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  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
  • Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 Llc v. Robert PrignoliTorts - Other (Judiciary Law 487) document preview
						
                                

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FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF RICHMOND ------------------------------------------------------------------------x : AMETHYST ALT ASSET FUND 2016 LLC : Index No. 151062/2022 Plaintiff : AFFIRMATION -against- : ROBERT PRIGNOLI, Defendants : ------------------------------------------------------------------------ x Lorenzo DeLuca, Esq. an attorney duly admitted to practice before the courts of the State of New York affirms the following under penalties of perjury: 1. I am the attorney for plaintiff Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 LLC in this action. I make this affirmation in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss and to disqualify the undersigned from acting as counsel in this matter. SUMMARY 2. This is an action for treble damages under Judiciary Law § 487 for deceptive and collusive acts committed by defendant in litigation against the Plaintiff. Defendant is not merely a pawn here but one who committed intentionally deceptive acts to aid his client’s fraud. The litigation sought take advantage of a scrivener’s error made in a deed (NYSCEF Docket #12) from the Sheriff of the City of New York which erroneously conveyed 21 properties to defendant’s client, Griffon Loring LLC instead of the 12 properties actually sold. The Sheriff later filed a Correction Deed (NYSCEF docket # 13) to remove the erroneously deeded properties. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive acts and collusion with his client, Plaintiff was prevented from enforcing its $5,000,000 judgment and incurred legal fees and other unnecessary costs in excess of $1,000,000. A copy of the Complaint is incorporated herein by reference (See NYSCEF # 6). 1 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 3. Defendant relied on falsified evidence to attack the Sheriff’s Correction Deed was invalid. To support his false narrative Defendant’s created, inter alia, a forged Real Property tax return (RP5217) as proof that the Sheriff intended to sell and sold 21 properties. The first page of the fake RP5217 produced by defendant, (See Exhibit A), shows that 21 properties were included in the sale and is signed by the Sheriff on the second page. By comparison the original RP5217 recorded in the office of the City Register (See Exhibit B), has the same signature page attached to a different first page which shows that only 12 properties were included in the sale. 4. Altering an instrument signed by the Sheriff or attaching the Sheriff’s signature to a different document is not merely a misdemeanor under Judiciary Law § 487it is also a Class D forgery under the Penal Law. Defendant’s client has sought to insulate itself from criminal liability for this forged instrument by claiming that it was merely a filing error, or an oversight accidentally filed in two separate actions1. See affidavit of Darshan Shah sworn October 28, 2021, (See Exhibit C ¶ 17,18). But in so doing Griffon admitted that it executed the original certification under the penalty of perjury that they purchased only 12 properties. Thus, by shifting the culpability for the false document to the defendant’s law office failure, Griffon actually admitted that all of its litigation was a hoax from the start. 5. Defendant’s instant 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss completely fails. Other than the conclusory assertion that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, defendant offers no support of any kind for its argument that the deceptive acts described with due particularity in the Complaint are merely conclusory. Moreover, a conclusive negative inference can be drawn from Defendant’s failure to offer any denial of the specific 1 The fake RP5217 was actually attached as an exhibit to Shah affidavits in two action and attached to a Prignoli affirmation in a third action. 2 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 allegations. The ancient maxim “Qui Tacet Consentire Videtur” applies to a party who had an opportunity to deny a statement, and not having done so, creates a presumption that the party could not controvert the statement. M'Kee v. People, 36 N.Y. 113 (1867). “The presumption of the admission of the truth of the matter stated, is founded upon the fact that the party receiving it has omitted to deny or controvert it.” Resseguie v. Mason, 58 Barb. 89, 99 (1870). 6. Having no ability to deny the truth of the Complaint’s allegations of fabrication, forgery, frivolous conduct etc. the opposition resorts to a “et tu quoque” argument. The literal translation of which is “and you are another” but in common vernacular is called “Whataboutism”. See Zacharius v Kensington Publ. Corp., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6677 citing Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Am. Longevity, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14743, 2001 WL 1111981, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001); In re Amidon, 164 A.D. 869, 869-70, (1st Dep't 1914). In Zacharius, the court noted that “et tu quoque” opposition diverts attention from the allegations of the complaint but fails to raise a relevant dispute of fact. In any event the et tu quoque arguments made here are simply not true. Moreover, they are not relevant in a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. For purposes of this motion the allegations of the complaint are deemed to be true. Here defendant is spinning yet another false narrative that does not justify or excuse its deceitful use of materially false statements supported by fabricated and forged documents. 7. Defendant’s failure to deny any of the allegations is also fatal to its motion to disqualify. The motion is premature at this pre-answer stage. There are no material issues of fact regarding the allegations of the complaint until issue is joined. In any event, it is undisputed that the deceitful documents were filed by defendant in the official court dockets 3 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 and, thus, require little or no foundation. Moreover, it is undisputed that defendant’s version the RP5217 is a mistake. Since Griffon attributes that mistake to law office failure, the only issue is the defendant’s veracity not the Plaintiff’s. FACTS 8. The genesis of the underlying litigation is a 76 unit town home development in Kings County known as Loring Estates LLC. Loring was at the center of a massive fraud involving multiple mortgages given by straw purchasers of the same Loring properties. After the fraud was discovered and the leader was jailed, his henchmen sought to keep the properties from being seized to repay the defrauded purchasers of the fraudulent mortgages, including DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc.(“DLJ”). In July 2009 Loring fraudulently conveyed 19 of its remaining properties to Halifax Group LLC. In October 2009, Defendant’s client, Darshan Shah was enlisted to assist in a further fraudulent transaction involving the sale of 1393 Stanley Avenue, Brooklyn, NY to Tiffany Associates I LLC. As a result of the transaction Shah’s entity MDS Management Inc. was given a mortgage in the amount of $50,000. See Exhibit D. 9. In 2008, one of the defrauded mortgage purchasers US Bank commenced litigation in Supreme Court Kings County, US Bank v. Luka, Loring et al Index No 25789/2008 by filing a complaint and a Notice of Pendency to quiet title. Thereafter on May 1, 2012, the Supreme Court Kings County entered a judgment against Luka and Loring declaring, Agathia Luka, to be the owner of the property at 1432 Loring subject to the US Bank mortgage. A copy of the Judgment is annexed as Exhibit E. 10. In 2010 DLJ commenced litigation in Supreme Court New York county, DLJ v Kontogiannis Index no 104675/2010 to recover damages for the fraud and sought to undo 4 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 all of the fraudulent transactions engaged in by the henchmen. On December 2, 2011, the court granted DLJ a judgment in the amount of $48,267,204.83 against Loring Estates and many others. DLJ served an execution and sought to sell Loring’s interest in certain properties at a Sheriff’s sale. DLJ directed the Sheriff to sell 12 of the Loring properties and published a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in the NY Post. (See Exhibit F) 11. On December 12, 2012, the Sheriff conducted the auction sale. Defendant’s client Griffon Loring LLC (“Griffon”) was the high bidder for the 12 properties with a winning bid of $3,300,000. Griffon executed a memorandum of sale agreeing to pay $3,300,000 for the 12 properties offered in the published Notice of Sale. (See Exhibit G). Simultaneously Griffon purchased title insurance for the 12 properties listed in the notice of sale and received a title commitment for the same 12 properties on December 17, 2012. (See Exhibit H). On December 19, 2012, Griffon sent an email to Stout Street as holder of mortgages on 7 of the disputed properties that it had purchased 12 properties and was interested in acquiring the rest. (See Exhibit I). 12. On January 3, 2013, the Sheriff executed a deed that included all 12 properties listed in the published notice of sale but by mistake included an additional 9 properties. making a total of 21 properties. Attached to the deed was an original real property tax return RP5217 signed by the Sheriff which declared under penalties of perjury that the transaction included only 12 properties. (See NYSCEF Doc # 12) at pages marked 13 and 14 of 22). Griffon also signed the RP5217 certifying under penalties of perjury that only 12 properties had been purchased in the transaction. The Erroneous Deed for the 21 properties along with the RP5217 certifying that only 12 properties were included was duly recorded on February 15, 2013. 5 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 13. On March 20, 2013, the Sheriff executed a Correction Deed to remove the 9 properties that had been erroneously included in the earlier deed. The Correction Deed was duly recorded on March 28, 2013. (see NYSCEF doc # 13). The Sheriff forwarded a copy of the recorded Correction deed to Griffon along with a letter explaining his action and including a copy of the Notice of Sale (See Exhibit J). Griffon took no action with respect to the 9 disputed and accepted the Correction Deed. 14. On or about October 16, 2013, in Griffon Loring v. Mc Neil, Supreme Court Kings county Veronica Humphries, as authorized managing agent for Griffon, signed an affidavit in which she swore that Griffon had purchased only 12 properties and attached a copy of the Correction Deed as proof of Griffon’s ownership. (See Exhibit K) On October 16, 2013, Michael Finz acting as attorney for Griffon submitted an affirmation attesting to Griffon’s purchase of only 12 properties. (See Exhibit L) On December 14, 2013, defendant was substituted to act as counsel for Griffon in the matter and other Griffon related landlord and tenant proceedings in Kings county. 15. In April 2015, Griffon offered to purchase from Loring’s bankruptcy trustee the same properties that it later claimed in litigation that it had owned since 2013. (See Exhibit M) Later in August 2016, defendant’s client, Darshan Shah agreed to form a joint venture with Amethyst’s predecessor to purchase a limited assignment of the DLJ Judgment for the express purpose of executing on the same properties that Griffon later claimed to own. (See Exhibit N) Shah defaulted on the contract leaving Amethyst’s predecessor to complete the transaction. Defendants Deceitful Acts in Litigation Landlord and Tenant Litigation in Kings County (Kuznieski) 6 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 16. On or about June 30, 2017, Darshan Shah was alerted to the fact that certain New York City records erroneously described Griffon as the owner despite the Correction Deed. (See Exhibit O). To correct the city’s records on July 21, 2017, the Office of the New York City Register re-recorded the earlier deeds from Loring to Halifax and noted that ”this document is being placed in the index to reflect the names of the owner as shown on the last recorded deed.” (See Exhibit P). 17. On or about August 15, 2017 defendant commenced 21 holdover proceedings on behalf of Griffon in L & T Court, Kings County in which defendant alleged that Griffon was the owner of the Property. When the respondents in those proceedings challenged Griffon’s standing as landlord based on the Correction Deed and the records of the City Register, defendant created two letters that purported to reject the Correction Deed. The letters were backdated to make them appear to have been written 4 years earlier. (See Exhibit Q). No proof was submitted that the letters were actually sent. Despite the fake letters the court (Judge Kuznieski) agreed with respondents that the earlier mistaken deed was properly corrected by the Correction Deed and directed Griffon to go Supreme Court for any further relief. (See Exhibit R). Quiet Title Action in Kings County (Toussaint) 18. On or about January 30, 2018, defendant commenced an action Kings county, Griffon v. Loring et al Index No. 501946/2018 to quiet title to the 9 disputed properties by seeking to invalidate the Correction Deed. The verified petition stated at ¶ 21 that “Pursuant Article 15 of the RPAPL we have joined all parties who may have an interest in the properties.” At ¶ 22 defendant wrote that: There are no other parties in interest to this proceeding that have not been joined” The action was brought against three named 7 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 defendants, Halifax Group LLC, Loring Estates LLC and Plaza Real Estate Holdings Inc. However, on the date of the petition both Defendant and Griffon had actual knowledge that (a) Halifax, Loring and Plaza were in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings whose assets were controlled by a trustee, (b) Halifax was the record owner of 7 of the 9 properties subject to a mortgage held by Stout Street Fund I LP, (c) Joseph Jeffries-el was the owner of 1393 Stanley subject to a mortgage held by Nationstar Mortgage and (d) Agathia Luka was the owner of the 1432 Loring subject to a mortgage held by US Bank. 19. It is undisputed that Griffon had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy trustee’s interest because in a conflicts check in 2014 counsel for the Trustee, Tarter Krinsky, who also represented Michael Shah, Griffon’s 99% owner, was advised that Griffon had no interest in the subject properties. (See Exhibit S). Moreover, as shown above Griffon had offered to purchase the Trustee’s interest in the disputed properties. Defendant’s actual knowledge of the Stout Street mortgage foreclosure was described in the Kuznieski Decision, supra. Defendant also had actual knowledge of Jeffries-el’s title to 1393 Stanley Avenue because his client had partially financed his purchase in 2009 and had been repaid with the proceeds of the Nationstar Mortgage. 20. It is undisputed that Defendant had actual knowledge that Agathia Luka was the owner of 1432 Loring subject to the US Bank Mortgage because on September 25, 2017, defendant had submitted an affirmation and memorandum of law in US Bank’s foreclosure action representing Darshan Shah as a tenant of the property. Significantly at no point in that litigation did defendant ever claim that Griffon was the owner of the property. Instead, defendant admitted that Agathia Luka was the owner of the property by deed dated April 15, 2005, subject to the US Bank Mortgage. Moreover, the Prignoli affirmation and its 8 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 accompanying memo of law both acknowledge that Luka’s ownership, subject to the mortgage is ”Res Judicata” by virtue of a Quiet Title Judgment entered on May 1, 2012. (See Exhibit T). Thus, the defendant simultaneously affirmed opposite facts in two different Supreme Courts. Thereby, being deceitful to one of them. 21. In the Toussaint action Defendant again introduced as evidence the purported rejection letters as grounds to invalidate the Correction Deed. Upon learning of the action, the trustee’s counsel, Tarter Krinsky, wrote to defendant advising that Griffon had no interest in the property and that the quiet title action was subject to the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court. Robert Wolf, Esq. wrote that defendant’s actions were a violation of the automatic stay and “in addition to being predicated on an outright falsehood.” A copy of the letter is annexed as Exhibit U. As a result, Justice Toussaint dismissed the petition. Undaunted by the Trustee’s admonition, defendant filed a motion to reargue in defiance of the automatic stay resulting in an emphatic denial and a direction that any further requests or petitions be made in Bankruptcy Court. (See Exhibit V) Griffon’s Motion to Lift Stay in Bankruptcy Court (Judge Lord) 22. Following the closure of the Supreme Court to further petitions, defendant filed a motion to lift stay in Loring’s bankruptcy case before Judge Nancy Hershey Lord. Prior to making the motion Griffon’s principal Michael Shah realized that his prior waiver of conflict based on lack of ownership was inconsistent with his father’s hoax litigation. . Griffon advised Tarter Krinsky that its prior waiver of conflict was a mistake and insisted that Tarter Krinsky withdraw from the matter. Griffon’s claims of ownership were then extensively contested before the Bankruptcy Court and their motion to lift stay was denied with prejudice. (See Exhibit W ). 9 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 23. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of "an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment" Paramount Pictures Corp. v Allianz Risk Transfer AG, 31 NY3d 64, 72, (2018). Collateral Estoppel "comes into play when four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits' " Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17, (2015). 24. The only issue before Judge Lord was whether Griffon had a colorable non- frivolous claim to the disputed properties. Her conclusion that Griffon could not meet the very low bar for a lift stay motion resolved the issue against Griffon. It was a binary decision. If the properties were part of the bankrupt estate under the control of the Trustee, ipso facto, they could not belong to Griffon. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the combination of Justice Toussaint’s dismissal and Judge Lord’s denial of Griffon’s claim with prejudice of Griffon precludes further litigation of the issue. Griffon’s Subsequent Actions in Kings, Richmond and New York Counties 25. After Judge Lord’s denial with prejudice defendant retuned to Justice Toussaint with another motion to reargue. Anticipating the unsuccessful result, defendant commenced yet another action in Kings County, Griffon Loring v Amethyst et al Index no 504769/2019 (J. Baynes). Griffon sought to reargue in a different forum the same issues that had been decided by Justice Toussaint and Justice Lord in the lift stay motion using the same fake rejection letter as Exhibits. When the court declined to sign an order to show cause with a TRO, Defendant started yet another identical action in Richmond County under Index no. 10 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 85039/2019 (J. Porzio). When the Court declined to sign a TRO, defendant abandoned the action. 26. On April 25, 2019, Defendant commenced yet another action by filing an identical petition seeking the same relief.in New York county, Griffon v. Amethyst 154292/2019 (J. Goetz). However, after another request for a TRO was denied by Justice Ostrager in the original DLJ action (See Exhibit X) defendant appeared before Justice Goetz with another application. This application was supported by a completely new argument which claimed that the Sheriff had “confirmed” that its sale included all 21 of the disputed properties. (See Affidavit of Darshan Shah Exhibit C supra ¶ 9). In support of that new contention defendant included as an exhibit the falsified RP 5217, described above. Given the importance of the fake RP5217 to Griffon’s argument it is simply not credible that its inclusion was accidental or an oversight. Darshan Shah was not at the sale and could not support his claims with perjury Defendant created the fake 5217 to create an argument in its favor. . 27. Griffon’s protestation that it was an accident is also belied by the fact that the falsified RP5217 was used other times as well. On July 19, 2019, in the Kings County action Index No. 504769/2019 @ NYSCEF Docket # 94 defendant filed an affirmation which stated that Mr DeLuca signed forms that admitted that Griffon had purchased 21 properties. Prignoli attached the same falsified RP5217 as an exhibit to his affirmation as was used in New York County. (See Exhibit Y). 28. Defendant, Prignoli’s intent to deceive is clearly shown by his complete reliance on the RP5217 that he knew was completely false. From all of the foregoing Prignoli was also aware that Griffon’s claim was predicated on an outright falsehood. 11 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 Indeed, on May 28, 2019, as Docket # 27 and on July 8, 20192 as Docket # 75 Prignoli filed in the Kings county action accurate and complete copies of the RP5217 attached to the deed as recorded with the City Register. The pages used in Exhibit Y were taken out of order from the recorded document. The consecutive page numbers at the bottom right of each were deleted to obscure the fact that the pages were taken out of order. 29. In light of the foregoing Griffon’s claims of an accident or oversight lack credibility. Indeed, virtually anything said by Griffon’s principals should be viewed with suspicion. The willingness of Plaintiff’s principals aided by their attorneys to flout the law has been noted by other courts. In Delshah Group v Javeri, Index No. 09-cv-06909-KBF, Judge Katherine Forrest of the Southern District of New York had this to say about Griffon’s owner, Michael Shah. “Shahs’ testimony came across as contrived; he contradicted himself at various points, was contradicted by testimony of other more credible witnesses, and was contradicted by documents. The court was left with the impression that he was prepared to say whatever he deemed necessary to obtain a judgment in Delshah’s favor.” See Exhibit Z pages 7 and 8. Similar to this litigation Footnote 2 on page 7 also reveals the court’s suspicions about questionable conduct regarding spoliation of evidence. The court concluded “However, since the evidence in favor of defendants in this case is already so overwhelming the Court need not now make a finding of spoliation or impose a penalty.” 30. Defendant’s pattern of litigation misconduct in furtherance of the Shah interests is well-known in Richmond County. In Kimso Apts v. Dulce Maria Rivera et al Richmond County Index No. 151044/2017 defendant improperly brought suit against a tenant for complaining about building conditions. To delay the resulting anti-Slapp damage 2 The same copy is attached to defendant’s motion papers as NYSCEF docket # 12 12 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 claims defendant abused the discovery process and even filed a motion asking Justice McMahon to recuse based on alleged personal animus. Prignoli stated in his supporting affirmation dated December 19, 2020; “it is crystal clear that Judge Judith McMahon hates my guts….” Prignoli’s client was ultimately sanctioned and required to pay over $100,000 in legal fees to the defendants. Applicable Law 31. Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 an attorney or counselor who “is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion with intent to deceive any court or party… is guilty of a misdemeanor and in addition to the punishment prescribed in the penal law, he forfeits to the injured party treble damages to be recovered in a civil action.” Judiciary Law §487 is a statute that has its origins in the penal law and its "intent is to enforce an attorney's special obligation to protect the integrity of the courts and foster their truth seeking function" Judiciary Law § 487 "focuses on the attorney's intent to deceive, not the deceit's success" Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d 8, 14 (2009). 32. Accordingly, although injury to the plaintiff is an essential element of a Judiciary Law § 487 cause of action seeking civil damages (see Klein v Rieff, 135 AD3d 910, 913,(2nd Dept 2016) "recovery of treble damages under Judiciary Law § 487 does not depend upon the court's belief in a material misrepresentation of fact in a complaint" (Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d at 15). A party's legal expenses in defending the lawsuit may be treated as the proximate result of the misrepresentation (see id.). 33. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action" Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 (2nd Dept (2010), and, "[i]n considering such a motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and 13 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (id. at 1181) see also Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88. “The court should liberally construe the complaint and accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and any submissions in opposition to the motion to dismiss.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152,(2002). Even if inartfully pleaded, a claim should not be dismissed when the facts stated are sufficient to make out a cause of action ( Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88); 34. The complaint here clearly alleges multiple acts of deceit of both the courts and the plaintiff involving the intentional falsification of documents and the creation of fictitious evidence to support knowingly false claims and narratives. Although the act must be shown to be intentional, intent is rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must ordinarily be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a defendant's actions (see People v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, (1995). Intent is an invisible operation of the mind for which direct evidence is rarely available" People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489, (2011). 35. There can be no benign intent associated with the submission of fictitious documents. The only purpose is to deceive or attempt to deceive the court or the parties. In Four Star Stage Lighting, Inc. v. Merrick, 56 A.D.2d 767 (1st Dept 1977) it was held that the allegation of deception of a court by substitution of a single page of a sworn statement stated a valid basis for relief under Judiciary Law § 487. In Mazel 315 W 35th LLC v. 315 W 35th Assoc. LLC, 120 A.D.3d 1106 (1st Dep't 2014) the court held that "Plaintiff's evidence showing that defendant presented false assignment documents for recordation in the City Register and sent a letter to the justice stating falsely that his client was the true owner of the notes and mortgages establishes an egregious act of intentional deceit of the court sufficient to support the cause of action." Similarly, in Kurman v. Schnapp, 73 A.D.3d 435, 435, 17 14 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 (1st Dep't 2010) "Plaintiff stated a cause of action under Judiciary Law § 487 by alleging that defendant deceived or attempted to deceive the court with a fictitious letter addressed to him….". 36. Here intent can clearly be inferred from the fact that the documents were used to counter the overwhelming evidence that Griffon’s claim is a blatant hoax. The hoax is demonstrated by the very document, the RP 5217, that defendant sought to manipulate out of existence. Defendant sought to deceive the court into believing it was a sworn statement in support of Griffon’s claims when the original document says exactly the opposite. Indeed, Griffon ‘s declaration that it purchased on only 12 properties in the RP 5217 is a conclusive judicial admission that estops further false claims here. The Nassau County Action 37. Defendants’ reliance on the Nasau county action is completely misplaced. When the ambiguous complaint (NYSCEF Docket # 18) was challenged by motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement Griffon opposed the motion by admitting that it does not own the disputed properties and never owned them. Based on Griffon’s sworn allegations in opposition to the motion the Nassau court ( J.Voutsinas) held that: “that numerous other courts seem to have passed on the question of whether or not Plaintiff actually owned the other properties and that the courts seem to have concluded that Plaintiff did not. Plaintiff’s complaint …… does not challenge the fact that Plaintiff did not actually own the Property.” See Exhibit AA. 38. Griffon’s admission is not surprising given the recent adverse decisions in New York County. On July 2, 2021, J. Goetz held that “The memorandum of sale dated December 12, 2012 (the MOS) and signed by DeLuca for Griffon on December 12, 2012, 15 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 confirms that Griffon purchased only the 12 Sold Properties at the sheriff’s sale. In April 2022, the Appellate Division First Department, in Griffon Loring LLC v. Amethyst Alt Asset Fund 2016 LLC, 204 A.D.3d 407 (1st Dept 2022) upheld the Goetz decision. The court highlighted the central question of the litigation to be “as to whether plaintiff bought the disputed properties as he claims.” 39. The court agreed that Griffon did not buy the disputed properties holding: “The Notice of Sale, however, listed only 12 properties, and excluded the disputed properties. The sale was limited to the properties identified in the notice of sale only.”. The First Department could find no evidence to support Griffon’s claim to ownership of the properties and thus any basis to sustain its action. In fact, Griffon has never offered, in any of the litigation, any direct admissible evidence to support its claim of ownership that was not obviously flawed or fabricated. 40. The First Department also found that although the Erroneous Deed listed the disputed properties, “the sheriff immediately corrected the deed and clarified that he had erroneously listed the disputed properties (See Beebe v. La Pierre, 114 AD2d 668,669 [3rd Dept 1985]). The Sheriff submitted an affidavit confirming the error and noted that his office lacked the authority to sell the disputed properties (See Matter of New Cr. Bluebelt, Phase 4, 79Ad3d 888, 891 [2d Dept2010]).” 41. Thus, after a clear rejection of their claims by court Griffon has finally admitted that it did not actually own the properties and that it was all a hoax. In the Stout foreclosure litigation Sam Floed one of the tenants of the disputed properties described in an affidavit an encounter with Darshan Shah as follows: “ Specifically, Griffon Loring, througb its principals, officers, employees and agents, have threatened me and my family with 16 of 19 FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 12/01/2022 03:48 AM INDEX NO. 151062/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/01/2022 eviction if I do not pay Griffon Loring $2,000 each month in rent”. “Recently, I spoke with Shah concerning an injury I sustained on the Property and my intention to bring a lawsuit against the owner for the damages I sustained as a result of their negligence. In response, Shah advised that Griffun Loring and Shah, individually, are not the owners of the Property. Shah further clarified that he is "fighting" to become the owner of the Property.” See Exhibit BB. 42. In that rare moment of candor Shah finally admitted the truth. Neither he nor Griffon owned the disputed properties, but they were fighting to get them. In this case fighting involved defendant’s falsification of records to deceive the courts. These acts go way beyond sharp litigation practices and cross both ethical and criminal lines. Griffon was clearly the beneficiary of a mistaken delivery by the Sheriff. However, it is only in the game of Monopoly that one can retain the benefit of bank errors. In New York when one receives a mistaken delivery intended for another or more than the intended delivery, the recipient is bound by law to take reasonable steps to r