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1 KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP
JOHN W. KEKER - # 49092
2 jkeker@keker.com
DAN JACKSON - # 216091 ELECTRONICALLY
3 djackson@keker.com
WARREN A. BRAUNIG - # 243884 F I L E D
Superior Court of California,
4 wbraunig@keker.com County of San Francisco
NICHOLAS S. GOLDBERG - # 273614
5 ngoldberg@keker.com 02/22/2022
633 Battery Street Clerk of the Court
BY: RONNIE OTERO
6 San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 Deputy Clerk
Telephone: (415) 391-5400
7 Facsimile: (415) 397-7188
8 MARK J. HATTAM - # 173667
mhattam@sdcwa.org
9 General Counsel
SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY
10 4677 Overland Avenue
San Diego, CA 92123-1233
11 Telephone: (858) 522-6791
Facsimile: (858) 522-6566
12
Attorneys for Petitioner, Plaintiff, and Cross-Defendant EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES
13 SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY [GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103]
14
15 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
16 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
17
SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004
18 AUTHORITY,
Consolidated with Case Nos. CPF-16-515282
19 Petitioner, Plaintiff and Cross- & CPF-18-516389
Defendant,
20 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
v. AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SAN
21 DIEGO COUNTY WATER
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR
22 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; ALL SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE
23 VALIDITY OF THE RATES ADOPTED Date: April 13, 2022
BY THE METROPOLITAN WATER Time: 2:00 p.m.
24 DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Dept.: 306
ON APRIL 8, 2014 TO BE EFFECTIVE Judge: Hon. Anne-Christine Massullo
25 JANUARY 1, 2015 AND JANUARY 1,
2016; and DOES 1-10, Date Filed: May 30, 2014
26
Respondents, Defendants and Trial Date: May 16–27, 2022
27 Cross-Complainant.
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................6
4 II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................8
5 III. ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................12
6 A. This Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s cross-claims for declaratory
relief regarding the WSR, which are precluded by SDCWA I and II. ....................13
7
B. This Court should hold that Metropolitan has a duty to provide reasonable
8 credit for offsetting benefits, and dispose of Metropolitan’s erroneous and
precluded cross-claims and affirmative defenses seeking to evade that duty. .......14
9
C. The Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s precluded challenges to the
10 validity and enforceability of the Exchange Agreement........................................16
11 D. The Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s timeliness defenses. ........................19
12 E. The Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s claim-presentation and
dispute-resolution defenses. ...................................................................................20
13
F. The Court should hold that Proposition 26, Government Code §
14 54999.7(a), and the principle of “cost causation” apply to Metropolitan’s
charges. ..................................................................................................................22
15
1. Proposition 26 applies to Metropolitan’s charges. .....................................22
16
2. Government Code § 54999.7(a) applies to Metropolitan’s charges. .........24
17
3. The principle of cost causation applies to Metropolitan’s charges. ...........24
18
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4
Arizona v. California
5 (1963) 373 U.S. 546 ...................................................................................................................8
6 Barratt American, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 685 ........................................................................................................15, 19
7
Beckstead v. International Industries, Inc.
8 (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 927 .....................................................................................................12
9 Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil
10 (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205 ........................................................................................................22, 23
11 Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry
(1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 415 .................................................................................................12, 13
12
California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland
13 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 ................................................................................................................23
14 Denio v. City of Huntington Beach
15 (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 424 ............................................................................................... passim
16 DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 ..............................................................................................................12
17
Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors
18 (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292 ...................................................................................................15
19 Guthrie v. Times-Mirror Co.
(1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 879 .......................................................................................................18
20
21 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679 ......................................................................................................23
22
Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan
23 (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657 ......................................................................................................12
24 Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial Irr. Dist.
(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403 ..........................................................................................8, 10, 19
25
Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist.
26
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1762 ....................................................................................................20
27
Pease v. Zapf
28 (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 293 ......................................................................................................19
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1 Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228 ..................................................................................................21
2
Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases
3
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758 ............................................................................................7, 8, 17
4
Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases
5 (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 72 ......................................................................................................17
6 Reid v. City of San Diego
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343 ......................................................................................................19
7
San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern
8 California
9 (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124 ............................................................................................ passim
10 San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern
California
11 (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 21, 2021, No. A161144) 2021 WL 4272331 ................................. passim
12 Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 220 ..............................................................................................................23
13
14 Shupe v. Nelson
(1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 693 ...............................................................................................17, 18
15
Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority
16 (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441 ........................................................................................................20, 21
17 Templo v. State
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730 ......................................................................................................23
18
Weisblat v. City of San Diego
19
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1022 ..................................................................................................23
20
Constitutional Provisions
21
Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 1 ........................................................................................................ passim
22
Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 2 ................................................................................................................24
23
Statutes
24
Civ. Code, § 3399 ..........................................................................................................................18
25
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1)................................................................................................. passim
26
27 Code Civ. Proc., § 870 ...................................................................................................................17
28 Gov. Code, § 910(c), (d), (e) .........................................................................................................20
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1 Gov. Code, § 911 ...........................................................................................................................21
2 Gov. Code, § 945.6(a)(1), (2) ..................................................................................................20, 21
3 Gov. Code, § 54999.1(h) ...............................................................................................................24
4
Gov. Code, § 54999.7(a) ........................................................................................................ passim
5
Wat. Code, § 1810 et seq. ................................................................................................................9
6
Wat. Code, § 1811(c) ............................................................................................................. passim
7
Rules
8
Cal. Rule of Court 8.1115(b)(1).......................................................................................................6
9
Other Authorities
10
7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Judgment, § 452.......................................................12, 14
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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22
23
24
25
26
27
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1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 The purpose of this motion is to make the trial of these cases1 more efficient. Trial should
3 focus on disputed questions of fact. Legal questions can and should be decided in advance, on
4 this motion for summary adjudication, because doing so will completely dispose of several causes
5 of action, affirmative defenses, and issues of duty. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
6 Indeed, summary adjudication of most of these issues follows directly from this Court’s final
7 judgment and peremptory writ of mandate in the prior cases, and from San Diego County Water
8 Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124
9 (SDCWA I), the “plain rulings” of which control here. (San Diego County Water Authority v.
10 Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 21, 2021, No. A161144)
11 2021 WL 4272331, *6 (SDCWA II). SDCWA II, although unpublished, is likewise binding here
12 based on collateral estoppel. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).)
13 First, the Court should dispose of the first cross-claim asserted by Metropolitan in all
14 three of its cross-complaints in these cases, in which Metropolitan asks this Court to declare that
15 Metropolitan may lawfully charge its Water Stewardship Rate (WSR) under the Exchange
16 Agreement and as part of its wheeling rate. This Court should enter judgment against
17 Metropolitan on this first cross-claim because it contravenes the rulings of the Court of Appeal, as
18 well as this Court’s prior judgment and writ of mandate. According to Metropolitan, those
19 rulings only applied to the prior rate years (2011–2014). But the Court of Appeal expressly
20 rejected that contention in SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at pages *5–6, criticizing
21 Metropolitan’s intransigence and directing this Court to put an end to it.
22 Second, this Court should hold that Metropolitan has a duty to give the Water Authority
23 “reasonable credit” for “offsetting benefits for the use of the conveyance system” to deliver
24 conserved water pursuant to the Exchange Agreement, and should dispose of Metropolitan’s
25 meritless cross-claims and affirmative defenses to the contrary. (Wat. Code, § 1811, subd. (c).)
26
1
27 The cases presently at issue between San Diego County Water Authority (the Water Authority)
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Metropolitan) are CPF-14-514004 (2014
28 action), CPF-16-515282 (2016 action), and CPF-18-516389 (2018 action). The “prior cases” are
CPF-10-510830 (2010 action) and CPF-12-512466 (2012 action).
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1 It is undisputed that Metropolitan refuses to provide any such credit, and it is indisputable under
2 SDCWA I and II and this Court’s prior rulings that Metropolitan’s failure to do so is a violation of
3 law and a breach of the Exchange Agreement, for which the Water Authority is entitled to
4 damages. The amount of the credit, and the Water Authority’s damages, will be proved at trial.
5 The Water Authority, therefore, is neither moving for summary judgment across the board, nor
6 for summary adjudication of its contract claims. But this Court can and should rule before trial,
7 on this motion for summary adjudication, that Metropolitan has the legal duty to provide
8 reasonable credit for offsetting benefits: a legal conclusion that follows directly from the
9 Wheeling Statutes and the prior rulings of this Court and the Court of Appeal.
10 Third, the Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s challenges to the validity and
11 enforceability of the Exchange Agreement. This Court already rejected Metropolitan’s attacks on
12 the Exchange Agreement, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that “none is persuasive.” (SDCWA
13 I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) Metropolitan is estopped from claiming otherwise now.
14 And it is also estopped by the validation of the Exchange Agreement, at its own request, in the
15 Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 838 (QSA).
16 Fourth, the Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s timeliness defenses, which this Court
17 and the Court of Appeal have already rejected as legally erroneous. (See SDCWA I, supra, 12
18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1141–1143.)
19 Fifth, the Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s affirmative defenses based on the claim-
20 presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act and the dispute-resolution provision of
21 the Exchange Agreement, which also fail as a matter of law, as this Court found in the prior cases.
22 Sixth, the Court should grant summary adjudication to the Water Authority on its claims
23 and Metropolitan’s cross-claims concerning Proposition 26 (Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 1),
24 Government Code section 54999.7(a), and the principle of “cost causation.” As this Court
25 previously held, those statutes and principles—“that is, that Met must charge for its services
26 based only on what it costs to provide them”—apply to Metropolitan’s charges.2 (Ex. 1 at pp.
27
28 2
The term “charges” is used broadly in this brief to include “rates” and other fees and taxes.
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1 47–48, 50.)3 These are pure questions of law that can and should be answered before trial.
2 Indeed, resolving these legal issues—especially the applicability of Proposition 26—will
3 not only streamline the trial of these cases, but also may obviate future cases. The fundamental
4 reason for all of these cases is that Metropolitan enacts new charges every two years, yet refuses
5 to even acknowledge—much less carry—its “burden of proving by a preponderance of the
6 evidence that” each of its charges “is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover
7 the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are
8 allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits
9 received from, the governmental activity.” (Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 1.) Once this Court refutes
10 Metropolitan’s efforts to shirk that burden, perhaps Metropolitan will finally begin to carry it.
11 Accordingly, as further demonstrated below, the Court should grant this motion.
12 II. BACKGROUND4
13 The importance of these cases is illustrated by “how deep [their] roots” go. (QSA, supra,
14 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 776.) Lacking space for those roots here, the Water Authority respectfully
15 refers the Court to several key cases: SDCWA I and II, of course, as well as QSA, supra, 201
16 Cal.App.4th 758; Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546 (Arizona); and Metropolitan Water
17 Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403 (MWD).
18 The fundamental fact underlying these cases is that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision
19 to begin enforcing the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona, which limited
20 California’s basic yearly allotment of Colorado River water to 4.4 million acre-feet, meant that
21 Metropolitan, and urban Southern California, was going to be seriously short of water. (See QSA,
22 supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 785, 787–788.) The Water Authority, as part of the overall
23 Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA), helped solve the problem by paying for agricultural
24 water conservation in the Imperial Valley. (Ibid.) But for the Water Authority’s conservation
25
26 3
Exhibit references are to the Declaration of Dan Jackson, filed herewith.
4
27 This section provides useful context but it need not be entirely undisputed for this Court to
decide the legal issues presented. Undisputed Material Facts are in the Separate Statements filed
28 herewith, one for each action. Where the entries or numbering differ, the action is specified—
e.g., “2016 UMF n” refers to the nth undisputed fact in the Separate Statement for the 2016 action.
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1 efforts, Metropolitan and its member agencies would be even more seriously short of water today.
2 The Colorado River water that the Water Authority has paid to conserve must be
3 conveyed, or “wheeled,” to urban Southern California through Metropolitan’s Colorado River
4 Aqueduct. The necessity of access to public infrastructure to move water to areas where it is
5 needed motivated the enactment of the Wheeling Statutes in 1986 (Wat. Code, § 1810 et seq.),
6 and then ultimately led to the Exchange Agreement. Under the Wheeling Statutes, Metropolitan
7 must not charge more than “fair compensation,” which must include “reasonable credit for any
8 offsetting benefits for the use of the conveyance system.” (Id., § 1811, subd. (c).)
9 On January 14, 1997, Metropolitan adopted wheeling rates through its Resolution 8520,
10 which was at the heart of both MWD, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at page 1418, and SDCWA I, supra,
11 12 Cal.App.5th at page 1148. SDCWA I addressed, in particular, Resolution 8520’s premise that
12 the State Water Project (SWP) is part of Metropolitan’s conveyance system. (See 12 Cal.App.5th
13 at p. 1148.) The Water Authority contested that premise and argued that conveyance charges
14 must not include SWP costs. This Court agreed. But the Court of Appeal did not; instead, it
15 upheld Metropolitan’s Resolution 8520. (See id. at pp. 1146–1148.) Although Metropolitan
16 purported to rescind Resolution 8520 in August 2020, it cannot sweep its admissions in its own
17 resolution under the rug—especially not after having successfully advocated its Resolution 8520
18 twice on appeal. (See ibid.; MWD, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.)
19 Metropolitan’s Resolution 8520 provides that, “to the extent a wheeling transaction
20 enables Metropolitan to avoid costs, such avoidable costs should not be included in the wheeling
21 rate,” which “shall be reduced to reflect the regional water supply benefits,” to be determined “in
22 the same manner as such benefits are calculated for use in the Local Projects and Groundwater
23 Recovery Program”—now called the Local Resources Program. (Ex. 11, §§ 6 & 10.) This
24 motion does not seek to summarily adjudicate the amount of damages, leaving that for trial. But
25 Metropolitan’s Resolution 8520 is an admission that, under the Wheeling Statutes, Metropolitan
26 must provide “reasonable credit for any benefits for the use of its conveyance system,” and that
27 this credit, required by law, should be calculated in the same manner as Local Resources
28 Program benefits. (Id. at p. 2 & § 10.)
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1 Reasonable credit for offsetting benefits was also the basis for the price term in the
2 parties’ original 1998 Exchange Agreement. In order to facilitate that agreement, which was of
3 “vital state interest,” emergency legislation required David N. Kennedy, the Director of the
4 Department of Water Resources (DWR), to recommend a wheeling rate for the transfer of
5 conserved water from the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) to the Water Authority through
6 Metropolitan’s conveyance system. (Ex. 12.) Director Kennedy did so on January 5, 1998. (Ex.
7 13.) His recommended wheeling rate included reasonable credit for “the regional benefits
8 provided by San Diego bringing conserved IID water to the region.” (Id., fn. 4, emphasis added.)
9 His calculation of those benefits was simple: the amount Metropolitan otherwise “would have to
10 pay” for the water. (Id., fn. 3.) On January 13, 1998, Metropolitan agreed to “the framework
11 proposed by Director David Kennedy.” (Ex. 14 at MWDRECORD2014_0009349.)
12 But “disputes continued among the water agencies over Colorado River water allocations
13 that prevented water deliveries” under the 1998 Exchange Agreement. (SDCWA I, supra, 12
14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136.) “Negotiations ensued to settle competing claims to Colorado River
15 water, resulting in a number of related agreements” in 2003, including the QSA and the operative
16 Exchange Agreement. (Ibid.) “Unable to agree upon the long-term price the Water Authority
17 would be charged for the water received under the [Exchange Agreement], the parties agreed to
18 an initial price with future prices linked to standard water rates, lawfully set.” (Ibid.) After an
19 initial period with a fixed price, the parties agreed that “the Price shall be equal to the charge or
20 charges set by Metropolitan’s Board of Directors pursuant to applicable law and regulation and
21 generally applicable to the conveyance of water by Metropolitan on behalf of its member
22 agencies.” (Ex. 3, ¶ 5.2.) The Water Authority further agreed not to challenge Metropolitan’s
23 conveyance charges (or the resulting price) for five years, “but reserved the right thereafter to
24 contest [Metropolitan’s] rates as contrary to ‘applicable law and regulation.’” (SDCWA I, supra,
25 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137, quoting Ex. 3, ¶ 5.2.)
26 As the Court of Appeal made clear in SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pages 1135–
27 1137, 1150–1151 and 1154, the Wheeling Statutes’ definition of “fair compensation” is
28 “applicable law” governing the price term of the Exchange Agreement, although other provisions
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1 of the Wheeling Statutes (regarding available capacity, for example) do not apply because the
2 Exchange Agreement separately addresses those issues directly. (See Ex. 3, ¶¶ 3.1–3.7.) In
3 SDCWA II, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the Wheeling Statutes’ definition of “fair
4 compensation” applies “under both the Wheeling Statutes and the parties’ exchange agreement
5 under which Metropolitan had a duty to calculate water rates pursuant to applicable law and
6 regulation.” (2021 WL 4272331, at p. *7, emphases added.) Thus, Metropolitan breaches the
7 Exchange Agreement if it charges more than “fair compensation,” which, by law, must include
8 “reasonable credit for any offsetting benefits.” (Wat. Code, § 1811, subd. (c).)
9 The Court of Appeal also refuted Metropolitan’s argument that it may continue to charge
10 its WSR for the conveyance of water, an argument Metropolitan advanced despite the contrary
11 rulings in SDCWA I and this Court’s final judgment and peremptory writ of mandate in the prior
12 cases. (See SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at pp. *5–9.) The WSR is “designed to fund
13 water conservation programs.” (SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150.) But such
14 payments are “outside the scope of recoverable costs contemplated by the wheeling statutes”
15 because they are “not a cost of using the conveyance system to wheel water. Funding
16 conservation programs may lessen capital expenditures for system expansion in the future, as
17 Metropolitan asserts, but that potential savings is not recoverable under the terms of the statute
18 that permits recovery for actual conveyance costs—not avoided costs.” (Id. at pp. 1150–1151.)
19 In SDCWA II, the Court of Appeal rejected Metropolitan’s argument that the foregoing
20 ruling only applies to the rates at issue in the prior cases—those charged from 2011 through 2014.
21 (SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at p. *5.) “As reflected in the judgment, [SDCWA I] held
22 invalid Metropolitan’s practice of allocating a water stewardship rate (funding for water
23 conservation programs) as a cost subcomponent (recoverable as a transportation cost in its
24 wheeling rate and the transportation rates charged under the exchange agreement).” (Ibid.) That
25 “determination concerned a particular category of costs (‘water stewardship rate’) which did not
26 vary from year to year. Thus, there was no need nor did [the Court of Appeal] intend to limit [its]
27 determination to any particular rate year.” (Ibid., citation omitted.) Metropolitan’s assertion on
28 appeal—which it repeats as its first cause of action in all three of its cross-complaints here—that
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1 it may charge its WSR as part of “its wheeling rate or the transportation rates charged under the
2 exchange agreement, thereby contravening [SDCWA I], supports the trial court’s continuing
3 jurisdiction to assure compliance with its judgment.” (Id. at p. *6.) It also supports—indeed,
4 compels—summary adjudication, among other grounds for such relief discussed below.
5 III. ARGUMENT
6 Summary adjudication is appropriate if there is no triable issue of material fact and the
7 motion “completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or
8 an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) The applicability of issue preclusion,
9 or collateral estoppel, to particular claims or defenses is an issue of law properly decided on
10 summary adjudication. (See, e.g., Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67
11 Cal.App.5th 657, 686–687, 707–708 (Meridian).)
12 Issue preclusion applies “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually
13 litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in
14 the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th
15 813, 825 (DKN).)5 The first element is not in question here. This Court’s final judgment and
16 peremptory writ of mandate in the prior cases are final adjudications that were affirmed in
17 SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at page *9. The appellate decisions are also “entitled to res
18 judicata effect.” (Beckstead v. International Industries, Inc. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 927, 934.)
19 The fourth element also is not in question: the parties are the same. Nor is the “necessarily
20 decided” requirement in question: it merely excludes issues that were “entirely unnecessary” to
21 the prior judgment. (Meridian, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 701, citation omitted.)
22 Despite the rule that issue preclusion only applies to “issues actually litigated, it is often
23 said that a judgment is binding as to all matters which were raised or which might have been
24 raised.” (Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 415, 429, quoting what is
25 now 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Judgment, § 452.) The apparent conflict is resolved
26 by distinguishing between issues and arguments. “Clearly a former judgment is not a collateral
27 5
The focus here is on issue rather than claim preclusion because the latter only applies where the
28 causes of action are the same (DKN, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824), whereas the Water Authority’s
complaints state new causes of action. (See SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1142–1143.)
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1 estoppel on issues which might have been raised but were not; just as clearly it is a collateral
2 estoppel on issues which were raised, even though some factual matters or legal arguments which
3 could have been presented were not.” (Ibid.)
4 This distinction between issues and arguments is aptly illustrated by Denio v. City of
5 Huntington Beach (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 424 (Denio). That case involved the same parties, “the
6 same contract and the same general facts” as a prior case; but, in the second case, the plaintiffs
7 sought additional damages. (Id. at pp. 425–426.) The City argued that “the former judgment
8 estops the [plaintiffs] from claiming any further payments under the contract” because the
9 judgment “determined that the [plaintiffs] were entitled to the reasonable value of their services
10 and to nothing more.” (Id. at p. 427.) But the court disagreed. The first case “was not tried or
11 decided on the issue of the reasonable value” of the plaintiffs’ services, so their new damages
12 claims were not precluded. (Id. at p. 428.) Additional damages, in other words, are a new issue.
13 The defendant’s challenges to the validity and enforceability of the contract, on the other hand,
14 were not new issues; they were barred by issue preclusion—including “new” defenses of
15 “frustration of the object of the contract” and “failure of consideration.” (Id. at p. 427.) Those
16 were new arguments about the issues of validity and enforceability of the contract that had
17 already been decided. “It would be inconsistent in this case to admit evidence and to permit a
18 decision which would have the effect of destroying a contract for compensation, the validity and
19 binding effect of which, and the right to recover compensation under which, was specifically
20 upheld in the former action.” (Id. at p. 430.)
21 Applying the foregoing principles disposes of most of Metropolitan’s meritless cross-
22 claims and affirmative defenses as a matter of law, and will streamline this case for trial.
23 A. This Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s cross-claims for declaratory
relief regarding the WSR, which are precluded by SDCWA I and II.
24
As an initial matter, this Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s first cross-claim (in all
25
three actions) for declaratory relief that it may charge its WSR as part of its wheeling and
26
transportation rates and (in the 2014 and 2016 actions) under the Exchange Agreement. Those
27
claims were already precluded by SDCWA I, and that conclusion is now incontrovertible under
28
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in San Francisco County
Ruling
PEOPLE CENTER, INC. D/B/A RIPPLING, A DELAWARE VS. ASURE PAYROLL TAX MANAGEMENT LLC, A DELAWARE LLC ET AL
Jul 11, 2024 |
CGC24615613
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Thursday, July 11, 2024, Line 15. PLAINTIFF PEOPLE CENTER, INC. D/B/A RIPPLING's Motion For Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff People Center, Inc. d/b/a Rippling's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) For the 1:30 p.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
A & A GENERAL BUILDING CONSTRUCTION INC., A VS. ARLENE S. TASIM ET AL
Jul 12, 2024 |
CGC23609755
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Friday, July 12, 2024, Line 12. DEFENDANT ARLENE TASIM AND ALI TASIM'S Motion For Sanctions Against A A General Building Construction Inc. Pursuant To Code Of Civil Procedure Section 1281.99. Defendants and Cross-Complainants' unopposed Motion for Sanctions in the amount of $8350.00 is granted (CCP section 1281.99), payment to be made within 30 days of the filing of this order. Friday's Law & Motion Calendar will be called out of Dept. 301. Anyone intending to appear in person should report to Dept. 301. However, anyone intending to appear remotely should use the regular Zoom information for Dept. 302's Law & Motion Calendar for 9:30 a.m. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RCE)
Ruling
YOLANDA JONES ET AL VS. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 |
CGC23609805
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 10. 2 - DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS, LLC's MOTION TO STRIKE 1ST Amended COMPLAINT. Off calendar. The Quezada declaration fails to show that the parties met and conferred "in person, by telephone, or by video conference" in compliance with CCP 435.5. The parties are ordered to comply with the code. The response to the complaint is now due August 7, 2024. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
EDWARD WESTERMAN VS. FTI CONSULTING, INC. ET AL
Jul 09, 2024 |
CGC24615152
Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 12. PLAINTIFF EDWARD WESTERMAN's Motion To Seal. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to seal is granted. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
CLEAR HOMES LLC, A NEW MEXICO LIMITED LIABILITY VS. BRENDAN MICHAEL WEE ET AL
Jul 11, 2024 |
CGC23607972
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 11, 2024 line 2. DEFENDANT BRENDAN WEE, ERIKA HILTON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS is Off Calendar - Per request of moving party. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.
Ruling
ELIANE DOS SANTOS VITAL, AN INDIVIDUAL ET AL VS. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA ET AL
Jul 12, 2024 |
CGC22601133
Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, Jul-12-2024, Line 2, PLAINTIFFS ELIANE DOS SANTOS VITAL, AN INDIVIDUAL, and WIDES VITAL DA SILVA'S, AN INDIVIDUAL, Motion To Compel Further Responses To Plaintiffs Request For Production Of Documents, Set Two. Pro Tem Judge William Lynn, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: Parties to appear if the motion remains unresolved. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to williamclynn@gmail.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/JPT)
Ruling
Y.P. VS. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 |
CGC24613065
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 12. DEFENDANT EARL IGNACIO AND WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'s Motion To Compel Arbitration. Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Earl Ignacio's motion to compel arbitration and stay is denied. (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
MARY ELIZABETH LEMASTERS VS. SCHOENBERG FAMILY LAW GROUP P.C. ET AL
Jul 09, 2024 |
CGC22600572
Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 4. PLAINTIFF MARY LEMASTERS' MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD. Hearing required. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
JOHN P BERNARD VS. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 |
CGC23608339
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 8. PLAINTIFF JOHN BERNARD's Motion For Award Of Attorneys Fees, Costs, And Expenses. Off calendar for noncompliance with Local Rule 2.7(B) (courtesy copies). The motion may be re-set for a Mon.-Thurs. after July 24, with papers to bear new hearing date. In meantime, counsel shall meet and confer to resolve their differences. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Preview
1 KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP JOHN W. KEKER - # 49092 2 jkeker@keker.com DAN JACKSON - # 216091 ELECTRONICALLY 3 djackson@keker.com WARREN A. BRAUNIG - # 243884 F I L E D Superior Court of California, 4 wbraunig@keker.com County of San Francisco NICHOLAS S. GOLDBERG - # 273614 5 ngoldberg@keker.com 02/22/2022 633 Battery Street Clerk of the Court BY: RONNIE OTERO 6 San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 Deputy Clerk Telephone: (415) 391-5400 7 Facsimile: (415) 397-7188 8 MARK J. HATTAM - # 173667 mhattam@sdcwa.org 9 General Counsel SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY 10 4677 Overland Avenue San Diego, CA 92123-1233 11 Telephone: (858) 522-6791 Facsimile: (858) 522-6566 12 Attorneys for Petitioner, Plaintiff, and Cross-Defendant EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES 13 SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY [GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103] 14 15 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 16 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 17 SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004 18 AUTHORITY, Consolidated with Case Nos. CPF-16-515282 19 Petitioner, Plaintiff and Cross- & CPF-18-516389 Defendant, 20 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND v. AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SAN 21 DIEGO COUNTY WATER METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR 22 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; ALL SUMMARY ADJUDICATION PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE 23 VALIDITY OF THE RATES ADOPTED Date: April 13, 2022 BY THE METROPOLITAN WATER Time: 2:00 p.m. 24 DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Dept.: 306 ON APRIL 8, 2014 TO BE EFFECTIVE Judge: Hon. Anne-Christine Massullo 25 JANUARY 1, 2015 AND JANUARY 1, 2016; and DOES 1-10, Date Filed: May 30, 2014 26 Respondents, Defendants and Trial Date: May 16–27, 2022 27 Cross-Complainant. 28 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................6 4 II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................8 5 III. ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................12 6 A. This Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s cross-claims for declaratory relief regarding the WSR, which are precluded by SDCWA I and II. ....................13 7 B. This Court should hold that Metropolitan has a duty to provide reasonable 8 credit for offsetting benefits, and dispose of Metropolitan’s erroneous and precluded cross-claims and affirmative defenses seeking to evade that duty. .......14 9 C. The Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s precluded challenges to the 10 validity and enforceability of the Exchange Agreement........................................16 11 D. The Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s timeliness defenses. ........................19 12 E. The Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s claim-presentation and dispute-resolution defenses. ...................................................................................20 13 F. The Court should hold that Proposition 26, Government Code § 14 54999.7(a), and the principle of “cost causation” apply to Metropolitan’s charges. ..................................................................................................................22 15 1. Proposition 26 applies to Metropolitan’s charges. .....................................22 16 2. Government Code § 54999.7(a) applies to Metropolitan’s charges. .........24 17 3. The principle of cost causation applies to Metropolitan’s charges. ...........24 18 IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page(s) 3 Cases 4 Arizona v. California 5 (1963) 373 U.S. 546 ...................................................................................................................8 6 Barratt American, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2005) 37 Cal.4th 685 ........................................................................................................15, 19 7 Beckstead v. International Industries, Inc. 8 (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 927 .....................................................................................................12 9 Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil 10 (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205 ........................................................................................................22, 23 11 Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 415 .................................................................................................12, 13 12 California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland 13 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 ................................................................................................................23 14 Denio v. City of Huntington Beach 15 (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 424 ............................................................................................... passim 16 DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 ..............................................................................................................12 17 Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors 18 (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292 ...................................................................................................15 19 Guthrie v. Times-Mirror Co. (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 879 .......................................................................................................18 20 21 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679 ......................................................................................................23 22 Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan 23 (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657 ......................................................................................................12 24 Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403 ..........................................................................................8, 10, 19 25 Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist. 26 (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1762 ....................................................................................................20 27 Pease v. Zapf 28 (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 293 ......................................................................................................19 3 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228 ..................................................................................................21 2 Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases 3 (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758 ............................................................................................7, 8, 17 4 Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases 5 (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 72 ......................................................................................................17 6 Reid v. City of San Diego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343 ......................................................................................................19 7 San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern 8 California 9 (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124 ............................................................................................ passim 10 San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California 11 (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 21, 2021, No. A161144) 2021 WL 4272331 ................................. passim 12 Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220 ..............................................................................................................23 13 14 Shupe v. Nelson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 693 ...............................................................................................17, 18 15 Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority 16 (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441 ........................................................................................................20, 21 17 Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730 ......................................................................................................23 18 Weisblat v. City of San Diego 19 (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1022 ..................................................................................................23 20 Constitutional Provisions 21 Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 1 ........................................................................................................ passim 22 Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 2 ................................................................................................................24 23 Statutes 24 Civ. Code, § 3399 ..........................................................................................................................18 25 Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1)................................................................................................. passim 26 27 Code Civ. Proc., § 870 ...................................................................................................................17 28 Gov. Code, § 910(c), (d), (e) .........................................................................................................20 4 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 Gov. Code, § 911 ...........................................................................................................................21 2 Gov. Code, § 945.6(a)(1), (2) ..................................................................................................20, 21 3 Gov. Code, § 54999.1(h) ...............................................................................................................24 4 Gov. Code, § 54999.7(a) ........................................................................................................ passim 5 Wat. Code, § 1810 et seq. ................................................................................................................9 6 Wat. Code, § 1811(c) ............................................................................................................. passim 7 Rules 8 Cal. Rule of Court 8.1115(b)(1).......................................................................................................6 9 Other Authorities 10 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Judgment, § 452.......................................................12, 14 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 The purpose of this motion is to make the trial of these cases1 more efficient. Trial should 3 focus on disputed questions of fact. Legal questions can and should be decided in advance, on 4 this motion for summary adjudication, because doing so will completely dispose of several causes 5 of action, affirmative defenses, and issues of duty. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) 6 Indeed, summary adjudication of most of these issues follows directly from this Court’s final 7 judgment and peremptory writ of mandate in the prior cases, and from San Diego County Water 8 Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124 9 (SDCWA I), the “plain rulings” of which control here. (San Diego County Water Authority v. 10 Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 21, 2021, No. A161144) 11 2021 WL 4272331, *6 (SDCWA II). SDCWA II, although unpublished, is likewise binding here 12 based on collateral estoppel. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).) 13 First, the Court should dispose of the first cross-claim asserted by Metropolitan in all 14 three of its cross-complaints in these cases, in which Metropolitan asks this Court to declare that 15 Metropolitan may lawfully charge its Water Stewardship Rate (WSR) under the Exchange 16 Agreement and as part of its wheeling rate. This Court should enter judgment against 17 Metropolitan on this first cross-claim because it contravenes the rulings of the Court of Appeal, as 18 well as this Court’s prior judgment and writ of mandate. According to Metropolitan, those 19 rulings only applied to the prior rate years (2011–2014). But the Court of Appeal expressly 20 rejected that contention in SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at pages *5–6, criticizing 21 Metropolitan’s intransigence and directing this Court to put an end to it. 22 Second, this Court should hold that Metropolitan has a duty to give the Water Authority 23 “reasonable credit” for “offsetting benefits for the use of the conveyance system” to deliver 24 conserved water pursuant to the Exchange Agreement, and should dispose of Metropolitan’s 25 meritless cross-claims and affirmative defenses to the contrary. (Wat. Code, § 1811, subd. (c).) 26 1 27 The cases presently at issue between San Diego County Water Authority (the Water Authority) and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Metropolitan) are CPF-14-514004 (2014 28 action), CPF-16-515282 (2016 action), and CPF-18-516389 (2018 action). The “prior cases” are CPF-10-510830 (2010 action) and CPF-12-512466 (2012 action). 6 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 It is undisputed that Metropolitan refuses to provide any such credit, and it is indisputable under 2 SDCWA I and II and this Court’s prior rulings that Metropolitan’s failure to do so is a violation of 3 law and a breach of the Exchange Agreement, for which the Water Authority is entitled to 4 damages. The amount of the credit, and the Water Authority’s damages, will be proved at trial. 5 The Water Authority, therefore, is neither moving for summary judgment across the board, nor 6 for summary adjudication of its contract claims. But this Court can and should rule before trial, 7 on this motion for summary adjudication, that Metropolitan has the legal duty to provide 8 reasonable credit for offsetting benefits: a legal conclusion that follows directly from the 9 Wheeling Statutes and the prior rulings of this Court and the Court of Appeal. 10 Third, the Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s challenges to the validity and 11 enforceability of the Exchange Agreement. This Court already rejected Metropolitan’s attacks on 12 the Exchange Agreement, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that “none is persuasive.” (SDCWA 13 I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) Metropolitan is estopped from claiming otherwise now. 14 And it is also estopped by the validation of the Exchange Agreement, at its own request, in the 15 Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 838 (QSA). 16 Fourth, the Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s timeliness defenses, which this Court 17 and the Court of Appeal have already rejected as legally erroneous. (See SDCWA I, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1141–1143.) 19 Fifth, the Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s affirmative defenses based on the claim- 20 presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act and the dispute-resolution provision of 21 the Exchange Agreement, which also fail as a matter of law, as this Court found in the prior cases. 22 Sixth, the Court should grant summary adjudication to the Water Authority on its claims 23 and Metropolitan’s cross-claims concerning Proposition 26 (Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 1), 24 Government Code section 54999.7(a), and the principle of “cost causation.” As this Court 25 previously held, those statutes and principles—“that is, that Met must charge for its services 26 based only on what it costs to provide them”—apply to Metropolitan’s charges.2 (Ex. 1 at pp. 27 28 2 The term “charges” is used broadly in this brief to include “rates” and other fees and taxes. 7 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 47–48, 50.)3 These are pure questions of law that can and should be answered before trial. 2 Indeed, resolving these legal issues—especially the applicability of Proposition 26—will 3 not only streamline the trial of these cases, but also may obviate future cases. The fundamental 4 reason for all of these cases is that Metropolitan enacts new charges every two years, yet refuses 5 to even acknowledge—much less carry—its “burden of proving by a preponderance of the 6 evidence that” each of its charges “is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover 7 the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are 8 allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits 9 received from, the governmental activity.” (Cal. Const., art. 13C, § 1.) Once this Court refutes 10 Metropolitan’s efforts to shirk that burden, perhaps Metropolitan will finally begin to carry it. 11 Accordingly, as further demonstrated below, the Court should grant this motion. 12 II. BACKGROUND4 13 The importance of these cases is illustrated by “how deep [their] roots” go. (QSA, supra, 14 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 776.) Lacking space for those roots here, the Water Authority respectfully 15 refers the Court to several key cases: SDCWA I and II, of course, as well as QSA, supra, 201 16 Cal.App.4th 758; Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546 (Arizona); and Metropolitan Water 17 Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403 (MWD). 18 The fundamental fact underlying these cases is that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision 19 to begin enforcing the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona, which limited 20 California’s basic yearly allotment of Colorado River water to 4.4 million acre-feet, meant that 21 Metropolitan, and urban Southern California, was going to be seriously short of water. (See QSA, 22 supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 785, 787–788.) The Water Authority, as part of the overall 23 Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA), helped solve the problem by paying for agricultural 24 water conservation in the Imperial Valley. (Ibid.) But for the Water Authority’s conservation 25 26 3 Exhibit references are to the Declaration of Dan Jackson, filed herewith. 4 27 This section provides useful context but it need not be entirely undisputed for this Court to decide the legal issues presented. Undisputed Material Facts are in the Separate Statements filed 28 herewith, one for each action. Where the entries or numbering differ, the action is specified— e.g., “2016 UMF n” refers to the nth undisputed fact in the Separate Statement for the 2016 action. 8 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 efforts, Metropolitan and its member agencies would be even more seriously short of water today. 2 The Colorado River water that the Water Authority has paid to conserve must be 3 conveyed, or “wheeled,” to urban Southern California through Metropolitan’s Colorado River 4 Aqueduct. The necessity of access to public infrastructure to move water to areas where it is 5 needed motivated the enactment of the Wheeling Statutes in 1986 (Wat. Code, § 1810 et seq.), 6 and then ultimately led to the Exchange Agreement. Under the Wheeling Statutes, Metropolitan 7 must not charge more than “fair compensation,” which must include “reasonable credit for any 8 offsetting benefits for the use of the conveyance system.” (Id., § 1811, subd. (c).) 9 On January 14, 1997, Metropolitan adopted wheeling rates through its Resolution 8520, 10 which was at the heart of both MWD, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at page 1418, and SDCWA I, supra, 11 12 Cal.App.5th at page 1148. SDCWA I addressed, in particular, Resolution 8520’s premise that 12 the State Water Project (SWP) is part of Metropolitan’s conveyance system. (See 12 Cal.App.5th 13 at p. 1148.) The Water Authority contested that premise and argued that conveyance charges 14 must not include SWP costs. This Court agreed. But the Court of Appeal did not; instead, it 15 upheld Metropolitan’s Resolution 8520. (See id. at pp. 1146–1148.) Although Metropolitan 16 purported to rescind Resolution 8520 in August 2020, it cannot sweep its admissions in its own 17 resolution under the rug—especially not after having successfully advocated its Resolution 8520 18 twice on appeal. (See ibid.; MWD, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) 19 Metropolitan’s Resolution 8520 provides that, “to the extent a wheeling transaction 20 enables Metropolitan to avoid costs, such avoidable costs should not be included in the wheeling 21 rate,” which “shall be reduced to reflect the regional water supply benefits,” to be determined “in 22 the same manner as such benefits are calculated for use in the Local Projects and Groundwater 23 Recovery Program”—now called the Local Resources Program. (Ex. 11, §§ 6 & 10.) This 24 motion does not seek to summarily adjudicate the amount of damages, leaving that for trial. But 25 Metropolitan’s Resolution 8520 is an admission that, under the Wheeling Statutes, Metropolitan 26 must provide “reasonable credit for any benefits for the use of its conveyance system,” and that 27 this credit, required by law, should be calculated in the same manner as Local Resources 28 Program benefits. (Id. at p. 2 & § 10.) 9 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 Reasonable credit for offsetting benefits was also the basis for the price term in the 2 parties’ original 1998 Exchange Agreement. In order to facilitate that agreement, which was of 3 “vital state interest,” emergency legislation required David N. Kennedy, the Director of the 4 Department of Water Resources (DWR), to recommend a wheeling rate for the transfer of 5 conserved water from the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) to the Water Authority through 6 Metropolitan’s conveyance system. (Ex. 12.) Director Kennedy did so on January 5, 1998. (Ex. 7 13.) His recommended wheeling rate included reasonable credit for “the regional benefits 8 provided by San Diego bringing conserved IID water to the region.” (Id., fn. 4, emphasis added.) 9 His calculation of those benefits was simple: the amount Metropolitan otherwise “would have to 10 pay” for the water. (Id., fn. 3.) On January 13, 1998, Metropolitan agreed to “the framework 11 proposed by Director David Kennedy.” (Ex. 14 at MWDRECORD2014_0009349.) 12 But “disputes continued among the water agencies over Colorado River water allocations 13 that prevented water deliveries” under the 1998 Exchange Agreement. (SDCWA I, supra, 12 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136.) “Negotiations ensued to settle competing claims to Colorado River 15 water, resulting in a number of related agreements” in 2003, including the QSA and the operative 16 Exchange Agreement. (Ibid.) “Unable to agree upon the long-term price the Water Authority 17 would be charged for the water received under the [Exchange Agreement], the parties agreed to 18 an initial price with future prices linked to standard water rates, lawfully set.” (Ibid.) After an 19 initial period with a fixed price, the parties agreed that “the Price shall be equal to the charge or 20 charges set by Metropolitan’s Board of Directors pursuant to applicable law and regulation and 21 generally applicable to the conveyance of water by Metropolitan on behalf of its member 22 agencies.” (Ex. 3, ¶ 5.2.) The Water Authority further agreed not to challenge Metropolitan’s 23 conveyance charges (or the resulting price) for five years, “but reserved the right thereafter to 24 contest [Metropolitan’s] rates as contrary to ‘applicable law and regulation.’” (SDCWA I, supra, 25 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137, quoting Ex. 3, ¶ 5.2.) 26 As the Court of Appeal made clear in SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pages 1135– 27 1137, 1150–1151 and 1154, the Wheeling Statutes’ definition of “fair compensation” is 28 “applicable law” governing the price term of the Exchange Agreement, although other provisions 10 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 of the Wheeling Statutes (regarding available capacity, for example) do not apply because the 2 Exchange Agreement separately addresses those issues directly. (See Ex. 3, ¶¶ 3.1–3.7.) In 3 SDCWA II, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the Wheeling Statutes’ definition of “fair 4 compensation” applies “under both the Wheeling Statutes and the parties’ exchange agreement 5 under which Metropolitan had a duty to calculate water rates pursuant to applicable law and 6 regulation.” (2021 WL 4272331, at p. *7, emphases added.) Thus, Metropolitan breaches the 7 Exchange Agreement if it charges more than “fair compensation,” which, by law, must include 8 “reasonable credit for any offsetting benefits.” (Wat. Code, § 1811, subd. (c).) 9 The Court of Appeal also refuted Metropolitan’s argument that it may continue to charge 10 its WSR for the conveyance of water, an argument Metropolitan advanced despite the contrary 11 rulings in SDCWA I and this Court’s final judgment and peremptory writ of mandate in the prior 12 cases. (See SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at pp. *5–9.) The WSR is “designed to fund 13 water conservation programs.” (SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150.) But such 14 payments are “outside the scope of recoverable costs contemplated by the wheeling statutes” 15 because they are “not a cost of using the conveyance system to wheel water. Funding 16 conservation programs may lessen capital expenditures for system expansion in the future, as 17 Metropolitan asserts, but that potential savings is not recoverable under the terms of the statute 18 that permits recovery for actual conveyance costs—not avoided costs.” (Id. at pp. 1150–1151.) 19 In SDCWA II, the Court of Appeal rejected Metropolitan’s argument that the foregoing 20 ruling only applies to the rates at issue in the prior cases—those charged from 2011 through 2014. 21 (SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at p. *5.) “As reflected in the judgment, [SDCWA I] held 22 invalid Metropolitan’s practice of allocating a water stewardship rate (funding for water 23 conservation programs) as a cost subcomponent (recoverable as a transportation cost in its 24 wheeling rate and the transportation rates charged under the exchange agreement).” (Ibid.) That 25 “determination concerned a particular category of costs (‘water stewardship rate’) which did not 26 vary from year to year. Thus, there was no need nor did [the Court of Appeal] intend to limit [its] 27 determination to any particular rate year.” (Ibid., citation omitted.) Metropolitan’s assertion on 28 appeal—which it repeats as its first cause of action in all three of its cross-complaints here—that 11 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 it may charge its WSR as part of “its wheeling rate or the transportation rates charged under the 2 exchange agreement, thereby contravening [SDCWA I], supports the trial court’s continuing 3 jurisdiction to assure compliance with its judgment.” (Id. at p. *6.) It also supports—indeed, 4 compels—summary adjudication, among other grounds for such relief discussed below. 5 III. ARGUMENT 6 Summary adjudication is appropriate if there is no triable issue of material fact and the 7 motion “completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or 8 an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) The applicability of issue preclusion, 9 or collateral estoppel, to particular claims or defenses is an issue of law properly decided on 10 summary adjudication. (See, e.g., Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 11 Cal.App.5th 657, 686–687, 707–708 (Meridian).) 12 Issue preclusion applies “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually 13 litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in 14 the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 15 813, 825 (DKN).)5 The first element is not in question here. This Court’s final judgment and 16 peremptory writ of mandate in the prior cases are final adjudications that were affirmed in 17 SDCWA II, supra, 2021 WL 4272331, at page *9. The appellate decisions are also “entitled to res 18 judicata effect.” (Beckstead v. International Industries, Inc. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 927, 934.) 19 The fourth element also is not in question: the parties are the same. Nor is the “necessarily 20 decided” requirement in question: it merely excludes issues that were “entirely unnecessary” to 21 the prior judgment. (Meridian, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 701, citation omitted.) 22 Despite the rule that issue preclusion only applies to “issues actually litigated, it is often 23 said that a judgment is binding as to all matters which were raised or which might have been 24 raised.” (Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 415, 429, quoting what is 25 now 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Judgment, § 452.) The apparent conflict is resolved 26 by distinguishing between issues and arguments. “Clearly a former judgment is not a collateral 27 5 The focus here is on issue rather than claim preclusion because the latter only applies where the 28 causes of action are the same (DKN, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824), whereas the Water Authority’s complaints state new causes of action. (See SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1142–1143.) 12 MPAs ISO WATER AUTHORITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Lead Case No. CPF-14-514004; Consolidated with CPF-16-515282 & CPF-18-516389 1774641 1 estoppel on issues which might have been raised but were not; just as clearly it is a collateral 2 estoppel on issues which were raised, even though some factual matters or legal arguments which 3 could have been presented were not.” (Ibid.) 4 This distinction between issues and arguments is aptly illustrated by Denio v. City of 5 Huntington Beach (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 424 (Denio). That case involved the same parties, “the 6 same contract and the same general facts” as a prior case; but, in the second case, the plaintiffs 7 sought additional damages. (Id. at pp. 425–426.) The City argued that “the former judgment 8 estops the [plaintiffs] from claiming any further payments under the contract” because the 9 judgment “determined that the [plaintiffs] were entitled to the reasonable value of their services 10 and to nothing more.” (Id. at p. 427.) But the court disagreed. The first case “was not tried or 11 decided on the issue of the reasonable value” of the plaintiffs’ services, so their new damages 12 claims were not precluded. (Id. at p. 428.) Additional damages, in other words, are a new issue. 13 The defendant’s challenges to the validity and enforceability of the contract, on the other hand, 14 were not new issues; they were barred by issue preclusion—including “new” defenses of 15 “frustration of the object of the contract” and “failure of consideration.” (Id. at p. 427.) Those 16 were new arguments about the issues of validity and enforceability of the contract that had 17 already been decided. “It would be inconsistent in this case to admit evidence and to permit a 18 decision which would have the effect of destroying a contract for compensation, the validity and 19 binding effect of which, and the right to recover compensation under which, was specifically 20 upheld in the former action.” (Id. at p. 430.) 21 Applying the foregoing principles disposes of most of Metropolitan’s meritless cross- 22 claims and affirmative defenses as a matter of law, and will streamline this case for trial. 23 A. This Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s cross-claims for declaratory relief regarding the WSR, which are precluded by SDCWA I and II. 24 As an initial matter, this Court should dispose of Metropolitan’s first cross-claim (in all 25 three actions) for declaratory relief that it may charge its WSR as part of its wheeling and 26 transportation rates and (in the 2014 and 2016 actions) under the Exchange Agreement. Those 27 claims were already precluded by SDCWA I, and that conclusion is now incontrovertible under 28