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Exhibit N, Harris Brief in Opposition to Prestige's Motion for Summary Judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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ROBERT HARRIS, Plaintiff designates
New York County as the
Place of Trial
Basis of Venue is
Plaintiff, Location of Relevant Events
Index No. 650175/2017
vs. Date Purchased 1/10/2017
INTIMO, INC., NATHAN NATHAN
individually, TOMMY NATHAN, individually,
MORIS ZILKHA, individually, PRESTIGE
EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
a/k/a PRESTIGE EMPLOYEE
ADMINISTRATORS, PRESTIGE EMPLOYEE
ADMINISTRATORS II, INC. a/k/a PRESTIGE
EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATORS and JOHN
DOES 1-10, and ABC CORPS. 1-8,
fictitious names for persons or entities whose
present roles and identities are unknown,
Defendants.
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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW OPPOSING THE PRESTIGE DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
MEYERS FRIED-GRODIN, LLP
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
Phone: (646) 596-1292
E-mail: JMeyers@MfgLegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Harris
Of Counsel and on the Brief:
Jonathan Meyers, Esq.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY.............................................................................................................2
COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION ...................................3
LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................5
I. BECAUSE MATERIAL FACT ISSUES EXIST AS TO WHETHER THE
PRESTIGE DEFENDANTS WERE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEIR
MOTION MUST BE DENIED ...........................................................................................5
II. THE NEW YORK PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYER ACT DOES NOT
ALLOW PRESTIGE TO ESCAPE LIABILITY ................................................................5
III. PLAINTIFF’S JOINT EMPLOYER CLAIMS AGAINST THE PRESTIGE
DEFENDANTS ARE VIABLE ………………………………………………………..…6
A. The Prestige Defendants Explicitly Admit they Were Plaintiff’s Employer ...........7
B. The Prestige Defendants Had Sufficient Authority and Control Over
Plaintiff to Be Considered His Joint Employer........................................................7
C. Plaintiff’s Other Claims Against the Prestige Defendants Are Proper ....................9
1. Insofar as the Prestige Defendants Were Plaintiff’s Employer, They Are
Equally Liable as Intimo on Plaintiff’s Other Claims .............................................9
2. The Other Claims Are Not Subject to Dismissal on a “Duplicativness”
Basis .........................................................................................................................9
VI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE DISCOVERY IS
NOT COMPLETE…………………………………………………… …………………10
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………..……11
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff Robert Harris opposes the summary judgment motion filed by Defendants Prestige
Employee Administrators, Inc. a/k/a Prestige Employee Administrators’ and Prestige Employee
Administrators II, Inc. a/k/a Prestige Employee Administrators’ (the “Prestige Defendants”).
Material issues of fact exist as to whether the Prestige Defendants were Plaintiff’s joint
employer, along with the other Defendants (the “Intimo Defendants”).
To begin with, while New York does have a Professional Employers Organization statute, that
Act does not shield PEOs of liability or prohibit application of a joint employer theory to PEOs.
Next, the Prestige Defendants prepared documents explicitly stating that Plaintiff is their
employee. One document the Prestige Defendants had Plaintiff sign states: “I Robert Harris, an
employee of Prestige Administrators, Inc. hereby authorize the employer to deduct from my wages
for contribution for benefits . . .” Additionally, the Employee Handbook promulgated by the Prestige
Defendants states about Intimo and Prestige: “Both are your employers.” (emphasis added).
And at his deposition, the Prestige Corporate Representative admitted that Plaintiff was
employed by Prestige.
Moreover, in its Service Agreement with Intimo, Prestige obtained control and authority over the
employees.
Either Prestige was Plaintiff’s employer, or it wasn’t. If it was, then it is equally as liable as
Intimo, to Plaintiff. Indeed, Prestige benefited from Plaintiff’s work. Here, there is an abundance of
evidence showing that the Prestige Defendants were Plaintiff’s employer. This creates a material fact
issue for a jury.
Accordingly, the Prestige Defendants’ summary judgment motion must be denied.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Summons and Complaint that initiated the instant
lawsuit. See Exhibit M to Prestige Moving Aff. at ¶ 59. 1
On February 10, 2017, the Intimo Defendants filed a motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in
its entirety for Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief Can Be Granted Pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7).
That motion was denied in part and granted in part, as set forth in the Court’s Decision and Order dated
December 12, 2018. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, dated January 6, 2020, aimed at
appealing the portions of the Order that dismissed some of Plaintiff’s substantive claims.
On April 23, 2019, Plaintiff and the Intimo Defendants entered into a Stipulation and Order
permitting Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to add the Prestige Defendants into the case. On May 28,
2019, the Court signed that Stipulation and Order.
On June 4, 2019 Employee Administrators, Inc. a/k/a Prestige Employee Administrators was
served with the Summons and Amended Complaint on June 4, 2019.
In lieu of filing an Answer, on July 24, 2019, the Prestige Defendants filed motion aimed at
dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as against them. On November 21, 2019, the Prestige Defendants
withdrew that motion.
Both the Prestige Defendants and Intimo Defendants have failed to provide important discovery.
Therefore, on September 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery aimed at the Intimo
Defendants. That motion has been fully submitted and a decision remains pending. Additionally,
following depositions and issues raised therein, on December 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed another motion to
compel discovery aimed at both the Prestige Defendants and the Intimo Defendants. That motion
remains pending.
1
“Prestige Moving Aff.” Refers to the Affidavit of Prestige’s counsel, dated January 17, 2020, submitted as part
of their summary judgment moving papers.
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COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION
The following is a summary of the factual background relevant to this motion:
A. The Prestige Defendants Had an Express Right of Direction and Control Over Plaintiff
Including Hiring, Firing and Disciplinary Authority
In Prestige’s Service Agreement with Intimo, Prestige was expressly granted the right of direction and
control over employees (including Plaintiff). It states:
Prestige shall have sufficient authority as may be required be any applicable law so as
to maintain a right of direction and control over assigned employees assigned to
client’s location and shall retain such such authority to hire, terminate, discipline, and
reassign assigned employees.
Exhibit G to Prestige Moving Aff. at p.2.
Additionally, the Service Agreement calls for Prestige to pay employees and to “maintain
necessary records and comply with reporting procedures. . .” Ibid.
B. The Prestige Defendants Explicitly Held Themselves Out as Plaintiff’s Employer
In the Intimo Defendants’ interrogatory answers, the Intimo Defendants identify Plaintiff’s
employers as being – in addition to Intimo – “Prestige Employee Administrators, Inc.” Meyers Aff. at
¶¶ 5-7 and Exhibits C & D thereto. 2
At his deposition, Prestige’s Corporate Representative admitted that the Employee Handbook
given to Plaintiff states that both Intimo and Prestige were his employers. And he specifically testified:
“In the co-employment relationship, yes, legally we are both employers.” Exh. B to Meyers Aff. at
28:14-29:11.
Additionally, on or about March 7, 2019, the Intimo Defendants produced documents concerning
Plaintiff which include documents that look to be of the kind ordinarily found in an employee’s
2
“Meyers Aff.” refers to the opposition certification of Jonathan Meyers, Esq., dated January 27, 2020.
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personnel file. While some of those documents bear the name “Intimo, Inc.” on them, others identify
Prestige Employee Administrators. Meyers Aff. at ¶¶ 8-15 & Exhibits E through J thereto.
For example, one document produced by the Intimo Defendants is entitled “Prestige Employee
Administrators Employee Termination Report” which reads “Employee : Robert Harris” Exhibit E to
Meyers Aff.
Another such example is document entitled “Prestige Employee Administrators Application for
Employment” which was completed by Plaintiff. Exhibit F to Meyers Aff.
Yet another example is document entitled “Prestige Employee Administrators Employee
Authorization & Waiver” which states: “I Robert Harris, an employee of Prestige Administrators,
Inc. hereby authorize the employer to deduct from my wages for contribution for benefits (i.e. group
health insurance, group dental insurance, life insurance, 401(k) etc.). Exhibit G to Meyers Aff.
(emphasis added).
And another example is document entitled “Prestige Employee Administrators COBRA Notice
Acknowledgement Form” which identifies Robert Harris as “Employee.” Exhibit H to Meyers Aff.
Additionally, there is the document entitled “Prestige Employee Administrators, Inc. For Intimo,
Inc. Employee Handbook” which states: “This Handbook was developed by Prestige for the utilization
of Intimo, Inc. Prestige and the Company are co-employers. In a co-employment relationship, duties
and responsibilities are allocated between Prestige and the Company. Both are your employers.” See
Exhibit I to Meyers Aff. at page Bates numbered DEF000095.
Plaintiff signed an acknowledgement of the aforementioned handbook. Exhibit J to Meyers Aff.
C. Plaintiff Understood Prestige to Be His Employer
Based upon representations made by the Prestige Employers, Plaintiff understood the Prestige
Defendants to be his employer. He testified:
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I was hired by Nathan, and three months after that, as I’m reminded after looking at these
documents, Prestige became a co-employer, joint employer, and they handled my paycheck, it
was drafted by them, it had their name on it. I viewed them as a joint employer.
Exh. A to Meyers Aff. at 229:16-230:5.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I. BECAUSE MATERIAL FACT ISSUES EXIST AS TO WHETHER THE
PRESTIGE DEFENDANTS WERE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEIR
MOTION MUST BE DENIED
Summary judgment is a “drastic remedy” and can be gratned only where no material or triable
issue of fact exists. Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1986);
Mandelos v. Karavasidis, 86 N.Y.2d 767, 768-69 (1995). The movant must come forward with
evidence “sufficien[t] to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment.” CPLR 3212(b).
The Court must draw all reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant/Plaintiff. See, e.g., Negri v.
Stop & Shop, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 625, 626, 491 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1985). “A motion for summary judgment
‘should not be greanted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from
the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility.”
Here, the record is rife with facts indicating that – in addition Intimo – the Prestige Defendants
were also Plaintiff’s employer. Accordingly, summary judgment should be denied.
II. THE NEW YORK PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYER ACT DOES
NOT ALLOW PRESTIGE TO ESCAPE LIABILITY
The Prestige Defendants largely hang their arguments on the New York Professional Employer
Act (NYLL §§ 915 through 924). However, there is nothing in the statute holding that a professional
employer organization (“PEO”) is immune from liability to employees under the NYLL. Niether does
the statute state that a PEO is not an employee’s employer by virtue of being a PEO. And the statute
places no limitations upon holding a PEO liable to an employee, jointly with the PEO’s client company.
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To the contrary, “. . .the statute, in a general sense, confers joint employment status on the PEO and
its client . . .” Matter of Robsonwoese, Inc., 42 A.D.3d 774, 840 N.Y.S.2d 638 (3rd Dep't
2007)(emphasis added).
Prestige may wish that the PEO Act immunizes it from liability from employees, but it does not.
In sum, the PEO Act has no bearing on the case at bar.
III. PLAINTIFF’S JOINT EMPLOYER CLAIMS AGAINST THE PRESTIGE
DEFENDANTS ARE VIABLE
Plaintiff Harris has viable claims for unpaid wages/commissions under under breach of contract
and related causes of action. These claims are properly brought against the Prestige Defendants because
they (and Intimo) were joint employers of Plaintiff. 3
To employ, is defined as to “suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). See Jimenez v.
Concepts of Indep., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 30257 at p. *3 (U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)(the NYLL follows
the same “suffer or permit” definition).
Similarly, the NYLL broadly defines employer as: “‘Employer’ includes any person,
corporation, limitied liability company, or association employing any individual in any occupation,
industry, trade, business or service.” NYLL § 190(3). See also, Jimenez at p. *3, noting the breadth of
the definition.
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff performed work with the permission of both the Intimo and
Prestige Defendants. Both Intimo and Prestige had the requiste authority and control to be Plaintiff’s
employer -- and both held themselves out as being his employer. Those representations cannot be
3
Plaintiff does not oppose the Prestige Defendants’ request for dismissal of his claims against Prestige for age
discrimination and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law and New York State Human Rights
Law. Following certain discovery, Plaintiff agreed to stipulate to the withdrawal of those age/retaliation claims
agsinst the Prestige Defendants.
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glossed over as mere fictions. They must count for something. Otherwise, the law would be supporting
a deceptive ruse.
A. The Prestige Defendants Explicitly Admit they Were Plaintiff’s Employer
The Prestige Defendants admit that they are employers (along with Intimo) of Plaintiff. The
Prestige/Intimo Employee Handbook outright states it. See Exhibit I to Meyers Aff. at page Bates
numbered DEF000095. The Intimo Defendants similarly state that Prestige was also an employer of
Plaintiff. See Exhibits C & D to Meyers Aff. (at rog answer 34). The cover of the Employee Handbook
bear Prestige’s logo and then repeats its name and then lists Intimo’s name. It is therefore only
reasonable for the reader of the handbook to assume that both the Intimo Defendants and Prestige
Defendants had the authority and control over the many areas of control over his work that are addressed
in the Employee Handbook. Those areas of control include: Code of Conduct (page 8), Attendance
(page 15), Discipline (page 9), Performance Reviews (page 16), Separation from Employment (page
26), etc.
In light of this, it is hardly surprising that Plaintiff believed he was jointly employed by both
Intimo and Prestige.
Even Prestige’s Corporate Representative admitted that Prestige was an employer of Plaintiff.
These admissions are conclusive.
B. The Prestige Defendants Had Sufficient Authority and Control Over Plaintiff
to Be Considered His Joint Employer
Even if the Prestige Defendants had not admitted being Plaintiff’s employer, the control and
authority they had, render them his joint employers.
As a threshold matter, itis not dispositive that Mr. Harris reported to Intimo’s Nathan Nathan
and considered Mr. Nathan to be his boss. The definition of “employer” is “expansive.” Zavala v. 411
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Holbrook Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 30434 at p. *3 (U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). Indeed, it is not necessary for
a company to exercise control and authority over the plaintiff to impute an employer/employee
relationship. It is enough for the company to simply possess that power. Id. at p. *4. For these
reasons, the Zavala court refused to grant summary judgment in a case similar to the one at bar. See
also Brankov v. Hazzard, 142 A.D.3d 445 (1st Dep’t 2016)(of the factors to consider “the extent of the
employers right to control the employee is most important and, if established, the other factors “are then
of marginal importance”).
Here, it is undisputed that the Prestige Defendants’ agreement with Intimo gave Prestige the
power over the very points that establish joint employer liability – namely, control and authority over
hiring and firing, discipline, and transfer. Exhibit G to Prestige Moving Aff. at p.2.
Notably, the Employee Handbook does not state that the Prestige Defendants lack the authority
and control over these issues with respect to Plaintiff. Indeed, it was Prestige that issued Plaintiff his
written termination notice. See Exhibit 4 to Meyers Aff. And it was Prestige that issued a job
application with its logo on it to Plaintiff. See Exhibit 5 to Meyers Aff. This projects hiring and firing
authority on Prestige’s part. Accordingly, just as the Zavala court denied summary judgment, so too
should the Court here.
The primarily relief Plaintiff seeks here is under a theory of breach of contract. However, just
because Plaintif and Nathan Nathan entered into that agreement does not excuse the Prestige Defendants
from liability. Either Prestige was a joint employer of Plaintiff or itwas not. If it was, then Nathan
Nathan acted with apparent authority to bind Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s employer to the contract. See, e.g.,
Scharf v. Idaho Farmer’s Market, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 500, 501 (1st Dep’t 2014); and Gonzalez v. Beacon
Terminal Associates L.P., 48 A.D.3d 518, 520 (2nd Dep’t 2008)(apparent authority creates fact issue
precluding summary judgment).
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Morever, the Prestige Defendants benefited from the contract. Prestige was paid by Intimo to be
Plaintiff’s employer. Prestige cannot enjoy the fruits of that contract and then walk away from it after it
has been breached. See HTRF Ventures, LLC v. Permasteelisa N. Am. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op
32095(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
C. Plaintiff’s Other Claims Against the Prestige Defendants Are Proper
1. Insofar as the Prestige Defendants Were Plaintiff’s Employer, They Are Equally Liable
as Intimo on Plaintiff’s Other Claims
Plaintiff’s fraud and promissory estoppel claims are based upon similar justifications as his
breach of contract claim and those jusitifcations preclude summary judgment being granted as to them.
Next, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim allows for recovery where “broad considerations of
equity and justice” exist. Andersen ex rel. Ansersen, Weinroth & Co., L.P. v. Weinroth, 849 N.Y.S.2d
210, 222 (1st Dep’t 2007). Here, equitable principles allow Plaintiff to recover from Prestige. This is
the only result that would be fair, given that Prestige held itself out as Plaintiff’s employer.
Additionally, the fruits of Plaintiff’s unpaid efforts indirectly benefitted Presitge. By Plaintiff providing
his efforts to Intimo, it allowed Intimo to thrive as a business and thereby be able to pay Prestige for its
PEO services.
Plaintiff’s quantum meruit claims are governed by similar equitable principles and they compel
the same result.
2. The Other Claims Are Not Subject to Dismissal on a “Duplicativness” Basis
Although Plaintiff has a pending claim for breach of contract, he is still permitted to maintain
alternative claims. “Causes of action may be stated alternatively or hypothetically.” CPLR R 3014.
“Undeniably, a plaintiff is entitled to advance inconsistent theories in allegeing a right to recovery.”
Cohn v. Lionel Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 559, 563, 289 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1968). Mr. Harris’ other claims are
all pled in the alternative and therefore are not subject to disissal.
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For example, see Joseph Sternberg, Inc. v. Wal-ber 36th Street Assoc., 187 A.D.2d 225, 594
N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st Dep’t 1993). There, in a case involving an unpaid commission, the Court upheld
alternative causes of action based on contract and quatum meruit:
In this State where a litigant fails to establish the right to recover upon an express
contract he may, in the same action, recover in quantum meruit. [Citations omitted]. If
warranted by the pleadings and proof, the case may be submitted to a jury on both
theories and an election need not be made. [Citations omitted]." (Supra, 305 N.Y. at 73,
111 N.E.2d 209; see also, Byrne v. Gillies Co., 144 App.Div. 677, 129 N.Y.S. 602, Walar
v. Rechnitz, 126 App.Div. 424, 110 N.Y.S. 777).
Thus, it appears that where there is a bona fide dispute as to the existence of a contract or
where the contract does not cover the dispute in issue, plaintiff may proceed upon a
theory of quantum meruit and will not be required to elect his or her remedies.
Id. at 146.
Similarly in the recent Man Advisors, Inc. v. Selkoe, 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 05483 (1st Dept. July 9,
2019) the First Department reversed the dismissal of a fraudulent inducement cause of action that the
trial court dismissed on the ground of “duplicativeness” of a breach of contract claim.
Here the Intimo Defendants dispute whether there is a contact in existence between them and Mr.
Harris. Indeed, they moved (unsuccessfully) to dismiss Mr. Harris’ breach of contract claim on their
original motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Intimo Defendants will seek to dismiss the
contract claim again on a summary judgement motion. The Man Advisors and Joseph Sternberg
decisions aim at avoiding a total loss of remedy for a plaintiff like Mr. Harris – should his breach of
contract claim ultimately be dismissed on a summary judgment motion. Accordingly, summary
judgment cannot be granted.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE DISCOVERY
IS NOT COMPLETE
Where discovery is not complete, a party may not obtain a grant of summary judgment. See
CPLR § 3212(f) and, e.g., De France v. Oestrike, 187 N.Y.S.2d 186, 8 A.D.2d 735 (2nd Dep’t 1959).
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Here, the Prestige Defendants have not complied with their discovery obligations. A motion
aimed at compelling their outstanding discovery is currently pending.
CONCLUSION
Material issues of fact exist as to whether the Prestige Defendants were Plaintiff’s joint employer
(along with the Intimo Defendants). Again and again Prestige represented itself to Plaintiff as being his
employer. In its Service Agreement with Intimo, Prestige staked out control and authority over the
employees. Prestige’s Corporate Representative even admitted that Presitge employed Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Prestige Defendants’ summary judgment motion must be denied.
MEYERS FRIED-GRODIN, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Harris
By: ____________________________________
Dated: January 27, 2020 Jonathan Meyers, Esq.
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
Phone: (646) 596-1292
E-mail: JMeyers@MfgLegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Harris
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