Preview
KKAMALA D. HARRIS
Attorney General of California
Susan M. CARSON :
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
BEVERLEY R. MEYERS
Deputy Attorney General
State Bar No, 109624
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
Telephone: (415) 703-5545
Fax: (415) 703-5480
E-mail: beverley.meyers@doj.ca.gov _
Attorneys for Respondents
Department of Social Services & Director
ELECTRONICALLY
FILED
Superior Court of California, .
County of San Francisco
FEB 13 2015
Clerk of the Court
BY: ROMY RISK
Deputy Clerk ~
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
RONALD C. BROOKS,,
Petitioner,
WILL LIGHTBOURNE, Director,
California Department of Social Services;
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Respondent.
Case No, CPF-14-513757
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF
DECISION
Date: March 18, 2015
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept: 302
Judge: Hon. Emest Goldsmith
Action Filed: July 14, 2014
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)Oo I DH MW RB WwW NY
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I.
Request for Statement of Decision.
Conclusion
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Harmonizing the governing statute and its implementing regulation does
not except petitioner’s son from the MFG rule nor provide that petitioner’s
notice was insufficient.
A. The statutory and legislative scheme do not exempt justice from the
MFG rule’s application when justice began residing with petitioner. ....,...4
1 The plain language of the relevant statute provides that
petitioner is a member of the MFG’s child’s “family,” and
CDSS was required to provide notice of the rule only to the
custodial parent prior to justice’s DIT... sess sssesseesseeeceteseee 5
2. The regulation implementing the governing statute provides
that CDSS was required to give only the custodial parent
notice of the MFG rule prior to justice’s birth. oo. eee 7
3. Tn harmonizing the governing statute with the regulation, the
notice provisions apply to the custodial parent and justice is
considered an MFG child when he resides with either
parent...
There was ample evidence of timely notice of the MFG rule to justice’s
mother, Diaz, prior to fustice’s Dirt. cc secssessserestesssecssssesressuscsseeseseneeeneeetens 9
A. The Alj made appropriate findings, oo. seccsesesssscssssessneestcssresseenseeesnees 10
B.
The Calworks maximum family grant rule does not violate petitioner’s
rights of notice under due process
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)oO Om NID
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
American Federation of Labor v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
(1994) 23 Cab App.Ath 31 cceccecssessseessssscssscssssssesssssesssessesssssssssssusssnssvessssoneensecessanveseeentsseeseees 9
Bixby v, Pierno :
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 cies soeearseneessessseenes iessaveeuscseeseacancavsssssesseverseasnesavesseranseeneessoeses 2,9
Brinker Restaurant Corp, v. Superior Court
(2012) 53 Cal. 4th 1004... ecccseecsesssessesssesssssssssesessseseesssessssseesecsssssssssssssseeeasecsssssvesaneanccessnees 5
California Chamber of Commerce y. Brown
(2011) 196 Cal. App.4th 233.
Campbell v. Bd. of Dental Examiners
(L971) 17 Cal App.3d 872 ..cceccssseecesssecsesessessesscsmsasssiecmsneescenssnesssccnssseseanicuesuestsecsacqeesneess 2
Engine Manufacturers Association v. California Air Resources Board
(2014) 231 Cal App Ath 1022 cccsccssecscseesscsssssssesserssvesssecsusssereesnessnessesssneasuesessessenseegsacereenee 5
Frink vy. Prod
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 166 veccscssssssssesssersecssesssessssssesssssessssssssssssessersavesseesserseessssecsseceseseesssucensersanes 2
Fukuda v. City of Angels
(1999) 20 Cal.4! 805 vccccssssssssssssosessessesssisssessusssssessssssssssensssssassssssnssossassensesesonsessnacesseensesese 3
Harlow v, Carleson
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 731.
In re Social Services Payments
(2008) 166 Cal App.4? 1249. cssccsscussssssssissssessecssusssssssssesseieesasnessrarentsciessssesisnsseseeseeeees 9
Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins, Appeals Bd.
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 770 cecccecssesssscssresssrssssessessessseesssrssseecsecsssesssersrsesssessusesseessusesseessssnesssueranennnes 2
King y. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Ba.
(1972) 25 Cal App.3d 199 cessessseessesssnescsreessneecssessesesccseessecessmsasasceressuesensevetsusesensuessareesnees 2
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bad.
(1981) 29 Cab. 3d LOL ve cccsessseeseesseseesseessesssessesssssssssessessesseessesnmssessessseenbeseseassunssesesessesnessee 3
People v. Ramirez
supra, 168 Cal.App.4"...
Sneed v. Saenz
(2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220 cc cccsccseesseesssssseescsessesessmsecsssenessvenacsonsseueesevennceseeaneeces 1
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass’n
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 28
Wollmer v. City of Berkeley
(2011) 193 Cal-App.4th 1329 ...sssccssssssecssseeseesssesssssecessssesssserssssssssssssssiesgenvesessnuecsecresssnneeeesss 5
Yamaha Corp, of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 1
STATUTES
Code of Civil Procedure
§ 632.
.(b).
§ 1094.
Code Civil Procedure
§ 1094.5, subd, (c)
, sul
Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1094.5, subds, (b), (C)..cssescssessssessrseecseveessessssecsuscsssseqsenssssessnesarssavessuscssssssnesestensarsenseccssssseneetss 2
Welfare and Institution Code
§ 11205.
§ 11450.
Evidence Code
Government Code
§ L1S13, subd. (d) o.ceecccesssssscsssssseessnssssvecssssssvesssecsuveessecesvecssecssvssunecssvesvarsanvecsusennseessecesseessnes 12
Manual of Policies and Procedures
§ 19-004 wi
§ 22-050.2 10
§ 22-050.21 . 10
§ 22-050.3 10
§ 44-314 4, 5,9, 13
§44-314.14. 7
§ 44-314.2 7
§ 44-3143 3
§ 44.314,5 6
§ 44-314.55, 7
§ 82-832... .7
iii
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPE-14-513757)TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Welfare and Institutions Code
§ LOSSO, subd. (In) ...ssssesssseesnsescsseseeresenecsserssssessssecssserssseesssssssecsaeassesssensaresaressserse wl
§ 11450,04(a) eee
§ 11450.04, subd. (a)...
§ 11450.04, subd. (d)(3).
§ 11450.04, subds. (b) - @..
§ 11450,16, subd. (c).,
§ 11450, subd. (a)...
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution ...
OTHER AUTHORITIES
All County Letter No. 01-82 ..cccsssssessssssseessnesssssessecensssesssssesvecesesssvenssnesseessseqssssssepsnsatssseessavessunssenees 9
Black’s Law Dictionary ...
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) p. 637 wc cssseseesessessssesesrssseessssssseereseeesesnsseeceeatennsneenseessees 6
California DSS Manual: Eligibility and Assistance Standards § 82-820, at p. 911.4 (2014) 0.6
CW 2102 Required Form (2000), available at
http://www.cdss.ca.gov/cdssweb/entres/forms/English/CW2102.PDF ....seescccsesseeeeseentee 8
iv
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)INTRODUCTION
Respondents, California Department of Social Services and Director Lightbourne
(collectively CDSS), correctly determined that petitioner was ineligible for an increase in cash
payments under the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs)
program based on custody of his son, Justice, a child who is not covered by the CalWORKs’
assistance pursuant to the Maximum Family Grant (MFG) Rule, (Welf. & Inst. Code, §
11450.04.) This rule provides that “the number of needy persons in the same family shall not be
increased for any child born into a family that has received aid under this chapter continuously for
the 10 months prior to the birth of the child.” (/bid.) Petitioner Brooks (petitioner) argues that
the MFG rule was incorrectly applied to his son because petitioner did not reside with the mother
at the time she received notice of the Rule, and petitioner had no separate notice that the Rule
would apply to his child. The clear purpose of the MFG Rule is to disincentivize childbearing for
purposes of increased CalWORKS’ benefits while parents are receiving state assistance. “[T]he
manifest purpose of the MFG statute under CalWORKs [is] to promote personal responsibility
and encourage increased work efforts with a goal of eliminating a family’s dependence on public
assistance.” (Sneed v. Saenz (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1237, citing Welf. & Inst. Code §
11205.)
Although petitioner argues that application of the MFG rule violates his Due Process
rights under the United States Constitution, there is no such violation. There is no disagreement
that petitioner was not part of the Assistance Unit (AU) that consisted of Justice’s mother and
Justice when Justice’s mother received notice of the MFG Rule. CDSS provided notice of the
Rule ten months prior to Justice’s birth to Justice’s mother, and that was all that was required
under the governing statutes and regulations. Moreover, this was all the process that was duc; to
exempt Justice from the MFG Rule when he moves in with the other parent would force an end-
run around the Rule, and further familial dependence on public assistance.
Mt
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)co fC Ome I DH RY DY
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitioner bears the burden of proof in establishing his entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
(Campbell v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 872, 875-876.) The scope of this
Court’s inquiry, as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), is limited
to determining whether CDSS “has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there
was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” To establish that
CDSS abused its discretion, petitioner must demonstrate that CDSS “has not proceeded in the
manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are
not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ, Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b), (c).) Where, as here, “it
is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is
authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is
established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the
evidence.” (/d., subd. (c).)
In reviewing CDSS’s decision, the court uses an independent judgment standard of review,
“giving deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances of the
agency action.” (Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal Ath 1, 8;
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28; Bixby v. Pierno
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144.) The independent judgment standard is appropriate here due to the
implication of a fundamental vested right, based on “the character and quality of its economic
aspect; ... or} the character and quality of its human aspect.” (/nterstate Brands v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 780.) Eligibility for and continuation of
welfare benefits are fundamental vested rights. (Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166; Harlow y,
Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731.)
Under the independent judgment test, the superior court is required to weigh the
administrative evidence and exercise its independent judgment on that evidence, (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1094.5, subd, (c}, King v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 199, 203.)
The superior court may only find an abuse of discretion if the court determines that the
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)wn
D we aw A
administrative findings are not supported by the weight (preponderence) of the evidence. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) Under the independent judgment test, the party challenging the
administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the trial court that the administrative
findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4
805, 817.)
The trial court should review a legal issue de novo. (California Chamber of Commerce v,
Brown (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 233, 248.) Legal issues include questions of statutory
construction, (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d
101, 111.) Even under de novo review, however, an agency’s “view of a statute or regulation it
enforces is entitled to great weight” because of the agency’s expertise unless the agency’s view is
“clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” (Ibid).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner's son, Justice Diaz (Justice), was born on September 7, 2002 to Cynthia Diaz
(Diaz). (Administrative Record [AR], pp. 27, 52.) At the time of Justice’s birth, Diaz was
receiving CalWORKs aid for herself and another child. (AR, p. 27.) The County determined that
Justice was an MFG child, having reviewed the signed MFG form (August 1, 2001 CW2102) in
the file. (AR, p. 38.) The County also determined that Diaz had properly received notice of the
MFG tule at least ten months prior to Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth—by virtue of the August
1, 2001 CW2102 form, and thus Justice was determined to be an “MFG child,” ineligible for
additional cash aid to the family. (AR, p. 38) Petitioner was not a resident of the same household
or a member of the CalWORKS’ assistance unit (AU), and did not have an ongoing relationship
with Diaz when Justice was born. (AR, pp. 8-9.) After establishing paternity, petitioner began
paying child support to Diaz, and briefly obtained custody of Justice in 2005, (AR, p. 9.) After
petitioner obtained full custody of Justice in April 2008, petitioner applied for CalWORKS’
benefits for Justice and himself. (AR, p. 9.) :
Petitioner applied for and received assistance through the CalWORKs program in
September 2008. The County of San Mateo (County) sent petitioner a Notice of Action (NOA)
on September 4, 2008, approving the maximum allowable amount for one person, less income
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
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disregard. (AR, p. 9.) The NOA explained that petitioner’s son, then six years old and newly in
his custody, would not make the AU eligible for additional aid pursuant to the MFG rule. (AR, p.
19.)
Pour years later, on January 16, 2013, petitioner submitted a Hearing Request to the County
of San Mateo claiming that his “child should not have been MFG'd.” (AR, p. 21.) Petitioner
appeared to receive his last CalWORKs payment in March 2013 (AR, p. 23). On March 18,
2013, petitioner conditionally withdrew the request for hearing before CDSS based on the
County’s agreement to review his file. If it could be determined that the MFG Rule did not apply
because there was a 24-month break in aid, the County would correct the underpayment; if not,
petitioner was free to renew the hearing request. (AR, p. 24.) The County issued a NOA on April
15, 2013, informing petitioner that Justice was correctly determined to be an MFG child, and that
no additional cash aid was available. (AR, p. 25.) Petitioner again appealed, and on June 12,
2013, CDSS conducted a hearing. (AR, pp. 26, & 47-48.) Ina decision, dated July 17, 2013, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustained the County’s action and denied petitioner’s claim,
which CDSS adopted the same day. (AR, p. 2.) Petitioner now brings this petition for a writ of
administrative mandamus, challenging final CDSS’s decision.
ARGUMENT
I. HARMONIZING THE GOVERNING STATUTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
REGULATION DOES NOt EXCEPT PETITIONER’S SON FROM THE MFG
RULE NOR PROVIDE THAT PETITIONER’S NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT.
A. The Statutory and Legislative Scheme Do Not Exempt Justice from
the MFG Rule’s Application When Justice Began Residing with
Petitioner.
Harmonizing Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450.04 (which provides for no
increase in aid for children born into the same family where the family has received aid for 10
months prior to the child’s birth), and the regulation, MPP Section 44-314! (which states that
notice must be given to the custodial AU), require that petitioner was not entitled to separate
notice of the MFG Rule at the time of Justice’s birth or any other time. Courts are mindful that
' CDSS’s regulations are set forth in the MPP, (People v. Ramirez, supra, 168
Cal.App.4" at p, 73.)
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)they “must construe the language of statutes and regulation in context,” and “must harmonize
these laws both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Wollmer y. City of
Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1349.) To the extent a regulation and a statute overlap,
courts should seek to harmonize them, as a court would with any two statutes. (Brinker
Restaurant Corp. v, Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027.7
Here, petitioner argues that because he was not part of Justice’s AU at the time of Justice’s
birth—when he did not even know Diaz was pregnant—any mandatory notice requirement does
not apply to him, and therefore, because he did not personally and timely receive notice of the
MFG Rule, the Rule does not apply to him. Harmonizing Welfare and Institutions Code section
11450.04 with MPP Section 44-314, it is clear that the MFG Rule applies to the whole family,
including petitioner, and notice is required only to the custodial parent, who is part of the 4U, ten
months before the birth of the child, In this case, notice to petitioner would have been impossible
since he was not identified as part of the family ten months prior to Justice’s birth.
1. The Plain Language of the Relevant Statute Provides that
Petitioner is a Member of the MFG’s Child’s “Family,” and
CDSS Was Required to Provide Notice of the Rule Only to the
Custodial Parent Prior to Justice’s Birth.
Neither the plain language of the MFG Rule, which is set forth in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 11450.04, nor the implementing regulations—-CDS8S’s Manual of Policies and
Procedures (MPP) Section 44-314, exempt petitioner’s son from the reach of the Rule. The MFG
Rule states as follows:
For purposes of determining the maximum aid payment specified in
subdivision (a) of Section 11450 and for no other purpose, the number of needy
persons in the same family shall not be increased for any child born into a family
2 Engine Manufacturers Association v, California Air Resources Board (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1022, 1036 (The court’s “fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature's
intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.” Courts “first examine the statutory language, giving
ita plain and commonsense meaning,” But, courts “do not examine that language in isolation, but
in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” Further, “[i]f the language is clear, courts
must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative
history, and public policy.” (Zbid.))
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)that has received aid under this chapter continuously for the 10 months prior to
the birth of the child.
(Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450.04, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) The exceptions to the Rule are
specifically set forth in statute, and include: children born as a result of rape, incest, contraceptive
failure (where an intrauterine device (UD) or Norplant was used, or either parent was sterilized);
child was born before 1995; family has not received aid for more than 24 months; child was
conceived when either parent was a non-needy caretaker relative; and, child is no longer living
with either parent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450.04, subds, (b) ~ (d); see also, MPP Section 44-
314.5.) Because petitioner’s situation does not fall within any of the specific exceptions created
by the Legislature, the MFG Rule applies to him.
“Family” includes blood relatives such as petitioner, Justice’s father. Petitioner argues that
his own AU, or household, did not receive notice. However, the MFG Rule states that aid will
not be increased for any child “born into a family” that has received aid continuously for 10
months before the birth of the child. (Cal, Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450.04(a) [emphasis added.)
The CalWORKs AU is indeed the household: CDSS regulations explain construction of an
assistance unit to include at least one of a number of eligible persons, and “[t]he AU shall include
the following persons when living in the same home and eligible at the time of initial family
application .. . :” the applicant child, any eligible siblings, and any parent. (California DSS
Manual: Eligibility and Assistance Standards § 82-820, at p. 911.4 (2014).)
CDSS has not explicitly defined “family” in its regulations, so the common understanding
of the term is applicable. Black’s Law Dictionary defines family first as a “group of persons
connected by blood, by affinity, or by law, esp. within two or three generations”; second as a
“group consisting of parents and their children’; and only third as a “group of persons who live
together and have a shared commitment to a domestic relationship.” (Black’s Law Dictionary
(8th ed. 2004) p. 637.)
Based upon the premise that the MFG Rule does not apply when the child is no longer
living in the “same house with either parent,” the converse is true: the MFG Rule applies while
the child is living in the same house with either parent. Welfare and Institutions Code section
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RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)11450.04, subdivision (d)(3) provides that the MFG rule will not apply if the child is no longer
living in the “same home with either parent.” While there is no legislative or procedural history
that defines the term “same home,” CDSS has interpreted this over the years, through regulations
in CDSS’s Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP) Section 44-314.55, to mean “not living with
either parent.” The section specifies that the MFG Rule does not apply if the child is not living
with cither parent. So therefore, the converse should also be true: the MFG Rule does apply when
the child is living with one of his parents.
2, The Regulation Implementing the Governing Statute Provides
that CDSS Was Required to Give Only the Custodial Parent
Notice of the MFG Rule Prior to Justice’s Birth.
Under the regulations, Justice is an MFG child. MPP Section 44-314.14 defines “MFG
Child” as “the child. . . that is not included in the AU size for the purpose of determining the
MAP [Maximum Aid Payment].” Further, MPP Section 44-314.2 states, “[w]hen a child is born
into an AU that has received aid for at least ten months immediately prior to the birth, the child
shall not be included in the AU size for the purpose of determining the MAP.” Justice is clearly
an MFG child because it is undisputed that he was residing with mother, Diaz, the custodial
parent, when he was born, and she was receiving aid ten months prior to his birth. (AR, pp. 28,
33, & 38.)
It is likewise undisputed that petitioner was not part of Justice’s mother AU, but this does
not preclude notice to the MFG child’s mother to be imputed to the father. When Justice was
born, petitioner was not living with Justice’s mother, and therefore, petitioner was not part of that
AU. “Every AU shall include the eligible parents of the eligible child when those persons reside
in the same house as the eligible child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450.16, subd. (c) (emphasis
added).)? Nonetheless, as we shall explain below, the MFG Rule follows Justice, and the only
notice CDSS was required to give—was to Diaz, Justice’s mother, the custodial parent when
Justice was born. Indeed, it would have been impossible to have provided petitioner notice under
the Rule ten months prior to Justice’s birth, when under the circumstances, he was not living with
3 Bven a father of an unborn child living in the home with the mother is excluded from the
AU, unless the father is the caretaker relative or parent of an eligible child. (MPP § 82-832.)
7
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)Diaz at the time, Indeed, petitioner testified he did not even know he had a child with Diaz until
she sued him for paternity. (AR, pp. 9 & 62.)
3. In Harmonizing the Governing Statute with the Regulation, the
Notice Provisions Apply to the Custodial Parent and Justice is
Considered an MFG Child When He Resides with Either
Parent.
Notice provisions appear only in CDSS’s regulations, and provide that the MFG Rule
applies as long as the AU received notice of the rule at least ten months prior to the child’s birth,
(MPP § 44-314.3.) This necessarily would have been the AU in which Justice was born—Diaz’s
AU, and notice was properly received there. MPP Section 44-314.3 specifically provides that the
MFG Rule applies “when the AU has received written notice of the MFG at least ten months prior
to the birth of the child,” and there has been no break in aid of at least two consecutive months
prior to the month of the birth of the child. Because Justice’s mother received notice ten months
prior to Justice’s birth, the MFG Rule applies to that AU, and was properly given.
No notice was required to be given to petitioner at any time once notice was given to the
custodial parent in the AU prior to Justice’s birth. The actual notice CDSS has provided aid
recipients since 2000 explains that the MFG rule will not apply if “no adult in your family
received written notice of the MFG rule at least ten months before the birth of the child.”
(California Department of Social Services, The Maximum Family Grant Rule (MFG) for
Recipients of Cash Aid, CW 2102 Required Form (2000), available at
hitp://www.cdss.ca.pov/edssweb/entres/forms/English/CW2102.PDF (emphasis added); see also,
_ AR, p. 34 [CW2102 provided to petitioner, which he signed on March 25, 2008].) Because
Jastice’s mother, Diaz, was an adult in Justice’s family, and properly received notice, the MFG
Rule applies.
Since November 2001, CDSS has explained that the very factual scenario at issue here
would result in the child remaining an MFG child. In an All County Letter (ACL) dated
November 2001 (prior to Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth), CDSS makes clear that the MFG
Rule follows the child. The letter poses the following relevant question and answer:
8
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPE-14-513757)A child was born into an existing AU in county #1 where mom was on aid for
more than ten months prior to the birth of the child. The MFG rule was applied to
the child. The child now lives with her father in county #2. Does the MFG rule
still apply? Also, what ifthe father was not previously on aid and had not been
notified of the MFG rule?
Yes, the MFG rule would be applied if county #2 can document that the AU
(mom) was appropriately notified of the MFG based on information from county
#1, even if the other parent (father) was not an AU member when the written
notice was sent to the AU. The MFG rule applies because the child was born into
an AU that had been receiving aid for the ten months prior to the birth of the child.
When the child went to live with the father, the MFG rule continues to apply.
(AR, p. 45, All County Letter No. 01-82, State of California ~ Health and Human Services
Agency, Department of Social Services, November 26, 2001, 423.) CDSS has interpreted the
MFG Rule, as set forth in MPP Section 44-314 since at least 2001 (as stated in the ACL)—a year
before Justice’s birth to require that the MFG status stays with the child. This long-standing
interpretation deserves deference, The Court is required to take judicial notice of CDSS’s ACLs
and accord deference to CDSS’s longstanding interpretations of the law expressed in the ACL.
(In re Social Services Payments (2008) 166 Cal.App.4" 1249, 1271 [citations omitted].} Further,
courts are required to accord great weight to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, and
only reject agency interpretations where they are contrary to statutory intent. (See American
Federation of Labor . California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 51, 58 [deference required for interpretation of a regulation|.)
Il, THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE MFG
RULE TO JUSTICE’S MOTHER, DIAZ, PRIOR TO JUSTICE’S BIRTH.
The issue.is whether the Administrative Law Judge abused his or her discretion in finding
that the child’s mother, Diaz, had notice of the MFG Rule at least ten months prior to Justice’s
birth. In reviewing CDSS’s decision, the court exercises an independent judgment standard of
review, “giving deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances of
the agency action.” (Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 1, 8;
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass’n (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28; Bixdy v. Pierno
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144.) There is no such abuse of discretion, and indeed, the weight of the
9
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)evidence supports this finding. (See Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5, subd. (c).) ‘There was also
reasonable and ample evidence that Diaz received notice of the MFG Rule ten months before its
application,
A. The ALJ Made Appropriate Findings.
Petitioner improperly asserts that the ALJ did not make this specific finding about notice
received by Diaz, Justice’s mother, of the MFG Rule ten months before Justice’s birth, and its
absence results in an insufficient finding, But, the ALJ noted that the county appeals specialist
stated that the mother of the child was given the appropriate notices and received aid ten months
prior to the birth of the child, making the child an MFG child. (AR, p. 3.) In the conclusion of
the decision, the ALJ: found that the County determined the child to be an MFG child and
ineligible to receive CalWORKs’ benefits; had reviewed the facts and determined the County’s
action denying benefits must be sustained; and that the Rule applies because the child was born
into an AU that had been receiving aid ten months prior to the birth of the child. (AR, p. 5.) The
ALJ, thus, plainly stated the reasons for the decision concerning the ALJ’s decision finding
Justice an MFG child.
B. There Was Reasonable and Ample Evidence that Diaz Received
Notice,
Although petitioner contends there is no non-hearsay evidence supporting Justice’s
mother’s Diaz’s notice of the MFG Rule, as CDSS will show below, there is no requirement that
there be non-hearsay evidence, but instead only “reasonable” evidence. Under the MPP, there is
no reference to hearsay at all and, therefore, there is no specific limitation to its admission at the
administrative hearing.’ MPP Section 22-050,2 provides that the evidence permitted is the “sort
of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.”
The evidence identified below is the sort of evidence that reasonable persons could rely upon to
show that notice.
“Tn hearings under the MPP, the ALJ is not bound by the rules of evidence, and shall
consider the nature of the evidence in assessing its probative value. (MPP §§ 22-050,21 & 22-
050.3.)
10
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)oD em ID
The weight of the record evidence supports that the child’s mother received the notice
required timely. First, on January 16, 2013, petitioner submitted a Hearing Request to the
County of San Mateo claiming that his “child should not have been MFG’d.” (AR, p. 32.) On
March 18, 2013, petitioner conditionally withdrew the request for hearing before CDSS based on
the County’s agreement to review his file. The County had agreed to review petitioner’s file and
that “if it can be reasonably certain that there was a 24 month break in aid, the County would
correct the underpayment,” and, if not, petitioner was free to renew his hearing request. (AR, p.
33.) The County issued a Notice of Action on April 15, 2013, informing petitioner that
it was found that the claimant’s child Justice Brooks was correctly determined to be a MFG
child and correctly remains deemed a MFG child not entitled to Cal WORKS benefits.
Required sign MFG forms (CW2102) on file. This notification is being send out to the
claimant to inform of the such findings and decision by the county.
(AR, p. 38.) Therefore, the implication from the notice is that the CW2102 was timely sent to
Diaz (and there was no break in aid).
Second, the ACL that was effective November 26, 2001 stated that counties were required
to use the CW2102 form as of August 2000, so that form was in effect prior to Justice’s birth.
(AR, p. 40.) Justice was born on September 7, 2002 (AR, p. 27). Thus, the County was required
to give Justice’s AU notice of the MFG Rule ten months prior to his birth—on or by November 7,
2001, Given Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth and that the County was required to give Justice’s
AU notice of the MFG Rule via the CW2012, effective August 2000, this policy, set forth in the
ACL, certainly suggests that the County provided notice via the CW2102 form ten months before
Justice’s birth.
Third, the County representative indicated that the file reflects that the proper CW2102 was
given timely to Cynthia, Justice’s mother, in both his position paper and in his testimony. In the
County representative’s position paper, the County stated that “Form CW2102 signed by the case
payee were found dated August 1, 2001, July 11, 2002, July 31, 2003, and July 27, 2004 (exhibit
1).” (AR, p. 28.) There was no objection to this reference in the County position paper. At the
5 Evidence Code section 664 provides that an official is presumed to have regularly
performed his or her official duty.
i
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)hearing, the County representative testified that he was not making the CW2102 available
because it was confidential’ as to the mother, Petitioner’s counsel appears to contend that the
County representative’s testimony about the CW2102 is hearsay. (AR, p. 11.) Here, petitioner’s
representative did not object to hearsay in the County position paper, so that evidence about the
County’s timely provision of the CW2102 form is unobjected-to hearsay and admissible. (See
Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (d).)
The evidence of CDSS’s ACL-—requiring that the CW2102 form be given to an
applicant/recipient, effective August 2000, coupled with the County Position Paper showing the
payee signed the CW2102 form as of August 1, 2001, show that Diaz had notice of the MFG Rule
as of August 1, 2001 at least ten months prior to Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth. Actually, she
received notice some 13 months prior to Justice’s birth.
Petitioner improperly contends that CDSS violated his Due Process rights when he was not
permitted to see evidence of the actual MFG Rule notice that Diaz received. As mentioned above,
there was ample circumstantial evidence of Diaz’s timely receipt of the CW2102 form.
Petitioner attended an evidentiary hearing on this issue, and had an opportunity to object to all of
the evidence stated above, and actually did object to the lack of the specific notice entered into
evidence. Under all the circumstances mentioned above, the ALJ was well within his or her
discretion to find that the County sent timely notice of the Rule to Diaz, and petitioner has not
been deprived of any process here.
IU THE CALWORKS MAXIMUM FAMILY GRANT RULE DOES NOT VIOLATE
PETITIONER’S RIGHTS OF NOTICE UNDER DUE PROCESS,
The “family” that includes petitioner had ample notice of the MFG Rule. As the statute and
regulation require, CDSS gave notice at least ten months prior to Justice’s birth to the custodial
parent. That is all the notice that is required, and that is what CDSS provided. Petitioner’s
concept of notice makes no sense under the circumstances. He seems to argue that because he
5 The County representative did not act unreasonably in attempting to protect the
confidentiality of Diaz’s records at the hearing. Generally, all documents related to the
administration of social services are confidential with limited exceptions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §
10850, subd. (h) & MPP §19-004.)
12
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPP-14-513757)was not part of the AU, who received notice prior to Justice’s birth, the MFG Rule should just
vanish, and petitioner should receive a higher grant including Justice now that Justice resides with
petitioner. The focus must be upon notice at the time the child was conceived.
To allow the child’s parents to overcome the reduction in funding by living apart or giving
custody to the other parent defeats the purpose of the Rule. It makes no sense to review the
notice to the custodial AU, under MPP Section 44-314, as exempting Justice from the MFG Rule
now—at some point after his birth, CDSS gave notice to the entire “family”—including
petitioner, when CDSS notified the custodial mother of the MFG Rule ten months before Justice’s
birth, Any other construction of the notice provision would defeat the entire point of the rule—
informing families, who are considering childbearing decisions or are engaging in behavior that
runs the risk of childbearing, that the MFG Rule will apply prospectively,
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION
For all the above reasons and based upon the Administrative Record in this case, there is no
factual or legal basis for issuance of a writ of administrative mandate, and the petition should be
denied, However, in the event the court grants any relief to petitioner, CDSS respectfully
requests pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632 that the court issue a Statement of
Decision explaining the factual and legal basis for any determination that petitioner is indeed
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13
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)eligible for an increase in assistance despite the MFG rule, or that notice was improperly given.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and based upon the weight of the evidence in the Administrative
Record, CDSS requests that the petition for a writ of mandate be denied.
Dated: February 12, 2015 . Respectfully Submitted,
KAMALA D, HARRIS
Attorney General of California
SUSAN M. CARSON
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Ben by EMongs
BEVERLEY R, MEYERS
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
Department of Social Services & Director
SF2014409191/41208684.doc
4
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND
REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL
Case Name: Brooks, Ronald v. Lightbourne
No.: CPE-14-513757
I declare:
Iam employed in the Office of the Attorney General; which is the office of a member of the
California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or
older and not a party to this matter. | am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the
Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United
States Postal Service.
On February 13. 2015, I served the attached RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT
OF DECISION by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail, addressed as follows:
Benjamin Pulliam
Latham & Watkins LLP - San Francisco
505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111-2562
E-mail: :Benjamin, Pulliam@lw,com
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true
and correct and that this declaration was executed on February 13,2015, at San Francisco,
California,
Ryan Lau Koon 2 —
Declarant OO Signature
SRIOL4A09TL
41208959.doc
Preview
KKAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California Susan M. CARSON : Supervising Deputy Attorney General BEVERLEY R. MEYERS Deputy Attorney General State Bar No, 109624 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 703-5545 Fax: (415) 703-5480 E-mail: beverley.meyers@doj.ca.gov _ Attorneys for Respondents Department of Social Services & Director ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, . County of San Francisco FEB 13 2015 Clerk of the Court BY: ROMY RISK Deputy Clerk ~ SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO RONALD C. BROOKS,, Petitioner, WILL LIGHTBOURNE, Director, California Department of Social Services; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent. Case No, CPF-14-513757 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION Date: March 18, 2015 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept: 302 Judge: Hon. Emest Goldsmith Action Filed: July 14, 2014 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)Oo I DH MW RB WwW NY ce 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IL I. Request for Statement of Decision. Conclusion TABLE OF CONTENTS Harmonizing the governing statute and its implementing regulation does not except petitioner’s son from the MFG rule nor provide that petitioner’s notice was insufficient. A. The statutory and legislative scheme do not exempt justice from the MFG rule’s application when justice began residing with petitioner. ....,...4 1 The plain language of the relevant statute provides that petitioner is a member of the MFG’s child’s “family,” and CDSS was required to provide notice of the rule only to the custodial parent prior to justice’s DIT... sess sssesseesseeeceteseee 5 2. The regulation implementing the governing statute provides that CDSS was required to give only the custodial parent notice of the MFG rule prior to justice’s birth. oo. eee 7 3. Tn harmonizing the governing statute with the regulation, the notice provisions apply to the custodial parent and justice is considered an MFG child when he resides with either parent... There was ample evidence of timely notice of the MFG rule to justice’s mother, Diaz, prior to fustice’s Dirt. cc secssessserestesssecssssesressuscsseeseseneeeneeetens 9 A. The Alj made appropriate findings, oo. seccsesesssscssssessneestcssresseenseeesnees 10 B. The Calworks maximum family grant rule does not violate petitioner’s rights of notice under due process i RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)oO Om NID TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES American Federation of Labor v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1994) 23 Cab App.Ath 31 cceccecssessseessssscssscssssssesssssesssessesssssssssssusssnssvessssoneensecessanveseeentsseeseees 9 Bixby v, Pierno : (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 cies soeearseneessessseenes iessaveeuscseeseacancavsssssesseverseasnesavesseranseeneessoeses 2,9 Brinker Restaurant Corp, v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 1004... ecccseecsesssessesssesssssssssesessseseesssessssseesecsssssssssssssseeeasecsssssvesaneanccessnees 5 California Chamber of Commerce y. Brown (2011) 196 Cal. App.4th 233. Campbell v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (L971) 17 Cal App.3d 872 ..cceccssseecesssecsesessessesscsmsasssiecmsneescenssnesssccnssseseanicuesuestsecsacqeesneess 2 Engine Manufacturers Association v. California Air Resources Board (2014) 231 Cal App Ath 1022 cccsccssecscseesscsssssssesserssvesssecsusssereesnessnessesssneasuesessessenseegsacereenee 5 Frink vy. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166 veccscssssssssesssersecssesssessssssesssssessssssssssssessersavesseesserseessssecsseceseseesssucensersanes 2 Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4! 805 vccccssssssssssssosessessesssisssessusssssessssssssssensssssassssssnssossassensesesonsessnacesseensesese 3 Harlow v, Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731. In re Social Services Payments (2008) 166 Cal App.4? 1249. cssccsscussssssssissssessecssusssssssssesseieesasnessrarentsciessssesisnsseseeseeeees 9 Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins, Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770 cecccecssesssscssresssrssssessessessseesssrssseecsecsssesssersrsesssessusesseessusesseessssnesssueranennnes 2 King y. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Ba. (1972) 25 Cal App.3d 199 cessessseessesssnescsreessneecssessesesccseessecessmsasasceressuesensevetsusesensuessareesnees 2 Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bad. (1981) 29 Cab. 3d LOL ve cccsessseeseesseseesseessesssessesssssssssessessesseessesnmssessessseenbeseseassunssesesessesnessee 3 People v. Ramirez supra, 168 Cal.App.4"... Sneed v. Saenz (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220 cc cccsccseesseesssssseescsessesessmsecsssenessvenacsonsseueesevennceseeaneeces 1 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass’n (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal-App.4th 1329 ...sssccssssssecssseeseesssesssssecessssesssserssssssssssssssiesgenvesessnuecsecresssnneeeesss 5 Yamaha Corp, of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 STATUTES Code of Civil Procedure § 632. .(b). § 1094. Code Civil Procedure § 1094.5, subd, (c) , sul Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, subds, (b), (C)..cssescssessssessrseecseveessessssecsuscsssseqsenssssessnesarssavessuscssssssnesestensarsenseccssssseneetss 2 Welfare and Institution Code § 11205. § 11450. Evidence Code Government Code § L1S13, subd. (d) o.ceecccesssssscsssssseessnssssvecssssssvesssecsuveessecesvecssecssvssunecssvesvarsanvecsusennseessecesseessnes 12 Manual of Policies and Procedures § 19-004 wi § 22-050.2 10 § 22-050.21 . 10 § 22-050.3 10 § 44-314 4, 5,9, 13 §44-314.14. 7 § 44-314.2 7 § 44-3143 3 § 44.314,5 6 § 44-314.55, 7 § 82-832... .7 iii RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPE-14-513757)TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Welfare and Institutions Code § LOSSO, subd. (In) ...ssssesssseesnsescsseseeresenecsserssssessssecssserssseesssssssecsaeassesssensaresaressserse wl § 11450,04(a) eee § 11450.04, subd. (a)... § 11450.04, subd. (d)(3). § 11450.04, subds. (b) - @.. § 11450,16, subd. (c)., § 11450, subd. (a)... CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS United States Constitution ... OTHER AUTHORITIES All County Letter No. 01-82 ..cccsssssessssssseessnesssssessecensssesssssesvecesesssvenssnesseessseqssssssepsnsatssseessavessunssenees 9 Black’s Law Dictionary ... Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) p. 637 wc cssseseesessessssesesrssseessssssseereseeesesnsseeceeatennsneenseessees 6 California DSS Manual: Eligibility and Assistance Standards § 82-820, at p. 911.4 (2014) 0.6 CW 2102 Required Form (2000), available at http://www.cdss.ca.gov/cdssweb/entres/forms/English/CW2102.PDF ....seescccsesseeeeseentee 8 iv RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)INTRODUCTION Respondents, California Department of Social Services and Director Lightbourne (collectively CDSS), correctly determined that petitioner was ineligible for an increase in cash payments under the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) program based on custody of his son, Justice, a child who is not covered by the CalWORKs’ assistance pursuant to the Maximum Family Grant (MFG) Rule, (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450.04.) This rule provides that “the number of needy persons in the same family shall not be increased for any child born into a family that has received aid under this chapter continuously for the 10 months prior to the birth of the child.” (/bid.) Petitioner Brooks (petitioner) argues that the MFG rule was incorrectly applied to his son because petitioner did not reside with the mother at the time she received notice of the Rule, and petitioner had no separate notice that the Rule would apply to his child. The clear purpose of the MFG Rule is to disincentivize childbearing for purposes of increased CalWORKS’ benefits while parents are receiving state assistance. “[T]he manifest purpose of the MFG statute under CalWORKs [is] to promote personal responsibility and encourage increased work efforts with a goal of eliminating a family’s dependence on public assistance.” (Sneed v. Saenz (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1237, citing Welf. & Inst. Code § 11205.) Although petitioner argues that application of the MFG rule violates his Due Process rights under the United States Constitution, there is no such violation. There is no disagreement that petitioner was not part of the Assistance Unit (AU) that consisted of Justice’s mother and Justice when Justice’s mother received notice of the MFG Rule. CDSS provided notice of the Rule ten months prior to Justice’s birth to Justice’s mother, and that was all that was required under the governing statutes and regulations. Moreover, this was all the process that was duc; to exempt Justice from the MFG Rule when he moves in with the other parent would force an end- run around the Rule, and further familial dependence on public assistance. Mt Mt 1 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)co fC Ome I DH RY DY STANDARD OF REVIEW Petitioner bears the burden of proof in establishing his entitlement to a writ of mandamus. (Campbell v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 872, 875-876.) The scope of this Court’s inquiry, as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), is limited to determining whether CDSS “has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” To establish that CDSS abused its discretion, petitioner must demonstrate that CDSS “has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ, Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b), (c).) Where, as here, “it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.” (/d., subd. (c).) In reviewing CDSS’s decision, the court uses an independent judgment standard of review, “giving deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances of the agency action.” (Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal Ath 1, 8; Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144.) The independent judgment standard is appropriate here due to the implication of a fundamental vested right, based on “the character and quality of its economic aspect; ... or} the character and quality of its human aspect.” (/nterstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 780.) Eligibility for and continuation of welfare benefits are fundamental vested rights. (Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166; Harlow y, Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731.) Under the independent judgment test, the superior court is required to weigh the administrative evidence and exercise its independent judgment on that evidence, (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd, (c}, King v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 199, 203.) The superior court may only find an abuse of discretion if the court determines that the 2 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)wn D we aw A administrative findings are not supported by the weight (preponderence) of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) Under the independent judgment test, the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the trial court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4 805, 817.) The trial court should review a legal issue de novo. (California Chamber of Commerce v, Brown (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 233, 248.) Legal issues include questions of statutory construction, (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 111.) Even under de novo review, however, an agency’s “view of a statute or regulation it enforces is entitled to great weight” because of the agency’s expertise unless the agency’s view is “clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” (Ibid). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Petitioner's son, Justice Diaz (Justice), was born on September 7, 2002 to Cynthia Diaz (Diaz). (Administrative Record [AR], pp. 27, 52.) At the time of Justice’s birth, Diaz was receiving CalWORKs aid for herself and another child. (AR, p. 27.) The County determined that Justice was an MFG child, having reviewed the signed MFG form (August 1, 2001 CW2102) in the file. (AR, p. 38.) The County also determined that Diaz had properly received notice of the MFG tule at least ten months prior to Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth—by virtue of the August 1, 2001 CW2102 form, and thus Justice was determined to be an “MFG child,” ineligible for additional cash aid to the family. (AR, p. 38) Petitioner was not a resident of the same household or a member of the CalWORKS’ assistance unit (AU), and did not have an ongoing relationship with Diaz when Justice was born. (AR, pp. 8-9.) After establishing paternity, petitioner began paying child support to Diaz, and briefly obtained custody of Justice in 2005, (AR, p. 9.) After petitioner obtained full custody of Justice in April 2008, petitioner applied for CalWORKS’ benefits for Justice and himself. (AR, p. 9.) : Petitioner applied for and received assistance through the CalWORKs program in September 2008. The County of San Mateo (County) sent petitioner a Notice of Action (NOA) on September 4, 2008, approving the maximum allowable amount for one person, less income 3 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)Oo Oo I DH BBN moo = Ss oe NID A RB WD NN YY NN Y BRR RE BRE S disregard. (AR, p. 9.) The NOA explained that petitioner’s son, then six years old and newly in his custody, would not make the AU eligible for additional aid pursuant to the MFG rule. (AR, p. 19.) Pour years later, on January 16, 2013, petitioner submitted a Hearing Request to the County of San Mateo claiming that his “child should not have been MFG'd.” (AR, p. 21.) Petitioner appeared to receive his last CalWORKs payment in March 2013 (AR, p. 23). On March 18, 2013, petitioner conditionally withdrew the request for hearing before CDSS based on the County’s agreement to review his file. If it could be determined that the MFG Rule did not apply because there was a 24-month break in aid, the County would correct the underpayment; if not, petitioner was free to renew the hearing request. (AR, p. 24.) The County issued a NOA on April 15, 2013, informing petitioner that Justice was correctly determined to be an MFG child, and that no additional cash aid was available. (AR, p. 25.) Petitioner again appealed, and on June 12, 2013, CDSS conducted a hearing. (AR, pp. 26, & 47-48.) Ina decision, dated July 17, 2013, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustained the County’s action and denied petitioner’s claim, which CDSS adopted the same day. (AR, p. 2.) Petitioner now brings this petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, challenging final CDSS’s decision. ARGUMENT I. HARMONIZING THE GOVERNING STATUTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATION DOES NOt EXCEPT PETITIONER’S SON FROM THE MFG RULE NOR PROVIDE THAT PETITIONER’S NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT. A. The Statutory and Legislative Scheme Do Not Exempt Justice from the MFG Rule’s Application When Justice Began Residing with Petitioner. Harmonizing Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450.04 (which provides for no increase in aid for children born into the same family where the family has received aid for 10 months prior to the child’s birth), and the regulation, MPP Section 44-314! (which states that notice must be given to the custodial AU), require that petitioner was not entitled to separate notice of the MFG Rule at the time of Justice’s birth or any other time. Courts are mindful that ' CDSS’s regulations are set forth in the MPP, (People v. Ramirez, supra, 168 Cal.App.4" at p, 73.) 4 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)they “must construe the language of statutes and regulation in context,” and “must harmonize these laws both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Wollmer y. City of Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1349.) To the extent a regulation and a statute overlap, courts should seek to harmonize them, as a court would with any two statutes. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v, Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027.7 Here, petitioner argues that because he was not part of Justice’s AU at the time of Justice’s birth—when he did not even know Diaz was pregnant—any mandatory notice requirement does not apply to him, and therefore, because he did not personally and timely receive notice of the MFG Rule, the Rule does not apply to him. Harmonizing Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450.04 with MPP Section 44-314, it is clear that the MFG Rule applies to the whole family, including petitioner, and notice is required only to the custodial parent, who is part of the 4U, ten months before the birth of the child, In this case, notice to petitioner would have been impossible since he was not identified as part of the family ten months prior to Justice’s birth. 1. The Plain Language of the Relevant Statute Provides that Petitioner is a Member of the MFG’s Child’s “Family,” and CDSS Was Required to Provide Notice of the Rule Only to the Custodial Parent Prior to Justice’s Birth. Neither the plain language of the MFG Rule, which is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450.04, nor the implementing regulations—-CDS8S’s Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP) Section 44-314, exempt petitioner’s son from the reach of the Rule. The MFG Rule states as follows: For purposes of determining the maximum aid payment specified in subdivision (a) of Section 11450 and for no other purpose, the number of needy persons in the same family shall not be increased for any child born into a family 2 Engine Manufacturers Association v, California Air Resources Board (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1036 (The court’s “fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.” Courts “first examine the statutory language, giving ita plain and commonsense meaning,” But, courts “do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” Further, “[i]f the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” (Zbid.)) 5 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)that has received aid under this chapter continuously for the 10 months prior to the birth of the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450.04, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) The exceptions to the Rule are specifically set forth in statute, and include: children born as a result of rape, incest, contraceptive failure (where an intrauterine device (UD) or Norplant was used, or either parent was sterilized); child was born before 1995; family has not received aid for more than 24 months; child was conceived when either parent was a non-needy caretaker relative; and, child is no longer living with either parent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450.04, subds, (b) ~ (d); see also, MPP Section 44- 314.5.) Because petitioner’s situation does not fall within any of the specific exceptions created by the Legislature, the MFG Rule applies to him. “Family” includes blood relatives such as petitioner, Justice’s father. Petitioner argues that his own AU, or household, did not receive notice. However, the MFG Rule states that aid will not be increased for any child “born into a family” that has received aid continuously for 10 months before the birth of the child. (Cal, Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450.04(a) [emphasis added.) The CalWORKs AU is indeed the household: CDSS regulations explain construction of an assistance unit to include at least one of a number of eligible persons, and “[t]he AU shall include the following persons when living in the same home and eligible at the time of initial family application .. . :” the applicant child, any eligible siblings, and any parent. (California DSS Manual: Eligibility and Assistance Standards § 82-820, at p. 911.4 (2014).) CDSS has not explicitly defined “family” in its regulations, so the common understanding of the term is applicable. Black’s Law Dictionary defines family first as a “group of persons connected by blood, by affinity, or by law, esp. within two or three generations”; second as a “group consisting of parents and their children’; and only third as a “group of persons who live together and have a shared commitment to a domestic relationship.” (Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) p. 637.) Based upon the premise that the MFG Rule does not apply when the child is no longer living in the “same house with either parent,” the converse is true: the MFG Rule applies while the child is living in the same house with either parent. Welfare and Institutions Code section 6 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)11450.04, subdivision (d)(3) provides that the MFG rule will not apply if the child is no longer living in the “same home with either parent.” While there is no legislative or procedural history that defines the term “same home,” CDSS has interpreted this over the years, through regulations in CDSS’s Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP) Section 44-314.55, to mean “not living with either parent.” The section specifies that the MFG Rule does not apply if the child is not living with cither parent. So therefore, the converse should also be true: the MFG Rule does apply when the child is living with one of his parents. 2, The Regulation Implementing the Governing Statute Provides that CDSS Was Required to Give Only the Custodial Parent Notice of the MFG Rule Prior to Justice’s Birth. Under the regulations, Justice is an MFG child. MPP Section 44-314.14 defines “MFG Child” as “the child. . . that is not included in the AU size for the purpose of determining the MAP [Maximum Aid Payment].” Further, MPP Section 44-314.2 states, “[w]hen a child is born into an AU that has received aid for at least ten months immediately prior to the birth, the child shall not be included in the AU size for the purpose of determining the MAP.” Justice is clearly an MFG child because it is undisputed that he was residing with mother, Diaz, the custodial parent, when he was born, and she was receiving aid ten months prior to his birth. (AR, pp. 28, 33, & 38.) It is likewise undisputed that petitioner was not part of Justice’s mother AU, but this does not preclude notice to the MFG child’s mother to be imputed to the father. When Justice was born, petitioner was not living with Justice’s mother, and therefore, petitioner was not part of that AU. “Every AU shall include the eligible parents of the eligible child when those persons reside in the same house as the eligible child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450.16, subd. (c) (emphasis added).)? Nonetheless, as we shall explain below, the MFG Rule follows Justice, and the only notice CDSS was required to give—was to Diaz, Justice’s mother, the custodial parent when Justice was born. Indeed, it would have been impossible to have provided petitioner notice under the Rule ten months prior to Justice’s birth, when under the circumstances, he was not living with 3 Bven a father of an unborn child living in the home with the mother is excluded from the AU, unless the father is the caretaker relative or parent of an eligible child. (MPP § 82-832.) 7 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)Diaz at the time, Indeed, petitioner testified he did not even know he had a child with Diaz until she sued him for paternity. (AR, pp. 9 & 62.) 3. In Harmonizing the Governing Statute with the Regulation, the Notice Provisions Apply to the Custodial Parent and Justice is Considered an MFG Child When He Resides with Either Parent. Notice provisions appear only in CDSS’s regulations, and provide that the MFG Rule applies as long as the AU received notice of the rule at least ten months prior to the child’s birth, (MPP § 44-314.3.) This necessarily would have been the AU in which Justice was born—Diaz’s AU, and notice was properly received there. MPP Section 44-314.3 specifically provides that the MFG Rule applies “when the AU has received written notice of the MFG at least ten months prior to the birth of the child,” and there has been no break in aid of at least two consecutive months prior to the month of the birth of the child. Because Justice’s mother received notice ten months prior to Justice’s birth, the MFG Rule applies to that AU, and was properly given. No notice was required to be given to petitioner at any time once notice was given to the custodial parent in the AU prior to Justice’s birth. The actual notice CDSS has provided aid recipients since 2000 explains that the MFG rule will not apply if “no adult in your family received written notice of the MFG rule at least ten months before the birth of the child.” (California Department of Social Services, The Maximum Family Grant Rule (MFG) for Recipients of Cash Aid, CW 2102 Required Form (2000), available at hitp://www.cdss.ca.pov/edssweb/entres/forms/English/CW2102.PDF (emphasis added); see also, _ AR, p. 34 [CW2102 provided to petitioner, which he signed on March 25, 2008].) Because Jastice’s mother, Diaz, was an adult in Justice’s family, and properly received notice, the MFG Rule applies. Since November 2001, CDSS has explained that the very factual scenario at issue here would result in the child remaining an MFG child. In an All County Letter (ACL) dated November 2001 (prior to Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth), CDSS makes clear that the MFG Rule follows the child. The letter poses the following relevant question and answer: 8 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPE-14-513757)A child was born into an existing AU in county #1 where mom was on aid for more than ten months prior to the birth of the child. The MFG rule was applied to the child. The child now lives with her father in county #2. Does the MFG rule still apply? Also, what ifthe father was not previously on aid and had not been notified of the MFG rule? Yes, the MFG rule would be applied if county #2 can document that the AU (mom) was appropriately notified of the MFG based on information from county #1, even if the other parent (father) was not an AU member when the written notice was sent to the AU. The MFG rule applies because the child was born into an AU that had been receiving aid for the ten months prior to the birth of the child. When the child went to live with the father, the MFG rule continues to apply. (AR, p. 45, All County Letter No. 01-82, State of California ~ Health and Human Services Agency, Department of Social Services, November 26, 2001, 423.) CDSS has interpreted the MFG Rule, as set forth in MPP Section 44-314 since at least 2001 (as stated in the ACL)—a year before Justice’s birth to require that the MFG status stays with the child. This long-standing interpretation deserves deference, The Court is required to take judicial notice of CDSS’s ACLs and accord deference to CDSS’s longstanding interpretations of the law expressed in the ACL. (In re Social Services Payments (2008) 166 Cal.App.4" 1249, 1271 [citations omitted].} Further, courts are required to accord great weight to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, and only reject agency interpretations where they are contrary to statutory intent. (See American Federation of Labor . California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 51, 58 [deference required for interpretation of a regulation|.) Il, THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE MFG RULE TO JUSTICE’S MOTHER, DIAZ, PRIOR TO JUSTICE’S BIRTH. The issue.is whether the Administrative Law Judge abused his or her discretion in finding that the child’s mother, Diaz, had notice of the MFG Rule at least ten months prior to Justice’s birth. In reviewing CDSS’s decision, the court exercises an independent judgment standard of review, “giving deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances of the agency action.” (Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 1, 8; Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass’n (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28; Bixdy v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144.) There is no such abuse of discretion, and indeed, the weight of the 9 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-5 13757)evidence supports this finding. (See Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5, subd. (c).) ‘There was also reasonable and ample evidence that Diaz received notice of the MFG Rule ten months before its application, A. The ALJ Made Appropriate Findings. Petitioner improperly asserts that the ALJ did not make this specific finding about notice received by Diaz, Justice’s mother, of the MFG Rule ten months before Justice’s birth, and its absence results in an insufficient finding, But, the ALJ noted that the county appeals specialist stated that the mother of the child was given the appropriate notices and received aid ten months prior to the birth of the child, making the child an MFG child. (AR, p. 3.) In the conclusion of the decision, the ALJ: found that the County determined the child to be an MFG child and ineligible to receive CalWORKs’ benefits; had reviewed the facts and determined the County’s action denying benefits must be sustained; and that the Rule applies because the child was born into an AU that had been receiving aid ten months prior to the birth of the child. (AR, p. 5.) The ALJ, thus, plainly stated the reasons for the decision concerning the ALJ’s decision finding Justice an MFG child. B. There Was Reasonable and Ample Evidence that Diaz Received Notice, Although petitioner contends there is no non-hearsay evidence supporting Justice’s mother’s Diaz’s notice of the MFG Rule, as CDSS will show below, there is no requirement that there be non-hearsay evidence, but instead only “reasonable” evidence. Under the MPP, there is no reference to hearsay at all and, therefore, there is no specific limitation to its admission at the administrative hearing.’ MPP Section 22-050,2 provides that the evidence permitted is the “sort of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.” The evidence identified below is the sort of evidence that reasonable persons could rely upon to show that notice. “Tn hearings under the MPP, the ALJ is not bound by the rules of evidence, and shall consider the nature of the evidence in assessing its probative value. (MPP §§ 22-050,21 & 22- 050.3.) 10 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)oD em ID The weight of the record evidence supports that the child’s mother received the notice required timely. First, on January 16, 2013, petitioner submitted a Hearing Request to the County of San Mateo claiming that his “child should not have been MFG’d.” (AR, p. 32.) On March 18, 2013, petitioner conditionally withdrew the request for hearing before CDSS based on the County’s agreement to review his file. The County had agreed to review petitioner’s file and that “if it can be reasonably certain that there was a 24 month break in aid, the County would correct the underpayment,” and, if not, petitioner was free to renew his hearing request. (AR, p. 33.) The County issued a Notice of Action on April 15, 2013, informing petitioner that it was found that the claimant’s child Justice Brooks was correctly determined to be a MFG child and correctly remains deemed a MFG child not entitled to Cal WORKS benefits. Required sign MFG forms (CW2102) on file. This notification is being send out to the claimant to inform of the such findings and decision by the county. (AR, p. 38.) Therefore, the implication from the notice is that the CW2102 was timely sent to Diaz (and there was no break in aid). Second, the ACL that was effective November 26, 2001 stated that counties were required to use the CW2102 form as of August 2000, so that form was in effect prior to Justice’s birth. (AR, p. 40.) Justice was born on September 7, 2002 (AR, p. 27). Thus, the County was required to give Justice’s AU notice of the MFG Rule ten months prior to his birth—on or by November 7, 2001, Given Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth and that the County was required to give Justice’s AU notice of the MFG Rule via the CW2012, effective August 2000, this policy, set forth in the ACL, certainly suggests that the County provided notice via the CW2102 form ten months before Justice’s birth. Third, the County representative indicated that the file reflects that the proper CW2102 was given timely to Cynthia, Justice’s mother, in both his position paper and in his testimony. In the County representative’s position paper, the County stated that “Form CW2102 signed by the case payee were found dated August 1, 2001, July 11, 2002, July 31, 2003, and July 27, 2004 (exhibit 1).” (AR, p. 28.) There was no objection to this reference in the County position paper. At the 5 Evidence Code section 664 provides that an official is presumed to have regularly performed his or her official duty. i RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)hearing, the County representative testified that he was not making the CW2102 available because it was confidential’ as to the mother, Petitioner’s counsel appears to contend that the County representative’s testimony about the CW2102 is hearsay. (AR, p. 11.) Here, petitioner’s representative did not object to hearsay in the County position paper, so that evidence about the County’s timely provision of the CW2102 form is unobjected-to hearsay and admissible. (See Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (d).) The evidence of CDSS’s ACL-—requiring that the CW2102 form be given to an applicant/recipient, effective August 2000, coupled with the County Position Paper showing the payee signed the CW2102 form as of August 1, 2001, show that Diaz had notice of the MFG Rule as of August 1, 2001 at least ten months prior to Justice’s September 7, 2002 birth. Actually, she received notice some 13 months prior to Justice’s birth. Petitioner improperly contends that CDSS violated his Due Process rights when he was not permitted to see evidence of the actual MFG Rule notice that Diaz received. As mentioned above, there was ample circumstantial evidence of Diaz’s timely receipt of the CW2102 form. Petitioner attended an evidentiary hearing on this issue, and had an opportunity to object to all of the evidence stated above, and actually did object to the lack of the specific notice entered into evidence. Under all the circumstances mentioned above, the ALJ was well within his or her discretion to find that the County sent timely notice of the Rule to Diaz, and petitioner has not been deprived of any process here. IU THE CALWORKS MAXIMUM FAMILY GRANT RULE DOES NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS OF NOTICE UNDER DUE PROCESS, The “family” that includes petitioner had ample notice of the MFG Rule. As the statute and regulation require, CDSS gave notice at least ten months prior to Justice’s birth to the custodial parent. That is all the notice that is required, and that is what CDSS provided. Petitioner’s concept of notice makes no sense under the circumstances. He seems to argue that because he 5 The County representative did not act unreasonably in attempting to protect the confidentiality of Diaz’s records at the hearing. Generally, all documents related to the administration of social services are confidential with limited exceptions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10850, subd. (h) & MPP §19-004.) 12 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPP-14-513757)was not part of the AU, who received notice prior to Justice’s birth, the MFG Rule should just vanish, and petitioner should receive a higher grant including Justice now that Justice resides with petitioner. The focus must be upon notice at the time the child was conceived. To allow the child’s parents to overcome the reduction in funding by living apart or giving custody to the other parent defeats the purpose of the Rule. It makes no sense to review the notice to the custodial AU, under MPP Section 44-314, as exempting Justice from the MFG Rule now—at some point after his birth, CDSS gave notice to the entire “family”—including petitioner, when CDSS notified the custodial mother of the MFG Rule ten months before Justice’s birth, Any other construction of the notice provision would defeat the entire point of the rule— informing families, who are considering childbearing decisions or are engaging in behavior that runs the risk of childbearing, that the MFG Rule will apply prospectively, REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION For all the above reasons and based upon the Administrative Record in this case, there is no factual or legal basis for issuance of a writ of administrative mandate, and the petition should be denied, However, in the event the court grants any relief to petitioner, CDSS respectfully requests pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632 that the court issue a Statement of Decision explaining the factual and legal basis for any determination that petitioner is indeed Mf Mf tf Hl Mt il Mf Mt 13 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)eligible for an increase in assistance despite the MFG rule, or that notice was improperly given. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and based upon the weight of the evidence in the Administrative Record, CDSS requests that the petition for a writ of mandate be denied. Dated: February 12, 2015 . Respectfully Submitted, KAMALA D, HARRIS Attorney General of California SUSAN M. CARSON Supervising Deputy Attorney General Ben by EMongs BEVERLEY R, MEYERS Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Respondents Department of Social Services & Director SF2014409191/41208684.doc 4 RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION (CPF-14-513757)DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL Case Name: Brooks, Ronald v. Lightbourne No.: CPE-14-513757 I declare: Iam employed in the Office of the Attorney General; which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. | am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On February 13. 2015, I served the attached RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail, addressed as follows: Benjamin Pulliam Latham & Watkins LLP - San Francisco 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111-2562 E-mail: :Benjamin, Pulliam@lw,com I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on February 13,2015, at San Francisco, California, Ryan Lau Koon 2 — Declarant OO Signature SRIOL4A09TL 41208959.doc