Preview
FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 08/24/2022 11:17 AM INDEX NO. 350720/2009E
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 95 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 08/24/2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX
-----------------------------------------------------------X
JUSTIN DePROSPO, an infant by his mother and guardian
EILEEN SANTIAGO and EILEEN SANTIAGO, Index #: 350720/2009
individually, (Action # 1)
Plaintiffs,
AFFIRMATION IN
-against- OPPOSITION
MICHELLE NIXON-COCHRAN, GENERAL BAITOA
AUTOMOTIVE WAREHOUSE, INC., BAITOA GENERAL
AUTO EQUIPMENT INC., HECTOR NUNEZ, d/b/a
GENERAL BAITOA AUTO PARTS, EDWARD TURNER,
450 CONCORD AVENUE CORP., d/b/a GENERAL
BAITOA, and CONCORD AVENUE, LLC,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
JENNIFER SANTIAGO, as the Administratrix of the Index No. 301290/2010
Estate of RICHARD SANTIAGO, and EILEEN (Action # 2)
SANTIAGO HADDOCK, Individually and as Parent and
Natural Guardian for Minor Children, JEREMIAH RICHARD
SANTIAGO and MATTHEW RICHARD SANTIAGO,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
MICHELLE NIXON-COCHRAN, GENERAL BAITOA
AUTOMOTIVE WAREHOUSE, INC., BAITOA GENERAL
AUTO EQUIPMENT INC., HECTOR NUNEZ, d/b/a
GENERAL BAITOA AUTO EQUIPMENT CO., HECTOR
NUNEZ D/B/A GENERAL BAITOA AUTO PARTS,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------X
TOBI R. SALOTTOLO, an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of New
York, subscribing and affirming as true, under penalties of perjury, states as follows:
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1. I am associated with the law firm of Proner & Proner, the attorney for the
plaintiffs, JUSTIN DePROSPO and EILEEN SANTIAGO, and as such am fully familiar with all
of the pleadings and proceedings heretofore had in these actions.
2. This affirmation is being submitted in opposition to the motion by the defendants
GENERAL BAITOA AUTOMOTIVE WAREHOUSE, INC., BAITOA GENERAL AUTO
EQUIPMENT, INC., and 450 CONCORD AVENUE CORP. d/b/a GENERAL BAITOA
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "BAITOA") for an order granting said defendants leave to
reargue their motion for summary judgment under CPLR §2221(d) and, upon granting BAITOA
leave to reargue, granting said defendants motion for summary judgement under CPLR §3212
plaintiffs'
dismissing complaint and all cross-complaints on the ground that the defendant
MICHELLE NIXON-COCHRAN (hereinafter referred to as "NIXON-COCHRAN") was acting
as an independent contractor and not as an agent, servant and/or employee of BAITOA when the
incident out of which this cause of action arose took place.
3. All the exhibits which have been submitted by the defendants BAITOA in support
of their motion are incorporated herein by reference, including the transcripts of the deposition
testimony of NIXON-COCHRAN and BAITOA's president, Kenneth Maurer, and the statement
that NIXON-COCHRAN gave to the police at the accident scene, copies of which are also
"B" "C"
annexed hereto and marked Exhibits "A", and respectively.
4. This case was restored to the Trial Calendar on October 8, 2021, by way of the
filing of a Note of Issue. Pursuant to the Rules of this Part, the deadline to file a motion for
summary judgment is 60 days after the filing of the Note of Issue.
5. Itmust be noted that the defendant, NIXON-COCHRAN, whose cross-motion for
summary judgment was also denied by Order of this Honorable Court dated July 5, 2022 and
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whose original cross-motion was in fact untimely as the same was not filed until January 18,
2022 and on entirely different grounds than BAITOA, has neither filed a motion for leave to
reargue or a notice of appeal from said Order at thistime.
6. The defendant BAITOA's original motion which sought summary judgment on
the ground that NIXON-COCHRAN was an independent contractor was served on December 7,
2021, and, even though plaintiffs initially conceded that itwas timely filed, itappears that the
motion could be considered untimely on the ground that, as admitted by BAITOA's counsel in
their motion for leave to reargue, BAITOA's initial notice of motion was filed without a return
date and an amended notice of motion had to be filed but was not done until December 21, 2021
which is beyond the 60 day period allowed for filing dispositive motions. The plaintiffs leave it
up to the Court to decide whether or not BAITOA's motion was timely.
7. Should the Court find BAITOA's motion timely and grant leave to reargue their
plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, the argument in opposition to BAITOA's summary
judgment motion is set forth below:
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO BAITOA'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
8. The plaintiffs commenced this action to recover for serious personal injuries
which were sustained by the plaintiff, JUSTIN DePROSPO, when the motorcycle on which he
was a passenger collided with the rear of NIXON-COCHRAN's double parked vehicle as
NIXON-COCHRAN was making a delivery for BAITOA. As will be set forth herein, the
evidence in the record raises genuine factual issues as to whether BAITOA has sufficient input
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into the method and manner in which NIXON-COCHRAN performed her job to render her an
employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, at the time of the accident.
9. The Courts of this State have repeatedly held that the issue of "whether an
operator of a delivery vehicle is an agent, potentially rendering the principal liable under the
fact."
doctrine of respondeat superior, or an independent contractor, is a question for the trier of
Carrion v. Orbit Messenger, 82 N.Y.2d. 742, 744 (1983); Rivera v. Fenix Car Servi. Corp., 81
(2nd (2nd
A.D.3d 622, 623 Dep't. 2011); Sigh v. Sukhu, 180 A.D.3d 834 Dep't. 2020).
10. Although one would never know it from reading BAITOA's moving papers, it is
well settled that the existence of an agreement labelling a delivery driver as an "independent
contractor"
is not dispositive on the issue of whether a party is an independent contractor or
employee, but rather merely a factor to be weighed with other factors which indicate control such
as whether the worker (1) worked at [her or]his own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other
employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer's payroll, and (5) was on a fixed
schedule."
Bynog v Cipriani Group, 1 NY3d 193, 198, (2003); D.S v. Positive Behavior Support
(2nd
Consulting & Psychological Res., P.C., 197 A.D.3d 518, 520 Dep't 2021); _ Nachman v
(2nd
Koureichi, 165 AD3d 818, 820 Dep't. 2018).
11. In its moving papers, the defendant BAITOA does not even attempt to deny that
NIXON-COCHRAN was negligent in double parking her vehicle or that the double-parked vehicle
was a substantial contributing factor in causing the accident. Instead, it claims it is entitled to
summary judgment solely on the ground that NIXON-COCHRAN was acting as an independent
contractor, rather than an employee, when she was making the delivery. In advancing that
argument, BAITOA has neglected to advise the Court that NIXON- COCHRAN testified that she
worked on a fixed schedule, received specific instructions from BAITOA as to how to make the
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workers'
delivery at issue, and received compensation benefits in connection with the injuries she
sustained while making the delivery.
12. Although BAITOA tried to prevent plaintiff from ascercaining whether or not it
workers'
afforded compensation benefits to NIXON-COCHRAN, itwas eventually compelled
by way of a court order to furnish an affidavit from itsinsurance carrier, a copy of which is
annexed hereto and marked Exhibit "D", attesting to the fact that it did in fact pay both medical
workers'
and indemnity compensation benefits to NIXON-COCHRAN in connection with the
injuries she sustained in the incident out of which this cause of action arose. BAITOA's
reluctance to furnish this information voluntarily was undoubtedly because only employees, and
workers'
not independent contractors, are entitled to receive compensation benefits. In re
Renouf 254 N.Y. 349 (1930).
13. When she was deposed, NIXON-COCHRAN made itclear that in addition to
workers'
paying her compensation benefits in connection with the accident, BAITOA fixed her
schedule, which required her to work six days a week and request time off two days in advance.
"A"
(Ex. 12:5-12; 18:17-25; 133:6-21). She also testified that she had already finished her
"boss"
assigned deliveries for the day, when she was instructed by her at BAITOA to make a
delivery for him on her way home and told that the recipient would be standing outside waiting
"A"
for her. (Ex. 22:20-23:17). The law is clear that under circumstances such as these, the issue
of whether NIXON-COCHRAN was acting as an agent of BAITOA or an independent
contractor at the time of the accident is a factual one that must be left to the jury to decide.
COUNTER STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
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14. NIXON-COCHRAN began working for BAITOA about four or five months
before the accident as a driver making deliveries of parts to various auto mechanic shops and
"A" NIXON-
dealers. (Ex. 11:18-21, 12:20-25). While itis certainly true that BAITOA required
contractor"
COCHRAN to sign an operator's agreement that stated she was an "independent in
order to obtain employment, itsclaim that she set her own schedule, and just appeared at
BAITOA's office whenever she chose to, is a complete fabrication.
15. Notwithstanding the allegations set forth in BAITOA's moving papers to the
contrary, NIXON-COCHRAN's work schedule and the schedules of the other drivers was set by
"A"
BAITOA. (Ex, 12:9-12). Drivers were told they must report to work at 8:30 A.M. and the
workday ended after they had made their lastdelivery for the day which would usually be
"A"
between 4:30 and 5:00 P.M. (Ex. 12:5-12). NIXON-COCHRAN and about fifteen other
employees would report to work every day between 8:15 A.M. and 8:20 A.M and sit in a room
waiting to get their delivery assignments. (Ex. "A", pgs. 18: 17-25). They worked six days per
days'
week, Monday through Saturday, and had to give at leasttwo notice if they wanted to take
"A"
a day off. (Ex. 133:6-21). In addition, as has already been set forth herein, itis undisputed
that NIXON-COCHRAN received worker's compensation benefits in connection with the
injuries she sustained in the accident out of which this cause of action arose. (Ex. "D").
16. BAITOA's delivery drivers were given a route with an address and invoice, and
they would then have to check the parts with the invoice. (Ex. "A", p. 13, lines 10-14). At the
end of the workday, drivers were required to provide BAITOA with a copy of the invoice for
every delivery that they had made so BAITOA could match itagainst their records as to what
"B" NIXON-
had been dispatched out. (Ex. 26:3-8). All the BAITOA employees, including
COCHRAN, used their own vehicles to make the deliveries. (Ex. "A", p. 14, lines 5-8).
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NIXON-COCHRAN was paid on a weekly basis either in cash or by a check bearing the
company's name and did not receive a W-2. (Ex. "A", p. 16, lines 7-11; p. 84, lines 6-22).
17. NIXON-COCHRAN testified that the accident took place at the end of the
"A"
workday after "everyone was off the clock". (Ex. 22:20-21, 74:20-24). She was leaving to
go home and take her kids shopping when her boss called her back in and asked her to make a
"A"
delivery for him on her way home. (Ex. 22:20-21; 74:20-24). The pertinent portion of her
testimony reads as follows:
A. I remember leaving the job. It was the last.....everybody else had left,and itwas like
three gentlemen left with my boss. I was on my way home. He had one call. He
Michele?"
called me back in.He said, "Could you do this on your way home for me,
I said "Sure", took it.
He said, "The owner is going to be standing out in the front when you get there,
leave."
because it's late and he's ready to
"Fine."
And I said I took itright over there.
I seen-I can't think of the guy's name. He was standing in the front. He waved
me down when he saw me coming down the block, so I pulled right up to him. I
rolled my window down, I hand him his box, his invoice, he signed it,he ripped it,
gave itback, and said, "Have a good weekend, Michele".
you."
I said, "Same to
"A"
And all of a sudden, I feltboom, and that is it.(Ex. 22:20-23:17).
18. When she was deposed, NIXON-COCHRAN initially denied that she was double
parked at the time of the accident, but upon further questioning readily admitted that she wasn't
"A"
sure if her vehicle was stopped more than 15 feet away from the curb or not. (Ex. 28:18-20,
away"
37:7-38:5). She also asked if she could say that she was "one car from the curb, because
there" "A" 39:10-
there "was a car right when she "pulled up to where the gentleman was". (Ex.
40:4). When shown the statement which she had given to the police at the time of the accident
(Ex. "C"), NIXON-COCHRAN admitted that she told the police at the accident scene that she
"A"
was "double parked making a delivery for GENERAL BAITOA". (Ex. 56:24-58:11). Then
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when asked again ifshe was double parked at the time of the accident, NIXON-COCHRAN
parked"
changed her prior testimony and responded, "I believe I was double and then went on to
"A"
testify she was stopped to the left of a parked red/burgundy car. (Ex. 58:15-19, 80:5-21).
She also readily admitted that there was a driveway she could have gone into but instead she
"A"
pulled up to the man her boss had told her would be waiting for her. (Ex. 49:20-23). The
police report, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked Exhibit "E", indicates that the
reporting officer concluded that improper lane usage by NIXON-COCHRAN was a contributing
accidentl
factor to the and cited her for a violation of NYCRR 4-07-B1 which reads as follows:
(b) Obstruction of traffic.
(1) Traffic lane. No person shall operate a vehicle in a manner which obstructs trafficin
lanes specifically designated for the movement of traffic.
Such lanes include, but are not limited
to, no standing zones and no stopping zones.
19. When he was deposed, the president of GENERAL BAITOA, Kenneth Maurer,
workers'
readily admitted that NIXON-COCHRAN had filed a compensation claim in
workers'
connection with the accident and that he learned of the accident from the compensation
"B" workers'
carrier. (Ex. 20:3-8; 13:17-22). However, when questioned as to how the
workers'
compensation claim was resolved and as to who the compensation carrier was, Mr.
Maurer claimed not to know. (Ex "B", 20: 9 -23; 32: 7 -11). In itsinitial discovery response, a
copy of which is annexed hereto and marked Exhibit "F", BAITOA indicated that itsliability
carrier was Utica National Insurance Group. When asked at his deposition if Utica was also the
workers' "B"
compensation carrier, Mr. Mauer responded that itwas not. (Ex. 41:10-13).
1 Improper"
The reporting officerinserted the # 13 in box #21 indicatingthat "Passing or Lane Usage was an
apparent contributing factor to the accident.
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20. Immediately following Mr. Mauer's deposition, plaintiff served the defendant
BAITOA and the defendant NIXON-COCHRAN with post-deposition discovery demands
workers'
seeking information relevant to NIXON-COCHRAN's compensation claim, copies of
"G" "H"
which are annexed hereto and marked Exhibits and respectively. The demand which
was directed to the defendant NIXON-COCHRAN sought the production of any records in her
workers'
possession relevant to her compensation claim as well as HIPAA authorizations
Workers' workers'
addressed to the Compensation Board and her compensation carrier. On
the defendant NIXON- COCHRAN's counsel responded to the demands for
May 10, 2016,
workers' applicable"
compensation records and authorizations simply by stating "not without
offering any explanation as to why. The discovery demand which was directed to BAITOA
workers'
sought the production of all compensation records, orders and judgments pertaining to
workers'
the compensation claim filed by NIXON-COCHRAN against BAITOA as well as any
workers'
records pertaining to NIXON-COCHRAN's compensation claim. BAITOA never
responded to the demand.
21. On November 28, 2016, plaintiff made a motion for an order directing that the
answers of the defendants NIXON-COCHRAN and BAITOA be stricken unless they responded
to the foregoing discovery demands by either furnishing the documents requested in said
demands or an affidavit stating why said documents could not be furnished. The moving papers
made itclear that confirmation of whether BAITOA's insurance carrier has paid workers
compensation benefits to NIXON-COCHRAN in connection with the accident was relevant
because itwas a factor to be considered when determining whether NIXON-COCHRAN was
acting as an agent, servant and/or employee of BAITOA or an independent contractor since if
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workers'
she was truly an independent contractor, BAITOA would not be obligated to pay her
compensation benefits.
22. On January 20, 2017, the parties resolved the motion by entering into a stipulation
which provided that the defendant NIXON -COCHRAN would provide HIPAA compliant
workers'
authorizations for those portions of her no-fault and compensation files with regard to
allreferences to her employment status within 60 days. Subsequent to the signing of the
stipulation, your affirmant's office was advised by counsel for NIXON-COCHRAN that they
could not forward the authorizations as required by the stipulation because they could not locate
NIXON-COCHRAN. NIXON-COCHRAN's insurance carrier did, however, furnish your
affirmant's office with an ISO claim search, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked
Exhibit "I", which indicated that despite Mr. Mauer's sworn testimony to the contrary, Utica
workers'
Mutual was in fact BAITOA's compensation carrier, that the adjuster was Carol A.
Hines, and that the claim number was 1033846.
23. Upon receipt of the ISO claim search, yóur affirmant's office served Utica Mutual
with a subpoena duces tecum, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked Exhibit "J", which
sought "those portions of your filepertaining to the Worker's Compensation Claim which was
filed by Michele Nixon-Cochran in connection with an accident that took place on August 7,
2009 bearing claim number 1033846 that relate to a determination as to whether or not Michele
Nixon-Cochran was an employee of your insured, General Baitoa, at the time of said accident".
Rather than complying with the subpoena, Utica moved to quash it.
24. In addition to opposing the motion to quash, the plaintiff made a cross-motion for
an order directing Utica Mutual to furnish the plaintiff with a sworn statement either confirming
workers'
or denying that itpaid compensation benefits to Michelle-Nixon Cochran in connection
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with injuries she sustained in an accident that took place on August 7, 2009 and setting forth the
name of the insured on whose behalf those benefits were either paid or denied. On June 13,
2018, the Hon. Norma Ruiz issued an order, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked
Exhibit "K", directing Utica Mutual Insurance Company to provide the plaintiff with the sworn
statement. Shortly thereafter, on August 6, 2018, which was more than two years after plaintiffs
workers'
had made their initial request for the compensation information, Utica National
Insurance Company finally furnished an affidavit stating that "Michelle Nixon-Cochran has been
collecting both medical and indemnity worker's compensation benefits....effective April 1, 2009
to April 1, 2010, from General Baitoa Automotive Warehouse, Inc. arising out of an accident
2009."
that is alleged to have occurred on August 7, (Ex. "D").
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS SUCH THAT A DETERMINATION AS TO
WHETHER NIXON-COCHRAN WAS ACTING AS AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR OR AN EMPLOYEE OF BAITOA AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT IS A FACTUAL ONE THAT MUST BE LEFT TO THE JURY TO
DECIDE.
25. Because a motion for summary judgment is the functional equivalent of a trial,it
must not be granted if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue and the Court's
finding," determination"
function is limited to "issue not "issue [Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46
NY2d 223 (1977); Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 3 NY2d 395, 144 N.E.2d 387, 165
N.Y.S.2d 498 (1957). In accordance with that harsh standard, the "movant bears the heavy
burden of establishing "a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law,
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tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact'". Deleon
v New York City Sanitation Dept., 25 NY3d 1102, 1106, quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68
NY2d 320, 324 (1986); see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Or., 64 NY2d 851, 853 (1985);
Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562(1980). The evidence which the defendant
BAITOA has submitted in support of itsmotion clearly fails to meet that burden.
26. The Courts of this State, including the Court of Appeals, have repeatedly held that
in most instances the issue of "whether an operator of a delivery vehicle is an agent, potentially
rendering the principal liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, or an independent
fact."
contractor, is a question for the trier of Carrion v. Orbit Messenger, 82 N.Y.2d. 742, 744
(2nd
(1983); see also Rivera v. Fenix Car Servi. Corp., 81 A.D.3d 622, 623 Dep't. 2011); Sigh v.
(2nd
Sukhu, 180 A.D.3d 834 Dep't. 2020). The Court of Appeals has also made it clear that the
"
fact that there is an agreement labelling a delivery driver as an "independent contractor is not
dispositive on the issue of whether a party is an independent contractor or employee, but rather
merely a factor to be weighed with others. Carlson v. American Int. Group, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 288,
301 (2017); see also D.S v. Positive Behavior Support Consulting & Psychological Res., P.C., 197
(2nd
A.D.3d 518 Dep't 2021) [The fact that a contract exists designating a person as an independent
contractor is to be considered but is not dispositive]. Araneo v Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown,
(2nd
55 AD3d 516, 518 Dep't. 2008) ; Shanklin v Wilhelmina Models, Inc., 161 AD3d 610, 611,
(1" (2nd
Dep't. 2018); Hernandez v Chefs Diet Delivery, LLC, 81 AD3d 596, 599 Dep't. 2011).
27. It is well settled that "(w)hether the relationships of the operators-deliverers with
the delivery companies is that of employees or independent contractors involves a question of fact
as to whether there is evidence of either control over the results produced or over the means used
results."
to achieve the Matter of Rivera (State Line Delivery Serv.-Roberts) 69 NY2d 679, 682
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(1986); Carlson, supra at 301. Itis equally well settled that "(f)actors relevant to assessing control
include whether the worker (1) worked at [her or] his own convenience, (2) was free to engage in
other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer's payroll, and (5) was on
schedule."
a fixed Bynog v Cipriani Group, 1 NY3d 193, 198, (2003); D.S v. Positive Behavior
(2nd
Support Consulting & Psychological Res., P.C., 197 A.D.3d 518, 520 Dep't 2021); Nachman
(2nd
v Koureichi, 165 AD3d 818, 820 Dep't. 2018).
28. In the case at hand, there is evidence that NIXON-COCHRAN was on a fixed
schedule that required her to report to work six days a week, work an eight-hour day, and request
time off at least two days in advance. In addition, itis undisputed that she was afforded the fringe
workers'
benefit of receiving the compensation medical and indemnity benefits to which only
and not independent are entitled. It is also undisputed that NIXON-
employees, contractors,
COCHRAN was specifically instructed by her boss to deliver the package to a gentleman who
would be waiting outside on the street for it,and that in accordance with those instructions she
double parked and rolled down her window when she saw the gentleman waving at her. The law
is clear, that under circumstances such as these, the issue of whether NIXON-COCHRAN was
acting as an employee of BAITOA or an independent contractor at the time of the accident is a
factual one that must be left to the jury to decide. Carrion, supra; Rivera, supra; Sigh, supra;
Carlson, supra; Bynog, supra; D.S v. Positive Behavior Support Consulting & Psychological Res.,
supra; Hernandez, supra; Matter of Rivera, supra; Nachman, supra.
CONCLUSION
29. The relevant case law makes itclear that the issue of whether NIXON-COCHRAN
was acting as an independent contractor or an employee of the defendant BAITOA when she
double parked her vehicle is a factual one that must be left to a jury to decide.
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