Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------------------X
:
SINAR SEEN, Individually and as Temporary :
Administrator of the Estate of MUNIR SEEN, Deceased, :
: Index No. 190225/2018
:
Plaintiff, :
:
-against- :
:
84 LUMBER COMPANY, et al., :
:
:
Defendants. :
:
------------------------------------------------------------------------X
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT KAISER
GYPSUM COMPANY, INC.’S MOTION FOR (1) A JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT; (2) AN ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL; OR (3) A
REMITTITUR OF A CLEARLY EXCESSIVE VERDICT
Page 1 of 50
1 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................3
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................8
LAW AND ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................8
I. Defendant Has Failed To Demonstrate That It Is Entitled To Judgment Notwithstanding The
Verdict ..................................................................................................................................... 8
a. The Causation Opinions of Plaintiff’s Experts Meet The Legal Requirements Set Forth
in Nemeth and are Factually Distinguishable from the Opinions Held to be Insufficient
in Nemeth........................................................................................................................... 9
b. Defendant’s Arguments in Support of Judgment in its Favor are Not Well-Taken ........ 16
1. Inaccurate, Superficial Comparisons to Nemeth Fail to Demonstrate that
Defendant is Entitled to JNOV............................................................................................... 17
2. There is a Sufficient Factual Basis for the Jury to Have Determined That
Exposure to Asbestos from Kaiser Joint Compounds was a Contributing Factor ................ 21
3. Defendant has Otherwise Failed to Show That Plaintiff’s Experts’ Opinions were
Unreliable or Insufficient....................................................................................................... 23
4. The Reversals of Distinguishable Cases are Irrelevant to the Issues Here ......... 26
II. Kaiser is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based On Any Alleged Evidentiary Error ................. 27
a. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Plaintiff’s Direct Examination of
Mr. Seen to be Used Along With Kaiser’s Questioning ................................................. 27
b. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Limiting Kaiser’s Cross-Examination of Dr.
Moline With Respect to Other Brands of Joint Compound ............................................ 30
1. The Court Was Within Its Discretion to Limit Kaiser’s Cross-Examination of Dr.
Moline Based on the Scope of Her Direct Testimony And Kaiser’s Failure to Demonstrate a
Prima Facie Case for Apportionment .................................................................................... 31
2. Defendant Cannot Show Any Prejudice and, Moreover, Has Waived any Alleged
Error ...................................................................................................................................... 33
c. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Plaintiff’s Experts to Testify
Regarding All Sources of Asbestos in Kaiser’s Joint Compound, Including Asbestos-
Containing Talc ............................................................................................................... 35
III. The Court Should Deny Any Remittitur Or, Alternatively, Any Remittitur Should Be
Substantially More Modest That What Defendant Proposes ................................................. 40
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................49
Page 2 of 50
2 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Adams v. Georgian Motel Corp.,
291 A.D.2d 712 (3d Dep’t 2002) .............................................................................................40
Andrusziewicz v. Atlas,
13 A.D.3d 325 (2d Dep’t 2004) ...............................................................................................30
Avila v. State of New York,
132 Misc.2d 1068 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1986).....................................................................................39
Barrowman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
252 A.D.2d 946 (4th Dep’t 1998) ............................................................................................38
Bigelow v. Acands, Inc.,
196 A.D.2d 436 (1st Dep’t 1993) ......................................................................................29, 31
Billok v. Union Carbide Corp.,
170 A.D.3d 1388 (3d Dep’t 2019) ...........................................................................................29
Campbell v. Diguglielmo,
148 F.Supp.2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)..................................................................................45, 46
Capara v. Chrysler Corp.,
52 N.Y.2d 114 (1981) ..............................................................................................................41
Carlucci v. Union Carbide
(New York Co., Apr. 24, 2014) ...............................................................................................49
Carulo v. John Crane Inc.
226 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2000).......................................................................................................22
Chisholm v. R.T. Vanderbilt Co.
(Schenectady Co., Feb. 10, 2015) ............................................................................................49
Collins v Weinberg,
88 AD2d 1037 (3d Dept 1982) ................................................................................................35
Page 3 of 50
3 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Conway v Elite Towing & Flatbedding Corp.,
135 AD3d 893 (2d Dept 2016) ................................................................................................37
Dalrymple v. Koka,
2 A.D.3d 769 (2d Dep’t 2003) .................................................................................................39
Daniele v. Pain Mgmt. Ctr. of Long Island,
168 A.D.3d 672 (2d Dep’t 2019) .............................................................................................33
Sean R. ex rel. Debra R. v. BMW of N.A., LLC,
26 N.Y.3d 801 (2016) ...................................................................................................... passim
Durant v. Shuren,
33 A.D.3d 843 (2d Dep’t 2006) ...............................................................................................39
Dyer v. Amchem Prod., Inc.,
207 A.D.3d 408 (1st Dept. 2022).............................................................................................26
Farmer v. Nostrand Ave. Meat and Poultry,
37 A.D.3d 653 (2d Dep’t 2007) ...............................................................................................28
Feldsberg v. Nitschke,
49 N.Y.2d 636 (1980) ..............................................................................................................27
Ford v. A.O. Smith Water Products,
173 A.D.3d 602 (1st Dep’t 2019) ............................................................................................48
Fraser v. 301-52 Townhouse Corp.,
57 A.D.3d 416 (1st Dep’t 2008) ..............................................................................................10
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Global Nuclear Servs. & Supply,
280 A.D.2d 360 (1st Dep’t 2001) ............................................................................................32
Grams v. ACandS, Inc. (In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asb. Litig.),
197 A.D.2d 901 (4th Dep’t 1993) ............................................................................................33
Holmes v. Weissman,
251 A.D.2d 1078 (4th Dep’t 1998) ..........................................................................................31
Inwood Sec. Alarm, Inc. v 606 Rest., Inc.,
35 AD3d 194 (1st Dept 2006)..................................................................................................39
Keeton v. Cardinal O’Hara H. Sch.,
233 A.D.2d 839 (4th Dep’t 1996) ............................................................................................32
Killian v. A.C. & S., Inc.,
207 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................26
Page 4 of 50
4 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Marsh v. Smyth,
12 A.D.3d 307 (1st Dep’t 2004) ........................................................................................10, 17
Mazella v. Beals,
27 N.Y.3d 694 (2016) ..............................................................................................................16
McCarthy v Handel,
297 AD2d 444 (3d Dept 2002) ................................................................................................39
Medina v. Chile Communications, Inc.,
15 Misc.3d 525 (Bronx Cty. 2006) ..........................................................................................41
Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, Inc.,
39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976) ..............................................................................................................27
In re N.Y.C.A.L. (Juni),
148 A.D.3d 233 (1st Dep’t 2017) aff’d 32 N.Y.3d 1116 (2018) ...........................11, 20, 22, 25
Matter of N.Y.C.A.L. (Olson),
207 A.D. 415 (1st Dep’t 2022) ................................................................................................26
Nash v. Navistar
(Onondaga Co., Dec. 19, 2014) ...............................................................................................49
Nemeth v. Brenntag N.A., Inc.,
183 A.D.3d 211 (1st Dep’t 2020) ............................................................................................20
Nemeth v. Brenntag N.A., Inc.,
38 N.Y.3d 336 (2022) ...................................................................................................... passim
In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Idell),
164 A.D.3d 1128 (1st Dep’t 2018) .................................................................................. passim
Nicolla v. Fasulo,
161 A.D.2d 966 (3d Dep’t 1990) .............................................................................................33
Nonnon v. City of New York,
88 A.D.3d 384 (1st Dep’t 2011) (citation to internal quotation omitted) ....................... passim
Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
7 N.Y.3d 434 (2006) ........................................................................................................ passim
People v. Rivera,
189 A.D.2d 697 (1st Dep’t 1993) ......................................................................................31, 40
People v. Stone,
29 N.Y.3d 166 (2017) ..............................................................................................................29
Page 5 of 50
5 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Pomponi v. A.O. Smith Water Prod. Co.,
207 A.D.3d 417 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................26
R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co.,
333 Conn 343, 216 A3d 629 (2019) ........................................................................................37
Rabito v Deer Park Mgt. Services, LLC,
106 AD3d 798 (2d Dept 2013) ................................................................................................35
Reed v. City of New York,
304 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dep’t 2003) ................................................................................................42
Reed v City of New York,
304 AD2d 1 (1st Dept 2003)....................................................................................................40
Rivera v. The City of New York,
2010 WL 11546021 (N.Y. Cty. Dec. 10, 2020) .......................................................................40
Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr.,
28 NY3d 999 (2016) ................................................................................................................36
Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co.,
106 A.D.3d 525 (1st Dep’t 2013) ............................................................................................34
Ronsini v. Garlock, Inc.,
256 A.D.2d 250 (1st Dep’t 1998) ......................................................................................23, 26
Salm v. Moses,
13 N.Y.3d 816 (2009) ........................................................................................................29, 31
Selkowitz v. Nassau County,
45 N.Y.2d 97 (1978) ................................................................................................................16
Silverberg v. Comm. Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County,
290 A.D.2d 788 (3d Dep’t 2002) .......................................................................................39, 40
Simpson v. Garlock et al.
(Schenectady Co., Aug. 28, 2009) ...........................................................................................49
So v. Wing Tat Realty, Inc.,
259 A.D.2d 373 (1st Dep’t 1999) ......................................................................................40, 41
State v. Metz,
241 A.D.2d 192 (1st Dept 1998)..............................................................................................28
Stern v. Inwood Town House, Inc.,
22 A.D.2d 650 (1st Dep’t 1964) ..............................................................................................30
Page 6 of 50
6 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Styles v. General Motors Corp.,
20 A.D.3d 338 (1st Dep’t 2005) ........................................................................................20, 25
Tate-Mitros v MTA New York City Tr.,
144 AD3d 454 (1st Dept 2016)................................................................................................38
Turturro v. City of New York,
28 N.Y.3d 469 (2016) (citation to internal quote omitted)........................................................9
Vera v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr.,
175 A.D.2d 716 (1st Dep’t 1991) ............................................................................................28
Other Authorities
CPLR 2002...............................................................................................................................28, 34
CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) ........................................................................................................36, 37, 40
CPLR 3113(c) ................................................................................................................................29
Def. Memo., at 51 .....................................................................................................................30, 32
Def.’s Memo, at 55 .........................................................................................................................38
Rule 3101(d) ............................................................................................................................36, 38
Page 7 of 50
7 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
INTRODUCTION
Respectfully, Defendant Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Kaiser
Gypsum”) motion for (1) a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) an order for a new trial; or
(3) a remittitur of a clearly excessive verdict should be denied in its entirety. As set forth below,
Defendant’s motion presents the Court with an incomplete and inaccurate discussion of the
evidence and arguments raised at trial and overlooks the applicable New York law governing the
contentions it now asserts in its post-trial motion. Plaintiff respectfully submits that when the
evidence is reviewed under the applicable legal standards, there is no doubt that the jury properly
rendered a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. For these reasons and the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s motion should be denied.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
(I)
Defendant Has Failed To Demonstrate
That It Is Entitled To Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict
Defendant Kaiser Gypsum moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the theory
that Plaintiff’s experts’ causation opinions are insufficient under the Court of Appeals’ recent
decision in Nemeth v. Brenntag N.A., Inc., 38 N.Y.3d 336 (2022). A jury verdict may be set aside
for lack of legally sufficient evidence only if “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and
permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [jurors] to the conclusion reached by the
jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.” Nemeth, 38 N.Y.3d at 342 (quoting Cohen v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499 (1978)). Defendant has failed to meet that standard
here and itsmotion should be denied. “Where, as here, various reasonable inferences could be
drawn from the evidence presented, the determination of proximate cause must be left to the jury,
and ‘[i]t is not within the province of [a court] to substitute its assessment of the evidence for that
Page 8 of 50
8 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
of the fact finder.’” Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 485 (2016) (citation to internal
quote omitted).
Defendant’s arguments, that Plaintiff’s causation evidence is insufficient under Nemeth,
are based primarily on inaccurate and incomplete comparisons between what was presented in
Nemeth and what was presented here. Most critically and unlike Nemeth, in which a glove-box
simulation performed by a geologist was essentially the only evidence of that decedent’s exposure
levels, Plaintiff’s experts here cited and relied upon published data from real-world measurements
of exposures for the specific tasks performed by Decedent Mr. Seen. Also, in contrast to Nemeth,
Plaintiff’s experts here used generally accepted methodologies to place Mr. Seen’s relevant
exposure squarely within ranges shown by published studies to cause mesothelioma.
Defendant’s observation, that some of the materials relied upon here and some of the
opinions expressed here overlap with materials and opinions presented in Nemeth, is
inconsequential. In that regard, Defendant is fallaciously conflating “insufficient” and
“prohibited.” The Nemeth Court did not hold that any of the materials or opinions in that case were
prohibited, precluded or wrong—rather, just that they were “insufficient” to establish specific
causation. Accordingly, the point here is not about what materials and opinions might overlap with
Nemeth, but rather that Plaintiff’s experts here have added what was missing in order to meet the
requisite standard.
(A)
The Causation Opinions of Plaintiff’s Experts Meet
The Legal Requirements Set Forth in Nemeth and are Factually
Distinguishable from the Opinions Held to be Insufficient in Nemeth
Nemeth does not change nor raise the requirements for proving causation in a toxic tort
case. It reaffirms the application of the Parker standard, that a causation opinion “should set forth
a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general
Page 9 of 50
9 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness
(specific causation).” 38 N.Y.3d at 342-43 (quoting Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434, 448
(2006)). It remains unnecessary for the plaintiff to “quantify exposure levels precisely or use the
dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation
are generally accepted in the scientific community.” 38 N.Y.3d at 342 (quoting Parker, 7 N.Y.3d
at 447-48). The court’s role under Frye remains limited to “determin[ing] whether the expert’s
deductions are based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance as reliable.” Marsh v. Smyth, 12 A.D.3d 307, 308 (1st Dep’t 2004). The court may not
“intrude upon the jury’s realm” by itself “weighing the evidence.” Id. See also Nonnon v. City of
New York, 88 A.D.3d 384, 394 (1st Dep’t 2011) (“Frye test is not concerned with the reliability of
a particular expert’s conclusions, but rather, with ‘whether the expert[’s] deductions are based on
principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable”) (citation
to internal quotation omitted); Fraser v. 301-52 Townhouse Corp., 57 A.D.3d 416, 420 (1st Dep’t
2008) (Frye foundational requirement is whether the generally accepted methodologies were
properly employed in the particular case to provide reliable measurement of level of the toxin).
Plaintiff’s primary medical causation expert, Dr. Jacqueline Moline, 1 relied upon historical
industrial hygiene testing data in formulating her opinions. She looked at several studies reporting
actual measurements from work with joint compounds and exposure levels associated with
different tasks. TR 2 179:23 – 180:15. She relied upon this historical data from real-world
monitoring of subjects doing actual drywall work. TR 181:2-20, 182:19-23 – 183:23. Dr. Moline
1
Dr. Moline is a board-certified physician specializing in occupational and internal medicine. TR 161:16-
19, 164:1-6. Defendant’s post-trial motion raises no issues as to her qualifications.
2
All citations to “TR” are to the trial transcript appended as Exhibit 1.
Page 10 of 50
10 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
read Mr. Seen’s testimony as to tasks he performed. She provided estimated numerical levels of
exposure, based on the historical data, for those tasks. TR 183:23 – 184:19 (5.3, 10, 41.4, 57.2 &
59 f/cc depending upon the task). Dr. Moline reviewed and relied upon the opinions and numerical
exposure estimates in industrial hygiene expert Steven Paskal’s 3 report, which estimates for Mr.
Seen’s work with joint compound including Kaiser’s comport with the historical data. TR 188:7-
9, 189:4-12. Mr. Paskal testified that for a drywall worker performing tasks like Mr. Seen, based
on reported studies, the average exposure range was 1 – 10 f/cc. TR 645:20 – 646:7. Plaintiff’s
expert medical pathologist, Dr. David Zhang, 4 testified that sheetrock and joint compound contain
asbestos that is releasable and respirable. TR 607:20 – 609:14. Unlike the glove-box simulation in
Nemeth, such opinions here were based upon a proper, accepted foundation and methodology and
clearly qualify as a sufficient “scientific expression” of Mr. Seen’s exposure. See 38 N.Y.3d at
346. See also Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 449 (comparison to exposure levels from published studies of
persons performing similar work recognized as example of an acceptable methodology); Nonnon,
88 A.D.3d at 396; In re N.Y.C.A.L. (Juni), 148 A.D.3d 233, 237 (1st Dep’t 2017) aff’d 32 N.Y.3d
1116 (2018).
Indeed, Defendant’s experts relied on the same or similar published measurements and
used similar methodologies to arrive at very similar per-task exposure levels for Mr. Seen’s work
with joint compound. TR 1017:5-17, 1079:12 – 1080:14, 1081:16-21, 1082:21-24, 1083:8-13.
Defense expert Dr. Brent Finley expressly acknowledged that the excursion levels relied upon by
3
Mr. Paskal is a Certified Industrial Hygienist whose areas of expertise include measuring occupational
exposures to asbestos. TR 627, 639-642. Defendant’s post-trial motion raises no issues as to his
qualifications.
4
Dr. Zhang is a physician who is board-certified in pathology and occupational medicine. TR 590:21 –
591:1-3, 594:13-22, 598:13-17. Defendant’s post-trial motion raises no issues as to his qualifications.
Page 11 of 50
11 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Plaintiff’s experts for various tasks are consistent with what he has found based on publications
and testing. TR 1011:11 – 1012:13. Defendant should not be heard to assert that such foundational
data is insufficient or that such methodologies are unreliable when employed Plaintiff’s experts,
as opposed to its own experts. See Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at 397 (court notes that the defendant relied
on a similar “proximity analysis” as a “recognized substitute for a dose-response analysis”). The
fact, that Defendant’s experts chose to perform additional legally optional calculations, does not
make Plaintiff’s experts’ opinions legally insufficient. Moreover, as Defendant argues with respect
to other issues, the jury is entitled to consider all evidence actually presented by either side—
which, here, includes Defendant’s experts’ opinions that Mr. Seen experienced 6 to 12 f/cc years
of exposure to asbestos from Kaiser joint compound. TR 1044:20-24, 1088:1-3. Any disagreement
as to the respective experts’ conclusions concerning the ability of exposures at that level to cause
pleural mesothelioma was for the jury to resolve. See Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at 398.
In that regard, what Parker requires—as reaffirmed in Nemeth—is demonstrating that the
plaintiff / decedent experienced a level of exposure “sufficient” to cause the disease at issue.
Nemeth, 38 N.Y.3d at 342-43 (quoting Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 448) (specific causation requires a
showing “that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness”) (emphasis
added). Making such showing does not necessarily require identifying a specific absolute threshold
below which there is no disease, provided that the plaintiff’s experts use generally accepted
methodologies to place the plaintiff’s / decedent’s exposures within a range that has been shown
to be “sufficient” to cause disease. Id.
Plaintiffs in the case at bar made such a showing of sufficiency in two acceptable ways.
First, Plaintiff’s experts relied upon studies showing increased incidents of mesothelioma
among drywall workers with exposures similar to Mr. Seen’s exposures. For instance, the
Page 12 of 50
12 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Dahlgren paper, upon which Dr. Moline relied (Moline Trial Ex. 15; see Exhibit 2), both sets out
historical exposure levels based on monitoring actual drywall work and identifies incidents of
mesothelioma among drywallers. 5 TR 195:15 – 196:17. As Dr. Moline explained, once
epidemiology has established the causal connection between the agent and the disease (i.e.,
asbestos causes mesothelioma), case series like the Dahlgren paper are useful to demonstrate
causation in particular settings involving that agent in particular products. TR 190:5 – 193:3 (case
series indicates “that a particular product…can cause enough exposure to cause mesothelioma”).
Dr. Moline also relied upon published data from a CDC mortality review (Moline Trial Ex. 6; see
Exhibit 3) reporting that construction workers including drywallers are 5.64 times more likely to
contract mesothelioma than unexposed persons. TR 196:18 – 197:10. See Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at
397-98 (observing that “[t]he Federal Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes that courts
have permitted an inference of specific causation where the relative risk in an epidemiological
study is greater than 2.0”). 6
The second method used by Plaintiff’s experts for demonstrating specific causation
involved showing the extent to which Mr. Seen’s exposures exceeded reported levels shown to be
sufficient to cause pleural mesothelioma. Dr. Moline relied upon and discussed published studies
in the medical / scientific literature attempting to identify a no-disease threshold in terms of f/cc
years. TR 215:20 – 216:13 (Moline Trial Exs. 19-22; see Exhibits 4 to 7). She testified that
5
The Dahlgreen paper is merely one of over a dozen studies addressing the real time asbestos exposures
that were described by Mr. Seen and which were discussed by Kaiser Gypsum witnesses, Mr. Paskal, and
Dr. Moline.
6
Such analysis—showing that individuals performing the same work with similar products have a six-fold
increased risk of mesothelioma—is not, as Kaiser will doubtless contend, akin to attributing specific
causation based solely on exposure to asbestos and the fact that asbestos is known to cause mesothelioma.
Rather, it is an acceptable methodology for connecting general causation to specific causation by placing
the particular individual in an identified at-risk group.
Page 13 of 50
13 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Lacourt, for example, found that cases of mesothelioma were still reported at lifetime exposures
as low as .1 f/cc years. TR 217:11-19. Dr. Zhang testified on cross-examination that recent studies
show that exposures at levels below .5 f/cc still carry a significant risk of mesothelioma. TR 619:9-
12. Defense expert Dr. Finley admitted on cross-examination that Mr. Seen’s lifetime exposure
exceeds 4.5 f/cc. TR 1046:5-21.
Dr. Moline certainly testified that “[t]here is no dose threshold in someone with
occupational exposure.” TR 214:16-17, 215:4-15. She testified that mesothelioma can be caused
by low exposures. TR 203:9-12. Critically—and unlike in Nemeth—Dr. Moline did not rely upon
the lack of an absolute threshold nor the incident of disease from very brief exposures in attributing
specific causation. Rather, she expressly opined that, although brief or low-level occupational
exposures are considered sufficient to cause mesothelioma, Mr. Seen’s occupational exposures
were not brief nor low-level. TR 203:16-21. Based on her review of Mr. Seen’s exposure history,
Dr. Moline relied upon the fact that his cumulative exposure from working with joint compound
was well beyond the .1 f/cc years shown in published studies to be sufficient to cause
mesothelioma. TR 218:5-11. Whether or not there is some lower threshold below which disease
does not occur is largely academic where, as here, Decedent’s exposure is solidly within a range
where disease does occur—which is what a plaintiff must show. 7
7
Plaintiff’s experts referenced and relied, in part, upon regulatory standards and positions taken by
regulatory agencies as a supplement to the various medical / scientific studies discussed above and not as a
substitute for such studies. As discussed more fully infra Part (I)(B)(3), decisions holding that regulatory
measures may be insufficient alone to establish causation does not preclude including such measures as
part of an expert’s reliance materials. Additionally, relying on the testing and findings that underlie a
particular standard is different and more acceptable than simply relying on the bare existence of the
standard. Here again, Defendant’s experts likewise relied, in part, on statements and positions from
regulatory agencies in formulating their opinions. Finally, organizations such as NIOSH, WHO and IARC
are scientific bodies and not regulatory agencies.
Page 14 of 50
14 of 50
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022
Plaintiff’s experts also opined as to the ability of chrysotile asbestos to cause mesothelioma
in anticipation of, and to refute, the opinions of Defendant’s experts that chrysotile has little or no
ability to do so. Dr. Moline identified and discussed published scientific studies and papers
concluding that chrysotile alone causes mesothelioma. TR 193:16-23 – 195:14 (Moline Trial Exs.
9-13; see Exhibits 8 to 12). She noted in particular a consensus position paper, published by a
group of epidemiologists, concluding that chrysotile causes mesothelioma. TR 218:18 – 219:23.
Dr. Moline also noted sources of amphiboles in Kaiser Gypsum’s joint compound from tremolite-
contaminated Canadian chrysotile and anthophyllite in RTV talc from Upstate New York—again,
in response to Kaiser’s defense that the chrysotile in its joint compounds could not cause
mesothelioma. TR 220:19 –221:21-23, 257:25 – 258:21, 260:17 – 263:6.
Based on her review of Mr. Seen’s exposure history, Dr. Moline concluded that his
cumulative exposure from working with joint compound was well above the .1 f/cc years at which
the literature reported the occurrence of mesothelioma. TR 218:5-11. She opined to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty: “Mr. Seen used Kaiser Gypsum as one of the joint compounds he used
in the course of his work as a drywaller, and that was one of the exposures that lead to his
mesothelioma.” TR 220:6-13. Based on Mr. Seen’s description of his exposures to Kaiser materials
in his deposition, Dr. Moline opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such exposure
was a substantial contributing factor to his mesothelioma. TR 263:7-15. She based that opinion
on: the facts of Mr. Seen’s exposure to a product (joint compound) that has been shown in
industrial hygiene studies to have elevated levels of asbestos exposure from the same tasks; that
all forms of asbestos cause mesothelioma; that he used such products with mixed fiber types over
a period of years; and his latency was appropriate. TR 263:16 – 264:22. Dr. Moline reiter
Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------------------------X : SINAR SEEN, Individually and as Temporary : Administrator of the Estate of MUNIR SEEN, Deceased, : : Index No. 190225/2018 : Plaintiff, : : -against- : : 84 LUMBER COMPANY, et al., : : : Defendants. : : ------------------------------------------------------------------------X PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC.’S MOTION FOR (1) A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT; (2) AN ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL; OR (3) A REMITTITUR OF A CLEARLY EXCESSIVE VERDICT Page 1 of 50 1 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................8 LAW AND ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................8 I. Defendant Has Failed To Demonstrate That It Is Entitled To Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict ..................................................................................................................................... 8 a. The Causation Opinions of Plaintiff’s Experts Meet The Legal Requirements Set Forth in Nemeth and are Factually Distinguishable from the Opinions Held to be Insufficient in Nemeth........................................................................................................................... 9 b. Defendant’s Arguments in Support of Judgment in its Favor are Not Well-Taken ........ 16 1. Inaccurate, Superficial Comparisons to Nemeth Fail to Demonstrate that Defendant is Entitled to JNOV............................................................................................... 17 2. There is a Sufficient Factual Basis for the Jury to Have Determined That Exposure to Asbestos from Kaiser Joint Compounds was a Contributing Factor ................ 21 3. Defendant has Otherwise Failed to Show That Plaintiff’s Experts’ Opinions were Unreliable or Insufficient....................................................................................................... 23 4. The Reversals of Distinguishable Cases are Irrelevant to the Issues Here ......... 26 II. Kaiser is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based On Any Alleged Evidentiary Error ................. 27 a. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Plaintiff’s Direct Examination of Mr. Seen to be Used Along With Kaiser’s Questioning ................................................. 27 b. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Limiting Kaiser’s Cross-Examination of Dr. Moline With Respect to Other Brands of Joint Compound ............................................ 30 1. The Court Was Within Its Discretion to Limit Kaiser’s Cross-Examination of Dr. Moline Based on the Scope of Her Direct Testimony And Kaiser’s Failure to Demonstrate a Prima Facie Case for Apportionment .................................................................................... 31 2. Defendant Cannot Show Any Prejudice and, Moreover, Has Waived any Alleged Error ...................................................................................................................................... 33 c. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Plaintiff’s Experts to Testify Regarding All Sources of Asbestos in Kaiser’s Joint Compound, Including Asbestos- Containing Talc ............................................................................................................... 35 III. The Court Should Deny Any Remittitur Or, Alternatively, Any Remittitur Should Be Substantially More Modest That What Defendant Proposes ................................................. 40 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................49 Page 2 of 50 2 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Adams v. Georgian Motel Corp., 291 A.D.2d 712 (3d Dep’t 2002) .............................................................................................40 Andrusziewicz v. Atlas, 13 A.D.3d 325 (2d Dep’t 2004) ...............................................................................................30 Avila v. State of New York, 132 Misc.2d 1068 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1986).....................................................................................39 Barrowman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 A.D.2d 946 (4th Dep’t 1998) ............................................................................................38 Bigelow v. Acands, Inc., 196 A.D.2d 436 (1st Dep’t 1993) ......................................................................................29, 31 Billok v. Union Carbide Corp., 170 A.D.3d 1388 (3d Dep’t 2019) ...........................................................................................29 Campbell v. Diguglielmo, 148 F.Supp.2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)..................................................................................45, 46 Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114 (1981) ..............................................................................................................41 Carlucci v. Union Carbide (New York Co., Apr. 24, 2014) ...............................................................................................49 Carulo v. John Crane Inc. 226 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2000).......................................................................................................22 Chisholm v. R.T. Vanderbilt Co. (Schenectady Co., Feb. 10, 2015) ............................................................................................49 Collins v Weinberg, 88 AD2d 1037 (3d Dept 1982) ................................................................................................35 Page 3 of 50 3 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Conway v Elite Towing & Flatbedding Corp., 135 AD3d 893 (2d Dept 2016) ................................................................................................37 Dalrymple v. Koka, 2 A.D.3d 769 (2d Dep’t 2003) .................................................................................................39 Daniele v. Pain Mgmt. Ctr. of Long Island, 168 A.D.3d 672 (2d Dep’t 2019) .............................................................................................33 Sean R. ex rel. Debra R. v. BMW of N.A., LLC, 26 N.Y.3d 801 (2016) ...................................................................................................... passim Durant v. Shuren, 33 A.D.3d 843 (2d Dep’t 2006) ...............................................................................................39 Dyer v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 207 A.D.3d 408 (1st Dept. 2022).............................................................................................26 Farmer v. Nostrand Ave. Meat and Poultry, 37 A.D.3d 653 (2d Dep’t 2007) ...............................................................................................28 Feldsberg v. Nitschke, 49 N.Y.2d 636 (1980) ..............................................................................................................27 Ford v. A.O. Smith Water Products, 173 A.D.3d 602 (1st Dep’t 2019) ............................................................................................48 Fraser v. 301-52 Townhouse Corp., 57 A.D.3d 416 (1st Dep’t 2008) ..............................................................................................10 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Global Nuclear Servs. & Supply, 280 A.D.2d 360 (1st Dep’t 2001) ............................................................................................32 Grams v. ACandS, Inc. (In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asb. Litig.), 197 A.D.2d 901 (4th Dep’t 1993) ............................................................................................33 Holmes v. Weissman, 251 A.D.2d 1078 (4th Dep’t 1998) ..........................................................................................31 Inwood Sec. Alarm, Inc. v 606 Rest., Inc., 35 AD3d 194 (1st Dept 2006)..................................................................................................39 Keeton v. Cardinal O’Hara H. Sch., 233 A.D.2d 839 (4th Dep’t 1996) ............................................................................................32 Killian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 207 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................26 Page 4 of 50 4 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Marsh v. Smyth, 12 A.D.3d 307 (1st Dep’t 2004) ........................................................................................10, 17 Mazella v. Beals, 27 N.Y.3d 694 (2016) ..............................................................................................................16 McCarthy v Handel, 297 AD2d 444 (3d Dept 2002) ................................................................................................39 Medina v. Chile Communications, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 525 (Bronx Cty. 2006) ..........................................................................................41 Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976) ..............................................................................................................27 In re N.Y.C.A.L. (Juni), 148 A.D.3d 233 (1st Dep’t 2017) aff’d 32 N.Y.3d 1116 (2018) ...........................11, 20, 22, 25 Matter of N.Y.C.A.L. (Olson), 207 A.D. 415 (1st Dep’t 2022) ................................................................................................26 Nash v. Navistar (Onondaga Co., Dec. 19, 2014) ...............................................................................................49 Nemeth v. Brenntag N.A., Inc., 183 A.D.3d 211 (1st Dep’t 2020) ............................................................................................20 Nemeth v. Brenntag N.A., Inc., 38 N.Y.3d 336 (2022) ...................................................................................................... passim In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Idell), 164 A.D.3d 1128 (1st Dep’t 2018) .................................................................................. passim Nicolla v. Fasulo, 161 A.D.2d 966 (3d Dep’t 1990) .............................................................................................33 Nonnon v. City of New York, 88 A.D.3d 384 (1st Dep’t 2011) (citation to internal quotation omitted) ....................... passim Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434 (2006) ........................................................................................................ passim People v. Rivera, 189 A.D.2d 697 (1st Dep’t 1993) ......................................................................................31, 40 People v. Stone, 29 N.Y.3d 166 (2017) ..............................................................................................................29 Page 5 of 50 5 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Pomponi v. A.O. Smith Water Prod. Co., 207 A.D.3d 417 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................26 R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 333 Conn 343, 216 A3d 629 (2019) ........................................................................................37 Rabito v Deer Park Mgt. Services, LLC, 106 AD3d 798 (2d Dept 2013) ................................................................................................35 Reed v. City of New York, 304 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dep’t 2003) ................................................................................................42 Reed v City of New York, 304 AD2d 1 (1st Dept 2003)....................................................................................................40 Rivera v. The City of New York, 2010 WL 11546021 (N.Y. Cty. Dec. 10, 2020) .......................................................................40 Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 28 NY3d 999 (2016) ................................................................................................................36 Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 106 A.D.3d 525 (1st Dep’t 2013) ............................................................................................34 Ronsini v. Garlock, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 250 (1st Dep’t 1998) ......................................................................................23, 26 Salm v. Moses, 13 N.Y.3d 816 (2009) ........................................................................................................29, 31 Selkowitz v. Nassau County, 45 N.Y.2d 97 (1978) ................................................................................................................16 Silverberg v. Comm. Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County, 290 A.D.2d 788 (3d Dep’t 2002) .......................................................................................39, 40 Simpson v. Garlock et al. (Schenectady Co., Aug. 28, 2009) ...........................................................................................49 So v. Wing Tat Realty, Inc., 259 A.D.2d 373 (1st Dep’t 1999) ......................................................................................40, 41 State v. Metz, 241 A.D.2d 192 (1st Dept 1998)..............................................................................................28 Stern v. Inwood Town House, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 650 (1st Dep’t 1964) ..............................................................................................30 Page 6 of 50 6 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Styles v. General Motors Corp., 20 A.D.3d 338 (1st Dep’t 2005) ........................................................................................20, 25 Tate-Mitros v MTA New York City Tr., 144 AD3d 454 (1st Dept 2016)................................................................................................38 Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469 (2016) (citation to internal quote omitted)........................................................9 Vera v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 175 A.D.2d 716 (1st Dep’t 1991) ............................................................................................28 Other Authorities CPLR 2002...............................................................................................................................28, 34 CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) ........................................................................................................36, 37, 40 CPLR 3113(c) ................................................................................................................................29 Def. Memo., at 51 .....................................................................................................................30, 32 Def.’s Memo, at 55 .........................................................................................................................38 Rule 3101(d) ............................................................................................................................36, 38 Page 7 of 50 7 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 INTRODUCTION Respectfully, Defendant Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Kaiser Gypsum”) motion for (1) a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) an order for a new trial; or (3) a remittitur of a clearly excessive verdict should be denied in its entirety. As set forth below, Defendant’s motion presents the Court with an incomplete and inaccurate discussion of the evidence and arguments raised at trial and overlooks the applicable New York law governing the contentions it now asserts in its post-trial motion. Plaintiff respectfully submits that when the evidence is reviewed under the applicable legal standards, there is no doubt that the jury properly rendered a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. For these reasons and the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion should be denied. LAW AND ARGUMENT (I) Defendant Has Failed To Demonstrate That It Is Entitled To Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict Defendant Kaiser Gypsum moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the theory that Plaintiff’s experts’ causation opinions are insufficient under the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Nemeth v. Brenntag N.A., Inc., 38 N.Y.3d 336 (2022). A jury verdict may be set aside for lack of legally sufficient evidence only if “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [jurors] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.” Nemeth, 38 N.Y.3d at 342 (quoting Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499 (1978)). Defendant has failed to meet that standard here and itsmotion should be denied. “Where, as here, various reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence presented, the determination of proximate cause must be left to the jury, and ‘[i]t is not within the province of [a court] to substitute its assessment of the evidence for that Page 8 of 50 8 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 of the fact finder.’” Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 485 (2016) (citation to internal quote omitted). Defendant’s arguments, that Plaintiff’s causation evidence is insufficient under Nemeth, are based primarily on inaccurate and incomplete comparisons between what was presented in Nemeth and what was presented here. Most critically and unlike Nemeth, in which a glove-box simulation performed by a geologist was essentially the only evidence of that decedent’s exposure levels, Plaintiff’s experts here cited and relied upon published data from real-world measurements of exposures for the specific tasks performed by Decedent Mr. Seen. Also, in contrast to Nemeth, Plaintiff’s experts here used generally accepted methodologies to place Mr. Seen’s relevant exposure squarely within ranges shown by published studies to cause mesothelioma. Defendant’s observation, that some of the materials relied upon here and some of the opinions expressed here overlap with materials and opinions presented in Nemeth, is inconsequential. In that regard, Defendant is fallaciously conflating “insufficient” and “prohibited.” The Nemeth Court did not hold that any of the materials or opinions in that case were prohibited, precluded or wrong—rather, just that they were “insufficient” to establish specific causation. Accordingly, the point here is not about what materials and opinions might overlap with Nemeth, but rather that Plaintiff’s experts here have added what was missing in order to meet the requisite standard. (A) The Causation Opinions of Plaintiff’s Experts Meet The Legal Requirements Set Forth in Nemeth and are Factually Distinguishable from the Opinions Held to be Insufficient in Nemeth Nemeth does not change nor raise the requirements for proving causation in a toxic tort case. It reaffirms the application of the Parker standard, that a causation opinion “should set forth a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general Page 9 of 50 9 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation).” 38 N.Y.3d at 342-43 (quoting Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434, 448 (2006)). It remains unnecessary for the plaintiff to “quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation are generally accepted in the scientific community.” 38 N.Y.3d at 342 (quoting Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 447-48). The court’s role under Frye remains limited to “determin[ing] whether the expert’s deductions are based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable.” Marsh v. Smyth, 12 A.D.3d 307, 308 (1st Dep’t 2004). The court may not “intrude upon the jury’s realm” by itself “weighing the evidence.” Id. See also Nonnon v. City of New York, 88 A.D.3d 384, 394 (1st Dep’t 2011) (“Frye test is not concerned with the reliability of a particular expert’s conclusions, but rather, with ‘whether the expert[’s] deductions are based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable”) (citation to internal quotation omitted); Fraser v. 301-52 Townhouse Corp., 57 A.D.3d 416, 420 (1st Dep’t 2008) (Frye foundational requirement is whether the generally accepted methodologies were properly employed in the particular case to provide reliable measurement of level of the toxin). Plaintiff’s primary medical causation expert, Dr. Jacqueline Moline, 1 relied upon historical industrial hygiene testing data in formulating her opinions. She looked at several studies reporting actual measurements from work with joint compounds and exposure levels associated with different tasks. TR 2 179:23 – 180:15. She relied upon this historical data from real-world monitoring of subjects doing actual drywall work. TR 181:2-20, 182:19-23 – 183:23. Dr. Moline 1 Dr. Moline is a board-certified physician specializing in occupational and internal medicine. TR 161:16- 19, 164:1-6. Defendant’s post-trial motion raises no issues as to her qualifications. 2 All citations to “TR” are to the trial transcript appended as Exhibit 1. Page 10 of 50 10 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 read Mr. Seen’s testimony as to tasks he performed. She provided estimated numerical levels of exposure, based on the historical data, for those tasks. TR 183:23 – 184:19 (5.3, 10, 41.4, 57.2 & 59 f/cc depending upon the task). Dr. Moline reviewed and relied upon the opinions and numerical exposure estimates in industrial hygiene expert Steven Paskal’s 3 report, which estimates for Mr. Seen’s work with joint compound including Kaiser’s comport with the historical data. TR 188:7- 9, 189:4-12. Mr. Paskal testified that for a drywall worker performing tasks like Mr. Seen, based on reported studies, the average exposure range was 1 – 10 f/cc. TR 645:20 – 646:7. Plaintiff’s expert medical pathologist, Dr. David Zhang, 4 testified that sheetrock and joint compound contain asbestos that is releasable and respirable. TR 607:20 – 609:14. Unlike the glove-box simulation in Nemeth, such opinions here were based upon a proper, accepted foundation and methodology and clearly qualify as a sufficient “scientific expression” of Mr. Seen’s exposure. See 38 N.Y.3d at 346. See also Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 449 (comparison to exposure levels from published studies of persons performing similar work recognized as example of an acceptable methodology); Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at 396; In re N.Y.C.A.L. (Juni), 148 A.D.3d 233, 237 (1st Dep’t 2017) aff’d 32 N.Y.3d 1116 (2018). Indeed, Defendant’s experts relied on the same or similar published measurements and used similar methodologies to arrive at very similar per-task exposure levels for Mr. Seen’s work with joint compound. TR 1017:5-17, 1079:12 – 1080:14, 1081:16-21, 1082:21-24, 1083:8-13. Defense expert Dr. Brent Finley expressly acknowledged that the excursion levels relied upon by 3 Mr. Paskal is a Certified Industrial Hygienist whose areas of expertise include measuring occupational exposures to asbestos. TR 627, 639-642. Defendant’s post-trial motion raises no issues as to his qualifications. 4 Dr. Zhang is a physician who is board-certified in pathology and occupational medicine. TR 590:21 – 591:1-3, 594:13-22, 598:13-17. Defendant’s post-trial motion raises no issues as to his qualifications. Page 11 of 50 11 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Plaintiff’s experts for various tasks are consistent with what he has found based on publications and testing. TR 1011:11 – 1012:13. Defendant should not be heard to assert that such foundational data is insufficient or that such methodologies are unreliable when employed Plaintiff’s experts, as opposed to its own experts. See Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at 397 (court notes that the defendant relied on a similar “proximity analysis” as a “recognized substitute for a dose-response analysis”). The fact, that Defendant’s experts chose to perform additional legally optional calculations, does not make Plaintiff’s experts’ opinions legally insufficient. Moreover, as Defendant argues with respect to other issues, the jury is entitled to consider all evidence actually presented by either side— which, here, includes Defendant’s experts’ opinions that Mr. Seen experienced 6 to 12 f/cc years of exposure to asbestos from Kaiser joint compound. TR 1044:20-24, 1088:1-3. Any disagreement as to the respective experts’ conclusions concerning the ability of exposures at that level to cause pleural mesothelioma was for the jury to resolve. See Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at 398. In that regard, what Parker requires—as reaffirmed in Nemeth—is demonstrating that the plaintiff / decedent experienced a level of exposure “sufficient” to cause the disease at issue. Nemeth, 38 N.Y.3d at 342-43 (quoting Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 448) (specific causation requires a showing “that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness”) (emphasis added). Making such showing does not necessarily require identifying a specific absolute threshold below which there is no disease, provided that the plaintiff’s experts use generally accepted methodologies to place the plaintiff’s / decedent’s exposures within a range that has been shown to be “sufficient” to cause disease. Id. Plaintiffs in the case at bar made such a showing of sufficiency in two acceptable ways. First, Plaintiff’s experts relied upon studies showing increased incidents of mesothelioma among drywall workers with exposures similar to Mr. Seen’s exposures. For instance, the Page 12 of 50 12 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Dahlgren paper, upon which Dr. Moline relied (Moline Trial Ex. 15; see Exhibit 2), both sets out historical exposure levels based on monitoring actual drywall work and identifies incidents of mesothelioma among drywallers. 5 TR 195:15 – 196:17. As Dr. Moline explained, once epidemiology has established the causal connection between the agent and the disease (i.e., asbestos causes mesothelioma), case series like the Dahlgren paper are useful to demonstrate causation in particular settings involving that agent in particular products. TR 190:5 – 193:3 (case series indicates “that a particular product…can cause enough exposure to cause mesothelioma”). Dr. Moline also relied upon published data from a CDC mortality review (Moline Trial Ex. 6; see Exhibit 3) reporting that construction workers including drywallers are 5.64 times more likely to contract mesothelioma than unexposed persons. TR 196:18 – 197:10. See Nonnon, 88 A.D.3d at 397-98 (observing that “[t]he Federal Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes that courts have permitted an inference of specific causation where the relative risk in an epidemiological study is greater than 2.0”). 6 The second method used by Plaintiff’s experts for demonstrating specific causation involved showing the extent to which Mr. Seen’s exposures exceeded reported levels shown to be sufficient to cause pleural mesothelioma. Dr. Moline relied upon and discussed published studies in the medical / scientific literature attempting to identify a no-disease threshold in terms of f/cc years. TR 215:20 – 216:13 (Moline Trial Exs. 19-22; see Exhibits 4 to 7). She testified that 5 The Dahlgreen paper is merely one of over a dozen studies addressing the real time asbestos exposures that were described by Mr. Seen and which were discussed by Kaiser Gypsum witnesses, Mr. Paskal, and Dr. Moline. 6 Such analysis—showing that individuals performing the same work with similar products have a six-fold increased risk of mesothelioma—is not, as Kaiser will doubtless contend, akin to attributing specific causation based solely on exposure to asbestos and the fact that asbestos is known to cause mesothelioma. Rather, it is an acceptable methodology for connecting general causation to specific causation by placing the particular individual in an identified at-risk group. Page 13 of 50 13 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Lacourt, for example, found that cases of mesothelioma were still reported at lifetime exposures as low as .1 f/cc years. TR 217:11-19. Dr. Zhang testified on cross-examination that recent studies show that exposures at levels below .5 f/cc still carry a significant risk of mesothelioma. TR 619:9- 12. Defense expert Dr. Finley admitted on cross-examination that Mr. Seen’s lifetime exposure exceeds 4.5 f/cc. TR 1046:5-21. Dr. Moline certainly testified that “[t]here is no dose threshold in someone with occupational exposure.” TR 214:16-17, 215:4-15. She testified that mesothelioma can be caused by low exposures. TR 203:9-12. Critically—and unlike in Nemeth—Dr. Moline did not rely upon the lack of an absolute threshold nor the incident of disease from very brief exposures in attributing specific causation. Rather, she expressly opined that, although brief or low-level occupational exposures are considered sufficient to cause mesothelioma, Mr. Seen’s occupational exposures were not brief nor low-level. TR 203:16-21. Based on her review of Mr. Seen’s exposure history, Dr. Moline relied upon the fact that his cumulative exposure from working with joint compound was well beyond the .1 f/cc years shown in published studies to be sufficient to cause mesothelioma. TR 218:5-11. Whether or not there is some lower threshold below which disease does not occur is largely academic where, as here, Decedent’s exposure is solidly within a range where disease does occur—which is what a plaintiff must show. 7 7 Plaintiff’s experts referenced and relied, in part, upon regulatory standards and positions taken by regulatory agencies as a supplement to the various medical / scientific studies discussed above and not as a substitute for such studies. As discussed more fully infra Part (I)(B)(3), decisions holding that regulatory measures may be insufficient alone to establish causation does not preclude including such measures as part of an expert’s reliance materials. Additionally, relying on the testing and findings that underlie a particular standard is different and more acceptable than simply relying on the bare existence of the standard. Here again, Defendant’s experts likewise relied, in part, on statements and positions from regulatory agencies in formulating their opinions. Finally, organizations such as NIOSH, WHO and IARC are scientific bodies and not regulatory agencies. Page 14 of 50 14 of 50 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/11/2022 05:29 PM INDEX NO. 190225/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 579 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/11/2022 Plaintiff’s experts also opined as to the ability of chrysotile asbestos to cause mesothelioma in anticipation of, and to refute, the opinions of Defendant’s experts that chrysotile has little or no ability to do so. Dr. Moline identified and discussed published scientific studies and papers concluding that chrysotile alone causes mesothelioma. TR 193:16-23 – 195:14 (Moline Trial Exs. 9-13; see Exhibits 8 to 12). She noted in particular a consensus position paper, published by a group of epidemiologists, concluding that chrysotile causes mesothelioma. TR 218:18 – 219:23. Dr. Moline also noted sources of amphiboles in Kaiser Gypsum’s joint compound from tremolite- contaminated Canadian chrysotile and anthophyllite in RTV talc from Upstate New York—again, in response to Kaiser’s defense that the chrysotile in its joint compounds could not cause mesothelioma. TR 220:19 –221:21-23, 257:25 – 258:21, 260:17 – 263:6. Based on her review of Mr. Seen’s exposure history, Dr. Moline concluded that his cumulative exposure from working with joint compound was well above the .1 f/cc years at which the literature reported the occurrence of mesothelioma. TR 218:5-11. She opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty: “Mr. Seen used Kaiser Gypsum as one of the joint compounds he used in the course of his work as a drywaller, and that was one of the exposures that lead to his mesothelioma.” TR 220:6-13. Based on Mr. Seen’s description of his exposures to Kaiser materials in his deposition, Dr. Moline opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such exposure was a substantial contributing factor to his mesothelioma. TR 263:7-15. She based that opinion on: the facts of Mr. Seen’s exposure to a product (joint compound) that has been shown in industrial hygiene studies to have elevated levels of asbestos exposure from the same tasks; that all forms of asbestos cause mesothelioma; that he used such products with mixed fiber types over a period of years; and his latency was appropriate. TR 263:16 – 264:22. Dr. Moline reiter