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  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
						
                                

Preview

FILED DALLAS COUNTY 1/10/2020 4:50PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK Miranda Lynch CAUSE NO. DC-19-20391 DAVID NGUYEN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § VS. § 134m JUDICIAL DISTRICT § PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL § INSURANCE COMPANY § Defendant. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: COMES NOW, PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (“Progressive” and/or “Defendant”), Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause and files this its Original Answer to Plaintiff’s Original Petition Subject t0 Motion t0 Transfer Venue and in support thereof would respectfully represent and show unto the Court the following: MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Defendant objects t0 venue in Dallas County, the county in which this action was instituted, on the ground that Dallas County isnot a proper county for the prosecution of this lawsuit. Venue is mandatory in Ellis County pursuant to Texas law. As set forth in the Texas Insurance Code: Section 1952.110. VENUE. Notwithstanding Section 15.032, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, an action against an insurer in relation t0 the coverage provided under this subchapter, including an action t0 enforce that coverage, may be brought only in the county in which: (1) the policyholder 0r beneficiary instituting the action resided at the time of the accident involving the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle; or (2) the accident occurred. Section 15.032. INSURANCE. Suit against fire, marine, or inland insurance companies may also be commenced in any county in Which the insured property was situated. A suit 0n a policy may be brought against any life insurance company, 0r accident insurance company, or life and accident, or health and accident, or life, health, and accident insurance company in the county in which the company’s principal office in this state is located or in the county in which the loss has occurred DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 1 or in Which the policy holder 0r beneficiary instituting the suit resided at the time the cause 0f action accrued. Section 15.016. OTHER MANDATORY VENUE. An action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute. Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, 1985. Defendant asserts that the following facts establish mandatory venue in Ellis County and support this Motion to Transfer Venue: 1. The incident Which is the basis of this lawsuit allegedly occurred in Ellis County. (Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Paragraph 8, Page 3). Many 0f the fact witness pertaining t0 the events set forth in Plaintiff’s petition reside 0r work in 0r near Ellis County. Much of the physical evidence will be gathered and assembled in Ellis County. Dallas County has n0 connection t0, and n0 interest in, the adjudication 0fthis case. Based 0n the facts and statutes referenced above, the present case is required by law to be maintained in Ellis County. Any permissive venue statute relied on by Plaintiff to bring suit in Dallas County is superseded by the above mandatory venue statutes and supporting facts. Pleading further, and Without waiving the foregoing, this Court may transfer an action from a court 0f proper venue to another court 0f proper venue in this State when the Court determines that the provisions 0f Section 15.002(b) 0f the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code have been met. Said Section states that, for the convenience of the parties and Witnesses and in the interest of justice, a court may so transfer an action where the court finds: (1) Maintenance 0f the action in the county 0f suit would work an injustice t0 the movant considering movant’s economic and persona hardship; (b) the balance 0f interests 0f all the parties predominates in favor of the action being brought in the other county; and (c) the transfer 0f the action would not work an injustice t0 any other party. DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 2 As set forth above, the venue facts support venue in Ellis County, not Dallas County. Maintenance of this action in Dallas County will work an injustice t0 Defendant. Having this lawsuit, for all practical purposes, conducted in more than one county forces Defendant t0 incur additional attorneys’ fees t0 manage and try the case in one county and conduct its investigation and discovery in another. In addition, transfer 0f venue t0 Ellis County Will not work an injustice t0 any other party since much of the investigation, discovery and depositions in the case are going to be conducted in Ellis County. The balance 0f the parties’ interests dictates that the case be developed and tried in a single county, which should be Ellis County. Defendant requests that this action be transferred t0 District Court in Ellis County, Texas, Where proper venue lies in this cause. ORIGINAL ANSWER SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE 1. Pursuant t0 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 92, Defendant generally denies any and all allegations and claims asserted by Plaintiff (including, but not limited t0, any allegations, claims, 0r causes of action asserted in Plaintiff’s Original Petition and any amendments or supplements thereto) and demands strict proof thereof by a preponderance of the evidence. 2. Defendant specifically claims any credit or offset available from payments made by or on behalf of the alleged underinsured motorist, including any offset for payments made to Plaintiff pursuant t0 Plaintiff” s personal injury protection benefits (“PIP”), if any. 3. Additionally, t0 the extent that the medical expenses exceed the amount actually paid 0n Plaintiff’s behalf, Defendant asserts the statutory defense set forth in § 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Thus, recovery of medical 0r health care expenses incurred by Plaintiff are limited t0 the amount actually paid 0r incurred by 0r 0n behalf 0f Plaintiff. DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 3 4. Pleading further and in the strict alternative, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed t0 comply With Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.091, which requires any party Who seeks damages for either loss 0f earnings or based 0n loss of earning capacity, to provide evidence in the form of a net loss after reduction for income tax payments or unpaid tax liability pursuant to federal income tax law. 5. Defendant intends to comply with the terms and conditions 0f the policy sued on; however, Defendant specifically does not agree t0 waive any rights it has under the policy 0f insurance sued 0n herein and insist on their rights as contained in the policy, including definitions, conditions and exclusions contained therein. 6. Defendant specifically denies that all conditions precedent necessary for recovery by Plaintiff under any policy 0f insurance issued by Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company have been met. Under Texas law, Defendant’s contractual obligation t0 pay uninsured (“UM”) 0r underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits does not arise until Plaintiff obtains a legal judgment establishing the liability 0r fault 0fthe purported underinsured driver, the actual damages sustained by Plaintiff and that such damages exceed the tortfeasor’s limits 0f liability. Brainard vs. Trinity University Ins. C0,, 216 S.W. 3d 809, 818 (TeX. 2006); Henson vs. State Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. C0,, 17 S.W. 3d 652-54 (TeX. 2000). Neither requesting UIM benefits nor filing suit against the insurer triggers a contractual duty t0 pay. Id. 7. Plaintiff has not established the necessary conditions precedent t0 establish a valid claim for UIM benefits. Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied the conditions precedent necessary t0 assert a claim for UIM benefits and t0 recover under any policy of insurance issued by Defendant. 8. Further, Defendant denies that Plaintiff can pursue a declaratory judgment claim and is not entitled t0 attorneys’ fees as there has not been a breach 0f the policy by Defendant and DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 4 the declaratory judgment chapter does not support the award 0f same in the context of a UIM lawsuit. 9. Defendant reserves the right t0 assert any other policy provision, term, definition, condition precedent, 0r exclusion as the litigation progresses and as any new or additional facts are discovered or ascertained by Defendant. 10. Further answering, if the same be necessary, Progressive contends that the allegations made the basis of the claims and alleged damages, if any, 0f Plaintiff were caused by acts and/or omissions 0f persons 0r third parties over Whom Progressive had n0 control, and for Whom Progressive is not in law responsible. Such acts and/or omissions were the sole proximate cause or a proximate cause or a producing cause of the occurrence in question and the alleged damages, if any. 11. Progressive hereby asserts its right to contribution and indemnity from any c0- defendant 0r third-party defendant which may be joined in this action pursuant to Chapters 32 and 33, Tex. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. By doing so, Progressive does not admit liability and continues to deny the allegations as asserted by Plaintiff against Progressive and any other defendant or third-party defendant. 12. Pleading further, Progressive would show Plaintiffs claim is barred or otherwise limited to the extent that Plaintiff failed to mitigate her alleged damages and/or Plaintiff’s condition pre-existed the automobile accident in question. 13. Any coverage for the claim to which Plaintiff’s pleading refers may be barred, in whole or in part, by the provisions, terms, exclusions, conditions and limitations applicable t0 the policy at issue. 14. Further answering, and in the alternative, Progressive pleads the limitation 0f DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 5 recovery 0f exemplary damages as set forth in Section 41.006, fl, and Section 41,007, e_t. fl e_t. of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 15. Progressive reserves the right t0 raise additional affirmative defenses and t0 supplement those asserted herein upon discovery of further information regarding Plaintiff’s claims and upon further investigation as to the provisions, terms and conditions of the Progressive policy. 17. Progressive would further plead to the extent the Plaintiff has received any monies 0r settlement from any alleged joint tortfeasor 0r in accordance with the terms 0f any insurance policy, worker’s compensation policy 0r any other source arising 0r related t0 the incident made the basis 0f this suit, Progressive would show that pursuant to Texas common law and the one satisfaction rule, Progressive is entitled t0 an offset 0r a credit With regard t0 said amounts. For any settlements that have been made 0r Will be made by any alleged joint tortfeasor and/or responsible third-party, Progressive is entitled t0 a full credit, offset, pro-rate reduction or percentage reduction, based 0n the percentage of fault attributable t0 each settling defendant herein, and Progressive makes known to the other parties and the Court that itwill avail itself of its rights in this regard under Chapters 32 and 33 0f the TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE, including Section 33.012(b) or any other applicable law 0r statute. Specifically, Progressive would show that it isentitled to a dollar—for-dollar credit or a percentage-based reduction based 0n Plaintiffs’ prior settlements, if any. 18. Progressive would show the Court and jury that the injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by the contributory negligence and/or negligent conduct 0f Plaintiff at the time of the incident made the basis of this suit. Plaintiff failed to use that degree of care and caution Which would have been used by persons 0f ordinary prudence under the same or similar DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 6 circumstances. Progressive is entitled to a comparative fault instruction under Chapter 33 0f the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Plaintiffs comparative fault/negligence was the sole cause and/or the proximate cause 0f Plaintiff’s damages, if any. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE Pursuant to Rule 194 0f the Texas Rules 0f Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is requested t0 disclose, Within thirty (3 0) days of service 0f this request, the information 0r material described in Rule 194.2. Plaintiff is also hereby requested to amend or supplement his Responses to these Requests for Disclosure in accordance With Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 193.5. NOTICE PURSUANT TO TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 193.7 Pursuant t0 TeX.R.CiV.Pr0c.§193.7 Defendant serves notice 0n Plaintiff that Defendant intend t0 use Plaintiff’s discovery responses in the trial 0f this cause 0f action. DEMAND FOR JURY Defendant would show that they request this case be transferred t0 the Court’s active jury docket. A jury fee is being paid at the time of the filing 0f this Answer. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant pray that upon final trial and hearing hereof, that no recovery be had from Defendant, but that Defendant g0 hence without delay and recover its costs, and for such other and further relief t0 Which Defendant may be justly entitled and Will ever pray. DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 7 Respectfully submitted, WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L.L.P. BY: /S/ Randall G. Walters RANDALL G. WALTERS — 20819480 randy.walters@wbclawfirm.com Service of Documents: WaltersEDOcsNotifications@wbclaWfirm.com Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500 10440 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75231 2 14/347-8381 — FAX 214/347-8380 — DIRECT 214/749-4805 — MAIN ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on this the 10th day of January, 2020, a true and correct copy of the above document has been forwarded to all known counsel of record. /s/Randall G. Walters RANDALL G. WALTERS DEFENDANT’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 8