Motion-Secondary: Danielle P. Schafhautle v. Quality Auto Body Inc., Douglas Sessa, Neil A Margulies, Gmac, Ally Financial Inc., Vaul Trust, Karilu C. Libardi, Edward J Norcia, All N.Y. Auctioneers, John Doe

On July 18, 2017 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Danielle P. Schafhautle, and All N.Y. Auctioneers, Ally Financial Inc., Douglas Sessa, Edward J Norcia, Gmac, John Doe, Karilu C. Libardi, Neil A Margulies, Quality Auto Body Inc., Vaul Trust, for Commercial - Contract in the District Court of Suffolk County.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
---------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DANIELLE P. SCHAFHAUTLE, IndeX No.:613386/2017

Plaintiff,
AFFIRMATION IN
-against- SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S ORDER
QUALITY AUTOBODY, INC., DOUGLAS SESSA, TO SHOW CAUSE
NEIL A. MARGULIES, GMAC, ALLY FINANCIAL, TO VACATE THE
INC., VAULT TRUST, KARILU C. LIBARDI, EDWARD DEFAULT JUDGMENT
J. NORCIA, ALL N.Y. AUCTIONEERS, AND JOHN DOE,
BEING A FICTITIOUS NAME,

Defendants.
_____________.__...__________ _
_---·---------------------------------------·------X

JOSEPH M. LIVELY, ESQ., an attorney duly admitted to practice before the courts of

the State of New York, Managing Partner of JOSEPH M. LIVELY ESQ., P.C. affirms the truth of

the following pursuant to CPLR §2106 and under the penalty of perjury:

1. I am the Managing Partner of JOSEPH M. LIVELY ESQ., P.C. the law

Sessa"
firm for the Defendant, Douglas Sessa (hereinafter "Mr. or "Defendant").

2. I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances in this action by virtue of the

file maintained by my office and numerous conversations with my client.

3. Courts favor matters decided on their merits. In the interest of justice, ifthis matter

been decided on the merits, it would have resulted in a decision in favor of the Defendant, since

Plaintiff failed to plead with sufficient specificity a single act or action or producing a scintilla of

proof that Mr. Sessa committed any acts of negligence, made any misrepresentations to plaintiff

or committed any fraudulent act as and against the Plaintiff. Should the judgment stand, itwould

result in a windfall for the Plaintiff which is not merited or warranted in accordance with the facts

plead by Plaintiff herself, which form the basis for the Default Judgment against Mr. Sessa.

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STATEMEN_T OF RELEVANT FACTS

4. Karilu C. Libardi (hereinafter referred to as "Libardi"), upon information and

belief leased a 2008 Chevrolet Suburban on or about May 22, 2008.

5. upon information and was a client of Neil A. a co-
Libardi, belief, Margulies,

defendant in this action.

6. Sometime in 2014, prior to the date when Mr. Sessa began working for Quality

Auto Body, Inc. as its manager, and contrary to the baseless claims made by Plaintiffl, in her

Complaint (See Plaintiff's Complaint, annexed hereto as Exhibit "A", ¶4) that Mr. Sessa was or

is the President of Co-Defendant, Quality Auto Body, Inc. (See also the affidavit of Douglas

Sessa $7 (hereinafter referred to as "Sessa Affidavit") annexed hereto as Exhibit "B").

7. Further, annexed hereto as Exhibit "C", please find the New York State

Department of State Corporations Database Information Page for Quality Auto Body, Inc., which

liststhe Officer of the Corporation as Raymond Burghardt, a non-party, who was, in fact, the

President and CEO of Quality Auto Body, Inc. and Mr. Sessa's boss at the time of the action.

8. Additionally, without any evidence presented, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Sessa was

a shareholder of Quality Auto Body, Inc., which as demonstrated by the New York State

Database is patently false as Raymond Burghardt was and stillis the sole shareholder. See

Exhibit "C".

9. In or around February 2016, approximately two years after Libardi lefthis 2008

Chevrolet Suburban that is the subject of this action, (hereinafter the "Vehicle"), at Quality Auto

Body, Inc.; the owner of Quality, after attempting to contact the lien holder, the titleowner and

Libardi, to pick up the vehicle, directed Mr. Sessa to call a former co-defendant in the action who

1 It information Plaintiff
should be notedthat,upon and belief, is a wholesale used car salesperson,who, as an
experienced purchaser of used cars, engages in transactionsuch as thesubject transactionon a regular basis.

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was released from the case, N.Y. Auctions, to retain them to fileall of the necessary lien

paperwork to file a mechanic's lien for unpaid storage fees in September 2016.

10. Notice was given for an auction in October 2016 prior to Plaintiff purchasing the

Automobile, contrary to Plaintiff's complaint which indicates that at the Auction Quality

Autobody, Inc. purchased the Vehicle for its own behalf at the Auction, which was held on

October 28, 2016, no one appeared at the auction. (Plaintiff's Complaint ¶¶ 46 and 47).

11. No one appeared at the auction, which at the time all parties believe was a valid

Auction and had no reason to believe was invalid since none of parties who would have had a

claim to stop the auction had appeared or objected and no one purchased the vehicle at auction.

12. Three days later, on November 1, 2016, Plaintiff was given the paperwork to

purchase the Vehicle.

13. Prior to tendering any money, Plaintiff went to New York Department of Motor

Vehicles ("DMV").

14. At DMV, Plaintiff confinned herself that what Mr. Sessa had told her was h
at the time he said it,that DMV had accepted the mechanic's lien and itbecame a part of the

DMV's record.

15. As confinned by Plaintiff herself when Mr. Sessa gave her all the lien

paperwork to independently confirm the validity and existence of the lien herself when she went

to DMV in Amityville and confirmed that at the time the paperwork to transfer the vehicle was

in order. (Plaintiff's Complaint ¶¶ 107 and 108).

16. Prior to purchasing the Vehicle Plaintiff was also given the opportunity to call

ALLY, the lender as the successor in interest to GMAC Financing, the original lender when the

Vehicle was purchased.

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17. As stated by Plaintiff herself in her complaint, Ally also confirmed that the lien

against the vehicle was satisfied, further confirming that what Mr. Sessa stated to her was true at

the time he said itsince the financial institution that held a lien prior confirmed that the lien had

been satisfied.

18. Thus, Sessa never misrepresented anything to Plaintiff who was given every

Opportunity to confirm the truth of Sessa's words and both DMV and ALLY confirmed that

what Sessa said to her was true at the time.

19. Plaintiff asserts several other inaccurate statements in her complaint without a

scintilla of evidence and contrary to the documents annexed hereto stating that Douglas Sessa

was partners with Co-Defendant Margulies, which is patently false since Sessa, as demonstrated

by the New York State Department of State Corporation Database was not an owner or officer of

Co-Defendant Quality but merely a manager.

20. Sessa did not gain any benefit from the sale of the Vehicle to Plaintiff as the

monies collected went to Quality and NOT to Sessa.

21. Plaintiff makes claims against Sessa in causes of action Fifth, for Fraud, Sixth for

Misrepresentation, Seventh for Conversion, Ninth for Breach of Warranty whose elements would

require Sessa to have a duty to the plaintiff which he did not, Tenth for Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress and finally that because of Sessa's actions that the Corporate Veil protecting

Officers, Owners and employees from personal liability, should be pierced.

22. However, Plaintiff failed to plead a single act, action or statement made by Mr.

Sessa at the time itwas made was untrue or fraudulent in any way as Plaintiff confirmed when

she spoke with Ally Financial and with DMV.

23. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to plead in what manner Douglas Sessa individually,

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had breached any warranty or how he had any duty to plaintiff as he was not specially placed that

Plaintiff relied upon Sessa in any way and any claims made regarding the price of the vehicle on

the papers was a request made by Plaintiff, upon information and belief, to lower the amount she

would have to pay in DMV fees and in any event, any claim for Fraud or Misrepresentation

would have to result in harm to Plaintiff which it could not and did not.

24. With respect to the conversion claim and the claim for negligent infliction of

emotional distress, Sessa did not commit any act which would give rise to a viable claim for

either, as he was given the same information Plaintiff confirmed with Ally and DMV at the time

of the sale; and in exchange for the payment which Sessa received on behalf of Quality as its

employee, which he did not keep since itwas not his and did not receive any benefit from, he

gave Plaintiff the Vehicle and allof the titlepaperwork which at the time itwas given was valid.

25. Thus, any claims for conversion against him personally cannot be sustained.

26. But for the law office failure on the part of Mr. Sessa's counsel, Mr. Sessa can

demonstrate that those causes of action against him personally for fraud, misrepresentation and

conversion may not be sustained since there are no acts, statements or actions alleged in the

complaint that were taken or made by him individually and thus should not be allowed to stand

as the basis for a judgment against him.

27. Additionally, there is no basis for negligent infliction of emotional harm since Mr.

Sessa cannot be held liable for the actions of third parties; and finally, as an employee of Quality,

Mr. Sessa had no duty to plaintiff as to an implied warranty but even if he did, at the time he

made any statements or took any actions. all of which Plaintiff herself investigated and found to

be true prior to purchasing the Vehicle, Mr. Sessa did not breach any warranty to Plaintiff and

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thus he can establish on the merits that the action against him should be dismissed for failure to

state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

_ARGUMENT

Point I

A Preliminary Injunction isAppropriate as Defendant Has Made A Prima Facie Showing of
Entitlement to Vacate This Honorable Courts Default Judgment Against Defendant Sessa

28. Pursuant to CPLR §6301, a preliminary injunction is appropriate where 1. the

Defendant's rights need be preserved respecting the subject of the action and tending to render

the judgment ineffectual; .... which, ifcommitted or continued during the pendency of the

action, would produce injury to the defendant.

29. A temporary restraining order is a drastic remedy and will only be granted ifthe

movant establishes a clear right to it under the law and upon the relevant facts set forth in the

moving papers. William M. Blake Agency, Inc. v. Leon, 283 AD2d 423, 424 (2d Dept. 2001);

Peterson v. Corbin, 275 AD2d 35, 36 (2d Dept. 2000). Injunctive relief will lie where a movant

demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits, a danger of irreparable harm unless the

injunction is granted and a balance of the equities in his or her favor. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso,

75 NY2d 860 (1990); W T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 517 (1981); Merscorp, Inc. v.

Romaine, 295 AD2d 431 (2d Dept. 2002); Neos v. Lacey, 291 AD2d 434 (2d Dept.).

30. The grounds upon which injunctive relief may be granted are found in CPLR

§6301 which states in relevant part that:

"Injunctive relief may be granted in any action where itappears that the Plaintiff

threatens or is about to do, or is doing or procuring or suffering to be done, an act in

violation of the defendant's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to

render the judgment ineffectual, or in any action where the defendant has demanded and

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would be entitled to a judgment restraining the Plaintiff from the commission or
continuance of an act,which, ifcommitted or continued during the pendency of the
Defendant."
action, would produce injury to the

31. With rare exceptions, a court's authority to grant injunctive relief is limited to the

two situations specified in the statute. (See Umformed Fire fighters Assn. of Greater N.Y v City

of New York, 79 NY2d 236, 239-240 (1992).

32. The decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound

discretion of the Supreme Court. Doe v. Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 (1988); Automated Waste

Disposal, Inc. v. Mid-Hudson Waste, Inc., 50 AD3d 1073 (2d Dept. 2008); City of Long Beach v.

Sterling American Capital, LLC, 40 AD3d 902, 903 (2d Dept. 2007)5 ; Ruiz v. Meloney, 26

AD3d 485 (2d Dept. 2006).

33. Defendant seeks a injunction to the forward progress of post-
preliminary stop

judgment collection activities based on a default judgment that but for law office failure would

never have been granted, since Plaintiff's pleading fail to plead specific acts, which would entitle

plaintiff to judgment against Defendant Sessa or if pled are belied by contradictory documentary

evidence.

34. Defendant unfortunately initially hired an attorney who was failed to answer the

complaint, despite being retained to answer the complaint and who despite having an obvious

conflict of interest took the case and prosecuted the case ineffectively until the Court pointed out

Counsel's obvious conflict of interest at which time Defendant Sessa's own counsel admitted, in

not so many words, that he did not answer the complaint due to conflicts on the case should be

handled and that he had a conflict of interest and should not have excepted the case, and thus the

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default was not intentional or willful on the part of Mr. Sessa. See Mr. Sessa's former counsel's

Order to Show Cause for relief annexed hereto as Exhibit "D".

35. In the instance that the temporary restraining order is not granted, the default

judgment which but for his initial counsel's law office failure would never have been entered on

the merits, Defendant Sessa, the Defendant who never failed to attend a conference or appear in

Court on appointed dates, would be required jointly and severally to pay a judgment on behalf of

his employer at the time and other defendants who, in fact, may have rightfully received a

judgment against them.

A Danger of Irre parable Harm

36. Simply stated, no where in Plaintiff's pleadings is there a single instance pled that

indicated Mr. Sessa committed any fraudulent act or misrepresented any fact.

37. In fact, in each instance where itis alleged Mr. Sessa made any representations,

plaintiff confirmed the facts with a third party who confirmed what Mr. Sessa said to be true at

the time he said them.

38. Thus, absent any viable claims against Defendant Sessa personally, and since

Sessa was merely an employee and not as Plaintiff claims devoid of any proof whatsoever, a

principal of Quality or a partner of anyone the documents annexed hereto bear out, irreparable

harm would be done ifan injunction is not issued because Sessa would be required to pay a

judgment but for his counsel's failure to answer despite being retained to do so, would never

have been granted on the merits.

Balance of the Equities

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39. Defendants are requesting injunctive relief until such time as the instant order to

show cause is decided by the Court.

40. There is a default judgment stillagainst several other co-defendants who plaintiff

may still recover from, parties that may have rightly had a default judgment granted against

them.

41. Plaintiff did not plead or adduce any proof aside from bald statements which are

belied by documentary evidence that she is entitled to judgment against Defendant Sessa.

42. Moreover, Plaintiff has yet to commence any post-judgment collection actions

and, even in the unlikely event that the default judgment is upheld against Mr. Sessa, interest on

the judgment will continue to accrue, thus preventing any harm to come to plaintiff from the

delay.

43. Injunctive relief will lie where a movant demonstrates a likelihood of success on

the merits, a danger of irreparable harm unless the injunction is granted and a balance of the

equities in his or her favor. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 NY2d 860 (1990); W.T Grant Co. v.

Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 517 (1981); Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, 295 AD2d 431 (2d Dept. 2002);

Neos v. Lacey, 291 AD2d 434 (2d Dept. 2002).

44. As in Aetna Ins. Inc. v. Capasso, plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits, a danger of irreparable harm which cannot be reduced to a money

judgment, and in balancing the equities will be irreparably harmed whereas any harm which

would be attributed to plaintiff will be minor.

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45. Defendant prays for a preliminary injunction to protect defendants from a

deficiency judgment and to ensure a quicker path to normalcy after losing his family home, one

of the two instances per CPLR §6301 where a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy.

Uniformed Firefighters Assn. of Greater N.Y. v City of New York, 79 NY2d 236, 239-240 (1992).

Point H

46. CPLR 5105 (1)(a) which is the means by which a party may seek relief from
judgment or order states in relevant part:

(a) On motion. The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from itupon
such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested party with such notice as the court may
direct, upon the ground of:

"excusable default, if such motion is made within one year after service of a copy
of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry upon the moving party or,
if themoving party has entered the judgment or order, within one year after such
entry;"

(2nd
47. As held in Swensen v MV Transp., Inc., 89 A.D. 924; 933 NY S2d 96 Dept.

2011) to vacate a default, the defaulting party must demonstrate under CPLR 5015(a)(1) a

reasonable excuse for the default in opposing the motion and potentially meritorious defense if

the matter were to be decided on the merits.

48. To vacate his default, Defendant Sessa is required to demonstrate a reasonable

excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 (a) (1);

Ogunmoyin v 1515 Broadway Fee Owner, LLC, 85 AD3d 991 (201 1); Legaretta v Ekhstor, 74

AD3d 899 (2010); Rivera v Komor, 69 AD3d 833 (2010); Nowell v NYU Med. Ctr., 55 AD3d

573 (2008). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the Supreme

Court's discretion (see White v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 41 AD3d 709, 710 (2007), and

the Supreme Court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see

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credible"
CPLR 2005) where that claim is supported by a "detailed and explanation of the

default or defaults at issue (Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476, 479 (2004).

49. The determination of what constitutes reasonable excuse for default lies within

the trialcourt's discretion. As in Swenson, the Court stated: "Here, the plaintiff's counsel

provided a detailed and credible explanation for his default in this matter, which included various

acts of misconduct and deception by his former associate attorney who worked on the plaintiff's

appellants'
matter. The plaintiff also demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the

judgment."
motion for summary Supra, also see Eastern Sav. Bank, FSB v Charles, 103 46

704(2nd
A.D.3d 683; 959 N.Y.S.2d Dept 2013); Green Apple Mgt. Corp. v Aronis, 46 A.D.3d

(2nd (2nd
669, 865 N.Y.S.2d 355 Dept 2008; Levi v. Levi, 46 A.D.3d 519, 520, 848 N.Y.S.2d 228

Dept 2007).

50. Furthermore, law office failure by a litigant's former attorney has been broadly

excuse,"
considered to constitute "reasonable especially when itis unintentional. See, Auto

Distributors v. Auto Collection, 85 A.D.3d 734, 925 N.Y.S. 2d 151 (2 Dept. 2011); Easton v.

(1st
Associates Leasing, 24 A.D. 3d 141, 805 N.Y.S. 2d 333 Dept. 2005); Green Apple Mgmt, Id.;

Piszczatowski v. Hill, 93 A.D. 3d 707, 940 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (2 Dept. 2012); Infante v. Breslin

Realty, 95 A.D. 3d 1075, 944 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (2 Dept. 2012); Romanian Orthodox Church v.

(2nd
Zindel, 44 A.D. 2d 744, 843 N.Y.S. 2d 414 Dept. 2007) (failure of counsel to oppose motion

for summary judgment was isolated and unintentional with no evidence of willful neglect).

51. Other factors in deciding whether to vacate a default are the prejudice to the other

party by the delay. Here, the Court's decision is only eleven months old, and the Plaintiff has

taken no other actions since the decision and therefore would not be prejudiced ifthe decision

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was vacated and she could prosecute her case on the merits as is favored by public policy. See,

Petulla Contracting v. Raneri, 94 A.D. 3d 751, 941 N.Y.S. 2d 659 (2nd Dept. 2012).

Meritorious Defense

Failure to Sufficiently Plead Fraud Against Defendant Sessa

52. To state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege a material misrepresentation of

fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and

damages. Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 558 (2009). The

allegations must be stated with particularity to satisfy CPLR 3016(b). Id. Thus, the plaintiff must

inference"
provide sufficient facts to support a "reasonable that the allegations of fraud are

true. Id. at 559-60. Conclusory allegations will not suffice. Id. Neither will allegations based on

information and belief. See Facebook, Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP (US), 134 A.D.3d 610, 615 (1st

Dept. 2015) ("Statements made in pleadings upon information and belief are not sufficient to

establish the necessary quantum of proof to sustain allegations of fraud.").

53. As stated hereinabove, in the instant action, Plaintiff's pleading are utterly devoid

of any single statement or action which would constitute fraud on the part of Defendant Sessa

individually, and any vicarious claim attributed to the actions of other co-defendants can not be

attributed to Sessa since he was only an employee of Quality whose had no interest in the

transaction complained of and did not make any false, misleading or fraudulent statements as

verified by the Plaintiff herself in her pleadings.

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Failure to Plead Misrepresentation Against Defendant Sessa

The Elements of Fraudulent Misrepresentation

54. In order to prevail in a lawsuit for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must be able
to prove the following six elements:

1. A representation was made (in contract law, a representation is any action or conduct that
can be turned into a statement of fact).
2. The representation was false.
3. The representation, when made, was either known to be false or made recklessly without
knowledge of itstruth.
4. The representation was made with the intention that the other party rely on it.
5. The other party did, in fact, rely on the representation.
6. The other party suffered damages as a result of relying on the representation. (Simcuski v

Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 452 (1978).

55. Plaintiff's causes of action alleged fraud in the inducement and fraudulent

misrepresentation. The elements of cause of action for fraud in the inducement are the same as

those for fraudulent misrepresentation, thus those causes of action against Defendant Sessa

should be addressed simultaneously (Urstadt Biddle Props., Inc. v Excelsior Realty Corp., 65

AD3d 1135 (2nd Dept 2009). The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are that: (1)

defendant made a material false representation; (2) defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff

thereby; (3) plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the representation; and (4) plaintiffs suffered

damage as a result of their reliance (Gizzi v Hall, 300 AD2d 879, 880 (3rd Dept 2002). The

burden of proof on these elements is by clear and convincing evidem (Simcuski v Saeli, 44

NY2d 442, 452 (1978). Consequently, plaintiffs are put to a substantially greater burden of proof

than the preponderance of the evidence standard. Rather, plaintiffs must establish evidence with

clear and convincing proof that itis highly probable that what plaintiffs claim happened, actually

did (Szpakowski v Shelby Realty, LLC, 15 Misc 3d 1146 (A), 2007 NY Slip Op 51186(U) (2007),

lv dismissed 48 AD3d 268 (1st Dept 2008); IV denied 12 NY3d 708 (2009).

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56. Thus, applying the facts of this case to the applicable standard of proof outlined

above, plaintiff needed to establish by clear and convincing evidence on the pleadings that

defendant had actual knowledge that a lien stillexisted and that the lien was properly served.

Merely alleging constructive knowledge of an alleged defect in title does not suffice Meyers v

Rosen, 69 AD3d 1095, 1097 (3rd Dept 2010).

Conversion

57. The Court of Appeals has held that the "[t]wo key elements of conversion are (1)

plaintiffs possessory right or interest in the property and (2) defendant's dominion over the

omitted]."
property or interference with it,in derogation of plaintiff s rights [internal citations

Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 (2006).

58. In the instant matter, Defendant Sessa did not receive any money from Plaintiff

personally, as the money was payable to co-Defendant, Quality. Thus, Defendant Sessa was

never in possession of any personal property of Plaintiff and thus the claim for conversion

against Mr. Sessa personally cannot stand.

59. In light of the foregoing, as a decision in favor of Defendant isjust and a reasonable

excuse having been provided for the default; in anticipation of the default against him being

vacated, Defendant Sessa seeks leave to fidea late answer pursuant to CPLR §3012 (d) which

states in relevant part:

"Extension of time to appear or plead. Upon the application of a party, the court may
extend the time to appear or plead, or compel the acceptance of a pleading untimely
served, upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of reasonable excuse for
default."
delay or

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"E"
60. Annexed hereto as Exhibit please find a proposed answer.

61. Pursuant to Uniform Court Rules §202.7(f) a letter was sent and confirmed

received via facsimile to Attorney for Plaintiff which puts them on notice of the proposed Order

to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order and the argument set to take place on October

"F"
7, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.. See Exhibit of the faxed letter and the facsimile confirmation

confirming Plaintiff Counsel's receipt of same.

62. Pursuant to CPLR §2217(b) there has been no prior request for the relief sought

herein.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for an Order enjoining Plaintiff from a post judgment

action against him personally until this Order to Show Cause to Vacate the Default has been

decided and the time to appeal any adverse decision has expired; to Vacate the Default Judgment

as against Sessa because he can demonstrate both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense

to the action and for such other, further and different relief as to this Court may be just and

proper.

Dated: Fariningdale, New York JOSEPHy. L1VELY, ESQ., P.C.
October 7, 2019 / gy -'2

Bý: Joseph 101. Lively, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant Sessa
110 Willard Ave

Farmingdale, NY 1 1735

(516) 967-4033
To:
William Sweeney, Jr.Esq.,

Attorney for Plaintiff
742 Veteran's Memorial Highway,
Hauppauge, New York 11788

(631) 361-6401

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK INDEX: 613386
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK YEAR: 2017

DANIELLE P. SCHAFHAUTLE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

QUALITY AUTOBODY, INC., DOUGLAS SESSA,
NEIL A. MARGULIES, GMAC, ALLY FINANCIAL,
INC., VAULT TRUST, KARILU C. LIBARDI, EDWARD
J. NORCIA, ALL N.Y. AUCTIONEERS, AND JOHN DOE,
BEING A FICTITIOUS NAME,

Defendants.

AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND TO VACATE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS AND AGAINST DEFENDANT DOUGLAS SESSA

JOSEPH M. LIVELY, ESQ., P.C.
Joseph M. Lively Esq.
110 Willard Avenue

Farmingdale, New York 11735
Telephope: (516) 967-4033

Certification Pursuant to 130-1.1 A of the Rule o 'theQjef A in trator (22NY CRP)

Joseph M. Lively, Esq.

To: William Sweeney, Jr. Esq.,

Attorney for Plaintiff
742 Veteran's Memorial Highway,
Hauppauge, New York 11788

(631) 361-8115

Service of a copy of the within
is hereby admitted

Dated: October

Case Info

Judge

John H Rouse Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

October 07, 2019

Case Filing Date

July 18, 2017

County

Parties

ALL N.Y. AUCTIONEERS Defendant
ALLY FINANCIAL INC. Defendant
Danielle P. Schafhautle Plaintiff
Douglas Sessa Defendant
Edward J Norcia Defendant
FONTANA, GEORGE C Attorney for the Defendants
GMAC Defendant
John Doe Defendant
Karilu C. Libardi Defendant
LIVELY, JOSEPH MICHAEL Attorney for the Defendants
LOCANTRO, JAMES C Attorney for the Defendants
Neil A Margulies Defendant
QUALITY AUTO BODY INC. Defendant
ROSENBERG, MICHAEL A Attorney for the Defendants
SWEENEY, WILLIAM H. Attorney for the Plaintiff
VAUL TRUST Defendant
JOSEPH NORCIA Attorney
HAROLD SWEENEY Attorney
ADAM MARGULIES Attorney
JAMES CESARANO Attorney

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Motion-Secondary: Danielle P. Schafhautle v. Quality Auto Body Inc., Douglas Sessa, Neil A Margulies, Gmac, Ally Financial Inc., Vaul Trust, Karilu C. Libardi, Edward J Norcia, All N.Y. Auctioneers, John Doe

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