conduct can support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional +
distress. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count seven is granted.
COUNT EIGHT: CONVERSION
Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count eight for conversion. “Conversion is an
unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over property belonging to
another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.” Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide,
LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 418, 934 A.2d 227 (2007). The operative complaint alleges that conversion
was committed “when [the] plaintiff’s personal property was unlawfully removed without lawful
authorization by the defendants from inside her home at 147 Cross Highway, Redding,
Connecticut on or about March 10, 2021.” Carmody and Gibbons argue that the operative
complaint contains no allegations that they personally removed any of the plaintiff’s property or
11assumed or exercised the right of ownership over the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff argues
that Carmody and Gibbons were involved in a conspiracy to commit conversion. As has already
been stated, the operative complaint does not allege a conspiracy, and it sets forth no allegations
that Carmody and Gibbons committed any acts resembling conversion. Accordingly, Carmody
and Gibbons’ motion to strike count eight is granted.
COUNT TEN: DEPRIVATION OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count ten for deprivation of equal rights and
privileges pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57 1a. “Section 52-571a provides: ‘Any person
aggrieved by a violation of section 53-37b may apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief,
recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and equitable.’ General
Statutes § 53-37b provides: ‘Any person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the
purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this
state or the United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the
United States, engages in the use of force or threat, as provided in section 53a-62, shall be guilty
of aclass A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a
class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony.’ General Statutes
§ 53a-62 further provides in relevant part: ‘(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second
degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another
person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2)(A) such person threatens to commit any
crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to
commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror . . . .’
Although there is a dearth of appellate authority interpreting the scope of § 52-57 1a, ‘[w]Jhen the
three statutes are read together, it is clear that § 52-571a authorizes a civil action when a plaintiff
12alleges that, by the use or threat of force, the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiff of the
equal protection of the laws/privileges and immunities of this state or the United States.”” Burton
y. Mason, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No.
X06-CV-21-5028294-S (January 21, 2022, Bellis, J.).
Carmody and Gibbons argue that the operative complaint does not allege any acts by
them that constitute a “use of force or threat.” The plaintiff counters that the operative complaint
alleges that Carmody and Gibbons sent her threatening messages. A defendant may be held
liable under § 52-571a based on a threat only if the threat violates § 53a-62. Section 53a-62
prohibits “intentionally plac[ing] or attempt[ing] to place another person in fear of imminent
serious physical injury . . . threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence with the intent to
terrorize another person, or . . . threaten[ing] to commit such crime of violence in reckless
disregard of the risk of causing such terror .. . .” The phrase “crime of violence” has not been
defined in the context of § 53a-621 Nevertheless, the phrase has been defined in the context bf
General Statutes § 53a-20, which provides in relevant part that “[a] person in possession or
control of premises . . . is justified in using . . . deadly physical force . .. when he reasonably
believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by [a] trespasser to commit arson or any
crime of violence ... .” The Supreme Court defined “crime of violence” in the context of § 53a-
20 to encompass “only those offenses which fall within the traditional common-law definition”
of acrime of violence. State v. Terwilliger, 314 Conn. 618, 661, 104 A.3d 638 (2014). This
definition includes “felonies which are committed by violence and surprise; such as murder,
robbery, burglary, arson, breaking a house in the day time with intent to rob, sodomy and rape.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 657 (quoting State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 483 (1863)).
Given that animals were considered property at common law; see, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 14
13Conn. 1, 1 (1840) (recognizing that the plaintiff’s chickens were his property); and that property
crimes such as simple theft were not considered crimes of violence at common law; see State v.
Moore, supra, 483; it is unlikely that killing an animal would have been considered a crime of
violence at common law.*
In the present case, the threatening messages allegedly sent by Carmody and Gibbons
could be reasonably interpreted as threats to kill the plaintiff’s goats, but could not be reasonably
interpreted as threats against the plaintiff herself or against any person. Killing the plaintiff's
goats would not be considered a crime of violence at common law. Thus, the messages do not
violate § 53a-62, and therefore cannot give rise to liability under § 52-571a.5 Accordingly,
Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count ten is granted.
COUNT ELEVEN: INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
Finally, Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count eleven for intrusion upon seclusion.
“{TJo establish a claim for intrusion upon the seclusion of another, a plaintiff must prove three
elements: (1) an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff’s solitude or
seclusion or private affairs or concerns, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person. .. . For there to be liability, the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion
must be substantial, must be of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
must be a result of conduct to which a reasonable person would strongly object. . . . In the
4 Although the Supreme Court has stated that specifically with respect to self-defense, “[t]he
statutes which enumerate the situations where the use of force is justified attempt to restate the
common law”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Terwilliger, supra, 314 Conn. 654; the
court “may presume that [words] used in different parts of the same statutory scheme [have] the
same meaning.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338
Conn. 347, 357-58, 258 A.3d 71 (2021).
5 The plaintiff also argues that Carmody and Gibbons are liable for Mason’s conduct. As the
complaint does not sufficiently allege a conspiracy, the court will not address Mason’s conduct.
14context of intrusion upon seclusion, questions about the reasonable person standard are
ordinarily questions of fact, but they become questions of law if reasonable persons can draw
only one conclusion from the evidence.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Parnoff'v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, 188 Conn. App. 153, 172-73,
204 A.3d 717 (2019).
“The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has
secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in a hotel or
insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the
defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private
affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It
may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by
opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private
bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of hisipersonal
documents.” 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652B, comment (b), pp. 378-79 (1977).
In the present case, the plaintiff points to her allegation that Carmody and Gibbons
“spread false and malicious information” over social media. She claims that this conduct
constitutes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion “on its face.” The Parnoff court defined “intrude”
as “to thrust or force in or upon someone or something especially without permission or
welcome.” Parnoff v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, supra, 188 Conn. App. 174. The
allegations of the operative complaint do not give rise to the conclusion that the alleged social
media posts were thrusted or forced upon her. Even if they did, “[t]he second element requires
that the intentional intrusion be upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion or private affairs or
concerns. The plaintiff therefore must show that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of
15seclusion or solitude in that place.” Id., 175. There is certainly no reasonable expectation of
seclusion or solitude on social media websites. The plaintiff also points to the allegation that
Carmody and Gibbons were involved in a conspiracy to intrude upon her seclusion. As has been
stated repeatedly, the operative complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to allege
a conspiracy. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count eleven is granted.
CONCLUSION
None of the challenged counts suffice to state a claim against Carmody or Gibbons.
Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike counts two, three, four, six, seven, eight,
ten, and eleven of the operative complaint is granted in its entirety.
BY THE COURT
421277
Bellis, J.
16
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DOCKET NO: X06-UWY-CV-21-5028294-S_: SUPERIOR COURT NANCY BURTON : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY v. : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL. : NOVEMBER 29, 2022 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #347 On April 21, 2021, the plaintiff, Nancy Burton, filed this action against numerous defendants, including Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons. In the operative pleading, the fifth amended complaint filed on April 12, 2022, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. The plaintiff has resided on property located at 147 Cross Highway in Redding for thirty-five years. Throughout ker lifetime, the plaintiff has become involved in numerous environmental causes including the antinuclear power movement. In furtherance of this objective, the plaintiff has adopted many goats and began testing their milk in order to ascertain their radioactivity. As far back as 2017, the plaintiff began experiencing problems with Carmody, Gibbons, and co- defendant David Philip Mason, all of whom are the plaintiff’s neighbors. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants began to harass her and complain about the presence of the goats on her property. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants would, inter alia: (1) scream at visitors to her property in an attempt to discourage them from adopting goats; (2) kick small goats who wandered beyond the fence on her property; (3) direct laborers to dump paint debris onto the shared stone wall of their separated properties; (4) enlist neighbors to participate in a “hate campaign using social media” to spread false information about the plaintiff and her goats;(5) instigate the publication of defamatory falsehoods about the plaintiff and (6) encourage others to file false police complaints against the plaintiff regarding her goats. The plaintiff also alleges that Carmody and Gibbons made threatening remarks with respect to her goats. For example, on August 19, 2020, Carmody anonymously sent the plaintiff a text message which read: “Are you actually aware of how much you are abusing these goats? They are screaming and desperate. You should be ashamed. But you will pay. With their lives.” The plaintiff further alleges that Gibbons had told her that he would “take pleasure in having [her] goats slaughtered for human consumption.” On April 30, 2020, some of the plaintiff’s goats walked onto Mason’s property. In response, Mason utilized an air horn to scare the goats and they “panicked .. . into [an] uncontrolled stampede as he chased them in a wild frenzy galloping onto the road as if to escape a wild predator and back onto [the] plaintiff’s property.” The plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ collective intent was “to cause the goats to be killed or injured in a collision with oncoming vehicles.” Subsequently, the plaintiff was arrested for animal cruelty in connection with the supposed death of a goat during this incident. She contends that no goats were killed or injured during the incident and that the arrest was based on false statements made to the police by the defendants. On February 3, 2021, co-defendant Charles DellaRocco, an animal control officer with the state of Connecticut’s Department of Agriculture, “secreted himself” onto Carmody and Gibbons’ property in order to conduct a surveillance operation of the plaintiff and her land. The information thereafter gleaned eventually led to the court, D ‘Andrea, J., issuing a search warrant for the plaintiff’s property. On March 10, 2021, agents of the state entered the plaintiff’s property and took possession of sixty-five goats. The goats were then moved to a large animal facility inNiantic where the plaintiff alleges they have been subjected to various “acts of wilful and deliberate abuse and cruelty to animals,” including the death of at least one pregnant goat. Thereafter, on April 9, 2021, the court, Cobb, J., entered a temporary order placing the plaintiff’s goats in the state’s custody in the case of State ex rel. Dunn v. Sixty-Five Goats, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X06-CV-21-6064254-S (April 9, 2021, Cobb, /.). According to the plaintiff, the proceedings before Judge Cobb were “an elaborate and reprehensible ruse by [the] defendants . . . to harm and humiliate [her], cause her crushing heartbreak and despair [and to] divert her from her important public-interest endeavors... .” The operative complaint contains eleven counts, nine of which are directed toward Carmody or Gibbons. These are: (1) count one for defamation (as to Carmody only); (2) count two for invasion of privacy; (3) count three for illegal search and seizure; (4) count four for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) count six for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) count seven for negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) count eight for conversion; (8) count ten for deprivation of equal rights and privileges; and (9) count eleven for intrusion upon seclusion. On June 10, 2022, Carmody and Gibbons filed a motion to strike all counts of the operative complaint directed toward them besides count one. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike on July 11, 2022. Carmody and Gibbons filed a reply memorandum on July 29, 2022. The court took the matter under consideration on October 17, 2022. “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188(2003). “[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court .. . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. . .. Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 253 (1997). “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit /egal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588. “A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). COUNT TWO: INVASION OF PRIVACY Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count two for invasion of privacy. “[T]he law of privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be let alone. . .. The four categories of invasion of privacy are set forth in3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652A as follows: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127-28, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). Although count two does not specify which category of invasion of privacy it is claiming, count eleven asserts intrusion upon seclusion. Additionally, the plaintiff does not raise appropriation of name or likeness in her opposition to the present motion. The court therefore assumes that count two is intended to claim either unreasonable publicity to private life or false light. A claim for unreasonable publicity of private life “tis actionable only if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concer to the public.” (Emphasis omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 133. [A] false light invasion of privacy occurs if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 131. In the present case, the plaintiff has not included any examples of statements published by Carmody or Gibbons in the complaint. Although she alleges that Carmody and Gibbons “spread false and malicious information about [the] plaintiff and the goats” on social media and “instigat[ed] publication of defamatory falsehoods about [the] plaintiff and the goats,” and that Carmody provided “false and malicious statements” about the plaintiff to a journalist, she does not allege the substance of these statements even at the most general level. It would be impossible for a fact finder to conclude that Carmody and Gibbons made statements that werehighly offensive to a reasonable person, a necessary clement of both unreasonable publicity and false light, without knowing what they actually said about the plaintiff. Thus, count two does not sufficiently state a claim for cither unreasonable publicity or false light. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count two is granted. COUNTS THREE AND FOUR: ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Carmody and Gibbons move to strike counts three and four for illegal search and seizure and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts three and four seek monetary damages under § 1983 for violations of the plaintiff’s first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights.! Section 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... .” “[I]n any §'1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fusco v. Connecticut, 815 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1987). Although it is true that “a private actor [may act] under color of state law when the private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents . . . [a] merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to ' Although count three does not specifically mention § 1983, the court assumes that the plaintiff is bringing it under § 1983, as “illegal search and seizure” is not a stand-alone cause of action. 6state a § 1983 claim against the private entity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciambriello v. Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002). “To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In the present case, the only factual allegations pertaining to interaction between Carmody and Gibbons and state actors are that they provided information to the Redding Police Department that was used to obtain an arrest warrant and permitted DellaRocco to conduct surveillance on the plaintiff’s land from their property. Merely providing information to police is insufficient to allow for a conclusion that Carmody and Gibbons were acting in concert or as part of a conspiracy with the state. See Young v. Suffolk, 922 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“the summoning of police officers or the provision of information to police officers, even if that information is false or results in the officers taking affirmative action, is not sufficient to constitute joint action with state actors for purposes of Section 1983”). See also Ginsburg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[t]he mere furnishing of information to police officers does not constitute joint action under color of state law which renders a private citizen liable under [§ 1983]” [internal quotation marks omitted]). As for allowing DellaRocco to conduct surveillance from their property, the court does not believe that this conduct suffices to show joint action or a conspiracy in the absence of more detailed allegations of “‘a substantial degree of cooperative action”; Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989); or allegations that Carmody and Gibbons “exerted influence on the [investigation].” Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 210 (Ist Cir. 1987). Thus, the operativecomplaint does not allege that Carmody and Gibbons were acting under color of state law. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike counts three and four is granted.? COUNT SIX: INTENTIONAL INFLICATION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count six for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. ... Whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine. . .. Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn, 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 210-11. 2 Having made this determination, the court need not examine Carmody and Gibbons’ qualified immunity or collateral estoppel arguments.In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that: (1) Carmody and Gibbons screamed expletives at her and her guests; (2) kicked the plaintiff’s goats; (3) dumped paint onto the stone wall separating their properties; (4) threatened to have the plaintiff arrested; and (5) made threatening remarks regarding the plaintiff’s goats, with Carmody sending a text message that the plaintiff would “pay with [the goats’] lives” and Gibbons informing the plaintiff that he would take pleasure in having the goats slaughtered for human consumption.? Connecticut courts have held that similar actions are not extreme and outrageous. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Yale University, 268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004) (defendant making disparaging remarks about plaintiff and saying that he would “kick [the plaintiff’s] ass” held not to be extreme and outrageous); Cassotto v. Aeschliman, 130 Conn. App. 230, 235, 22 A.3d 697 (2011) (defendant placing plaintiff at risk of violating work rules, falsely reporting that plaintiff engaged in outbursts and irrational behavior, becoming violently angry at plaintiff, and looking directly at plaintiff and stating “bang bang” held not to be extreme and outrageous). The court holds that as a matter of law, Carmody and Gibbons’ alleged conduct does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior such that the plaintiff can maintain an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count six is granted. COUNT SEVEN: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count seven for negligent infliction of emotional distress. “To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional 3 The plaintiff also argues that Carmody and Gibbons were engaged in a conspiracy with Mason, and therefore may be held liable for his conduct. Nevertheless, the operative complaint sets forth very few factual allegations of interactions between Mason and Carmody and Gibbons which could give rise to a finding of a conspiracy. As the complaint does not sufficiently allege a conspiracy, the court will not address Mason’s conduct. 9distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grasso v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc., 138 Conn. App. 759, 771, 54 A.3d 221 (2012). “While the articulation of the elements of an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress does not employ the adjectives ‘extreme’ or ‘outrageous,’ the requirement that any emotional distress complained of must be ‘severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm’ establishes a standard against which the scope of this tort might be measured.” Micek-Holt v. Papageorge, 180 Conn. App. 540, 571, 183 A.3d 1213, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 934, 183 A.3d 634 (2018). In cases involving behavior similar to the alleged actions taken by Carmody and Gibbons, courts have declined to find the behavior “severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm.” See, e.g., Micek-Holt v. Papageorge, supra, 180 Conn. App. 570-71 (neighbor taking photographs of plaintiff’s house, telling plaintiff's visitors that plaintiff was not paying rent, and making offensive gestures toward plaintiff held not severe enough to support claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn. App. 459, 499-500, 154 A.3d 1093 (2017) (neighbor blocking counterclaimant’s driveway with snow, accosting counterclaimant and his friends, insulting one of them by referring to a car accident, making a pejorative pun on the name of another, insulting the counterclaimant for drinking episodes, telling them that he “didn’t intend to be civil,” and referring to himself with a racial slur held not severe enough to support claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress). The present case slightly differs from those cases, however, as the plaintiff also alleges that Carmody and Gibbons made threats to kill her goats. “Our common law has never recognized a right to sue an individual for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress 10resulting from injury to such property as a pet.” Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 402, 853 A.2d 621, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 927, 859 A.2d 582 (2004). “The only circumstances under which our courts have recognized the sentimentality and emotional attachment to the loss of a pet is under a claim for negligent infliction of bystander emotional distress.” (Emphasis added.) Mulvaney v. Rodriguez, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-20- 6061430-S (April 26, 2021, Wiese, J.). Claims for negligent infliction of bystander emotional distress are cognizable only if “the plaintiff has . . . witnessed [a] fatal injury.” Myers v. Hartford, supra, 403. The caselaw makes clear that even if Carmody and Gibbons had actually killed her goats, the plaintiff would not be able to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless she personally witnessed the slaughter of her goats. Given this, the plaintiff plainly cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on threats to kill her goats. Thus, none of Carmody and Gibbons’ alleged conduct can support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional + distress. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count seven is granted. COUNT EIGHT: CONVERSION Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count eight for conversion. “Conversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.” Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 418, 934 A.2d 227 (2007). The operative complaint alleges that conversion was committed “when [the] plaintiff’s personal property was unlawfully removed without lawful authorization by the defendants from inside her home at 147 Cross Highway, Redding, Connecticut on or about March 10, 2021.” Carmody and Gibbons argue that the operative complaint contains no allegations that they personally removed any of the plaintiff’s property or 11assumed or exercised the right of ownership over the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff argues that Carmody and Gibbons were involved in a conspiracy to commit conversion. As has already been stated, the operative complaint does not allege a conspiracy, and it sets forth no allegations that Carmody and Gibbons committed any acts resembling conversion. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count eight is granted. COUNT TEN: DEPRIVATION OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count ten for deprivation of equal rights and privileges pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57 1a. “Section 52-571a provides: ‘Any person aggrieved by a violation of section 53-37b may apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief, recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and equitable.’ General Statutes § 53-37b provides: ‘Any person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state or the United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the United States, engages in the use of force or threat, as provided in section 53a-62, shall be guilty of aclass A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony.’ General Statutes § 53a-62 further provides in relevant part: ‘(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2)(A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror . . . .’ Although there is a dearth of appellate authority interpreting the scope of § 52-57 1a, ‘[w]Jhen the three statutes are read together, it is clear that § 52-571a authorizes a civil action when a plaintiff 12alleges that, by the use or threat of force, the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws/privileges and immunities of this state or the United States.”” Burton y. Mason, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06-CV-21-5028294-S (January 21, 2022, Bellis, J.). Carmody and Gibbons argue that the operative complaint does not allege any acts by them that constitute a “use of force or threat.” The plaintiff counters that the operative complaint alleges that Carmody and Gibbons sent her threatening messages. A defendant may be held liable under § 52-571a based on a threat only if the threat violates § 53a-62. Section 53a-62 prohibits “intentionally plac[ing] or attempt[ing] to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury . . . threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or . . . threaten[ing] to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror .. . .” The phrase “crime of violence” has not been defined in the context of § 53a-621 Nevertheless, the phrase has been defined in the context bf General Statutes § 53a-20, which provides in relevant part that “[a] person in possession or control of premises . . . is justified in using . . . deadly physical force . .. when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by [a] trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence ... .” The Supreme Court defined “crime of violence” in the context of § 53a- 20 to encompass “only those offenses which fall within the traditional common-law definition” of acrime of violence. State v. Terwilliger, 314 Conn. 618, 661, 104 A.3d 638 (2014). This definition includes “felonies which are committed by violence and surprise; such as murder, robbery, burglary, arson, breaking a house in the day time with intent to rob, sodomy and rape.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 657 (quoting State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 483 (1863)). Given that animals were considered property at common law; see, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 14 13Conn. 1, 1 (1840) (recognizing that the plaintiff’s chickens were his property); and that property crimes such as simple theft were not considered crimes of violence at common law; see State v. Moore, supra, 483; it is unlikely that killing an animal would have been considered a crime of violence at common law.* In the present case, the threatening messages allegedly sent by Carmody and Gibbons could be reasonably interpreted as threats to kill the plaintiff’s goats, but could not be reasonably interpreted as threats against the plaintiff herself or against any person. Killing the plaintiff's goats would not be considered a crime of violence at common law. Thus, the messages do not violate § 53a-62, and therefore cannot give rise to liability under § 52-571a.5 Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count ten is granted. COUNT ELEVEN: INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION Finally, Carmody and Gibbons move to strike count eleven for intrusion upon seclusion. “{TJo establish a claim for intrusion upon the seclusion of another, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concerns, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. .. . For there to be liability, the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion must be substantial, must be of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and must be a result of conduct to which a reasonable person would strongly object. . . . In the 4 Although the Supreme Court has stated that specifically with respect to self-defense, “[t]he statutes which enumerate the situations where the use of force is justified attempt to restate the common law”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Terwilliger, supra, 314 Conn. 654; the court “may presume that [words] used in different parts of the same statutory scheme [have] the same meaning.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 357-58, 258 A.3d 71 (2021). 5 The plaintiff also argues that Carmody and Gibbons are liable for Mason’s conduct. As the complaint does not sufficiently allege a conspiracy, the court will not address Mason’s conduct. 14context of intrusion upon seclusion, questions about the reasonable person standard are ordinarily questions of fact, but they become questions of law if reasonable persons can draw only one conclusion from the evidence.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parnoff'v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, 188 Conn. App. 153, 172-73, 204 A.3d 717 (2019). “The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of hisipersonal documents.” 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652B, comment (b), pp. 378-79 (1977). In the present case, the plaintiff points to her allegation that Carmody and Gibbons “spread false and malicious information” over social media. She claims that this conduct constitutes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion “on its face.” The Parnoff court defined “intrude” as “to thrust or force in or upon someone or something especially without permission or welcome.” Parnoff v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, supra, 188 Conn. App. 174. The allegations of the operative complaint do not give rise to the conclusion that the alleged social media posts were thrusted or forced upon her. Even if they did, “[t]he second element requires that the intentional intrusion be upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concerns. The plaintiff therefore must show that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of 15seclusion or solitude in that place.” Id., 175. There is certainly no reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude on social media websites. The plaintiff also points to the allegation that Carmody and Gibbons were involved in a conspiracy to intrude upon her seclusion. As has been stated repeatedly, the operative complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to allege a conspiracy. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike count eleven is granted. CONCLUSION None of the challenged counts suffice to state a claim against Carmody or Gibbons. Accordingly, Carmody and Gibbons’ motion to strike counts two, three, four, six, seven, eight, ten, and eleven of the operative complaint is granted in its entirety. BY THE COURT 421277 Bellis, J. 16