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  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview
  • SEAN DEBOTTE VS. KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT PLC SECURITIES/INVESTMENT document preview 
						
                                
Preview

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Robert A. Sacks (CSBN 150146)
sacksr@sullcrom.com

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1888 Century Park East

Los Angeles, California 90067-1725
Telephone: (310) 712-6600
Facsimile: (310) 712-8800

Laura Kabler Oswell (CSBN 241281)
oswelll@sullcrom.com

Kyle Niemi (CSBN 287404)
niemik@sullcrom.com

Jaswant Singh (CSBN 303428)
singhj@sullcrom.com

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1870 Embarcadero Road

Palo Alto, California 94303-3308
Telephone: (650) 461-5600
Facsimile: (650) 461-5700

Attorneys for the Underwriter Defendants

ELECTRONICALLY

FILED

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

09/28/2015
Clerk of the Court
BY:VANESSA WU

Deputy Clerk

[Complete List of Underwriter Defendants Attached]

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

IN RE KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT )
PLC SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

This Document Relates To:

ALL ACTIONS

ESS

Lead Case No. CGC-15-544770

Assigned for All Purposes to
Hon. Curtis E.A. Karnow

CLASS ACTION

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
THE UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’
DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
COMPLAINT’S SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION, AND JOINDER IN THE KING
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY

Hearing Date: October 5, 2015

Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 304
Judge: Hon. Curtis E.A. Karnow

Action Filed: March 17, 2015

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY!

LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-544770—

Underwriter Defendants:

J. P. Morgan Securities LLC

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated
Barclays Capital Inc.

Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.

RBC Capital Markets LLC

BMO Capital Markets Corp.
Cowen and Company LLC

Pacific Crest Securities LLC

Piper Jaffray & Co.

Stifel Nicolaus & Company, Inc.
Wedbush Securities, Inc.

Raine Securities LLC

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UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY!
LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-544770

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLPCU Om NIN DH BP WN |

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[SULLIVAN @ CROMWELL LLP

The Underwriter Defendants respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in support of their demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint (“FAC”). The Underwriter Defendants also hereby join in the reply
brief filed by King Digital Entertainment plc (“King” or the ““Company”), Hope Cochran, Robert
S. Cohn, and E. Stanton McKee, Jr. (collectively with King, the “King Defendants”).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Underwriter Defendants directly sold, or solicited
the purchase of, Plaintiffs’ securities as required to state a cause of action under Section 12(a)(2)
of the Securities Act. In fact, the Opposition concedes that, with the exception of City of Taylor,
each of the Plaintiffs purchased their King stock in the aftermarket, not in King’s initial public
offering (the “IPO”). While Plaintiffs claims have always been deficient because Plaintiffs were
unable to allege the identity of the underwriter from whom they purchased their securities, it is
now clear that Plaintiffs did not purchase securities from King or the Underwriter Defendants at
all. (Opp. at 3-4.) This is the end of the inquiry. Because Plaintiffs never entered into a buyer-
seller relationship with Defendants, Plaintiffs are unable to state a Section 12(a)(2) cause of
action. Defendants’ demurrer should be sustained with prejudice.

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 12(A)(2) BECAUSE
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ALLEGE THAT DEFENDANTS SOLD OR
SOLICITED THE PURCHASE OF PLAINTIFFS’ SECURITIES

As explained in the Underwriter Defendants’ Demurrer, Plaintiffs do not state a
Claim for a violation of Section 12(a)(2) because they fail to allege the requisite sales activity by
any of the Underwriter Defendants. (Underwriters’ Br. at 3.) In the Opposition, Plaintiffs
misstate the elements of a Section 12(a)(2) claim — mistakenly citing the elements of a Section
11 claim — to support their argument that they need only plead a misstatement or omission in the
registration statement to state a prima facie claim under Section 12(a)(2). (Opp. at 1.) This is
not the law. To state a Section 12(a)(2) cause of action, “a plaintiff must plead or prove (1) that

a defendant directly sold stock to the plaintiff or (2) directly solicited the plaintiffs purchase of

UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY!
LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-544770oO ON DUH BR WN

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SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

stock.” In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).

Plaintiffs attempt to skirt these pleading requirements. Plaintiffs first argue that
the question of whether the FAC adequately alleges that Defendants are Section 12 sellers may
not be decided at the pleading stage. But the cases Plaintiffs cite rebut this assertion. In Jn re
Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., the court first analyzed whether the plaintiffs had adequately
pled that defendants had solicited their purchase of securities before leaving the determination of
“{w]hether or not defendants actually solicited plaintiffs’ sales” to the jury. 257 F.R.D. 534, 550
(N.D. Cal. 2009). The same is true for the other cases the Opposition cites. See In re
Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1120 (D. Nev. 1998) (finding that plaintiffs
had adequately pled Defendant’s status as a statutory seller, though noting that some of
plaintiffs’ allegations, including that defendant was a “substantial factor” in causing a sale of
securities, would not have been sufficient) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654 (1988); In
re Portal Software, Inc. Sec, Litig., 2006 WL 2385250, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2006) (holding
that “plaintiffs . . . pled sufficient facts to demonstrate defendants’ seller status for purposes of|
the present motion.”).

Plaintiffs argue that the Underwriters’ actions alleged in the FAC constitute
solicitation, but nowhere in the FAC do Plaintiffs allege facts showing that the Underwriter
Defendants’ solicited Plaintiffs’ purchase of securities. Plaintiffs point to no such facts in their
Opposition. They do not allege any facts to suggest that the Underwriter Defendants solicited
their particular purchases, and their allegations that the Underwriter Defendants engaged in some
activities in connection with promoting the IPO are not sufficient to plead the buyer-seller
relationship with these Plaintiffs required by Section 12(a)(2). See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp.
Mortg. Backed Sec. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (‘At the very least. . .
the language of [Section 12(a)(2)] contemplates a buyer-seller relationship not unlike traditional
contractual privity.” (quoting Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642)). Plaintiffs cite absolutely no facts to
support their vague allegation that “defendants promoted and sold King stock to plaintiffs and

other members of the class.” (FAC § 78.) While the FAC describes various services the

UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY|
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SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LL?

Underwriters Defendants were hired to perform (id. { 24), it makes no connection between the
Underwriters’ services and Plaintiffs’ stock purchases. See Moore v. Kayport Package Exp.,
Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1989) (allegations that defendants participated in meetings and
gave advice and counsel concerning the preparation of the prospectus and promotional materials
merely described the provision of professional services, and thus could not support a section 12
claim); see also In re CytRx Corp. Sec. Litig., 2015 WL 5031232, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 13,
2015) (“Even participation in road shows to promote the sale of stock does not constitute active
solicitation [under Pinter].” (quoting Maine State Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2011 WL
4389689, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2011)); see also In re Violin Memory Sec. Litig., 2014 WL
5525946, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (allegation that plaintiff “bought common stock . . .
directly from J.P. Morgan” was insufficient because “Plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts that
Underwriters actively and directly solicited, communicated with, or negotiated with Plaintiffs in
connection with their stock purchases.”).

Plaintiffs also fail to specify which of the Underwriter Defendants allegedly
solicited their purchases when arranging the roadshow, assisting in the IPO, advising King on the
registration statement, or engaging in any of the other activities listed in the Opposition. (Opp.
at 2-3.) In fact, as discussed below in Section II, Plaintiffs now appear to allege that they
purchased securities from an unidentified aftermarket seller — not King or the Underwriter
Defendants. (Opp. at 3-4.) This absence of any purchaser—seller connection between Plaintiffs
and any Underwriter Defendant is fatal to Plaintiffs’ Section 12(a)(2) claim (the Second Cause of
Action). See Maine State Ret. Sys., 2011 WL 4389689, at *10 (allegation that defendant
““promoted’ the sale of securities is not sufficient [because] Plaintiffs must include very specific
allegations of solicitation, including direct communication with Plaintiffs.” (internal citations
omitted); see also In re Charles Schwab Corp., 257 F.R.D. at 549 (holding that Section 12(a)(2)
requires “that the defendant be alleged to have had some ‘direct’ role in the solicitation of the
plaintiff... .”); In re DDi Corp. See. Litig., 2005 WL 3090882, at *18 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2005)
(“[A] defendant’s ‘simple involvement’ in the preparation of a registration statement is

insufficient to establish the sort of relationship between a buyer and seller required for liability
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under § 12(a)(2).” (citing In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F.Supp. 2d at 1121)); Weinstein
v. Jain, 1995 WL 787549, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) (dismissing Section 12 claim where
plaintiffs alleged only that “the Underwriters were a ‘substantial factor’ in the plaintiff's stock
purchase.”).
Il. PLAINTIFFS ALSO LACK STANDING UNDER SECTION 12(a)(2)

Plaintiffs also lack standing to pursue claims under Section 12(a)(2). “Section 12
... permits suit against a seller of a security by prospectus only by ‘the person purchasing such
security from him,’ thus specifying that a plaintiff must have purchased the security directly
from the issuer of the prospectus.” Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 1081
(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77/(a)(2)). The FAC does not allege from whom Plaintiffs
purchased securities, when they purchased securities, how they purchased the securities, or any
other details of their purchases. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs do not even pretend they
purchased directly from King or any Underwriter Defendant, but suggest that they purchased
shares in the secondary market and that those shares are “traceable” to the IPO. (Opp. at 3-4.)

Plaintiffs’ contention that secondary market purchases from third parties are
sufficient to grant them standing to assert Section 12(a)(2) claims against the Underwriter
Defendants is incorrect as a matter of law. See Rieckborn v. Jefferies LLC, 81 F. Supp. 3d 902,
925 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (‘“Purchasers in private or secondary market offerings do not have

standing to bring actions under [Section 12(a)(2)].”’ (quoting Jn re Ultrafem Inc. Sec. Litig., 91
F. Supp. 2d 678, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Primo v. Pac. Biosciences of California, Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 2d 1105, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[C]ourts, including those in the Northern District of
California that have considered this issue, have found that § 12(a)(2) liability does not extend to
aftermarket transactions.”); Maine State Ret. Sys., 2011 WL 4389689, at *11 (“To maintain a
claim under Section 12(a)(2), Plaintiffs must allege they purchased a security directly from the
issuer of the prospectus supplement, here the Section 12 Underwriter Defendants, as part of the
initial public offering rather than in the secondary market.”); In re Wells Fargo Mortgage-

Backed Certificates Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 958, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Unlike Section 11,

which permits an action by a plaintiff who has purchased a security that is merely ‘traceable to”
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UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY|
LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-544770po

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the challenged misstatement or omission, Section 12(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to plead and prove
that it purchased a security directly from the issuer as part of the initial offering, rather than in
the secondary market.”); In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 749 F. Supp. 2d 964, 976 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (same); Jn re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1183 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiffs fail to plead that they purchased the securities directly from specific
underwriters, or directly traceable to specific underwriters, as required.”).

This is not a debatable issue but a well settled principle of the limits of Section
12(a)(2). In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court found that

“[t]he intent of Congress and the design of the statute require that § 12(2) liability be limited to

public offerings.” Jd. at 578. In the wake of Gustafson, courts generally agree that plaintiffs

only have standing if they purchased their securities in the offering pursuant to the prospectus.
See Yung v. Lee, 432 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We now join [other] courts in holding
that... a Section 12(a)(2) action cannot be maintained by a plaintiff who acquires securities

through a private transaction, whether primary or secondary.”). Plaintiffs cite a District of

Connecticut case, Feiner v. SS&C Technologies, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D. Conn. 1999),
decided prior to the Second circuit’s decision in Yung v. Lee to argue that a Section 12(a)(2)
claim may be based on an aftermarket purchase of securities. Feiner is not good law and has
been explicitly rejected.' See In re Levi Strauss & Co. Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 965, 983
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting Feiner and holding that Ҥ 12 is limited to transactions purchased
pursuant to a public offering and, therefore, does not extend to any after market transactions.”);
see also Primo, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (same; collecting cases); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 2004 WL 1435356, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004) (“The Feiner analysis is not
persuasive.”).

! Plaintiffs also cite a series of cases from the Southern District of New York, all decided
in the 1990s prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Yung v. Lee and its other subsequent
decisions to the same effect. To the extent these cases can be read to hold that a mere allegation
of a security is “traceable to” an offering is sufficient to confer Section 12(a)(2) standing; they
are no longer good law. See Freidus v. Barclays Bank PLC, 734 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2013)
(finding plaintiffs’ allegations that they bought securities “issued pursuant or traceable to”
offering materials to be inadequate; “[i]n order to have standing under § 12(a)(2)... plaintiffs
must have purchased securities directly from the defendants.” (internal citations omitted)).

5.

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LL?”

UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY|
LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-544770—

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But even if Feiner were good law, Plaintiffs would still be unable to establish
standing to bring a Section 12 claim against the Underwriter Defendants. The Feiner Court held
that Section 12(a)(2) standing requires that the plaintiff purchased stock from the seller within
the fixed number of days during which delivery of a prospectus is required. 47 F. Supp. 2d
at 253. But the FAC does not include any facts concerning Plaintiffs’ purchase of King stock,
including who the seller was or when Plaintiffs’ purchases were made. And even under Feiner,
Plaintiffs must still allege a direct sales or solicitation relationship with Defendants. See Jn re
WorldCom, 2004 WL 1435356, at *5 (rejecting Feiner, but holding that allegations would fail
under that case as well because “the Complaint does not allege that the aftermarket purchasers
bought . . . directly from [defendants].”).

Plaintiffs cite a single California decision, Jn re FireEye, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14-
cv-266866 (Santa Clara Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 2015), in which the court found that plaintiffs had
adequately pled standing by “provid[ing] the ultimate fact allegation that they purchased shares
of FireEye common stock issued pursuant and traceable to the Registration Statement.” (Opp.
Ex. A.) That decision is wrong, but in that case the plaintiffs at least pled the number of shares
they purchased and the date they purchased the shares (the day after the offering). (Id.) FireEye
demonstrates that a plaintiff must plead fact allegations to survive a demurrer, consistent with
California’s pleading standards. See Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318 (1985) (A demurrer
“admit[s] all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of,
fact or law.”). Plaintiffs here have not pleaded any facts that would support Section 12(a)(2)
standing, which their conclusory allegation that Plaintiffs “purchased King common stock in
and/or traceable to the IPO” only serves to emphasize. (FAC §[ 5.); see also In re CytRx Corp
Sec. Litg., 2015 WL 5031232, at *14 (holding that allegations from plaintiffs who “purchased
pursuant to and/or traceable” to a public offering are “wish-washy allegations [that] are
insufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have Section 12 standing—either the [plaintiffs]
purchased shares directly from one of the Section 12 Defendants in the [public] Offering or they
did not.”); Jn re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 976 (“[P]laintiffs allege

that they ‘acquired’ securities ‘pursuant and/or traceable to’ the registration statements and
y q Pl 8)
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UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY|
LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-54477028

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

prospectus supplements . . . If plaintiffs did in fact purchase the Certificates directly from the
defendants, they should have said so. An evasive circumlocution does not suffice as a
substitute.” (citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in the Underwriter
Defendants’ opening brief and the briefs filed by the King Defendants, the Underwriter
Defendants respectfully request that the Court sustain its demurrer and dismiss the FAC’s First

and Second Causes of Action against the Underwriter Defendants without leave to amend.

Dated: September 25, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

Katie. ( Les che Le
Robert A. Sacks (CSBN 150146) L lA

sacksr@sullcrom.com

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1888 Century Park East

Los Angeles, California 90067-1725
Telephone: (310) 712-6600
Facsimile: (310) 712-8800

Laura Kabler Oswell (CSBN 241281)
oswelll@sullcrom.com

Kyle Niemi (CSBN 287404)
niemik@sullcrom.com

Jaswant Singh (CSBN 303428)
singhj@sullcrom.com
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1870 Embarcadero Road

Palo Alto, California 94303-3308
Telephone: (650) 461-5600
Facsimile: (650) 461-5700

Attorneys for the Underwriter Defendants

-7-

UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY]
LEAD CASE NO, CGC-15-5447701 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 Tam employed in the County of Santa Clara, State of California. I am over the agel
3 of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
1870 Embarcadero Road, Palo Alto, CA 94303.
4 On September 25, 2015, I served the following document(s):
5
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE
6] UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED
CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT’S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, AND JOINDER IN
7 THE KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY
8 on the interested parties in the subject action by serving a true copy thereof as indicated below:
9 BY E-SERVICE: by e-serving via FileAndServeXpress any of the
0 participants listed below who are registered to receive service through FileAndServeXpress in
this action.
1 U.S. MAIL: I caused such envelope to be deposited in the mail at Palo
2| Alto, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. _I am “readily
familiar with this firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is
3 || deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day in the ordinary course of business.
4 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
5 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
6 foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 25, 2015, at Palo Alto, California.
| r
7 Ns a
Nico Desanti
8
9
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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SERVICE LIST

IN RE KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT plc SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

Lead Case No.: CGC-15-544770

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

James I. Jaconette

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
& DOWD LLP

655 West Broadway, Suite 1900

San Diego, CA 92101

Telephone: (619) 231-1058

Facsimile: (619) 231-7423

jamesj@rgrdlaw.com

Shawn A. Williams
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN

& DOWD LLP
Post Montgomery Center
One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 288-4545
Facsimile: (415) 288-4534
shawnw@rgrdlaw.com

Samuel H. Rudman

Mary K. Blasy

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN &
DOWD LLP

58 South Service Road, Suite 200

Melville, NY 11747

Telephone: (631-367-7100

Facsimile: (631) 367-1173

John T. Jasnoch

SCOTT + SCOTT LLP
707 Broadway, Suite 1000
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 233-4565
Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
jjasnoch@scott-scott.com

Thomas L, Laughlin IV
Joseph V.. Halloran
Deborah Clark-Weintraub
Amanda Lawrence

SCOTT + SCOTT LLP
The Chrysler Building

405 Lexington Avenue, 40" Floor
New York, NY 10174
Telephone: (212) 223-6444
Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
jhalloran@scott-scott.com

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SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY]

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SERVICE LIST

IN RE KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT ple SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
Lead Case No.: CGC-15-544770

Executive Committee Members

Francis A. Bottini, Jr.

Albert Y. Chang

Yury A. Kolesnikov
BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.
7817 Ivanhoe Ave., Suite 102
La Jolla CA 92307
Telephone: (858) 914-2001
Facsimile: (858) 914-2002

Tan D. Berg

Takeo A. Keller

ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
11622 El Camino Real, Ste. 100

San Diego, CA 92130

Telephone: (858) 764-2580

Facsimile: (858) 764-2582

Jack G. Fruchter

ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
One Penn Plaza, Suite 2805

New York, NY 10119

Lionel Z. Glanzy

Robert V. Prongay

Case E. Sadler

GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100

Los Angeles, CA 90067

Telephone: (310) 201-9150

Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

Laurence Rosen

THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
355 South Grand Ave., Suite 2450
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 785-2610
Facsimile: (213) 226-4684

Phillip Kim

THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 34" Floor
New York, NY 10016

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UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS’ MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS’ REPLY|

LEAD CASE NO. CGC-15-5447701 SERVICE LIST
2 IN RE KING DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT plc SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
Lead Case No.: CGC-15-544770
3
4] Additional Counsel for Plaintiff Thomas C. Michaud
VANOVERBEKE MICHAUD &
5 TIMMONY, P.C.
79 Alfred Street
6 Detroit, MI 48201
Telephone: (313) 578-1200
7 Facsimile: (313) 578-1201
8 Howard G. Smith
LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD G. SMITH
9 3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
0 Bensalem, PA 19020
1] Attorneys for Defendants King Digital Kevin P. Muck
Entertainment PLC, Hope Cochran, Dean S. Kristy
2] Robert S. Cohn, E. Stanton McKee Marie C. Bafus
Nair Diana Chang
3 FENWICK & WEST LLP
555 California Street, 12" Floor
4 San Francisco, CA 94104
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UNDERWRITER DEFENDANTS" MEMO ISO DEMURRER AND JOINDER IN KING DEFENDANTS” REPLY]

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