Motion-Secondary: Law Office Of J Bacher, Pllc v. Lawrence B. Saftler, D/B/A Law Office Of Lawrence B. Saftler

16CV02814 BARTEL v. CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF BARTEL’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS Given the parties representation that they are finalizing a stipulation, no tentative will be posted. Page 3 of 3

Case Number: 22STCV11303 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 FIDEL HERNANDEZ MEDINA, an individual and PATRICIA HERNANDEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants . Case No.: 22STCV11303 Hearing Date: 7/10/24 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs Background Pleadings Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandez (Plaintiffs) sue Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota USA) pursuant to an October 14, 2022 Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging claims of (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b). The claims arise from allegations that Toyota USA has breached express and implied warranties in favor of Plaintiffs by failing to repair, replace, or repurchase a used Toyota vehicle purchased by the Hernandez Plaintiffs subject to express warranties through which Toyota USA undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiffs vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. Relevant Procedural History On February 20, 2024, trial commenced in this action before concluding on February 26, 2024. On February 24, 2024, the jury issued its verdict in favor of Toyota USA. On March 8, 2024, judgment was entered in Toyota USAs favor. On March 21, 2024, Toyota USA filed its Memorandum of Costs, seeking to recover $22,309.48 in costs. On April 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Tax Costs. On June 26, 2024, Toyota USA filed its opposition to the instant motion. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply papers. Motion to Tax Costs Legal Standard : In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Assuming the prevailing party requirements are met, the trial court has no discretion to order each party to bear his or her own costs of suit. ( Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.) The term prevailing party for costs purposes is defined by statute to include: ¿ (1) The party with a net monetary recovery; ¿ (2) A defendant who is dismissed from the action; ¿ (3) A defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and ¿ (4) A defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) If the party does not fall within one of these four express categories, the court may exercise its discretion to award or deny costs. (See Lincoln v. Schurgin (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 100, 105.) If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) For example, even if a plaintiff maintains a net monetary recovery, in determining the prevailing party in the litigation, the trial court should also consider, if applicable, the defendants success on its declaratory relief claims and exercise its discretion to allow costs or not and, if allowed, to apportion them as appropriate. ( Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1142; see, e.g., Lincoln v. Schurgin , supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 104-105 [when plaintiff wins net monetary recovery but defendant prevails in its cross-action for declaratory relief, case presents circumstance not otherwise specified; in that case, determination of prevailing party is matter within courts discretion].) ¿Allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc . (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) A party seeking to tax costs must provide evidence to rebut this prima facie showing. ( Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266, superseded by statute on other grounds in Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1) [whether costs permissible from filing of complaint or from date of 998 offer].) Mere statements unsupported by facts are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing that costs were necessarily incurred. ( Jones v. Dumrichob , supra , at p. 1266.)¿On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. ( Ibid .) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. , supra , 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) However, because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute, a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized. ( Ibid .) Discretion is abused only when, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. ( Lincoln v. Schurgin , supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.)¿ Order Striking or Taxing Costs : GRANTED IN PART As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Toyota USA is not seeking to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) because that statute is limited to buyers of consumer goods. Rather, as the prevailing party in this action, Toyota USA is entitled to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(a)(4) and 1033.5. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs appear to argue the opposite. (See Reply at pp. 3-4, relying on Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264.) However, this argument is not persuasive. Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) does not explicitly preclude a seller of consumer goods from recovering their costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 1032. Indeed, in Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, the Court rejected this argument. ( Id. at p. 988 [In this case, plaintiff filed suit under the Song-Beverly Act, but defendants prevailed. Defendants sought to recover their costs and expert witness fees under sections 1032, subdivision (b) and 998, subdivision (c), whereas plaintiff argued the more specific provisions of the Act prohibited prevailing defendants from any such recovery. We conclude defendants are entitled to their costs and expert witness fees].) Thus, in determining whether an award of costs should be issued, the Court will rely on the guideline set forth under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c). Here, Toyota USA seeks $22,309.48 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1032 and 1033.5. By way of its motion, Plaintiffs seek to tax these costs in the following categories: (1) motion and filing fees in its entirety or alternatively $181.08; (2) deposition costs in the amount of $4,351.70; (3) court reporter fees in their entirety; and (4) other costs and fees in the amount of $2,338.49. First, Plaintiffs argue that Toyota USAs requested costs of $1,447.72 for motion and filing fees should be stricken because they include attorney service fees, and Toyota USA has failed to correctly identify the actual court motion and filing fees incurred. (Motion at pg. 5.) However, this ignores the numerous invoices enclosed and referenced by Toyota USAs Memorandum of Costs at Attachment 1g that identify the court motion and filing fees incurred. Furthermore, [i]f the items in a cost memorandum appear proper, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence the expenses were necessarily incurred by the prevailing party. (Citation.) To controvert this evidence, the burden is on the objecting party to present evidence showing the contrary. (Citation) ( Whatley-Miller v. Cooper (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1115.) Filing fees and electronic filing fees are recoverable costs (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(1), (14).) Thus, it is Plaintiffs burden to present evidence to show why these costs should not be awarded. In this regard, Plaintiffs identify $181.08 worth of filing fee costs that should be taxed. (Motion at pp. 6-7.) Of these costs, the Court finds that the filing fees associated with Toyota USAs Motions in Limine were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation because they had been untimely filed. Therefore, these costs are taxed in the amount of $65.34. As to the costs associated with unsuccessful motions, the Court finds that these costs were not prepared merely out of convenience and are recoverable as a result. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c).) Second, Plaintiffs argues the claimed deposition costs should be taxed in the amount of $4,351.70 because the amounts are excessive and unnecessary. Recovery of deposition costs is allowed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(3).) Defendants point out that multiple deposition dates for the plaintiffs had to be scheduled and rescheduled. In this instance, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to undermine the prima facie evidence that the expenses were necessarily incurred by Toyota USA. ( Whatley-Miller, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1115.) Third, Plaintiffs contend that Toyota USAs claimed court reporter fees should be taxed because they are not recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033 subd. (b)(5). (Motion at pg. 8.) This argument is not persuasive. The Court has discretion to allow additional costs that are reasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5 subd. (c)(4). Based on the invoices submitted with its Memorandum of Costs, Toyota USA has shown that these claimed costs were for court reporting fees during the trial. Such expenses are reasonable in light of the understandable prudence of preserving a record for appeal. Notably, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to suggest that the amount of these fees is unreasonable. Therefore, the Court declines to tax this category of costs. Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that the claim for other costs and expenses that include meals, copying charges, travel, and lodging. (Motion at pp. 8-12.) The Court largely agrees that many of these costs are either not allowed or not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. For instance, Toyota USA seeks to recover $50.37 in FedEx charges of trial documents and the final status conference. Courier and messenger fees are recoverable, at the discretion of the trial court, if they are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. ( Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 696, as modified (July 18, 2019), rehg denied (Aug. 9, 2019), review denied (Oct. 23, 2019).) Because these costs are not expressly allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5, it is Toyota USAs burden to establish why these costs were necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) However, the opposition fails to articulate such a necessity. Thus, the Court taxes these courier costs as not reasonable. Also, Toyota USA seeks to recover $19.98 associated with a CARFAX report for trial, but Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(b)(2) excludes investigation costs. Moreover, Toyota USA seeks to recover a combined amount of $2,095.49 for meals, lodging, and travel. While it is in the Courts discretion to award these costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c)(4), they have been properly objected to, and Toyota USA has failed to meet its burden in establishing why these costs were not merely convenient and reasonable in amount. In terms of the $196.90 in costs spent for additional copies of trial exhibits, these costs are allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(13) and appear to be reasonable in amount. Thus, the Court declines to tax these amounts. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is granted in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs. Conclusion Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs.

Case Number: 22STCV33580 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 50 CAROLYN TRACIE LOVE, individually and as trustee for Trashawn Tillet , Plaintiff, vs. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, DEPARTMENT OF THE CORONER , et al. Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV33580 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEMURRERS TO PLAINTIFFS FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT; DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT Background Plaintiff Carolyn Tracie Love, individually and as trustee for Trashawn Tillett filed this action on October 14, 2022 against Defendants Los Angeles County, Department of the Coroner; Los Angeles City; Los Angeles Police Department; and Los Angeles Fire Department. On May 23, 2023, Defendant City of Los Angeles filed a notice of removal of the action to federal court. On November 15, 2023, the United States District Court, Central District of California issued an Order Granting in Part Defendants Motions to Dismiss [DKT Nos. 70, 71] And Remanding Case in the matter Carolyn Tracie Love v. Los Angeles County , et al ., Case No. 2:23-cv-03851-SB-PVC (herein, the Federal Action). The November 15, 2023 Order in the Federal Action provides, inter alia , as follows: After Defendants moved to dismiss her Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, filed an untimely Third Amended Complaint (TAC) nearly two weeks after her opposition deadline had passed. Dkt. No. 65 . The TAC significantly expands on her earlier pleadings, spanning 68 pages and alleging 24 causes of action&including 13 federal claims. Id . The Court allowed the filing of the TAC and denied as moot the motions to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. No. 67. The City and County now move to dismiss Plaintiffs TAC for failure to state a claim. Dkt. Nos. 70 , 71 . The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument and vacates the December 1, 2023 motion hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7-15 . Because Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible federal claims, the Court dismisses her federal causes of action and remands the remaining claims to state court. (November 15, 2023 Order, p. 2.) The November 15, 2023 Order in the Federal Action concludes that [a]ccordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants motions to dismiss, and Plaintiffs federal claims in Counts 7, 11, 14, and 16-25 are DISMISSED on the merits with prejudice. The Court does not reach the rest of Defendants arguments, but instead declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state-law claims. The case is therefore REMANDED to the state court from which it was removed. (November 15, 2023 Order, p. 8.) On November 20, 2023, a notice from the United States District Court, Central District of California was filed in this action indicating, inter alia , that [p]ursuant to this Courts ORDER OF REMAND issued on 11/15/2023, the above-referenced case is hereby remanded to your jurisdiction. Defendants County of Los Angeles (the County) and City of Los Angeles (the City) demurred to the Third Amended Complaint for Damages (TAC). As noted in the Countys request for judicial notice in support of the Countys Demurrer to the TAC, filed on December 20, 2023, the subject TAC was filed in the Federal Action on September 28, 2023. (Countys RJN, ¶ 1, Ex. A.) [1] The County demurred to the TACs third cause of action for negligent investigation and failure to render aid, fifth cause of action for negligent hiring, sixth cause of action for violation of California constitutional rights, eighth cause of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, ninth cause of action (untitled), and tenth cause of action for constructive fraud-intentional misrepresentation concealment. ( See May 1, 2024 Order; Countys 12/20/2023 RJN, ¶ 1, Ex. A.) On May 1, 2024, the Court issued an Order sustaining the Countys demurrer to the third, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action of the TAC as to the County and the Department of the Coroner, with leave to amend. In addition, the City demurred to the TACs first cause of action for failure to conduct a homicide investigation and wellness check, second cause of action for negligent investigation, third cause of action for negligent investigation and failure to render aid, fifth cause of action for negligent hiring, sixth cause of action for violation of California constitutional rights, eighth cause of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, ninth cause of action (untitled), tenth cause of action for constructive fraud-intentional misrepresentation concealment, twelfth cause of action for violation of Californias Unruh Civil Rights Act, thirteenth cause of action for violation of Californias Unruh Civil Rights Act, and fifteenth cause of action for violation of Government Code section 11135 . ( See May 1, 2024 Order; Countys 12/20/2023 RJN, ¶ 1, Ex. A.) On May 1, 2024, the Court issued an Order sustaining the Citys demurrer to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action of the TAC, with leave to amend. The Court overruled the Citys demurrer to the fifteenth cause of action of the TAC. On May 17, 2024, Carolyn Tracie Love, an individual, and on behalf of Trashawn Alton Tillet (Plaintiff) filed a Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC). [2] The FAC alleges causes of action for [3] (1) failure to conduct a homicide investigation and wellness check, (2) negligent investigation, (3) negligent investigation and failure to render aid, (5) negligent hiring, (6) violation of California constitutional rights, (7) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (8) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, (9) [untitled], (10) constructive fraud intentional misrepresentation concealment, (11) negligent investigation and failure to perform welfare check, (13) violation of Californias Unruh Civil Rights Act, (14) 42. U. S.C. - 1083 Monell Claim failure to train, and (15) violation of Government Code § 11135 . [4] The County now demurs to the third, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action of the FAC. In addition, the City now demurs to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action of the FAC. Carolyn Tracie Love (herein, Love) opposes both. [5] Allegations of the FAC In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia , that on October 20, 2021, Plaintiff arrived at the home of her son, Trashawn Alton Tillet (herein, the Decedent). (FAC, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that the Decedents eyes were closed and that he did not respond to his name. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges the Decedent had contusions on the right-side temple above his ear& (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that [m]ultiple bottles of alcohol were everywhere in his living room as if there had been a party, and that Plaintiff believes that the alcohol bottles were staged and planted by a violent perpetrator to district attention from a crime and crime scene. (FAC, ¶¶ 5, 14.) Plaintiff alleges that paramedics arrived at the apartment. (FAC, p. 7:5.) Plaintiff alleges that she never observed either paramedic deploy life saving measures. (FAC, ¶ 48.) Plaintiff further alleges that one paramedic said, sorry he been dead for maybe a few days. (FAC, ¶ 56.) Plaintiff further alleges, inter alia , that LAPD officers&never thoroughly investigated&whether [the Decedent] was the victim of a homicide. (FAC, ¶ 185.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that there is substantial evidence that the coroner mixed up the findings of a different deceased. (FAC, ¶ 322.) Plaintiff further alleges that [it] appears that [the Decedents] body may have been cremated. Upon information and belief, the coroner gave the funeral possession of the wrong body. (FAC, ¶ 386.) The Countys Demurrer A. Legal Standard A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 .) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 .) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded . ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967 .) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713 .) B. Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action as to Plaintiffs Claims on Behalf of the Decedent The County asserts that the claims that Plaintiff is asserting (presumably) on behalf of Decedent fail because there are no allegations against the County relating to conduct occurring before Decedents death, and Plaintiff, proceeding in pro se, cannot represent the Decedent. (Demurrer at p. 12:9-12.) As set forth above, the FAC alleges, inter alia , that Plaintiff CAROLYN TRACIE LOVE, an individual, and on behalf of TRASHAWN ALTON TILLETT, her deceased son by and her attorney alleges as follows against Defendants Los Angeles County Coroners, Los Angeles City Fire Dept, Los Angeles City Police Dept does 1 to 10. (FAC, p. 1.) The County cites to People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 861-862 , where the California Supreme Court noted that [n]o civil claim can be asserted, on a decedents personal behalf, for injury or damage to the decedent that occurs, or accrues, after the decedent has died. The governing statutes recognize two, and only two, mutually exclusive types of actions that may be brought, or maintained, in consequence of a persons death. First, a cause of action in favor of a person survives the persons death, and may be commenced, or continued, by the decedents personal representative, or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. However, the damages recoverable in such an action are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death & (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) The County asserts that [h]ere, the factual basis of the Countys wrongdoing, as alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint, relates solely to conduct occurring after Decedents death namely, the purported negligent investigation of Decedents cause of death and the mishandling of his remains& (Demurrer at p. 12:17-20, emphasis omitted, citing FAC, ¶¶ 196-208.) The County asserts that [b]ecause there are no allegations against the County relating to conduct occurring before Decedents death, no claim accrued as to Decedent against the County before his death and each of the claims asserted on his behalf as to the County are properly dismissed. (Demurrer at p. 12:21-24, emphasis omitted.) Love does not appear to dispute this point in the opposition. [6] The County also asserts that Plaintiff, who is not an attorney, cannot represent the interests of Decedents estate proceeding pro se. (Demurrer at p. 13:3-4.) The caption page of the FAC lists Carolyn Tracie Love above Attorneys for CAROLYN TRACIE LOVE, (pro per) Individually. (FAC, p. 2.) However, as discussed, the FAC also alleges, inter alia , that Plaintiff CAROLYN TRACIE LOVE, an individual, and on behalf of TRASHAWN ALTON TILLETT, her deceased son by and her attorney alleges as follows against Defendants Los Angeles County Coroners, Los Angeles City Fire Dept, Los Angeles City Police Dept does 1 to 10. (FAC, p. 1, emphasis added.) Love does not appear to dispute that she has not obtained an attorney. The County cites to Hansen v. Hansen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 618, 621 , where the Court of Appeal noted that [a] person who is unlicensed to practice law and who represents a decedents estate cannot appear in propria persona on behalf of the estate in matters outside the probate proceedings. Since the passage of the State Bar Act in 1927, persons may represent their own interests in legal proceedings, but may not represent the interests of another unless they are active members of the State Bar. (Internal citations omitted.) Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the third, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action of the FAC, to the extent these causes of action are alleged by Plaintiff on behalf of the Decedent. C. Third, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action Next, the County asserts that Plaintiffs third, fifth, and eighth causes of action fail to plead the requisite statutory provision imposing a mandatory duty on the County for liability under California Government Code § 815.6 . (Demurrer at p. 13:6-8.) Plaintiffs third cause of action is for negligent investigation and failure to render aid, the fifth cause of action is for negligent hiring, and the eighth cause of action is for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The County notes that [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute. ( Gov. Code, § 815.)& In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care& ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183 .) In Plaintiffs third and fifth causes of action, she alleges that Defendants owed her a duty pursuant to Government Code section 815.6& (FAC, ¶¶ 398, 401.) In the eighth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Los Angeles Coroners Department owed her a duty pursuant to Government Code section 815.6& (FAC, ¶ 419.) Government Code section 815.6 provides that [w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. The County notes that [a] plaintiff seeking to hold a public entity liable under Government Code section 815.6 must specifically identify the statute or regulation alleged to create a mandatory duty. ( In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, 689 .) As noted by the County, Plaintiffs third, fifth, and eighth causes of action do not appear to identify any specific statute, enactment, or provision that Plaintiff claims imposed a mandatory duty on the County. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the third, fifth, and eighth causes of action of the FAC. D. Sixth Cause of Action The sixth cause of action of the FAC is for violation of California Constitutional rights. This cause of action alleges that Defendants actions violated, and continue to violate, Plaintiffs rights under Article I, Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 13 and 15 of the California Constitution . (FAC, ¶ 408.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violate[d] her due process right to a governmental investigation, violate[d] her due process right to an unbiased governmental investigation, and violate[d] her equal protection and/or due process right not to be singled out for irrational and/or arbitrary discriminatory treatment. (FAC, ¶ 407.) The County cites to authority supporting its assertion that Sections 1, 2, and 7 of Article I of the California Constitution do not provide for a private right of action for damages. The County cites to Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1237, footnote 6 , where the Court of Appeal noted that article I, section 1, of the California Constitution &states: All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. Clearly, although safety and happiness are inalienable rights, this provision of the Constitution does not establish the means whereby they may be enjoyed. No case has ever held that this provision enunciating the inalienable right to obtain safety and happiness is self-executing in the sense that it gives rise, in and of itself, to a private right of action for damages or an affirmative duty on the part of the state to take particular steps to guarantee the enjoyment of safety or happiness by all citizens. The County also cites to Degrassi v. Cook (2002) 29 Cal.4th 333, 342 , where the California Supreme Court conclude[d] that there is no indication in the language of article I, section 2(a) , nor any evidence in the history of that provision, from which we may find, within that provision, an implied right to seek damages for a violation of the free speech right set out therein. In addition, the County cites to Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 324 , where the California Supreme Court conclude[d] that there is no indication in the language of article I, section 7(a) , nor any evidence in the history of that section, from which we may find, within that provision, an implied right to seek damages for a violation of the due process liberty interest. The Court notes that Loves opposition to the Countys demurrer does not appear to address this legal authority. As to Article I, Sections 3, 13 and 15 , the County asserts that [n]one of these provisions of the California Constitution provide Plaintiff a due process right to a governmental investigation by the Countys DMEC as to the cause of Decedents death. (Demurrer at p. 15:17-19.) Indeed, as noted by the County, Section 3 concerns [a]ssembly, petition, open meetings, Section 13 concerns search and seizure, and Section 15 concerns safeguards in criminal prosecutions. ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 3 ; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13 ; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 .) Thus, the Court does not see how these provisions are relevant to Plaintiffs claims in the FAC. The County also asserts that [n]or has Plaintiff alleged any facts to support her allegation that she was singled out for irrational and/or arbitrary discriminatory treatment by the County. (Demurrer at p. 15:19-21; see FAC, ¶ 407.) Loves opposition to the Countys demurrer does not appear to address this point. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the sixth cause of action of the FAC. E. Ninth Cause of Action As noted by the County, the ninth cause of action of the FAC is untitled, but alleges that Plaintiff, as DECEDENTS successor in interest, seek [sic] all damages accruing to DECEDENT in a survival action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 . (FAC, ¶ 425.) The County asserts that there are no recoverable damages on behalf of Decedent against the County given that he was already deceased when the Countys DMEC responded . (Demurrer at p. 17:15-17.) As noted by the County, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, subdivision (a) provides that [i]n an action or proceeding by a decedents personal representative or successor in interest on the decedents cause of action, the damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement. In the opposition, Love does not appear to address the Countys assertion that there are no recoverable damages under the ninth cause of action given that the Decedent was already deceased when the Countys DMEC responded. (Demurrer at p. 17:16-17.) Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the ninth cause of action of the FAC. F. Tenth Cause of Action Plaintiffs tenth cause of action is for constructive fraud intentional misrepresentation concealment. In the tenth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia , that Defendants&intentionally misrepresented the status of decedents medical exam and the location of his remains& (FAC, ¶ 427.) The County asserts that the tenth cause of action fails because Plaintiff fails to identify any statutory basis for imposing direct liability as to the County for this claim. (Demurrer at p. 17:25-26.) As discussed, pursuant to Government Code section 815 , [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person& Indeed, the tenth cause of action does not allege any statutory basis for imposing liability on the County as to this cause of action. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the tenth cause of action of the FAC. G. Claims Against the Department of the Coroner Lastly, the County asserts that [i]n the Fourth Amended Complaint, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is separately naming the Department of the Coroner as a defendant. (Demurrer at p. 18:23-24.) The Court agrees that this is unclear, as the caption page of the FAC lists, inter alia , Los Angeles County, Department of the Coroner. The County asserts that to the extent the Department of Medical Examiner-Coroner is separately named, it should be dismissed as a duplicative defendant. (Demurrer at p. 19:11-12.) The County cites to City of Tracy v. Cohen (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 852, footnote 1 , where the Court of Appeal noted that [w]e again adjust the appellate title in one of these appeals, putting the official capacity cart (Successor Agency, etc.) back behind the party name horse (City of Tracy), and deleting the Department of Finance as a party, a redundant defendant. The Countys counsel also states in his supporting declaration that Plaintiff agreed&that she did not intend to separately name the Department of Coroner as a Defendant. (Bustos Decl., ¶ 5.) This does not appear to be disputed by Love in her opposition to the Countys demurrer. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the third, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action of the FAC against the Department of the Coroner, to the extent these causes of action are alleged against any purported separate entity named Department of the Coroner. The Citys Demurrer A. Legal Standard A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . ( Blank v. Kirwan , supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 318 .) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. , supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 872 .) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded . ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist ., supra , 2 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967 .) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. , supra , 67 Cal.2d at p. 713 .) B. First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Causes of Action as to Plaintiffs Claims on Behalf of the Decedent The City demurs to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action of the FAC. As discussed, the FAC alleges, inter alia , that Plaintiff CAROLYN TRACIE LOVE, an individual, and on behalf of TRASHAWN ALTON TILLETT, her deceased son by and her attorney alleges as follows against Defendants Los Angeles County Coroners, Los Angeles City Fire Dept, Los Angeles City Police Dept does 1 to 10. (FAC, p. 1, emphasis added.) The City argues that Plaintiff cannot assert any causes of action or seek any damages on behalf of the Decedent, as Plaintiffs alleged status as a trustee does not alter the fact that Plaintiff is prohibited from bringing these claims as a pro per . (Demurrer at p. 9:18-19.) As discussed, [a] person who is unlicensed to practice law and who represents a decedents estate cannot appear in propria persona on behalf of the estate in matters outside the probate proceedings. Since the passage of the State Bar Act in 1927, persons may represent their own interests in legal proceedings, but may not represent the interests of another unless they are active members of the State Bar. ( Hansen v. Hansen , supra , 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 [internal citations omitted] .) In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action of the FAC, to the extent these causes of action are alleged by Plaintiff on behalf of the Decedent. C. Federal Causes of Action Next, the City asserts that the federal causes of action are barred by res judicata& (Demurrer at p. 10:8-9.) It appears the federal causes of action the City is referring to are the seventh and fourteenth causes of action of the FAC, as the City asserts that [i]n meet and confer communications with Plaintiff, it was informed that the Seventh and Fourteenth causes of action were being withdrawn. (Demurer at p. 10:24-25.) The seventh cause of action of the FAC is for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . The fourteenth cause of action is for 42 U.S.C . 1983 Monell Claim Failure to Train. The City cites to Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 , where the California Supreme Court notes that Res judicata describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. The Mycogen Court noted that [a] clear and predictable res judicata doctrine promotes judicial economy. Under this doctrine, all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief. ( Id. at p. 897 [internal quotations omitted] .) As set forth above, the November 15, 2023 Order in the subject Federal Action provides, inter alia , as follows: After Defendants moved to dismiss her Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, filed an untimely Third Amended Complaint (TAC) nearly two weeks after her opposition deadline had passed. Dkt. No. 65 . The TAC significantly expands on her earlier pleadings, spanning 68 pages and alleging 24 causes of action&including 13 federal claims. Id . The Court allowed the filing of the TAC and denied as moot the motions to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. No. 67. The City and County now move to dismiss Plaintiffs TAC for failure to state a claim. Dkt. Nos. 70 , 71 . The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument and vacates the December 1, 2023 motion hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7-15 . Because Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible federal claims, the Court dismisses her federal causes of action and remands the remaining claims to state court. (November 15, 2023 Order, p. 2.) As also discussed, the November 15, 2023 Order in the Federal Action concludes that [a]ccordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants motions to dismiss, and Plaintiffs federal claims in Counts 7, 11, 14, and 16-25 are DISMISSED on the merits with prejudice... (November 15, 2023 Order, p. 8.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs TAC contained, inter alia , a seventh cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a fourteenth cause of action for 42 U.S.C . 1983 Monell Claim Failure to Train. (Countys 12/20/23 Request for Judicial Notice, ¶ 1, Ex. A.) In the opposition, Love does not appear to dispute that the seventh and fourteenth causes of action in her FAC are barred. The Citys counsel also indicates in her supporting declaration that Plaintiff represented that she would be withdrawing/removing federal causes of action and identified the Seventh&and Fourteenth causes of action. (Hunter Decl., ¶ 5.) This does not appear to be disputed by Love in her opposition. Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the seventh and fourteenth causes of action of the FAC. D. Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action Next, the City asserts that the FAC does not allege any statutory authority on which to bring any state law claims against the City, any of its departments or any of its employees. (Demurrer at p. 12:4-5.) As discussed, [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute. ( Gov. Code, § 815.)& In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care& ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 1183 .) Plaintiffs second cause of action for negligent investigation, third cause of action for negligent investigation and failure to render aid, and fifth cause of action for negligent hiring allege that Plaintiff&contends that Defendants owed her a duty pursuant to Government Code section 815.6& (FAC, ¶¶ 392, 398, 401.) In addition, Plaintiffs eighth cause of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress alleges that Plaintiff contends that the Defendant Los Angeles Coroners Department owed her a duty pursuant to Government Code section 815.6& (FAC, ¶ 419.) As set forth above, [a] plaintiff seeking to hold a public entity liable under Government Code section 815.6 must specifically identify the statute or regulation alleged to create a mandatory duty. ( In re Groundwater Cases , supra , 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 689 .) Plaintiffs second, third, fifth, and eighth causes of action do not appear to identify any specific statute or regulation purportedly imposing a mandatory duty on the City. Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the second, third, fifth, and eighth causes of action of the FAC. E. First and Eleventh Causes of Action The City also appears to assert that certain causes of action, including the first and eleventh causes of action of the FAC, fail because there is no right to police services, a police investigation or a particular type of investigation under Section 845 , and because Section 820.2&affords immunity for the discretionary manner in which an investigation is conducted. (Demurrer at p. 11:21-23.) Government Code section 845 provides in part that [n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise to provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection service. Government Code section 820.2 provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused. Plaintiffs first cause of action for failure to conduct a homicide investigation and wellness check alleges that Defendants owed her a duty pursuant to Government Code section 815.6 , and that Defendant breached that duty. (FAC, ¶¶ 388-389.) [7] Plaintiffs eleventh cause of action is for negligent investigation and failure to perform welfare check. In this cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that [o]n October 21, 2021, Defendant LAPD breached the mandated duty to perform a competent and thorough welfare check and investigation of the circumstances surroundings Trashawan[s] death. (FAC, ¶ 436.) Plaintiff further alleges that Trashawn was left to die without medical treatment from the defendant during a time of crisis. (FAC, ¶ 438.) In the opposition, Love does not appear to dispute that her first and eleventh causes of action are barred by Government Code section 845 or Government Code section 820.2 . Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the first and eleventh causes of action of the FAC. [8] F. Sixth Cause of Action As set forth above, Plaintiffs sixth cause of action alleges that Defendants actions violated, and continue to violate, Plaintiffs rights under Article I, Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 13 and 15 of the California Constitution . (FAC, ¶ 408.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violate[d] her due process right to a governmental investigation, violate[d] her due process right to an unbiased governmental investigation, and violate[d] her equal protection and/or due process right not to be singled out for irrational and/or arbitrary discriminatory treatment. (FAC, ¶ 407) Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides that [a]ll people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. ( Cal. Const., art. I § 1 .) The City asserts that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support her claim for violation of her state constitutional right to privacy. (Demurrer at p. 16:8-9.) Love does not appear to specifically address this point in her opposition to the Citys demurrer. The City also cites to Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 391 , where the Court of Appeal found that [t]here is no cause of action for damages for alleged violations of California Constitution, article I, section 2, subdivision (a) (freedom of speech), article I, section 3, subdivision (a) (right to petition the government)&or article I, section 7, subdivision (a) (due process and equal protection), when such an action is not tied to an established common law or statutory action, and Julian alleges no such cause of action. Here, Loves opposition to the Citys demurrer does not appear to demonstrate how she may allege a cause of action for damages for a violation of Article I, Sections 2, 3 , or 7 of the California Constitution. As to Article I, Sections 13 and 15 of the California Constitution , the City asserts that these sections are not applicable to the facts of this case. Indeed, as discussed, Section 13 concerns search and seizure, and Section 15 concerns safeguards in criminal prosecutions. ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 13 ; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 .) In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the sixth cause of action of the FAC. G. Ninth Cause of Action As discussed, the ninth cause of action of the FAC is untitled, but alleges that Plaintiff, as DECEDENTS successor in interest, seek [sic] all damages accruing to DECEDENT in a survival action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 . (FAC, ¶ 425.) In the demurrer, the City asserts that Plaintiffs Ninth claim for damages fails as a matter of law, as it is essentially a survival action, which is a claim personal to Tillet and not to Plaintiff. Plaintiff, who is pro per, cannot bring any claims on behalf of Tillet, and there is no legally cognizable right to bring this claim. (Demurrer at p. iii:3-6.) As discussed, the caption page of the FAC states Carolyn Tracie Love above Attorneys for CAROLYN TRACIE LOVE, (pro per). (FAC, p. 1.) Plaintiff does not appear to state that she obtained counsel. As set forth above, [a ] person who is unlicensed to practice law and who represents a decedents estate cannot appear in propria persona on behalf of the estate in matters outside the probate proceedings. Since the passage of the State Bar Act in 1927, persons may represent their own interests in legal proceedings, but may not represent the interests of another unless they are active members of the State Bar. ( Hansen v. Hansen , supra , 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 [internal citations omitted] .) In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the ninth cause of action of the FAC. H. Tenth Cause of Action Plaintiffs tenth cause of action is for constructive fraud intentional misrepresentation concealment. In the tenth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia , that Defendants&intentionally misrepresented the status of decedents medical exam and the location of his remains& (FAC, ¶ 427.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants&knowingly failed to disclose to Plaintiff important fact(s) known to them about DECEDENT to with the [sic] fact that DECEDENTS records were misidentified with those of Lance Edward Williams& (FAC, ¶ 428.) In the demurrer, the City asserts that the tenth cause of action appears to be directed to conduct allegedly committed by the County defendants. (Demurrer at p. 17:26.) The City asserts that [t]here are no factual allegations as to anything that the City, its departments or its employees did or did not do. As such, this claim is uncertain and fails as to the City defendants. (Demurrer at pp. 17:27-18:2.) Love does not appear to respond to or dispute this point in the opposition. Indeed, the tenth cause of action does not appear to reference the City specifically. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the tenth cause of action of the FAC. I. Thirteenth Cause of Action The City also asserts that Plaintiffs Unruh Civil Rights Act cause of action fails as a matter of law. (Demurrer at p. 14:20.) Plaintiffs thirteenth cause of action for violation of Californias Unruh Civil Rights Act alleges, inter alia , that Trashawn is a gay black man with HIV which constitutes a disability that limits a major life activity. (FAC, ¶ 444.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conduct violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by denying (or aiding or inciting the denial of) Trashawns rights to full and equal use of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services Defendants [sic] offers to patients by denying Trashawn adequate care based on his disability. (FAC, ¶ 445.) In the demurrer, the City asserts, inter alia , that [t]he allegations in this claim also are conclusory at best, which does not satisfy the specific pleading standard as to public entities and public employees. (Demurrer at p. 14:23-25.) Indeed, Plaintiff does not appear to specify in the thirteenth cause of action how the City allegedly [denied] Trashawn adequate care based on his disability. (FAC, ¶ 445.) In Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 493-494 , cited by the City, the Court of Appeal noted that because under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable. Thus, to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity. ( Internal quotations omitted .) Love does not appear to respond to this point in the opposition. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action of the FAC. J. Fifteenth Cause of Action Plaintiffs fifteenth cause of action is for violation of Government Code section 11135 . Government Code section 11135, subdivision (a) provides that [n]o person in the State of California shall, on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation, be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state. Notwithstanding Section 11000 , this section applies to the California State University. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conduct denied Trashawn full and equal access to the services, programs, and activities offered by Defendant to patients at Defendants [sic] in violation of Cal. Govt Code Section 11135 . (FAC, ¶ 456.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants conduct also denied Carolyn, who is associated with Trashawn under the meaning of the statute by virtue of the fact that she is the mother of Trashawn, a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Section 11135(c)(1) , full and equal access to the services, programs, and activities offered by Defendant in violation of Section 11135 . (FAC, ¶ 457.) In the demurrer, the City notes that [t]his claim contains no factual allegations as to which state funded programs and services Plaintiff was denied access or how she was denied access by virtue of Defendant Citys alleged conduct in this incident. (Demurrer at p. 18:11-13.) Loves does not appear to respond to or dispute this point in the opposition. The City also notes that Government Code section 11135 is contained within Chapter 1 concerning State Agencies. The City asserts that Section 11135 accordingly does not pertain to the City. Love also does not appear to respond to this point in the opposition. Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the fifteenth cause of action of the FAC. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Countys demurrer to the third, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action of the FAC as to the County and the Department of the Coroner, without leave to amend. As discussed, the Court sustained the Countys previous demurrer to the TAC in its entirety. ( See May 1, 2024 Order.) In addition, Love has not proffered any basis for any amendment to cure the foregoing deficiencies. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is appropriate to sustain the Countys instant demurrer without leave to amend.¿ In addition, based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Citys demurrer to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action of the FAC. As discussed, the Court sustained the Citys previous demurrer to the TAC, except for the Citys demurrer to the fifteenth cause of action of the TAC. ( See May 1, 2024 Order.) In addition, Love has not proffered any basis for any amendment to cure the foregoing deficiencies. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is appropriate to sustain the Citys instant demurrer without leave to amend.¿ In light of the foregoing, t he Court orders the City to file and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal within 30 days of the date of this order. (¿ Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc . (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 186 [An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not a final judgment; a judgment of dismissal follows such an order as a matter of course.]¿.)¿¿ As to the County, the Court notes that the seventh cause of action of the FAC is alleged against all Defendants. However, the County did not demur to this cause of action. In his supporting declaration, the Countys counsel states that [d]uring the meet and confer, Plaintiff agreed to the dismissal of the Seventh Cause of Action& (Bustos Decl., ¶ 5.) However, it does not appear that any request for dismissal has been filed as to the seventh cause of action of the FAC. The Court also notes that the first, thirteenth, and fifteenth causes of action of the FAC do not appear to specify which defendant(s) such causes of action are alleged against. The County does not demur to these causes of action, and the Countys demurrer does not appear to discuss them. In light of the foregoing, the Court orders the County to file and serve its answer to the FAC within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿¿ The City is ordered to give notice of this Order. DATED: July 12, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] On May 1, 2024, the Court issued an Order pertaining to the Countys and the Citys respective demurrers to the TAC. The Courts May 1, 2024 Order provides, inter alia , that the Court grants the Countys request for judicial notice filed in support of the Countys demurrer. [2] The Court notes that on June 20, 2024, a Fifth Amended Complaint was submitted in this action. The Fifth Amended Complaint was electronically received on such date but was not filed. The docket for this action does not show that Plaintiff was authorized to file any Fifth Amended Complaint. [3] The FAC does not appear to allege any fourth or twelfth causes of action. [4] The Court notes that the first, thirteenth, and fifteenth causes of action do not appear to specify which defendant(s) such causes of action are alleged against. The second cause of action is alleged against LAPD. The third cause of action is alleged against the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire Department, County of Los Angeles, Department of Coroner. The fifth cause of action is alleged against County of Los Angeles, Department of Coroner, City of Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire Department. The sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action are alleged against All Defendants. The eleventh cause of action is alleged against Police Department. The fourteenth cause of action is alleged against Los Angeles City Police Department, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles Fire department EMT. [5] In the opposition, Love states that she is proceeding solely as Carolyn Love, an individual. (Oppn at p. 2:8.) [6] The Court also notes that Loves opposition asserts, inter alia , that Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint contains detailed factual allegations that, if proven true, constitute valid causes of action against Defendants. (Oppn at p. 23:12-13.) However, as discussed, the Fourth Amended Complaint is the operative pleading in this case. Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint was not filed, and the Court did not authorize Plaintiff to file a Fifth Amended Complaint. [7] As discussed, Government Code section 815.6 provides that [w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. Plaintiffs first cause of action also does not appear to identify any specific statute or regulation purportedly imposing a mandatory duty on the City. [8] The City also asserts that [t]he Eleventh claim is an added claim which also violates the Courts previous order not to add any additional claims. (Demurrer at p. 11:25-26.) Indeed, the TAC does not appear to specifically allege a cause of action for negligent investigation and failure to perform welfare check. (Countys 12/20/23 RJN, ¶ 1, Ex. A.) The Court notes that [f]ollowing an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the courts order.¿The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend. ( Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, [internal citation omitted].) The Courts May 1, 2024 Order did not authorize Plaintiff to allege an additional cause of action for negligent investigation and failure to perform welfare check. The Court finds that this is an additional ground to sustain the Citys demurrer to the eleventh cause of action of the FAC.

24CV00765 HATZIS, MORGAN RAE V. PRIETO, MARIA NERISSA ET AL EVENT: Defendants’ Demurrer to Complaint Defendants Maria Nerissa Prieto and Privilege Medical, Inc. have failed to comply with the notice requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §1005. The Proof of Service filed on June 11, 2024, the same day as the Demurrer, includes the wrong clients, wrong party names, wrong case number, wrong documents/motion, and is missing name and address of person/party served. As such, notice is insufficient, and the Demurrer is overruled on that basis.

Case Number: 23STCV24498 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Case Name: McGowan, et al. v. Fame Gardens LP Case No.: 23STCV24498 Matter: OSC re: Default Judgment Ruling: The Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs to give notice. This is a habitability matter. Plaintiffs Phillip Pharell Mcgowan, Devon Monique Martinez, Joseph Manuel Eddins, and Cereniti Claire Martinez Mcgowan seek a default judgment against Defendant Fame Gardens LP. While Plaintiffs request $540,000 in damages, the Complaint fails to make any specific request for damages against Defendant. This is problematic as [t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint . . . . (Code Civ. Proc. § 580.) Further, phrases such as in an amount not less than do not give notice for the purposes of Code Civ. Proc. § 580. ( Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4 th 1161, 1173-1174.) Code Civ. Proc. § 580 applies even when a defendant has defaulted after having filed an answer and having participated in discovery. (See Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 828; Elec. Funds Sols., LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1175.) That a statement of damages was served is irrelevant as this is not a personal injury or wrongful death action. Thus, Plaintiffs can either accept the jurisdictional minimum of $25,001 in damages or else amend the Complaints allegations as to damages, which would be a material change opening Defendants default. ( Cole v. Roebling Const. Co. (1909) 156 Cal. 443; Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 27-28.) Accordingly , the Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs to give notice.

Case Number: 22CHCV00784 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: F49 Dept. F49 Date: 7/10/24 Case Name: Patrick Graham v. Macaria Beltran, individual and trustee of The MCB Trust; and Does 1-10 Case No. 22CHCV00784 LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT DEPARTMENT F49 JULY 10, 2024 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 22CHCV00784 Motion filed: 5/10/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendants Macaria Beltran, an individual, and Macaria Beltran, Trustee of The MCB Trust (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: None. NOTICE: NOT OK (see analysis below). RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff to produce supplemental responses to Defendants first set of Special Interrogatories and imposing monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and his attorney of record for $1,635.00 TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED. BACKGROUND Plaintiff initiated this action on September 26, 2022. Subsequently, on December 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants and Does 1 to 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Fraud; (2) Negligent Misrepresentation; and (3) Specific Performance. Following this, Defendants filed their Answer to the FAC on January 11, 2023. On May 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Substitution of Attorney with the Court, substituting himself for his former counsel. Subsequently, on the same day, May 10, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (SROG), Set One (the Motion). No Opposition or Reply papers have been received by the Court. ANALYSIS On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) A. Procedural Requirements 1. Timeliness Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c), notice of this motion must be given within 45 days following the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or by a later date agreed-upon in writing, failing which the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c) ; but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].) The 45-day deadline is jurisdictional in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days[.] (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).) Here, Plaintiff served written responses by email to Defendants first set of SROG on February 14, 2024, (Block Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) The service of written responses establishes the deadline for Defendants to file a motion to compel further as April 4, 2024, calculated based on a 45-day period with an extension of two court days per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B), accounting for the method of electronic service. Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is filed timely as it was filed prior to the established deadline. 2. Meet and Confer A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) Here, the Court finds Defendants meet and confer efforts to be sufficient. (Block Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C and D.) 3. Separate Statement The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (a)(2) explicitly states that Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: ... (2) To compel further responses to interrogatories. A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) Here, Defendants have fulfilled the requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion. 4. Proof of Service For noticed motions, [u]nless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers must be served and filed in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 and, when applicable, the statutes and rules providing for electronic filing and service. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(a).) Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Furthermore, [i]f a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission, electronic service of that document is deemed complete at the time of the electronic transmission of the document or at the time that the electronic notification of service of the document is sent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Here, Defendants submit Proof of Service, indicating that on May 10, 2024, papers associated with the Motion were served upon Plaintiffs former counsels, Adam Grant and David Almaraz, by emailing the documents to the former counsels email addresses. However, the Proof of Service was filed with the Court at 4:25 p.m. concurrently with the Motion, subsequent to Plaintiffs filing of Substitution of Attorney at 3:36 p.m. on the same day. According to Code of Civil Procedure section 284, which provides that [t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment or final determination ... [u]pon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes, Plaintiffs former counsels ceased to represent Plaintiff upon the filing of the Substitution of Attorney, i.e., at 3:36 p.m. on May 10, 2024, and are no longer authorized to accept service on Plaintiffs behalf. Moreover, Defendants have not submitted any evidence of service upon the self-representing Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants have failed to demonstrate effective service of the moving papers either on Plaintiffs former counsels or on Plaintiff, in pro per, pursuant to applicable Code of Civil Procedure sections. Based on the above records, the Court determines that Defendants Motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 and California Rules of Court rule 3.1300(a). Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion. B. Monetary Sanctions As the Court has denied the Motion, the request for monetary sanctions, reserved for a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), is also DENIED. CONCLUSION Defendants Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, is DENIED. Defendants Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. Moving party to give notice.

CU23-03783 Motion to Compel X4 TENTATIVE RULING The parties are to appear.

Case Number: 23STCV02917 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING CHARLES SWEETEN, Plaintiff, v. DANTRELL GRACE, Defendant. Case No: 23STCV02917 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Calendar Number: 4 Plaintiff Golden Dragon Group LLC (Plaintiff) seeks leave to amend his Complaint against Defendant Jonathan Valdez (Defendant) The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion. The Court sets aside the default entered January 11, 2024. Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint within 10 days. Background This is a breach of contract case. In 2020 and 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant made a series of agreements (the Loan Agreements) whereby Plaintiff loaned Defendant certain amounts of money and further obtained a loan and a line of credit on Defendants behalf to be used exclusively for Defendants business. Defendant thereafter failed to make monthly loan and credit card payments pursuant to the Loan Agreements in a timely manner. On January 15, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to a repayment agreement (the First Repayment Agreement). From March 2022 to June 2022, Defendant ignored Plaintiffs communications and failed to make payments on the First Repayment Agreement. On July 12, 2022, the parties entered into a second repayment agreement (the Second Repayment Agreement). From August 2022 to December 2022, Defendant ignored Plaintiffs communications and failed to make payments on the Second Repayment Agreement. On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff served Defendant with a demand notice requesting that Defendant fulfill his repayment obligations. However, Defendant did not comply with the notice. Plaintiff filed this action on February 9, 2023, seeking recovery on Defendants breaches of the Loan Agreements, the First Repayment Agreement, and the Second Repayment Agreement. The Complaint seeks the recovery of a total of $81,000.00 under the various agreements. On March 14, 2023, the parties reached an agreement on the dispute in the form of a promissory note (the Promissory Note). Plaintiff filed the Promissory Note with the Court on March 17, 2023. The Promissory Note purports to settle the controversy in this action. However, no party sought dismissal of the action pursuant to the settlement in the Promissory Note. This action is consequently still pending. Defendant was defaulted on January 11, 2024. On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for default judgment against Defendant, seeking recovery on the Promissory Note. On May 13, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs request for default judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs Complaint did not plead the existence or breach of the Promissory Note and that Plaintiff sought damages on default in excess of the damages demanded in the Complaint. Plaintiff moved for leave to amend on June 11, 2024. No party has filed an opposition. Legal Standard A complainant may obtain leave from the trial court to amend their pleading beyond the number of amendments allowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 472 (a) by filing a noticed motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324.) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration stating: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier.¿(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324 (b).) Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 576.) In the absence of a showing of prejudice from the opposing side, the trial court ordinarily lacks discretion to deny a motion to amend a pleading. ( Honig v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.) Discussion Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add allegations that the parties entered the Promissory Agreement, under which Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff the amount of $83,741, and that Defendant has not made any payments to date. Plaintiff also seeks to add demands for damages, attorneys fees, and costs. The Court previously denied Plaintiff default judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff had not pleaded the existence and breach of the Promissory Agreement, which is the latest agreement stating the parties obligations to each other with respect to the Loan Agreements. Plaintiff now seeks to amend his complaint to fix that defect. The Court finds that such amendment is in the interest of justice. The Court grants Plaintiffs motion.