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  • William Castillo Jr., Julissa Castillo v. 99 Church Investors Llc, Tishman Construction Corporation, Tishman Construction Corporation Of New York Torts - Other (PERSONAL INJURY) document preview
  • William Castillo Jr., Julissa Castillo v. 99 Church Investors Llc, Tishman Construction Corporation, Tishman Construction Corporation Of New York Torts - Other (PERSONAL INJURY) document preview
  • William Castillo Jr., Julissa Castillo v. 99 Church Investors Llc, Tishman Construction Corporation, Tishman Construction Corporation Of New York Torts - Other (PERSONAL INJURY) document preview
  • William Castillo Jr., Julissa Castillo v. 99 Church Investors Llc, Tishman Construction Corporation, Tishman Construction Corporation Of New York Torts - Other (PERSONAL INJURY) document preview
						
                                

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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK ----- ----------------------- ----------x WILLIAM CASTILLO, JR. and JULISSA CASTILLO, Index No.: 154952/2017 Plaintiffs, Affirmation in Opposition to -against- Third Defendant. Port Party Morris Tile & Marble Corp.'s 99 CHURCH INVESTORS LLC, TISHMAN Motion to Strike CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF NEW YORK, Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------x 99 CHURCH INVESTORS LLC, TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF NEW YORK, Third-Party Plaintiffs, -against- PORT MORRIS TILE & MARBLE CORP. Third-Party Defendant. ----------------------------------------------------------------------X CANDICE Y. LANEZ, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of New York, hereby affirms the following to be true under the penalties of perjury: 1. I am associated with the law firm of WOOD SMITH HENNING & BERMAN, LLP, Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, 99 CHURCH STREET INVESTORS, LLC, TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF NEW YORK (collectively "Tishman") in the above-referenced matter, and as such, I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances as set forth herein. 2. This affirmation isrespectfully submitted in opposition to the motion of Third-Party Defendant, Port Morris Tile & Marble Corp., ("Port Morris") seeking an Order: (1) striking the third-party complaiñt for failure to provide a copy of the OCIP policy; (2) pursuant to CPLR 1 1 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 leave to amend the answer to include the affirmative defense of anti- §3025(b) seeking third-party subrogation; and, (3) for such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and proper. 3. This action seeks personal injuries arising from an alleged incident that occurred on February 10, 2017 at the premises/work site located at 99 Church Street, New York, New York. 4. The third-party defendant has no proper basis to seek to have Tishman's third-party complaint stricken. Tishman disclosed the ACE/Chubb Wrap Policy and complied with the Compliance Conference Order issued on January 9, 2019. The motion of the third-party defendant should be denied as the discovery sought has been provided and itsmotion is moot. 5. Courts have broad discretion in supervising disclosure, including granting or denying (2nd applications to strike pleadings. Javeed v. 3619 Realty Corp., 129 A.D.3d 1029 Dep't 2015). A penalty under CPLR §3126 will apply when a party "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or disclosed." willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been CPLR §3126; Gibbs v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 16 N.Y.3d at 79 (2010). 6. In New York, Courts have long recognized that [striking a pleading] for noncompliance with preliminary conference order should not be granted unless lack of compliance was willful, contumacious, deliberate, or in bad faith. McKinney's CPLR 3126, subd. 3.; Little v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 23 1 A.D.2d 496 (1996). Additionally, the drastic remedy of striking an answer for failure to comply with discovery demands is inappropriate, unless there is a clear showing that defendant's failure to comply was willful or contumacious. Hoi Wah Lai v. Mack, 89 (2nd A.D.3d 990 Dep't 2011). Further, courts have recognized that "[i]t is well established that the sanction . . . pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) should be granted only where itis conclusively shown that the discovery default was deliberate or contumacious". Wetzler v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 17 (4"' A.D.3d 1088 Dep't 2005). A court will typically find willful and contumacious behavior when a 2 2 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 party repeatedly failsto comply with court orders directing disclosure. McMahon v. Cobblestone (1st Lofts Condominium, 134 A.D.3d 646 Dep't 2015); Herrera v. City of New York, 238 A.D.2d (2nd 475 99 7. Furthermore, in How Wah Lai, the Court found that the defendants did not miss any plaintiffs' court-ordered deadlines since the defendants already served responses to notice to produce at the time of that the order was issued. Id., Palomba_v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 74 A.D.3d 1037 (2nd (2nd Dep't 2010); New York Timber. LLC v. Seneca Companics, 133 A.D.3d 576 Dep't 2015); (2nd Pascarelli v. City of New York, 16 A.D.3d 472 Dep't 2005) (belated compliance was not due to willful and contumacious conduct.). TISHMAN'S ANSWER SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN SINCE TISHMAN'S DISCLOSURE OF THE ACE/CHUBB POLICY IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE ORDER DATED JANUARY 9, 2019, WAS NEITHER WILLFUL NOR CONTUMACIOUS 8. In this case, Tishman complied with the Compliance Conference Order issued on January 9, 2019, that directed itto furnished a copy of the ACE/Chubb policy. 9. Tishman disclosed the primary policy afforded by Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania policy ("Primary policy"), the excess policy afforded by Westchester Fire Insurance Company ("Excess Policy"), and ACE/Chubb policy ("Wrap Policy") to all parties on or about January 23, 2019. A copy of Tishman's disclosure of the Primary Policy and Excess Policy is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A". 10. On or about March 14, 2019, Tishman served a copy of the Wrap Policy and a copy of the expiration notification of the policy on December 31, 2016 ("Expiration Notification"), pursuant to the Court Order. A copy of the aforementioned response and disclosure is annex hereto as Exhibit "B". The January 9, 2019 Compliance Conference Order was the only order directing Tishman's disclosure of the Wrap Policy. However, Tishman's belated disclosure is neither willful 3 3 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 nor contumacious as Tishman ultimately disclosed a full copy of the Wrap Policy. See Exhibit A. Therefore, Tishman's third-party complaint should not be dismissed. PORT MORRIS SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO ADD THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ANTI-SUBROGATION BECAUSE THE DEFENSE IS COMPLETELY DEVOID OF MERIT 11. Port Morris should not be permitted to amend it'sthird-party answer to assert the affirmative defense of anti-subrogation because ithas not identified one reason for their entitlement to seek leave. In general, leave to amend an answer to assert an affirmative defense may be granted where the proposed amendmeñt is neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit, and there is no evidence that itwould prejudice or surprise opposing party. Jeboda v. Danza, 133 A.D.3d (2nd 569 Dep't 2015). However, "the general rule is that motions for leave to amend must be supported by at least a minimal showing of merit". Tilden Fiñañcial Corp. v. Muffoletto, 161 (2nd (3rd A.D.2d 583 Dep't 1990) (citations omitted). See also Mathiesen v. Mead, 168 A.D.2d 736 Dep't 1990). Additionally, geñerally a court will not decide the merits but will determine ifa prima facie basis for the amendment has been established. Hospital for Joint Diseases Orthopaedic Institute v. James Katsikis Enviroñmcñtal Contractors, Inc., 173 A.D.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1991).) 12. Here, Port Morris vaguely states that itis entitled to add the affirmative defense of anti-subrogation since there will be no prejudice to Tishmsm Port Morris provides that "[Tishman has] known the facts which form the basis of this Motion, since the inception of this lawsuit". See Affirmation of Port Morris in Support of Motion to Strike dated February 27, 2019, $28. Port Morris has not established why or how Tishman would not otherwise be prejudiced or how Tishman knew of facts underlying the motion. Port Morris's bareboñes statement that "Tishman has known the facts" providing the basis of the motion to strike/add anti-subrogation isinsufficient to establish their entitlement to same. i_d.Since Port Morris failed to establish a prima face case that a defense of 4 4 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 anti-subrogation has merit or identified a single reason for same, the Court should deny Port Morris from amending their third-party answer. 13. Furthermore, Port Morris should not be permitted to assert the affirmative defense of anti-subrogation since the claim has no merit and Tishman would be severely prejudiced. shoes" Subrogation allows an insurer to "stand in the of its insured to seek indemnification from third parties whose wrongdoing has caused a loss for which the insurer is bound to reimburse. Millennium Holdings LLC v. Glidden Co., 27 N.Y.3d 406 (2016). The anti-subrogation rule bars owners' contractors' insurers, that issued protective policies naming owners as insureds and general contractors' liability policies naming contractors as insured from covering from contractors for amounts paid under OCP policies. North Star Reinsurance Corp. v. Coritinental Ins. Co., 82 N.Y.2d 281 (1993) (stating that "OCP and GCL policies were purchased together as coverage against same risk and paid for by contractors, and thus, OCP and GCL policies were indistinguishable from single policy"). In other words, anti-subrogation bars an insurer from subrogation against its own insured for a claim arising from the risk for which the insured was covered even when the insured expressly agreed to indemnify the party from whom the insurer's rights are derived. Millennium Holdings LLC v. Glidden Co., 27 N.Y.3d 406 (2016). 14. However, subrogation is typically permissible where the third-party is not named or additional insured. Millennium Holdings LLC v. Glidden Co., 27 N.Y.3d 406 (2016). Thus, the party seeking to claim anti-subrogation must establish that party the insurer is seeking to enforce its right of subrogation is (1) itsinsured, (2) an additional insured, or (3) a party who is intended to be covered the insurance in some other way. id. The essential element of the anti- by policy subrogation rule is that the party to which the insurer seeks to subrogate is covered by the relevant insurance policy. id. 5 5 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 15. Tishman was the named insured under the Primary Policy that had a policy number GL 05-16-12, with a policy period from October 1, 2016 to October 1, 2017, and had a policy limits of up to $2,000,000.00 per occurrence and $4,000,000.00 general aggregate. S_ee Exhibit A. insured" However, Tishman was not obligated to insure or name Port Morris as an "additional under the terms and conditions of the Primary Policy. Specifically, pursuant to Section II,entitled "Who Is Insured" An of the Primary Policy, additional insureds include "person(s) or organization(s) shown injury" in the Schedule, but only with respect to liability for "bodily . . .in the performance of your operations for the additional at the designated above.". See Exhibit A. ongoing insured(s) location(s) The Schedule identified those additional insured person(s) or organization(s) as "any person or organization whom you become obligated to include as an additional insured as a result of any contract or agreement you have entered into". i_d. 16. However, Port Morris was not considered an additional insured under the Schedule pursuant to the terms and conditions of the subcontract agreement between Tishman and Port Morris dated September 26, 2013 ("Port Morris Agreement"), a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "C". Rather, the Port Morris Agreement contained a unilateral obligation on Port Morris to indemnify, defend, and hold Tishman Harmless. See Exhibit C, §7. Tishman had no indemnification obligation to Port Morris. Specifically, Section 7 of the Port Morris Agreement sets forth: To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Contractor shall indemnify, defend through counsel acceptable to Construction Manager and Owner, and hold harmless the Owner [99 Church], Construction Manager [Tishman] and Owner, and hold harmless the Owner, Construction Manager, such other Indemnitees as may be defined herein, and theirrespective parent companies, corporations, members, limited liability companies and/or partnerships and their owned, controlled, associated, affiliated and subsidiary companies, corporations, members, limited liability companies, and/or partnerships . .. . from and against all claims or causes of action, 6 6 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 attorneys' damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to fees and legal and settlement costs and expenses (collectively, "Claims"), arising out of or resulting from the acts or omissions of Contractor of anyone for who acts Contractor may be liable in connection with the Contract Documents, the performance of, or failure to perform, the Work, or the Contractor's operations, including the performance of the obligations set forth in this Clause. To the fullest extend permitted by law, Contractor's duty to indemnify the Indemnitees shall arise whether or not caused in part by the active or passive negligence or other fault of any of the Indemnitees, provided, however, that Contractor's duty hereunder shall not arise to the extent that any such claim, damages, loss or expense was caused by the sole negligence or the Indemnitees or an Indemnitee. See Exhibit C, §7. "Indemnitees" 17. are specifically defined as Tishman Construction Corporation ofNew York, Owner (identified as 99 Church Investors LLC) and Owner's Representatives, and their respective parent companies, corporations, members and/or partnerships and their owned, controlled, affiliated, associated and subsidiary companies. Exhibit C. 18. Furthermore, the Port Morris Agreement explicitly obligated Port Morris to obtain insurance for its own work. Under §8 and Rider of the Port Morris Agrcemêñt, Port Morris was required to procure insurance for itswork performed pursuant to the agreement and list as additional insureds: "99 Church Street Investors, LLC, New York City Transit Authority/MTA, and allenrolled OCIP Contractors". See Exhibit C. Clearly, Port Morris was required to obtain itsown insurance coverage pursuant to the explicit terms of the Port Morris Agreement and to procure insurance in favor of defendants/third-party plaintiffs, 99 Church Investors, LLC, Tishman Construction Corporation and Tishman Construction Corporation of New York and to indemnify same pursuant to (2nd the Port Morris Agreement. Flowers v. KG Land New York Corp., 219 A.D.2d 579 1995). Additionally, there was no coverage afforded to Port Morris as an additional insured under 7 7 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 the Primary Policy. The Wrap Policy that previously afforded coverage to Port Morris was not in effect at the time of the incident. 19. Port Morris obtained itsown insurance with Old Republic Insurance under policy number A2DG00451605, for the policy period from May 14, 2016 to May 14, 2017. Copies of the Old Republic Insurance copy and Certificate of Liability are annexed hereto as Exhibit "D". 20. Additionally, pursuant to the Expiration Notification, the Wrap Policy expired on December 31, 2016, nearly two months before the accident occurred. he Exhibit B. Port Morris was notified of the expiration on December 1, 2016 clearly informing them to obtain their own insurance coverage, which Port Morris obtained through Old Republic Insurance. i_d.The expired Wrap Policy, existing Old Republic Insurance obtained by Port Morris pursuant to the Port Morris Agreement, Port Morris's unilateral obligation to indemnity and insure Tishman pursuant to §§7-8 of the Port Morris Agreemeñt and Rider, and the Primary Policy's explicit terms excluding Port Morris from coverage establish that Tishman neither named nor intended for Port Morris to be an additional (2nd insured or to be covered. Flowers v.KG Land New York Corp., 219 A.D.2d 579 Dep't 1995). Port Morris is clearly not a named or intended insured under any of Tishman's policies. There is no cognizable way that Port Morris could be covered under the Primary Policy or under an expired Wrap Policy. Tishman does not seek rights of subrogation against an insured under the Primary Policy or non-existent Wrap Policy. Therefore, since anti-subrogation clearly does not apply, itis meritless and Port Morris's motion to seek leave should be denied. 21. Port Morris's motion should also be denied because Tishman would be severely prejudiced in allowing the amêñdmêñt. "Prejudice has been defined as a special right lost in the interim, a change in position, or significant trouble or expense that could have been avoided had the amendment." original pleading coñtained the proposed Ward v. City of Schenectady, 204 A.D.2d 8 8 of 9 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/02/2019 03:17 PM INDEX NO. 154952/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 69 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/02/2019 779 (3d Dep't 1994) (citations omitted). See also Sterling Power Partners. L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 239 A.D.2d 191, 657 N.Y.S.2d 407, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 814 (1st Dep't 1997). The Wrap Policy expired on December 31, 2016-which is when Port Morris was immediately required to obtain their own commercial liability policy. Ithas been nearly two (2) years and two (2) months since the Wrap Policy expired and Port Morris was required to obtain their own insurance. As such, Port Morris's anti-subrogation defense is without merit. Mr. Castillo's accident allegedly occurred while working for Port Morris at a Tishman project site on February 10, 2017. 22. Tishman interposed the third-party complaint against Port Morris seeking contractual and common law indemnification, contribution, and additional insured status pursuant to the terms and conditions of the "Port Morris Agreement". A copy of the aforementioned impleader isannexed hereto as Exhibit "E". Tishman's impleader was based upon Port Morris's contractual obligation to indemnify Tishman and 99 Church Street Investors, LLC, and obtain insurance in favor of Tishman for the project and claim asserted by Plaintiffs. Since Port Morris knew that that Wrap Policy clearly expired over two years ago, Tishman would be forced to expend unnecessary expense prosecuting a meritless defense and would be severely prejudiced. As such, the court should prevent Port Morris from asserting anti-subrogation as an affirmative defense. WHEREFORE, itis respectfully requested that the Court deny Port Morris's motion in its entirety. Dated: New York, New York April 2, 2019 C A E 9 9 of 9