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  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
  • Diagnostic Imaging Consultants Of St. Petersburg, P.A.,Warncke, Robert vs 21St Century Centennial Insurance Company  SC Personal Injury Protection-Tier 1 $0.00-$99.99 document preview
						
                                

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Filing # 126524021 E-Filed 05/10/2021 06:37:20 PM IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE 13TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING CASE NO.: 21-CC-032297 CONSULTANTS OF ST. PETERSBURG, DIVISION: L P.A. D/B/A DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING CONSULTANTS, as assignee of Robert Warncke Plaintiff, vs. 21ST CENTURY CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. _____________________________________/ PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, Diagnostic Imaging Consultants of St. Petersburg, P.A. d/b/a Diagnostic Imaging Consultants (as assignee of Robert Warncke), by and through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, submits this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and moves for entry of partial summary judgment in its favor, reserving its right to move for summary judgment with regard to issues not rendered moot by this motion and stipulated to by the parties. In support thereof, Plaintiff states the following: I. Introduction Defendant paid PIP benefits to Plaintiff, based on the 2007 Medicare participating charge. Defendant paid the PIP Benefits to Plaintiff at the lower participating amount despite the fact that the Florida Legislature changed language of the PIP statute from paying the "participating" schedule to paying the "allowable" physicians schedule amount. Because, the highest "allowable" amount is the limiting charge, Defendant was legally obligated to pay at that rate. Reimbursement by Defendant at the "participating" amount was in direct contravention of 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 1 the legislative amendment that removed the word "participating" from the only statutory provision that the parties agree controls the outcome of this case. Defendant's interpretation does not comport with the legislative amendment and with long-standing statutory interpretation of Florida's No-Fault Statute. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There are no genuine dispute of material facts relating to this specific legal issue, and the sole legal issue for this Court's consideration in this motion is: Whether "allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and case subject to Medicare Part B," refers to the non-facility participating price or the non- facility limiting charge. This is referred to as the "limiting versus participating" issue. II. Standard for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is proper if no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). "Summary judgment is designed to test the sufficiency of the evidence to determine if there is sufficient evidence at issue to justify a trial or formal hearing on the issues raised in the pleadings." See The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195, 1200 (Fla.2006); Mendez v. West Gables Rehabilitation Hosp., LLC 123 So. 3d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 3DCA 2013). Because there are no material issues of fact and all that remains is an issue of law, this issue is properly disposed of via summary judgment. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla.1985). 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 2 III. Material Facts 1. Robert Warncke was an insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Defendant that was in full force and effect on 3/8/2016. 2. Pursuant to Defendant’s policy in effect on 3/8/2016, the methodology for determining the amount of reimbursement is pursuant to fee schedule limitations and the “schedule of maximum charges" payment methodology set forth in Fla. Stat.§§ 627.736(5)a. l- 627.736(5)a.5 (2012-2020). 3. On or about 3/8/2016, Robert Warncke sustained bodily injuries in a car accident. 4. Plaintiff provided diagnostic medical services to assignor on 3/24/2016. 5. Prior to providing these services and as a condition to providing them, Plaintiff obtained from Robert Warncke a written assignment of benefits. Pursuant to the assignment, Plaintiff billed Defendant directly for the medical services it provided to Robert Warncke. 6. During the course of treatment Plaintiff performed diagnostic imaging testing on Robert Warncke on 3/24/2016 and sent its bill directly to Defendant. 7. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) website, www.cms.gov., features a search tool to easily access the allowable amounts under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule ("MPFS"). The "MPFS Fee Schedule Search Tool" provides Medicare payment information on more than 10,000 services, including pricing, relative values and payment policies.681 8. Here, there are two available Medicare Part B Fee Schedule reimbursement possibilities for the service(s) provided on 3/24/2016: non-facility participating price or non- facility limiting charge. The parties' dispute arises as to whether Defendant should have paid the 681 https://www.cms.gov/apps/physician-fee-schedule/help/How to MPFS Booklet ICN901344.pdf 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 3 non-facility participating price or the non-facility limiting charge for the service, both of which appear on the MPFS Fee Schedule Search Tool for 2007. 9. The pertinent statutory provision provides: For purposes of subparagraph 1., the applicable fee schedule or payment limitation under Medicare is the fee schedule or payment limitation in effect on March 1 of the year in which the services, supplies, or care is rendered and for the area in which such services, supplies, or care is rendered, and the applicable fee schedule or payment limitation applies throughout the remainder of that year, notwithstanding any subsequent change made to the fee schedule or payment limitation, except that it may not be less than the allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B. 10. Defendant allowed 200% of the non-facility participating charge in 2007 for Pinellas County for Plaintiff’s 3/24/2016 bill. 11. Plaintiff contends that the proper amount that Defendant should have allowed for Plaintiff’s 3/24/2016 bill is 200% of the non-facility limiting price in 2007 for Pinellas County. 12. Plaintiff’s position is that the "allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B" is the non-facility limiting charge. 13. Defendant's position is that the "allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies and care subject to Medicare Part B" is the non-facility participating price. 14. The sole dispositive issue in this motion is whether "allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B[,]" refers to the non-facility participating price or the non-facility limiting charge. IV. Reimbursement Under the MPFS 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 4 Before delving into the complexities of which amount under the 2007 Medicare Part B fee schedule is correct under the PIP statute, a basic primer regarding reimbursement under the MPFS would be helpful. The MPFS is a list of uniform reimbursement rates for over 10,000 separate medical services established pursuant to federal statute682 as part of the federal government’s comprehensive strategy to fund Medicare reimbursements in a uniform manner designed to control increasing expenses.683 MPFS reimbursement rates are publicly available at CMS’s website by accessing the MPFS Fee Schedule Search Tool, which: allows health care professionals, suppliers, and institutional providers to find the Medicare payment amount for each code so they may calculate the beneficiary coinsurance amount. In addition, for those health care professionals/suppliers who choose to be nonparticipating, the MPFS provides the limiting charge. Participating providers are contractually bound to charge no more than Medicare- approved amounts under Medicare Participating Physician or Supplier Agreements 682 42 U.S.C. 1395w-4. 683 DHHS explained that: [s]ince January 1, 1992, Medicare has paid for physician services under section 1848 of the Social Security Act (the Act), ‘‘Payment for Physicians’ Services.’’ This section contains three major elements: (1) A fee schedule for the payment of physician services; (2) a method to control the rates of increase in Medicare expenditures for physicians’ services; and (3) limits on the amounts that nonparticipating physicians can charge beneficiaries. The Act requires that payments under the fee schedule be based on national uniform relative value units (RVUs) based on the resources used in furnishing a service. Section 1848 (c) of the Act requires that national RVUs be established for physician work, practice expense, and malpractice expense. United States, Department of Health and Human Services, “Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies and Adjustments to the Relative Value Units Under the Physician Fee Schedule, Other Part B Payment Policies, and Establishment of the Clinical Psychologist Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 1998.” 84 Fed. Reg. 59,050 (Oct. 31, 1997). 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 5 (MPPSAs).684 Nonparticipating providers are not contractually bound under MPPSAs and only accept assignments on a case-by-case basis. Id. Medicare reimburses nonparticipating providers 95% of the allowable amount under the MPFS (i.e., there is a five percent reduction in the Medicare-approved amounts for nonparticipants). Id. Additionally, there is a limit on what a nonparticipating provider who does not accept an assignment can charge the beneficiary-patient (i.e., when the provider charges the patient directly rather submitting the claim to Medicare). Id. That limit, called the “limiting charge,” is 115 percent of the amount paid to nonparticipating physicians. Id. Stated differently, the limiting charge is 115 percent of 95 percent of the allowable amount under the MPFS. In addition to distinguishing between participating and nonparticipating providers, there is a differential in reimbursable amounts under the MPFS based on the site of the service. As CMS explains: [u]nder the MPFS, some procedures have a separate Medicare fee schedule for a physician’s professional services when provided in a facility (such as a hospital) or a non-facility. Generally Medicare provides higher payments to physicians and other health care professionals for procedures performed in their offices because they are responsible for providing clinical staff, supplies, and equipment. This differential is viewed in the NON-FACILITY PRICE and FACILITY PRICE columns. Id. (all caps in the original). To recapitulate these concepts for ease of reference: • Participating providers in a non-hospital setting are paid the non-facility price under the MPFS; • Participating providers in a hospital setting are paid the facility price under the MPFS; 684 Participating health care professionals and suppliers have signed the Form CMS-460, “Medicare Participating Physician or Supplier Agreement” and submit only assigned claims (claims submitted by health care professionals and suppliers directly to Medicare on behalf of the beneficiary and are paid by Medicare directly to the billing provider). 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 6 • Nonparticipating providers in a non-hospital setting who accept assignments are paid 95% of the non-facility price under the MPFS; • Nonparticipating providers in a hospital setting who accept assignments are paid 95% of the facility price under the MPFS; • Nonparticipating providers in a non-hospital setting who do not accept assignments are paid the non-facility limiting charge (115% of 95% of the non- facility price under the MPFS); and • Nonparticipating providers in a hospital setting who do not accept assignments are paid the facility limiting charge (115% of 95% of the facility price under the MPFS). V. Basic Rules of Statutory Construction Required Defendant to Pay Benefits at the Limiting, Not Participating Rate The crux of this case is whether Defendant must pay the 2007 "limiting" or "participating" rate for the services provided to Robert Warncke on 3/24/2016. Defendant allowed the 2007 non-facility participating charge. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant should have allowed the 2007 non-facility "limiting" charge. The corresponding difference between the two reimbursement calculations is does not exceed $99.99. Defendant’s position is not supported by Florida law. (a) The Legislature's Amendment Deleting "Participating" and Replacing It With "Applicable Supports Plaintiff's Position. The resolution of the "limiting versus participating" issue depends on statutory interpretation, guided by well-established rules of statutory construction, as promulgated by our supreme court. Florida's PIP statute has been amended numerous times. See Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc., 141 So. 3d 147, 154 (Fla. 2013). In 2012, the Florida Legislature deleted the words "participating physicians" when referring to the Medicare Part B schedules for 2007. By deleting "participating" and replacing it with "applicable" the Legislature intended 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 7 to afford PIP insureds greater coverage, requiring insurers to reimburse at the higher limiting charge. The Florida PIP Statute states that when insurers limit PIP reimbursement in accordance with the fee schedule limitations of the PIP statute, the reimbursement may not be less than 2007 Medicare fee schedule. The 2008 version provided: For purposes of subparagraph 2., the applicable fee schedule or payment limitation under Medicare is the fee schedule or payment limitation in effect at the time the services, supplies, or care was rendered and for the area in which such services were rendered, except that it may not be less than the allowable amount under the participating physicians schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B. In 2012, this provision was amended deleting "participating physicians schedule" and replacing it with "applicable schedule." The 2012 version of section 627.736(5)(a)(2), provides: For purposes of subparagraph 1., the applicable fee schedule or payment limitation under Medicare is the fee schedule or payment limitation in effect on March 1 of the year in which the services, supplies, or care is rendered and for the area in which such services, supplies, or care is rendered, and the applicable fee schedule or payment limitation applies throughout the remainder of that year, notwithstanding any subsequent change made to the fee schedule or payment limitation, except that it may not be less than the allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B. "As always, legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's inquiry under the No- Fault Law," including the PIP statute." Virtual Imaging, 141 So. 3d at 152. 'Such intent is derived primarily from the language of the statute.' ld. (citations omitted). Importantly, the Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that "[w]hen the legislature amends a statute by omitting words, the general rule of construction is to presume that the legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning from that accorded it before the amendment." See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280, 283 (Fla. 1992)(citing Capella v. City of Gainesville, 377 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 8 So.2d 658 (Fla.1979) (citing Carlisle v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla.1977); Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So. 2d 116 (Fla.1968)). "[T]he Legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute." Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976). Conversely, "omission of words in an amending statute suggests that the legislature intended that the statute have a different meaning from that previously accorded." Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225, 228 (Fla. 1991); see also Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Santos, 18 So. 3d 317, 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (observing that "when the legislature amends a statute and omits words, the courts must presume the omission gives the statute a different meaning than its predecessor") (other internal citations omitted). Under the rules of statutory construction, Defendant was acting in direct contravention to the 2012 legislative amendment when it reimbursed Plaintiff at the 2007 participating price instead of the 2007 limiting charge. Defendant asserts the policy elects the utilization of the schedule of maximum charges or fee schedules for reimbursements of PIP claims under section 627.736(5)(a) and Plaintiff does not contest this assertion. The Florida PIP Statute further instructs insurers that while they may limit reimbursement in accordance with the terms of the statute, the reimbursement may not be less than 2007 Medicare fee schedule. Thus, when an insurer is reimbursing a charge, the insurer is required to compare the amount for the Medicare fee schedule in effect at the time the services were rendered (in this case, 2016) with the applicable schedule for 2007- and the insurer must pay the higher of the two. Fla. Stat. § 627.736 (5)(a)(2) (2012). Here, Defendant was required to compare reimbursements under three possible Medicare Part B schedules: 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 9 (1) the 2016 (year of rendered services) Medicare Participating Physicians Fee Schedule; (2) the 2007 Medicare Participating Physicians Fee Schedule; and (3) the 2007 Medicare Limiting Charge Fee Schedule. Because the 2007 Medicare Fee Schedules were higher than the 2016 Medicare Fee Schedules, Defendant was left with two possible available Medicare Part B fee schedule choices for reimbursement: participating or limiting charge. After comparing the "applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007'' based on the strict construction of the statute, Defendant reimbursed at the middle amount of the applicable fee schedules of Medicare Part B - - the 2007 non-facility participating charge. Chiropractic & Acupuncture Med. Center (Sabrina Nguyen) v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. 18- 6336 SC (Fla. Pinellas County Ct. Aug. 28, 2019) (Carassas, J.); Accu-Med Diagnostic Centers (a/a/o Neill Lopez) v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. 14-004705 COSO (Fla. Broward County Ct. Mar. 15, 2019) (Fry, J.); MDM Chiropractic Center (a/a/o Renal Thermidor) v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. 18-001551-XXXX- MB (Fla. Palm Beach County Ct., Mar. 6, 2019) (Gillman, J.). This construction of the 2012 legislative amendment is consistent with the whole of the PIP statute. The Legislature did not remove every reference to "participating" from the 2012 PIP statute. Rather, it only removed "participating" where it referred to the applicable fee schedule for Medicare Part B for 2007 - - the very provision which requires that insurers afford higher coverage. The amendment, in this statutory context, and given the well-established rules of construction for Florida's No-Fault Statute, requires that Defendant reimburse at the higher limiting charge. "When interpreting the provisions of the No-Fault Law, the Florida Supreme Court has explained that the statutes 'must be liberally construed in order to effect the legislative purpose of 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 10 providing broad PIP coverage for Florida motorists." Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. Florida Hospital Med. Ctr., 236 So. 3d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), aff'd Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. Florida Hospital Med. Crt., 260 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 20 18)( citing Blish v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 736 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Fla. 1999), and Vasques v. Mercury Cas. Co., 947 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)). "[W]ords must be given their plain meaning and statutes, should be construed to give them their full effect ... and [w]here possible, it is the duty of courts to adopt that construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with the other provisions of the same act." See Kingsway Amigo Ins. Co. v. Ocean Health Inc., 63 So. 3d 63, 66-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007), Knowles v. Beverly Enter.-Fla , Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2004) (internal quotation omitted)). The statutory language requiring that reimbursement under the fee schedule could not be less than 2007 Medicare Part B increases the coverage limitation amounts insurers could apply. As previously mentioned, the legislative amendment of removing the word "participating," in the very provision of the PIP statute which expands reimbursement of medical expenses under the fee schedules expands the fee schedules that insurers are to consider. And so, in construing that provision as amended, it is appropriate to construe it to provide for greater coverage, following the Florida Supreme Court's pronouncement that the PIP statute is to be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of providing broad coverage. Under section (5)(a)2, the insurer is required to reimburse medical expenses using the 2007 schedule of Medicare Part B, if the 2007 amount is greater. See Fla. Stat. § 627.736(5)(a)2 (amount "may not be less than the allowable amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services") (emphasis added). By reimbursing medical providers at the 2007 limiting charge, Defendant afforded the greatest coverage to its insured and gave effect to the legislature's deletion of the 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 11 words "participating physician," thereby reconciling and giving effect to the other provisions of the same statutory paragraph and the legislative purpose to provide broad PIP coverage to Florida motorists. (b) Defendant's Positions Regarding Limiting Fee Schedule is Contradicted by the CMS, the Third District Court of Appeal, and the PIP Statute. Defendant will argue that Defendant's reimbursement of participating charge was appropriate because the limiting charge is not mentioned anywhere in the PIP statute. Defendant will further maintain that that the 2007 limiting charge is not a recognized basis for reimbursement of PIP claims in Florida, because the only reference to any particular fee schedule under Medicare Part B is to the participating fee schedule. Defendant's argument is contradicted by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, by the Third District Court of Appeal, and the PIP Statute. i. Defendant's Argument is Contradicted by the CMS. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services promulgates the Medicare Part B Fee Schedules. There is no dispute that the website www.cms.gov provides a searchable tool to access allowable amounts under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule ("MPFS"). When searching the applicable physician fee schedules herein, CMS clearly provides both participating and limiting as "Physician Fee Schedule Search." Therefore, the limiting charge is a part of Medicare Part B. ii. Defendant's Argument is Contradicted by Third District Court of Appeal. The Third District Court of Appeal in Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Center v. Security National Insurance Company, 882 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), addressed the limiting versus participating issue under a previous version of the statute, which will be discussed in more detail below. However, for the purpose of whether the limiting charge is part of Medicare Part B, 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 12 the Third District discussed that "allowable amount" could potentially mean the highest of the three available "participating," "nonparticipating," or "limiting charge" Medicare Part B rate schedules. 882 So. 2d at 1028. See also, Priority Medical Centers, LLC (a/a/o Susan Boggiardino) v. Allstate Insurance Company, Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal; Case # 3D20- 291 (April 28, 2021). iii. The Limiting Charge is Florida's No-Fault Statute Fee Schedule. Prior to 2012, the PIP statute mandated that an insurer may not pay "less than the allowable amount under the participating physicians schedule of Medicare Part B for 2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B." Therefore, in the previous version of the statute (2008-2011), the insurer was required to reimburse under the participating physicians schedule, not any other fee schedule of Medicare Part B, such as the limiting charge. By deleting the words "participating physicians" and replacing them with "applicable schedule" the Legislature encompassed all applicable fee schedules of Medicare part B. The amendment expanded further the statutory provision that affords greater coverage ''for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B." If the Legislature had intended to limit the reimbursement to the "participating," this last clause would have been deleted, because it would contradict the restrictive reading that "applicable schedule" refers only to the "participating" fee schedule. See Priority Medical Centers, LLC (a/a/o Susan Boggiardino) v. Allstate Insurance Company, Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal; Case # 3D20-291 (April 28, 2021). The limiting charge is part of Medicare Part B. The specific statutory provision at issue refers to reimbursement rates for medical services, supplies and care subject to Medicare Part B. Thus, the limiting charge is within that reference in Florida's PIP Statute (c) Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Ctr. v. Sec. Nat. Ins. Co., 882 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), is misconstrued and actually supports Plaintiff's statutory 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 13 construction. Defendant will cite Millennium Diagnostic in support of its position that an insurer is required to pay the non-facility price (participating) of Medicare Part B. Millennium Diagnostic held that the participating fee schedule was the proper fee schedule payable to MRI providers under a 2001 version of the PIP statute based on the Legislature's addition of the word "participating" in a clarifying amendment. In its discussion, that Court specifically noted that "limiting" was an available Medicare Part B fee schedule. 882. So. 2d at 1028. Importantly, Millennium Diagnostic supports Plaintiff’s position that the legislative amendment removing the word "participating physicians" in reference to the fee schedules of Medicare Part B reverts to the analysis of the "limiting versus participating" issue and requires courts to consider the highest of the three available schedules of Medicare Part B. Id. In Millennium, the plaintiff/provider was arguing that the limiting charge, i.e., the highest of the three available fee schedules of Medicare Part B, was the appropriate reimbursement level for MRI providers. After the trial court entered its order, the Legislature amended section 627. 736(5)(b)5 to explicitly provide that the "participating physician fee schedule" controls the amounts payable to MRl providers. The Third District held that "we believe that the amendment was enacted as a clarification of the legislature's intent on what an 'allowable amount' would be." 882 So. 2d at 1030. Given the Third District's reasoning, this Court must give effect to the Legislature's removal of the words "participating physicians" and reverting back to the highest of the three possible Medicare Fee Schedules the Millennium Diagnostic court considered. Under the current version of the PIP statute, and giving effect to the 2012 legislative amendment, the highest reimbursement allowable fee schedule of Medicare Part B is the limiting charge. 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 14 VI. Conclusion Defendant failed to comply with section 627.736(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2012-2019), the legislative purpose of the PIP statute to provide broad coverage to Florida motorists, and give effect to the Legislature's deletion of the word "participating." Payment of the 2007 limiting charge is the only reasonable outcome of the limiting versus participating issue. Therefore, incorrectly paying the participating charge, Defendant underpaid Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff deserves a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Diagnostic Imaging Consultants of St. Petersburg, P.A. d/b/a Diagnostic Imaging Consultants, respectfully requests that this Court grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and award such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forgoing was served via Florida’s E-Filing Portal on, James E. Peterson, Esq., tampapip@farmersinsurance.com, Law Offices of Sanabria & Marsh - PIP Unit, P.O. Box 258829, Oklahoma City, OK 73125-8829 on May 10, 2021. Lorca J. Divale, FBN 0173622 THE PHYSICIAN COLLECTIONS GROUP, P.A. 701 S. Howard Ave., Ste 106-391 Tampa, FL 33606 Tel: (813) 600-3029; Email: lorcadlg@gmail.com COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF 5/10/2021 6:37 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 15