Miscellaneous: IVAN VON STAICH VS. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN

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                                SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Document Scanning Lead Sheet
Sep-29-2015 12:24 pm

Case Number: CPF-15-514508

Filing Date: Sep-29-2015 12:17

Filed by: DEBORAH STEPPE
Juke Box: 001 Image: 05094680

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE/ PROHIBITION/
CERTIFICATION

IVAN VON STAICH VS. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN

001005094680

Instructions:
Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.PrPaah Von SEateh COCR Ne: ETOGTE™™

California Men's Colony-East

P.0.Box 8101, San Luis Obispo, Ca. 93409-8101
reeprone no None raxno, None

ATTORNEY FOR (name Filed In Propria Persona

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIEOBNIA.CQUNTYOF San Francisco

STREETADORESS Ciwie Center Courthouse
mauincaooress 400 McAllister Street

CITY AND ZIP CODE isco, Ca. 946102
suscnnaae COE BERBERS 5°°

CASENAME: Staich Y-Governor Edmund G; Brown

a
IVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation ¢ PE -T 5- 5 1 4 5 0 e
"Unlimited Limited

(Amount (Amount [J counter oO Joinder -— Goes

demanded demanded is Filed with first appearance by defendant

exceeds $25,000) _ $25,000 or less) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402) DEPT:

Items 1-6 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2).
1. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case:
Auto Tort Contract COVE ON CNET

‘Auto (22) [J Breach of contractwairanty (06) (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400-3.403)
Uninsured motorist (46) _ Co Rule 3.740 collections (09) CI ‘Antitrusv/Trade regulation (03)
Other PUPDAWD (Personal Injury/Property _ L_] other collections (09) Construction defect (10)
Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort (J insurance coverage (18) J Mass tort (40)
Asbestos (04) co Other contract (37) O Securities litigation (28)
Product liability (24) Real Property CJ EnvironmentavToxic tort (30) .

Medica! malpractice (45)
Other PI/PD/WD (23)

Eminent domain/Inverse

y Insurance coverage claims arising from the
condemnation (14)

above listed provisionally complex case

Non-PUPDMWD (Other) Tort [2] wrongtut eviction (33). _ fypes (41)
Ets Business tortunfair business practice (07) L_] Other real property (26) Enforcement of Judgment
CJ civit rights (08) Unlawful Detainer Enforcement of judgment (20)
[J petamation (13) Commercial (31) Miscellaneous Civil Complaint
CD Fraua (16) Residential (32) RICO (27) :
[J intelectual property (19) Drugs (38) Other complaint (not specified above) (42)
i Professional negligence (25) Judicial Review Miscellaneous Civil Petition
Other non-P/PD/WD tort (35) Asset forfeiture (05) Partnership and corporate governance (21)
cI loyment Petition re: arbitration award (11) [—] other petition (not specified above) (43)
Wrongful termination (36) Writ of mandate (02)

Other sruteyment (15)
2. This case complex unt
factors requiring exceptional judicial management: VENUE,
a oO Large number of separately represented parties
b. J Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel
issues that will be time-consuming to resolve
c oO Substantial amount of documentary evidence

a els
pee State Bis of Sranitzaties |
d Large number,of witnesses 951, 957 (San Francise),

e. oO Coordination with related actions pending i in oné or more courts
in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court
f oO Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision

. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a[__] monetary _b. [XY nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief _. [_]punitive
. Number of causes of action (specify: See attaghed mandate for all grounds.

This case [_Jis Lglisnot aclass action Se yeSTED FUNDAMENTAL nreanr* to civil: trial

If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related cas

vate -fdo~15

Ivan Von Staich

AARwW

‘ou.may use form CI

(TYPE OR PRINT NAMED IATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)

NOTICE
« Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed
under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3:220.) Failure to file may result
in sanctions.
* File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule.
° If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all
other parties to the action or proceeding.

* Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only.

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use
Judicial Council of Caktorma.
(CM-010 (Rev. July 1. 2007}

CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET

‘Cal Rules of Court, rules 2 30, 3.220, 3.400-3.403, 3.740,
Cal Standards of Judicial Administration, std. 3.10
www courtinto.ca.gov

ee 138 Cal.App.4t

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San Francisco County Superio:
Ivan Von Staich CDC&R No. E-10079
California Men's Colony-East SEP 2.9 2015
P.O.Box 8101 (AQ:2148)
San Luis Obispo, Ca. 93409-8101

(Petitioner In Propria Persona) By:
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
zat :

— care wo. CPF-15-514509

2

) PETITION FOR WRITS .OF AMINISIRATIVE
} MANDATE AND PROHIBITION; FILED
)
)

Ivan Von Staich,

Petitioner, AGAINST THE GOVERNOR EDMUND G.

BROWN, WHO EXTENDED PETITIONER'S STAY
} IN PRISON BASED ON GOVERNOR'S
_) OWN (MDO) DANGER FINDING; REQUEST
Governor Edmund G. Brown, ) For. JURY TRIAL UNDER PENAL CODE
) §2966, Subds, (a)&(b);- REQUEST FOR
Respondent. __ ) DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELU:

) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT HEREOF

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT,
AND RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, Piease Take Notice:
*_* SCIVIL MANDATE ONLY, ROT CRIMINAL* * *
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE
FILED PURSUANT TO CCP §§1094.5, 1094.6, 90 DAYS TO SERVE PARTY
WITH VERIFIED COPY OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
BEING HELD BY GOVERNOR ON FEBRUARY 10, 2012
QUALIFYING PETITIONER IS A (MDO) DANGER TO THE PUBLIC
IF RELEASED ON PAROLE AT THE END OF MAXIMUM TERM

vs.

Petitioner Ivan Von Staich, CDC&R No. E-10079, files this
Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate, pursuant to CCP
§§1094.5, 1094.6, subds. (a), (b) and (f). Petitioner positively
asserts he was not properly served by the Governor/Respondent
with a verified copy of his alleged February 10, 2012 written
administrative hearing decision. “the ’ sovernor is mandated by
law pursuant to CCP §1094.6, subds. (a), (b) and (f), to serve
this Petitioner with a verified copy of his February 10, 2012

written administrative parole hearing report. The Governor was

Page-1-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibition

¥n. *7 Petitioner positively asserts there are no appeals allowed to challenge
the Governor's (MDO) danger finding, see Exhibit “F," no BPH or Governor
(MP0) danger findings can be appealed. Therefore, Petitioner request for
(M0) danger finding challenge is presented to this Court in accordance with
Penal Code §2966, subds. (a) & (b), authorizing Court trial to

(0) Conser  findtage eS FUNDAMENTAL RICH" SE fastert (MP0) danger

evaluation process.Co me KY DUN ek WD NY =

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required to inform this Petitioner that he only had 90 days
to file a administrative mandate petition challenging the
Governor's administrative decision dated February 10, 2012.
Because the Governor DID NOT properly serve his 2012 decision
with a verified cover letter informing Petitioner of his 90
days to challenge his written decision, the Governor has waived
his right to invoke the 90 day time requirement. See Herman
vy. Los les County Me’ litan -Tr. tion Authorit:
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 819, 822 fn. 1.

Petitioner also alleges in this Administrative mandate
that the Governor used older information from a 2010
psychological report to find Petitioner as a (MDO) danger to
the community, when there was a newer psychological report
rendered by CDC&R employed Forensic Expert Dr. Melvin Macomber,
which does not find any (MDO) danger, if released into the.
community. (See Exhibit "a" for reference to Dr. Macomber's
2011 psychological report.) Petitioner additionally alleges
the older 2010 psychological report was illegally written by
BPH(FAD) personally hired psychologist Richard Atwood, and that
he illegally obtained. his report when the Office of
Administrative Law (hereto after "OAL") had not approved the
use of BPH(FAD) psychology testing in 2010. (See definitive
proof that "OAL" had not approved BPH(FAD) psychology testing
in 2010, as Exhibit "B," attached hereto.) me 1/

Petitioner additionally alleges in this verified petition,

that the Governor had no legal authority in 2012 to find his

own made-up (MDO) danger to the community, as if, Petitioner
Page-2-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibition

Th. “17 Petitioner positively asserts P.C, §5068 exclusively authorizes the
CDC&R Director to obtain the psychological report, not BPH(FAD) in 2010.Co eo ND AH ke RD Dee

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suffered from a mental illness, when there is no mental iliness
finding. MDO is the acronym for “Mentally Disordered Offender,”
and this determination under Penal Code §2962 (a), used to
designate MDO status to this Petitioner, who ‘has never been
diagnosed by two separate CDC&R psychologists as suffering from
a “mental disorder.” Therefore, the Governor has no legal
authority to extend this Petitioner's incarceration after being
found suitable for parole release on September 14, 2011, during
his regular scheduled parole suitability hearing. (See Exhibit
"Cc" for reference to September 14, 2011 parole grant, which
was subsequently upheld by BPH Top Officials in Sacramento on
July 30, 2012.)

Petitioner asserts throughout this petition that his “vested
Fundamental Rights” have been violated by the Governor Edmund
G. Brown, who has failed to Properly serve Petitioner with a
written verified copy of his 2012 administrative hearing report,
which would have notified Petitioner he had 90 days under §1094.6
(a) to challenge his February 10, 2012 administrative decision.
This mandate is filed pursuant to ccpP §§1094.5, 1090.6, subds.
(a), (b) and (f£); and the statutory requirements under Penal
Code §2962, subd. (b).

RELIEF REQUESTED IN THIS ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE

WHEREFORE, Petitioner request the following declaratory
and injunctive relief: See fh. *2/belov
1. This Court issue declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Governor Edmund G. Brown, who has failed to comply with

the statutory provisions of Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §1094.6,
Page-3-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibition

Fn, *2/ Petitioner also request enforcement of treatment, if
this Quxt finds he - still retains any dager in acconaee with ve Cart (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 266, 272-273 ("Offenders oowicted of certain exmerated crines to
their “hental disaters” to receive mntal health treatment "DUR IN @ ad aie te
tenmination of their parole util their [aleged) mental disorder can be kept in renissim ani
they no lomer pose a darer to sxciety.") (Citing Ih re Qed (2004) 32 CaLdth 1, at p 9.)Co eA ND nH ke WB NY

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subds. (a), (b) and (f), when the Governor failed to send this
Petitioner Ivan Von Staich a verified copy of his February 10,
2012 administrative decision report, informing Petitioner in
a cover letter that he only had 90 days to file this petition.
Therefore, this Court issue injunctive and declaratory relief
against the Respondent Governor Brown’s 2012 unverified
administrative decision written report, and this Court order's
the Governor's unverified 2012 written report void and
unenforceable; and Court further order's the Governor's 2012
report to be stricken from Petitioner Ivan Von Staich‘s C-file
records under CDC&R prison No. E-10079,

2. This Court issue declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Governor Edmund G. Brown, who made-up his own (MDO) danger
to the community, based on an older 2010 BPH(FAD) psychological
report, illegally written and obtained when the “Office of
Administrative Law" ("OAL") Officials in Sacramento, had not
approved BPH(FAD) psychology testing in the year 2010, therefore,
this Court further orders that the BPH(FAD) psychological report
written illegally in 2010, be stricken from Petitioner Ivan
Von Staich!s entire CDC&R C-file record under CDC&R No. E-10079.
3. This Court issue order under Penal Code §2966, (a)&(b) that
the Governor provide this Court with two separate psychologists
who definitively assert Petitioner Ivan Von Staich is suffering
from a “mental disorder" that is causing his current danger

to the community, and if, the Governor does not provide such

evidence, this Court order Petitioner's September 14, 2011 parole
Fn, **

grant reinstated. !

Page-4-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibition

Fn. **/ Petitioner positively asserts there is no appeals system for inmates
to challenge © definitively assert appeals requesting MDO danger evaluation
hearings by the Chief BPH psychologist. See Code of Regs. tit. 15, §2240,
subd. (d) {no inmate appeals or request for MDO danger hearings allow]. Id.eo OND en he WD YY =

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4. This Court issue order against the Governor Edmund G. Brown
for deliberately breaching Petitioner's ongoing May 30, 1986
“Court Order" striking Petitioner's entire juvenile record from
the Governor's administrative parole review hearing process.
The Governor in his February 10, 2012 administrative report
relied heavily upon the “Court Ordered” stricken juvenile record
to form his "MDO" danger finding. Therefore, this Court further
order’s the Governor to not consider any juvenile record alleged
to be true, when in fact, was previously ordered stricken from
Petitioner"s CDC&R records on May 30, 1986, in the Orange County
Superior Court. (See Exhibit “D” for reference to Court Order
striking Petitioner's entire juvenile record from his current
adult prison record, therefore, this Court issues declaratory
and injunctive relief striking the Governor's entire 2012
administrative hearing report from Petitioner's CDC&R C-file
Fn, ***/

records.)

5. This Court issue order under the new California Supreme Court
citation, citing In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, authorizing
“jury trial” for any civil or criminal incarcerated person at
the end of his sentence, who"s incarceration is being extended
based on a danger finding, which must be supported by two
independent CDC&R psychologists, both finding evidence the
incarcerated individual is mentaiiy 111. See People v. Blackburn,
Tuesday, August 16, 2015, DJDAR 9457, at p. 9459.See P.C.§2962(b).
6. This Court issued declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Governor's 2012 administrative hearing report, where the

Governor placed “Court Ordered" stricken jury trial acquittal
Page-5-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibition

Fn, ***/ Petitioner additionally request injunctive and declaratory relief
under BPH Executive Jennifer Shaffer's new Administrative Directive No,2014-
05, which limits the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, which can ONLY
be submitted to the BPH Commissioners conducting the parole hearing, and
CANNOT be submitted to the Governor, as done in this case. Violates P.C,
§§3043, (b)(1), (c), 3043.2, 3043.5, 3046, see exhibit "I" for reference.Co et DA ke BW NR

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information into his 2012 administrative report, based on an
alleged arson charge, which Petitioner was previously acquitted
in the Riverside Superior Court in 1977. (See Exhibit "E“ for
reference to Petitioner's entire adult criminal record, which

definitively reveals Petitioner was acquitted of committing

an alleged arson charge in 1977.); authority -relied .on-by Court

is Wenke, Idus., Commercial Residential Inc. .v, - Superior Court
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1163-1164 (holding that state

officials are restricted from relying on acquittal information
information in any degree what so ever.); see also In _ re

Rosenkrantz (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 409, 425 ( pursuant to "CCR

§2326 [‘criminal charges not resulting in conviction (charges
which resulted in a acquittal or dismissal for any reason shall
not effect the parole date'].)" (Ibid., emphasis added.)

6. This Court issue any and ali additional relief the Court
deems appropriate under the grounds for relief set forth within
this administrative mandate petition, including the authority
set forth in Alvarez v, Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
969, 983 ("An order made in one department during the progress
of a cause can neither be ignored nor overlooked in another
Gepartment.") (Ibid., emphasis added.) This Court should not
overlook Petitioner"s ongoing sentencing hearing May 30, 1986
“Court Order" striking Petitioner's entire juvenile record from
his current CDC&R prison records.

VENUE OF MANDATE IS PROPERLY FILED IN THIS SAN FRANCISCO SUPERIOR
COURT.

Petitioner asserts the law governing venue of mandate

filings in California is set forth within State -Bd. of
Page~6-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/ProhibitionEqualization v. Superior Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 951, 957

("In determining the Legislature intent, we may also be guided
by the use of identical language in another statute. (Quarterman
v. Kefauver (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1371 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d
741}.) Code of Civil Procedure section 401 provides that whenever
an action involving the state is required by law to be commenced
in removed to County of Sacramento, it may be commenced in or
fried in any city or city and county of this State in which
the Attorney General has an office. As one commentator has noted,
section 401 was enacted to alleviate the hardship on litigants
created by the exclusive venue in Sacramento, and that, when
this statute applies, the proper venue is Sacramento, San
Francisco or Los Angeles (cities and counties which the Attorney
General currently has an office.) (3 Witkins Cal. Procedure
(4th ed 1997) Actions, §780, p. 966; see also Weil & Brown,
Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 1997) #:541.) Case law has interpreted section 401 in
the same manner. Regents of University of California v. Superior
Court (Cal.1970) 3 Cal.3d 529, 535, and fn. 4 [91 Cal.Rptr.
57, 476 P.2d 457] [actions under §401 may be brought in

Sacramento, San_ Francisco, Los Angeles, and Alcoholic Beverage

Control Appeals Board (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 759, 762-763 [18
Cal.Rptr. 151) (Harris).) Thus, the identical language of section
401 has been interpreted to include only the Attorney General's
law office.") (Ibid., emphasis added.)

WHEREFORE, venue in this San Francisco Superior Court is

proper. Petitioner positively maintains the Attorney General
Page-7-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/ProhibitionCo ONY KD nA ek. !B NY =

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has /holds a staffed law office within the county and city of
San Francisco, which authorizes this administrative mandate
to be filed in this Court.

I. Authorities In Support of the Declaratory and Injunctive
relief requested in this administrative petition pursuant to
CCP §§1060, 1094.5, 1094.6. Also, Penal Code §2966, subds. (a)
& (b), require proof Petitioner is suffering from a_ mental
disorder, after being ordered released by the 2011 BPH
Commissioners.

II. This Court take judicial notice of the new California
Supreme Court citation under Evidence Code §452 (a), published

as People v. Blackburn, Tuesday, August 16, 2015, DJDAR 9457,
at p. iS53

("In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, a case involving
the extension of confi t of a minor ward of the
California Youth Asthorfer we observed that the right
to a jury trial in an action which may lead to
involuntary confinement is fundamental" "Tha: at p.
306) and hasized that when individual are threatened
with involuntary confinement, [the right to a jury
trial is] equally important whether the threat of
confinement originates in a civil action “or a criminal
prosecution’ « at p. 307). (Ibid., emphasis a

Petitioner positively asserts he is entitled to a jury
trial based on the Governor"s 2012 administrative report finding
Petitioner as a (MDO) danger to the community, and used this
(MDO) danger to extend Petitioner's incarceration forever under
his own unsupported (MDO) danger to the community finding. See
Penal Code §2962, subd. (b), requiring .... two CDC&R

psychologist to support the Governor's (MDO) danger finding
Fn, ****/
during a jury trial process.

III, The Governor's 2012 (MDO) Danger Finding Must Be Supported
By An Underlining "Mental Illness" In According With The United
States Supreme Court In Foucha-v, -Louisiana (U.S.1992) 504 U.S.
71, 82-83

Petitioner is currently being held past his maximum term

activated after he was found suitable for parole release on
Page-8-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibition

Th. ****7 See Penal Code §2966, Subd. (a) ("A prisoner may request a hearing
before the Board of Prison Terms, and the board shall conduct a hearing,
if so requested.") (Ibid.); see also §2966, subd. (b) ("A prisoner who
disagrees with the determination of the Board of Prison Terms that he or
she meets the criteria of Section 2962, may file in the superior court.")
(Ibid., emphasis added in relevant part.)Co Oe Yt DH eke BR Re =

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September 14, 2011, which under In re Rodriquez (Cal.1975) 14
Cal.3d 639, 646-652, requires a separate maximum primary term
to be set by the BPH Commissioners. Petitioner maximum primary
term was set for May 11, 2007, which was overrode by the
Governor’s 2012 (MDO) danger finding. The Governor cannot support
his (MDO) danger finding with a underlining "mental iliness"
diagnoses. See Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 82-83 ("Herein,
in contrast, the State asserts because Foucha once committed
a criminal act and now has an antisocial . personality that
sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder for which
there is no effective treatment, he ‘may be held indefinitely.
This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any
other insanity acquittee not mentally 111 who could be shown
to have a personality disorder that may lead to criminal conduct.
The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though
he has completed his prison term. It would also be only a step
away from substituting confinement for dangerousness for our
present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside
from permissible confinement for mental iliness, incarcerates
only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have
violated a criminal law.") (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Foucha additionally states at page 80: ("The State may
also confine mentally 111 person if it shows “by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally i111 and
Gangerous," Jones v. United States, (1983) 463 U.S. 354, at
Pp. 362, 77 L.Ed.2d 694, 103 S.Ct. 3043. Here, the State has

not carried that burden; indeed, the State does not claim that
Page-9-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/ProhibitionFoucha is now mentally 112.") (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Here, as in Foucha, the Governor has no evidence Petitioner

is “mentally 111," which is causing current danger, or does
the have two CDC&R psychologists statesents to support his (DO)
danger finding, set forth in his administrative 2012 unverified
report. Petitioner's federal constitutional due process rights
have been violated by the Governor's unsupported (MDO) danger
finding, used to extend Petitioner's release on his maximum
term of confinement under the sentencing scheme for his 1983
one count second degree murderers, as set set forth in People
Wz Scott (1984) 150 Cal.App.4th 910, 919 (holding that Rodriquez
is still the sentencing scheme for all indeterminately sentenced
Prisoners in 1984.) Id. Petitioner was arrested in 1983,
therefore, the Governor cannot use his unsupported (MDO) danger
finding to override Petitioner's maximum term of confinement
from the year 1983,
A. Ground One. Petitioner Positively Asserts The Governor Has
Never Properly Served Him With A Verified Copy Of His
Administrative Quasi-Judicial Parole Grant Review Report, With
A Cover Letter Informing Petitioner He Only Has 90 Days To
Challenge His Administrative Decision, Which Is Mandatory Under
CCP §1094.6 Subds. (a), (b)&(f)

Petitioner positively asserts the Governor has never
properly served Petitioner with a copy of his 2012 administrative
parole review report, as required under CCP §1094.6 (a), which
must be served with a cover letter informing Petitioner he only
has 90 days to file any challenge this Superior Court. See Herman
v. les County Me’ litan Trans) tion  Authorit:

(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 819, 822 fn 1 ("The Court of Appeal held
Page-10-Petition For Writs Of Administrative Mandate/Prohibitionthat the [CCP] §1094.6 limitations period applies only if the
xequired notice is served on the party, and that service on
the party's lawyer does not trigger the 90-day period.") (Ibid.,
emphasis added.); see also Donnellan v. City-of Novato (2001)
86 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1102 ("the limitation provision of section
1094.6 does not begin to run until the subdivision (f) notice
is given.") (Ibid., citing El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. Rent
Review Com. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 335, 345, Cummings v. City
of Vernon (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 919, 922.)

Therefore, because the Governor has never served Petitioner
with a verified cover letter informing him he only had 90 days
to file this petition against his 2012 administrative written
decision, the time to commence this petition has been waived
by the Respondent/Governor. See El Dorado-Palm Spring, supra,
230 Cal.App.3d at p. 344 ("In light of the background of the
statute we conclude the Legislature intended the (90 day) period
to run from the date of giving notice.") (Ibid., citing Hittle
v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Assn. (Cal.1985)
39 Cal.3d 347, 386-387.) These citation effectively affirm that
90 day period to file a challenge to any administrative decision
does not begin until proper service has been completed, which

never occurred in this case.
B. Ground Two. The Governor Edmund G,. Brown Is Required To Serve
His 2012 Administrative written Report With A Verification,
Which Has Never Occurred In This Case

Petitioner positively asserts the Governor was required
pursuant to CCP §1094.6 (a), to serve Petitioner with a

verification under oath, attesting to the contents of his
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February 10, 2012 written administrative report, and that the
information within his report is true and correct. See Donnellan
v._ City of Novate (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1102 ("Section
1094.6 (b) requires that, when a local agency mails its written
decision to the party seeking the writ, such mailing must include
a written statement verified by oath or affirmation, or a written
statement attesting to the date the dcisim was mailed to the party
by first class mail, postage prepaid. Only such verified or
testimonial statement meets the requirements of §1094.6.")
(Ibid., emphasis added.)

In this case, the Governor issued his administrative parole
grant review report on February 10, 2012, however, Petitioner
waS never properly serviced with any written document under
oath or verification, regarding the date and contents of the
Governor's administrative decision report. See Donnellan, supra,
86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1102 ("It has also been noted that statutes
of limitations are technical defenses which should be strictly
construed to avoid the forfeiture of person's rights. Such
statutes are obstacles to just claims, and courts may not indulge
in strained constructions to apply the statutes to facts of
a particular case.") (Ibid., citing Steketee v. Lintz, Williams
& Rothberg (Cal.1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56; Herman v. Los Angeles
Co. Metro. Trans. Authorities (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 819, 826-
827.)

Therefore, the Governor has deliberately violated §1094.6,
which is mandatory statutory provision. See also People v. Bryant

(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1470 fn. 4 (holding that all legal
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documents submitted to the Legislature or a state court must
be verified under oath pursuant to CCP §2015.5.) Id. The
Governor's Pebruary 10, 2012 administrative decision is not
verified and must be disregarded as rubbish.

C, The Governor's 2012 Administrative Decision Makes An
Unsupported Finding That Petitioner Is A Current Danger To The
Community As An MDO Finding Under Penal Code §2962 (b), Thereby,
Stopping Petitioner's Release From Prison On His Maximum Term
Of Confinement, Set Only After The September 14, 2011 Board
Commissioners Found Petitioner Suitable For Parole Release,
Which, Activated The Separate Setting Of Petitioner's Maximum
Term Of Confinement Under The Sentencing Laws Governing
Petitioner's One Count Second Degree Murder Sentence

Petitioner positively asserts the Governor has made an
independent finding that Petitioner is currently a danger to
the community, as if, the Governor had the required evidence
to support his absurd finding of danger, when Petitioner is
not suffering from any "mental disorder,” which must be supported
by two CDC&R psychologists under Penal Code §2962, subd. (b).

See People v, Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154-1155:

("A due process challenge similar to Buffinton's but concerning the
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) Act (Former §6300-6330) was
made in People v. Martin (1980) 170 Cal.App.3d 714 [165 Cal.Rptr. 773]
(Martin), Martin rejected that chall » explaining: ‘Appellate also
argues that the prediction that a person may in the future engage in
conduct dangerous to others is not sufficiently reliable [as required

the due process clause] to justify deprivation of liberty. We
eomnizs that liberty is a funtedentat interest, and that, under the

Present state of the art, experts cannot predict with certainty whether
persons will engage in dangerous conduct. Yet, we also recognize that
persons subject to recommitment hearings pursuant to [the MDO Act]
have previously committed one, or more sexual offenses. . . . Further,
such persons cannot be recommitted unless they are shown to still have
a “mental disorder" which predisposes them to commit sexual offenses.
+. . We believe that a trier of fact can make reasonable assessments,
based upon the evidence, whether previous offender currently present
a high risk of serious harm to others by reason of their continuing
“mental disorder" Appellant's fundamental liberty vas adequately
protected by requiring that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt be utilized in establishing whether the person presents such
risk. The compelling interest in protecting society against sexually

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motivated injury and in providing beneficial treatment for such
disordered persons should Bot be sacrified by requiring a certainty
of prediction which is currently impossible to attain.") (Ibid.,
emphasis added, citing 107 Cal.3d at pp. 724725, citations omitted.)

Buff: goes on to state at p. 1157: ("Under the MDO Act, the
relevant term is "severe mental disorder." By reason of the "severe
mental disorder" the person committed under the MDO Act must represent
a “substantial of physical harm to others." (Pen. Code §2962,
subd. (d)(1).) term "severe mental disorder" is defined as “an
illness or disease or condition that substantially impairs the person's
» Perception of reality, emotional process, or judgment; or

which grossly impairs behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an
acute brain syndrome for which prompt remission, in the absence of
treatment, is unlikely. (Pen. Code, §2962, subd. (a).)" “Severe mental
sorder’ does not include "a personality or adjustment disorder.")
(Ibid., emphasis added. )

Buffington goes on to state at page 1157: ("The
definitions of "mental disorder" an “mental

defect" in California involuntary commitment
schemes noted above, including, che | SVPA, qu
similarly encompass a current "mental condition
that renders a person dangerous beyond his or
her control. Thus SVP’s are treated siailariy
for these purposes of the law.") (Ibid., emphasis

added.
Petitioner assert herein, the Governor within his February

10, 2012 administrative decision report, madeup his own (MDO)

_danger, without any current psychological evaluation evidence

——_——_

supporting his current danger finding, which the Governor used
as the sole basis to stop Petitioner's release on parole,
previously granted by the September 14, 2011 Board Commissioners,
who found absolutely no danger of any kind. The Governor has
effectively extended Petitioner's maximum term of confinement
set under the sentencing scheme for his 1983 second degree murder,
as set forth in People v. Scott (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 910, 919
(holding that In re Rodriguez (Cal.1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 646-652
is still the sentencing scheme in 1984, after Petitioner's 1983

arrest and conviction.) Id.
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The Governor in his unverified February 10, 2012
administrative written decision, found his own danger, and used
that unsupported danger finding to extend Petitioner's
incarceration for the rest of his life, and you consider

Petitioner has now served nearly 32 years of straight

incarceration, has Ro disciplinary reports for violence the
entire 32 years. The Governor cannot extend this Petitioner's
incarceration forever when the Governor has Ro diagnoses by
any two psychologists from the CDC&R stating Petitioner suffers
from a "mental disorder,” which is causing his current danger.
D. Ground Four. The Governor Violated Petitioner's “Vested
Fundamenta ght" Under Equal Protection Clause, To Be Afforded
The Same Danger To The Community Rights, As Those Afforded Under
The MDO Act, And The MDSO Act, Under California Law
Petitioner asserts under his "vested fundamental right"
as set forth in Mardesich v. Cal. Youthful Offender Parole Board
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1367 ("a full and the independent
judicial review of that decision is indicated because the
abrogation of the right is too important to the individual to
relegate it to exclusive administrative extinction.") (Ibid.)
See Buffington, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at Pp. 1158 ("Equal
protection requires that where persons committed under two
schemes are similarly situated for purposes of the law, they
be similarly treated. As we have seen, persons committed under
the SVPA and the MDO scheme (as well as other similar California
civil commitment schemes) are similarly situated for purposes

of defining the triggering mental disorder; these persons are

similarly treated because the trigging mental disorder is defined
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as a current and recognized mental condition render in those

committed dangerous beyond their control.") (See Exhibit "E"

for reference to newest BPH(FAD) Forensic Expert's 2012 report,
render by Dr. Thacker.) Dr. Thacker's 2012 report does not find
any mental disorder, which is absolutely required in order for
the Governor to extend this Petitioner past his maximum primary
base term, ... which ended on May 11, 2007. The Governor has
no legal authority to disregard CDC&R Forensic Expert Dr. Melvin
Macomber's 2011 future risk assessment report, which does not
shown any diagnoses with any type of required mental disorder.

Therefore, Petitioner's equal protection rights afforded
all other MDO Act or MDSO Act offenders, who have reached the
end of their state prison sentence, and must be found by two
psychologists to suffer from a underlining “mental disorder,”
be equally applied to this parole grant and suitable for parole
vreleased prisoner, who's release was stopped by the Governor
based on “current danger," without any required "mental

disorder." Petitioner is entitle to a jury trial under P.C.§2966.

E. Ground Five. Petitioner Holds A "Vested Fundamental Right"
That The Governor Would Be Forced Under Equal Protections Laws
Pursuant To Penal Code §2962, (b), And The Standardized
Psychological Future Danger Test Instrument Known Under The
Acronym PCL-R, Which Is Equally Used During All MDO-Act And
MDSO-Act Future Risk Assessment Evaluating Psychologists, And
You Consider, Two CDC&R Psychologists Under Penal Code §2962,
(b) Used The Same PCL-R Test As Used Upon All MDO, Or MDSO
Commitments, Revealing A Pattern By All Psychologists To Used
The Same Tests Under Equal Protection Of Each Individual
Commitment, Civil Or Criminal, Being Tested

Petitioner positively asserts the same PCL-R testing is
used under “equal protection rights," by all psychologists,

whether they are evaluating an inmate under the MDO Act, or
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‘the MDSO Act. The PCL-R is also used the sane by all CDC&R
or BPH(FAD) psychologists.’ See Garcetti v. Superior Court (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 508, 524 ("In the California Courts, the PCL-
R is a commonly used psychological test to determine future
danger exclusively for "Mentally Disturbed Sex Offenders.")
(Id.) Petitioner asserts if the same PCL-R psychological test
is used during all Penal Code §2962 (b) evaluations, than,
obviously, this PCL-R testing would equally apply to the
Governor's psychological current mental disorder, causing the
underlining danger, used by the Governor in this case to extend
Petitioner's confinement in state prison based solely on the
Present danger finding, (See Exhibit “F” for no "BPH" appeals allowed. )
E. Ground Six. Petitioner Asserts The Governor In His February
10, Administrative Parole Grant Danger Review Report, Relied
Upon An Older 2010 Psychological Report Written Illegally By
BPH(FAD) Psychologist Richard Atwood, When The "OAL" Official
Had Not Approved BPH(FAD) Future Danger Reports To Be Generated
By BPH(FAD) Officials In 2010

Petitioner positively asserts the Governor had no legal
authority to consider and accept the written danger report issued

by BPH(FAD) underground reporting psychologist Richard Atwood.
(See Exhibit "B" for reference to Governor's 2012 unverified

report.) Because the "OAL" Top Officials had not approved
BPH( FAD) psychology in 2010, when Dr. Atwood issued his danger
report in this case, the Governor had no legal authority to
consider that danger report, and should have only consider CDC&R
employed Forensic Expert Dr. Melvin Macomber later written 2011
report, as attached hereto for reference. The 2010 unauthorized
and illegally written report by Dr. Atwood should not be

considered by the Governor, and violates several areas of the
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administrative law required procedures under the "APA." See
Capen _v. Shewry (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 738, 746 ("If a policy
or procedure falls within the definition of the APA, the
promulgating agency must comply with the procedures for
formalizing such regulation.") (Ibid., emphasis added.); see

also Naturist Action Committee v. California State Dept. of
Parks & Recretion (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1250 ("If an

agency adopts a regulation without complying with the “APA”

requirements it is deemed an ‘underground regulation’ (Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 1, §250) and is invalid.”) (Ibid., emphasis
added, citing Modesto City Schools v. Education Audits Appeal
Panel (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1381.); and see Kings
Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Premo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 215,

217 ("Failure to comply with the "APA" nullifies the rule.")
(Ibid. )

Bottom line, the Governor had no legal authority to consider
and exclusively use the 2010 illegally written underground report
from BPH(FAD) psychologist Dr. Atwood. This is due based on
the very relevant fact, the "OAL" Top Officials had Rot approved
BPH(FAD) psychology testing in the year 2010. (See attached
exhibit for reference to May 5, 2011 order by "OAL" Top
Officials disapproval of BPH(FAD) testing in 2010.); see also
M.B._ex rel Bern v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools (7th Cir.2011)
668 F.3d 851, 862 ("Second, this court has expressed the view
that it is inappropriate to defer to the opinion of a single

psychologist, particularly where that opinion is in conflict
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with the opinion of “teachers and other professionals.") (Ibid. )
CDC&R Forensic Expert Dr. Melvin Macomber's newer 2011 future
danger report conflicts with the older illegally written report
by Dr. Atwood, also the newer 2012 BPH(FAD) future danger report
written by Forensic Expect Dr. Thacker conflicts with the older
2010 report written by Dr. Atwood. THEREFORE, Dr. Atwood's
illegally written 2010 report, rendered when "OAL" officials
had not approved BPH(FAD) testing must be ordered redacted from
all CDC&R records under Petitioner's name and prison number.
E-10079,.

F. Ground Seven. Petitioner Positively Asserts The Governor's
2010 Report Relies On “Court Ordered" Stricken Juvenile Records
From Over 40 Years In The Past, Used As A Basis To Form A Pattern
Of Threatening Behavior Allegedly Committed By This Petitioner,
When Under Welfare & Institution Code §5300.5, Subd. (c), A
Pattern Of Threatening Behavior Can Only Be Conducted Based
On The Inmates Records From Six Years In The Past

Petitioner positively asserts the Governor used “Court
Ordered” stricken juvenile records that are now over 40 years
in the past. The Governor used these "Court Ordered" stricken
juvenile records to form a pattern of threatening behavior,
which is not allowed under Welfare & Institution Code, §5300.5,
Subd. (c). See Im re Qawi (Cal.2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 20
("psychologists in the State of California who are accessing
a person's “current danger" can only go back six (6) years in
order to find a pattern of threatening behavior.") Id.

Bottom line, the Governor had no legal authority to utilize
a.40 plus year old juvenile record to form the basis of his
alleged pattern of ongoing present violence.

G. Ground Eight. Petitioner Positively Asserts He Holds A "Vested
Fundssental tight" That The Governor Would Strictly Follow The

Parole Grant Danger Evidence Review Laws, As Set Forth In In
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re Shaputis (Cal.2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 211

Petitioner asserts the Governor's 2012 administrative
decision finding "current danger" based on an older negative
illegally written underground psychological report, violates
the psychological evidence requirement set forth in Sha utis,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 211 ("Board or the Governor Bust
completely disregard older negative psychological reports, when
there is a newer report within the prisoner's parole C-file
records.") (Id., citing In re Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal. App.4th
1479, 1490.)

Bottom line, the Governor had no legal authority to
disregard the newer CDC&R employed psychologist’s 2011 report,
for the older 2010 report, which was illegally written without
the proper approval by "OAL" officials.

H. Petitioner Exclusively Requests Declaratory Relief Under
The Declaratory Judgment Act, CCP §§1060, 1061

Petitioner specifically pleas for relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, CCP §1060, as set forth in Baxter
Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 359-360

("Code of Civil Procedure, section 1060 provides in pertinent

part: *

Any person . . . who desire a declaration of his rights
or duties with respect to another .. . may, in cases of actual
controversy relating to the rights and duties of the respective
parties, bring an original action . . . in the superior court
for declaration of his rights or duties, either along or with
other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of

these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or
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could be claimed at that time.") (Ibid., emphasis added.); see
also Wilson & Wilson v., City Counsel of Redwood City (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582 (all that is required to prevail
on declaratory relief claim is two elements: (1) a proper subject
of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving
justifiable questions relating to Petitioner's rights or
obligations.") (Ibid., emphasis added.)
I. Petitioner Likewise Asserts He Is Entitled To Injunctive
For Several Relevant Reasons, Such As, He Previously Prevailed
When He Was Granted The Sentencing Hearing "Court Order” Striking
His Entire Juvenile Record From His Current Parole Grant
Governor's Review Process

Petitioner also request injunctive relief based on the
granting of his May 30, 1986 “Court Order” striking his entire
juvenile records from his current CDC&R adult Prison and parole
hearing review records. The relevant reason for injunctive relief
is quite similar, the published California citations mandate

that if a party has previously prevailed in a superior court

action, he is entitled to injunctive relief on this favorable

decisions. See Montrose Chemical Corp. v. American Motorists

Ins. Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 133, 160 ("A permanent injunction

is a determination on the merits that a plaintiff has prevailed
on the cause of action for or other wrongful act against a
defendant and that equitable relief is appropriate.") (Ibid.,

emphasis added.); accord Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992)

3 Cal.App.4th 640, 646 (same). Petitioner has already prevailed
with an ongoing "Court Order" striking his entire juvenile record

from the Governor/Respondent's parole grant review C-file, but
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has elected to breach this "Court Order," requiring further
and stronger enforcement of that original order.

Petitioner also asserts, he is entitled to injunctive relief
and declaration relief based on several published citations

restricting the Governor/Respondent's parole grant review to

the same evidence the original Board Commissioners reviewed
when they granted this Petitioner's parole release and maxiaua

term of confinement. See In re Copley (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th

427, 432 (definitively holding that Governor is restricted to
the same evidence as that within the parole grant review file.);
see In re Capistran (2008) 107 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1301; In re
Gray (2005) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 402; In re Scott (2005) 151
Cal. App.4th 573, 603; In_re_ Smith (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489,
507 (holding that Governor cannot accept letters from the
Prosecution containing new evidence Rot within the inmate's
parole grant file.) Fal’ the Governor in this case received a
letter from the prosecution containing the "Court Ordered"
stricken juvenile records which the Governor exclusively relied
upon to find Petitioner is a (MDO) danger to the community.

(See Exhibit "G" for reference to news paper article definitively

showing deputy district attorney Ray Armstrong sent the Governor
a letter containing the "Court Ordered" stricken juvenile
records.) (See November 28, 2012 BPH Hearing transcripts, where
the BPH Commissioner states on page 7 he would not violate the
"Court Order," and that the deputy district attorney was

admonished with the Board Commissioner's approval, not to send
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t ‘or Governor's 2012 report obtained from prison file.
See Exhibit ‘or reference to affidavit and declarations from entire
Staich household, that juvenile record did not occur 40 years in the past.Co 2B It Dn nH eh YDB YD =

ms

any more letters containing the "Court Ordered" stricken juvenile

Fn. 2/
records,

In addition, see also In re Ryner (2011) 196 Cal. App.4th
533, 552 fn. 3 ("In contrast to the Board which has the
obligation and ability to take evidence consistent with due

Process protections, the Governor cannot create an evidentiary

record.") (Ibid., emphasis added.); accord In re McDonald (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1024; In re Twinn (2010) 190 Cal. App.4th
447, 472-473 (same). (See Exhibit "L" for acquittal information. )
Conclusion

Based on the foregoing information, on several published
citations, on the attached Psychological reports, this Court
order the Governor administrative decision danger finding, be
overruled. Fiat Justitia, let justice be done.

Dated this (May of september 2015,

a dee :
IVAN VON ST
n

‘AICH
Petitioner In Pr ia P
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VERIFICATION BY IVAN VON STAICH

I, Ivan Von Staich, do certify and declare under penalty of
perjury that the information within the foregoing petition is
true and correct, and presented within the laws of the State
of California.

Yn

This petition was executive on this 1Das of September, 2015,
inet city of San Luis Obigpo, State of California.

Declarant: Ivan Von Staich

limiting all evidence to be sent to the