Preview
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Ryan Lazenby, and Temaca Irrigation LLC, Court File No. 27-CV-18-19659
Case type: Employment
Judge Joseph R. Klein
Plaintiffs,
v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Guadalupe Gomez, James Gomez, and
Temaca Lawn Sprinkler’s, Inc. d/b/a/ Temaca
Lawn Sprinklers,
Defendants.
The above-captioned matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Joseph R. Klein,
Judge of District Court, on December 14, 2018, pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary
Injunction.
Based upon the arguments of counsel, as well as the files, records, and proceedings herein,
the Court makes the following:
ORDER
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Injunction is hereby DENIED.
2. The attached memorandum of law is incorporated herein.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: February 1, 2019 ____________________________
Joseph R. Klein
Judge of District Court
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
FACTS
This case involves a dispute between Plaintiffs Ryan Lazenby and Temaca Irrigation, LLC
(“Temaca Irrigation”) and Defendants Guadalupe Gomez, James Gomez, and Temaca Lawn
Sprinkler’s, Inc. d/b/a Temaca Lawn Sprinklers (“Temaca Sprinklers”). In April 2017, Plaintiff
Lazenby and Defendant Gomez entered into a purchase agreement whereby Defendant Gomez
sold Temaca Sprinklers to Plaintiff Lazenby. Plaintiff Lazenby subsequently formed Temaca
Irrigation as a successor entity to Temaca Sprinklers.
Temaca Sprinklers, and its successor entity, Temaca Irrigation, is in the business of
servicing lawn irrigation systems in and around the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Temaca
Sprinklers was owned and operated by Defendant Gomez for approximately 15 years until he sold
it to Plaintiff Lazenby. Following the sale, Defendant Gomez was employed by Plaintiffs until the
summer of 2018.
Plaintiffs allege that following the sale and his termination, Defendant Gomez continued
to operate Temaca Sprinklers and held himself out to employees and customers as management
authority. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Gomez has solicited Temaca Irrigation customers
and persuaded them to stop doing business with Plaintiffs. It is further alleged by Plaintiffs that
Defendant Gomez has deposited checks mistakenly remitted by Temaca Irrigation customers to
Defendant Gomez at Temaca Irrigation’s former address.
Plaintiffs now move the Court for an order: (1) enjoining Defendants from servicing law
irrigation systems, soliciting law irrigation customers, or otherwise competing in the Minnesota
lawn irrigation business; (2) freezing all accounts held by Temaca Sprinklers; and (3) enjoining
Defendant Guadalupe Gomez from operating Temaca Sprinklers, and identifying and escrowing
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
any monetary compensation or receivables received as a result of servicing lawn irrigation
systems.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The district court may grant temporary injunctive relief if affidavits, deposition testimony,
or oral testimony demonstrate sufficient grounds. Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02(b). In requesting
temporary injunctive relief, the movant must show that a party will suffer irreparable injury before
a trial on the merits can be held, and that the relief sought will be ineffectual or impossible to grant
unless the status quo is maintained. Unlimited Horizon Mktg., Inc. v. Precision Hub, Inc., 533
N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). The purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the
status quo of the parties’ relationship until the case can be decided on its merits. Pickerign v. Pasco
Mktg., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Minn. 1975). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary
equitable remedy. Haley v. Forcelle, 669 N.W.2d 48, 55 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). It “is the strong
arm of equity” and should only be granted with “great caution and deliberation on the part of the
court.” Gen. Minn. Utilities Co. v. Carlton Cty. Co-op. Power Ass’n, 22 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Minn.
1946). Injunctive relief may be awarded “only in clear cases, reasonably free from doubt.” AMF
Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. 1961). The Court may
issue a temporary restraining order if no adequate remedy at law exists and denial of the injunction
will result in irreparable injury. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92
(Minn. 1979). The threatened injury must be “real, substantial, and irreparable.” Ind. School Dist.
No. 35, Marshall County v. Engelstad, 144 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Minn. 1966). When faced with a
motion for injunctive relief, the trial court considers the five factors enumerated in Dahlberg Bros.
v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965) “to aid the appellate court by affording
it a clear understanding of the ground * * * of the decision.” Cent. Lakes Educ. Ass'n v. Indep. Sch.
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
Dist. No. 743, Sauk Ctr., 411 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Asch v. Housing and
Redevelopment Authority, 97 N.W.2d 656, 664–65 (Minn. 1959)).
In this case, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently prove the type of irreparable harm required
for the Court to grant their Motion for Temporary Injunction. Additionally, in applying the
Dahlberg factors set forth below, the Court finds that the Motion for Temporary Injunction must
be denied.
I. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm.
A threshold requirement for injunctive relief is a showing by the movant that irreparable
injury will result before a decision on the merits can occur. Irreparable injury is a prerequisite to
obtaining injunctive relief. Central Lakes Educ. Ass’n, 411 N.W.2d at 878. Moreover, the party
seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that the injunction is necessary to prevent the
irreparable injury because there is no other adequate legal remedy available to them. U.S. Bank
Nat'l Ass'n v. Angeion Corp., 615 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). The burden of proof
rests upon the movant to show that irreparable injury entitles him to injunctive relief. AMF
Pinspotters, Inc., 110 N.W.2d at 351. In order to satisfy this threshold requirement, a party must
articulate “specific, particularized, non-speculative irreparable harm it stands to incur” if an
injunction is not issued. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Severson, 2015 WL 5719502 (D. Minn.
September 28, 2015). The plaintiff “must offer more than a mere statement that it is suffering
irreparable injury.” Duluth/Superior Communications, Inc. v. Shouts, 2004 WL 1327063 (Minn.
App. June 15, 2004).
In this case, the harm complained of is the loss of customers by Plaintiffs due to the alleged
conduct of the Defendants. In one instance, Plaintiffs allege that a customer terminated his business
relationship with Plaintiffs based on disparaging statements made by Defendant Gomez. In another
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
instance, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Gomez “approached current Temaca Irrigation customers
and attempted to persuade them to stop doing business with Plaintiffs by using false statements
about Plaintiff Lazenby.” Plaintiffs’ allegations of harm, though, are not plead with specificity and
are unsupported. This Court finds that the vague and conclusory allegations contained in
paragraphs 29-35 of the Complaint fall short of the showing necessary to demonstrate immediate
irreparable harm. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not made a showing that establishes a connection
between Defendants’ alleged conduct and customers terminating their business relationship with
Plaintiffs.
Even if Plaintiffs were to establish that customers were terminating their business with
them due to Defendants’ conduct, which the Court finds they have not, it would be insufficient to
constitute the type of irreparable harm requiring a temporary injunction. Indeed, when an injury
alleged is primarily economic, grounds for a temporary injunction are not established. Morse v.
City of Waterville, 458 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); see also Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d
710, 713 (Minn. 1982) (The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will
be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of
irreparable harm). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established the irreparable
harm necessary for granting a temporary injunction.
II. The Dahlberg Factors do not Support Granting a Temporary Injunction.
Absent a showing of irreparable harm, the granting of a temporary injunction is an abuse
of discretion, regardless of the Dahlberg factors. City of Mounds View v. Metropolitan Airports
Commission, 590 N.W. 2d 355 (Minn. App. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ failure to show
irreparable harm is, by itself, a sufficient ground upon which to deny its Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. Morse, 458 N.W. 2d at 729. However, even assuming that Plaintiffs had shown
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
irreparable harm, and that this harm were the type to justify a temporary injunction, the Dahlberg
factors would weigh against granting Plaintiffs a temporary injunction. The Dahlberg factors
include: 1) the nature of the relationship between the parties before the dispute giving rise to the
request for relief; 2) the harm to be suffered by the moving party if the injunction is denied as
compared to that inflicted on the non-moving party if the injunction is granted; 3) Plaintiffs’
likelihood of success on the merits; 4) the public interest; and 5) the administrative burden in
enforcing an injunction. Dahlberg Bros., 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. The Court has considered all five
Dahlberg factors, but Fa ctors 2 and 3 are determinative here.
The first Dahlberg factor requires that the court evaluate the nature of the relationship
between the parties before the dispute. Plaintiff Lazenby and Defendant Gomez entered into a
purchase agreement for Defendant Temaca Sprinklers, which was then succeeded by Plaintiff
Temaca Irrigation. Following the execution of the purchase agreement, the relationship between
Plaintiff Lazenby and Defendant Gomez was that of employer/employee, and the relationship
between Plaintiff Temaca Irrigation and Defendant Temaca Sprinklers was that of
predecessor/successor entity.
A temporary injunction is meant to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the
merits. Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Minn. 1975). Here, it is not
clearly established that the status quo of the parties’ relationship is immediately threatened absent
a temporary injunction. However, given the employer/employee and the predecessor/successor
relationships between the parties, the Court finds that this factor would weigh in favor of granting
the temporary injunction.
The second Dahlberg factor requires the court to evaluate the balancing of harms between
the parties, were the injunction to be granted. This court finds that the second factor weighs against
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
granting an injunction. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. Other than vague
and conclusory assertions, Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence of any of the
Defendants soliciting or stealing customers, or sufficient evidence to show that Defendant Gomez
was causing customers to terminate their business relationship with Plaintiffs.
The third Dahlberg factor requires that the court evaluate whether or not a plaintiff has
established that there is a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits. This court finds that
Plaintiffs have not established that there is a sufficient likelihood that they will prevail on the
merits. Plaintiffs’ claims are stated in general terms, are conclusory, and are not sufficiently
pleaded or supported to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. If a plaintiff can show no
likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a temporary injunction is not appropriate. Metro. Sports
Facilities Comm’n v. Minnesota Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
Plaintiffs bring five claims against Defendants: 1) Breach of contract; 2) Conversion; 3)
Tortious interference with a contract; 4) Tortious interference with a prospective business
advantage; and 5) Defamation. None of Plaintiffs’ claim are sufficiently plead to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits that would warrant the granting of a temporary injunction.
Claims 2-5 fail to establish a likelihood of success on the merits for reasons noted above. Namely,
Plaintiffs have not established a connection between Defendants’ alleged conduct and customers
terminating their business relationship with Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ primary claim is that for breach of contract. This claim relates to the restrictive
covenant in the purchase agreement, which states, in part: “for a period of 3 Years, the Seller will
not directly or indirectly engage in any business competitive with Temaca Law Sprinklers. This
covenant shall apply to the geographical area that includes all of the State of Minnesota.” Here,
too, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
sufficient to grant a temporary injunction. Indeed, a district court is to exercise great caution and
deliberation “in the granting of… [i]njunctive relief, [which] should be awarded only in clear cases,
reasonably free from doubt, and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” AMF
Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. 1961). See also Upper Midwest
Sales Co. v. Ecolab Inc., 577 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. App. 1998). This is especially true in the context
of non-compete agreements, which are “looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered, and
carefully scrutinized.” Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965);
see also Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sheehy Properties, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 882, 885-886 (Minn.
1978) (Providing that post-employment restrictive covenants are disfavored under Minnesota law
and public policy, and must be strictly construed). Under the strict construction of the covenant
required under Minnesota law, Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits
on his breach of contract claim. Accordingly, this Dahlberg factor also weighs against granting
the temporary injunction.
The fourth Dahlberg factor requires the court to assess whether the granting of an
injunction is consistent with public policy interests. This court finds that public policy would not
be served by granting an injunction. Minnesota law generally does not favor restrictive covenants
or restraints on trade and courts look upon such agreement with disfavor. See e.g. Kallok v.
Medtronic. Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn. 1998); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic. Ltd., 334 N.W.2d
626, 630 (Minn. 1983); Nat'l Recruiters. Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982);
Jim W. Miller Const., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1980); Harris v. Bolin, 247
N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. 1976); Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn.
1965). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a panoply of conduct, for reasons that are advanced in
only general and conclusory ways. To restrict the activities of parties on the basis of such
27-CV-18-19659
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
2/1/2019 3:05 PM
conclusory allegations, prior to the conduct of any discovery, would not serve the public interest.
Accordingly, public policy would not support granting a temporary injunction in this case.
The fifth Dahlberg factor requires the court to evaluate the administrative burden of
imposing the temporary injunction. In the present case, the court finds that the administrative
burden imposed by granting a temporary injunction as requested by Plaintiffs weighs neither
against nor in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated irreparable harm. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that the Dahlberg factors weigh in favor of granting their request for immediate
injunctive relief. Accordingly, their request for relief is, in all respects, denied.
JRK
Preview
27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF HENNEPIN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Ryan Lazenby, and Temaca Irrigation LLC, Court File No. 27-CV-18-19659 Case type: Employment Judge Joseph R. Klein Plaintiffs, v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION Guadalupe Gomez, James Gomez, and Temaca Lawn Sprinkler’s, Inc. d/b/a/ Temaca Lawn Sprinklers, Defendants. The above-captioned matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Joseph R. Klein, Judge of District Court, on December 14, 2018, pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Injunction. Based upon the arguments of counsel, as well as the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court makes the following: ORDER 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Injunction is hereby DENIED. 2. The attached memorandum of law is incorporated herein. BY THE COURT: Dated: February 1, 2019 ____________________________ Joseph R. Klein Judge of District Court 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM FACTS This case involves a dispute between Plaintiffs Ryan Lazenby and Temaca Irrigation, LLC (“Temaca Irrigation”) and Defendants Guadalupe Gomez, James Gomez, and Temaca Lawn Sprinkler’s, Inc. d/b/a Temaca Lawn Sprinklers (“Temaca Sprinklers”). In April 2017, Plaintiff Lazenby and Defendant Gomez entered into a purchase agreement whereby Defendant Gomez sold Temaca Sprinklers to Plaintiff Lazenby. Plaintiff Lazenby subsequently formed Temaca Irrigation as a successor entity to Temaca Sprinklers. Temaca Sprinklers, and its successor entity, Temaca Irrigation, is in the business of servicing lawn irrigation systems in and around the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Temaca Sprinklers was owned and operated by Defendant Gomez for approximately 15 years until he sold it to Plaintiff Lazenby. Following the sale, Defendant Gomez was employed by Plaintiffs until the summer of 2018. Plaintiffs allege that following the sale and his termination, Defendant Gomez continued to operate Temaca Sprinklers and held himself out to employees and customers as management authority. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Gomez has solicited Temaca Irrigation customers and persuaded them to stop doing business with Plaintiffs. It is further alleged by Plaintiffs that Defendant Gomez has deposited checks mistakenly remitted by Temaca Irrigation customers to Defendant Gomez at Temaca Irrigation’s former address. Plaintiffs now move the Court for an order: (1) enjoining Defendants from servicing law irrigation systems, soliciting law irrigation customers, or otherwise competing in the Minnesota lawn irrigation business; (2) freezing all accounts held by Temaca Sprinklers; and (3) enjoining Defendant Guadalupe Gomez from operating Temaca Sprinklers, and identifying and escrowing 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM any monetary compensation or receivables received as a result of servicing lawn irrigation systems. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The district court may grant temporary injunctive relief if affidavits, deposition testimony, or oral testimony demonstrate sufficient grounds. Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02(b). In requesting temporary injunctive relief, the movant must show that a party will suffer irreparable injury before a trial on the merits can be held, and that the relief sought will be ineffectual or impossible to grant unless the status quo is maintained. Unlimited Horizon Mktg., Inc. v. Precision Hub, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). The purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo of the parties’ relationship until the case can be decided on its merits. Pickerign v. Pasco Mktg., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Minn. 1975). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy. Haley v. Forcelle, 669 N.W.2d 48, 55 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). It “is the strong arm of equity” and should only be granted with “great caution and deliberation on the part of the court.” Gen. Minn. Utilities Co. v. Carlton Cty. Co-op. Power Ass’n, 22 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Minn. 1946). Injunctive relief may be awarded “only in clear cases, reasonably free from doubt.” AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. 1961). The Court may issue a temporary restraining order if no adequate remedy at law exists and denial of the injunction will result in irreparable injury. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979). The threatened injury must be “real, substantial, and irreparable.” Ind. School Dist. No. 35, Marshall County v. Engelstad, 144 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Minn. 1966). When faced with a motion for injunctive relief, the trial court considers the five factors enumerated in Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965) “to aid the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of the ground * * * of the decision.” Cent. Lakes Educ. Ass'n v. Indep. Sch. 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM Dist. No. 743, Sauk Ctr., 411 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Asch v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 97 N.W.2d 656, 664–65 (Minn. 1959)). In this case, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently prove the type of irreparable harm required for the Court to grant their Motion for Temporary Injunction. Additionally, in applying the Dahlberg factors set forth below, the Court finds that the Motion for Temporary Injunction must be denied. I. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm. A threshold requirement for injunctive relief is a showing by the movant that irreparable injury will result before a decision on the merits can occur. Irreparable injury is a prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief. Central Lakes Educ. Ass’n, 411 N.W.2d at 878. Moreover, the party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that the injunction is necessary to prevent the irreparable injury because there is no other adequate legal remedy available to them. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Angeion Corp., 615 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). The burden of proof rests upon the movant to show that irreparable injury entitles him to injunctive relief. AMF Pinspotters, Inc., 110 N.W.2d at 351. In order to satisfy this threshold requirement, a party must articulate “specific, particularized, non-speculative irreparable harm it stands to incur” if an injunction is not issued. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Severson, 2015 WL 5719502 (D. Minn. September 28, 2015). The plaintiff “must offer more than a mere statement that it is suffering irreparable injury.” Duluth/Superior Communications, Inc. v. Shouts, 2004 WL 1327063 (Minn. App. June 15, 2004). In this case, the harm complained of is the loss of customers by Plaintiffs due to the alleged conduct of the Defendants. In one instance, Plaintiffs allege that a customer terminated his business relationship with Plaintiffs based on disparaging statements made by Defendant Gomez. In another 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM instance, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Gomez “approached current Temaca Irrigation customers and attempted to persuade them to stop doing business with Plaintiffs by using false statements about Plaintiff Lazenby.” Plaintiffs’ allegations of harm, though, are not plead with specificity and are unsupported. This Court finds that the vague and conclusory allegations contained in paragraphs 29-35 of the Complaint fall short of the showing necessary to demonstrate immediate irreparable harm. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not made a showing that establishes a connection between Defendants’ alleged conduct and customers terminating their business relationship with Plaintiffs. Even if Plaintiffs were to establish that customers were terminating their business with them due to Defendants’ conduct, which the Court finds they have not, it would be insufficient to constitute the type of irreparable harm requiring a temporary injunction. Indeed, when an injury alleged is primarily economic, grounds for a temporary injunction are not established. Morse v. City of Waterville, 458 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); see also Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Minn. 1982) (The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established the irreparable harm necessary for granting a temporary injunction. II. The Dahlberg Factors do not Support Granting a Temporary Injunction. Absent a showing of irreparable harm, the granting of a temporary injunction is an abuse of discretion, regardless of the Dahlberg factors. City of Mounds View v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 590 N.W. 2d 355 (Minn. App. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ failure to show irreparable harm is, by itself, a sufficient ground upon which to deny its Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Morse, 458 N.W. 2d at 729. However, even assuming that Plaintiffs had shown 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM irreparable harm, and that this harm were the type to justify a temporary injunction, the Dahlberg factors would weigh against granting Plaintiffs a temporary injunction. The Dahlberg factors include: 1) the nature of the relationship between the parties before the dispute giving rise to the request for relief; 2) the harm to be suffered by the moving party if the injunction is denied as compared to that inflicted on the non-moving party if the injunction is granted; 3) Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits; 4) the public interest; and 5) the administrative burden in enforcing an injunction. Dahlberg Bros., 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. The Court has considered all five Dahlberg factors, but Fa ctors 2 and 3 are determinative here. The first Dahlberg factor requires that the court evaluate the nature of the relationship between the parties before the dispute. Plaintiff Lazenby and Defendant Gomez entered into a purchase agreement for Defendant Temaca Sprinklers, which was then succeeded by Plaintiff Temaca Irrigation. Following the execution of the purchase agreement, the relationship between Plaintiff Lazenby and Defendant Gomez was that of employer/employee, and the relationship between Plaintiff Temaca Irrigation and Defendant Temaca Sprinklers was that of predecessor/successor entity. A temporary injunction is meant to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits. Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Minn. 1975). Here, it is not clearly established that the status quo of the parties’ relationship is immediately threatened absent a temporary injunction. However, given the employer/employee and the predecessor/successor relationships between the parties, the Court finds that this factor would weigh in favor of granting the temporary injunction. The second Dahlberg factor requires the court to evaluate the balancing of harms between the parties, were the injunction to be granted. This court finds that the second factor weighs against 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM granting an injunction. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. Other than vague and conclusory assertions, Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence of any of the Defendants soliciting or stealing customers, or sufficient evidence to show that Defendant Gomez was causing customers to terminate their business relationship with Plaintiffs. The third Dahlberg factor requires that the court evaluate whether or not a plaintiff has established that there is a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits. This court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that there is a sufficient likelihood that they will prevail on the merits. Plaintiffs’ claims are stated in general terms, are conclusory, and are not sufficiently pleaded or supported to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. If a plaintiff can show no likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a temporary injunction is not appropriate. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Minnesota Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiffs bring five claims against Defendants: 1) Breach of contract; 2) Conversion; 3) Tortious interference with a contract; 4) Tortious interference with a prospective business advantage; and 5) Defamation. None of Plaintiffs’ claim are sufficiently plead to establish a likelihood of success on the merits that would warrant the granting of a temporary injunction. Claims 2-5 fail to establish a likelihood of success on the merits for reasons noted above. Namely, Plaintiffs have not established a connection between Defendants’ alleged conduct and customers terminating their business relationship with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ primary claim is that for breach of contract. This claim relates to the restrictive covenant in the purchase agreement, which states, in part: “for a period of 3 Years, the Seller will not directly or indirectly engage in any business competitive with Temaca Law Sprinklers. This covenant shall apply to the geographical area that includes all of the State of Minnesota.” Here, too, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM sufficient to grant a temporary injunction. Indeed, a district court is to exercise great caution and deliberation “in the granting of… [i]njunctive relief, [which] should be awarded only in clear cases, reasonably free from doubt, and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. 1961). See also Upper Midwest Sales Co. v. Ecolab Inc., 577 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. App. 1998). This is especially true in the context of non-compete agreements, which are “looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully scrutinized.” Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965); see also Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sheehy Properties, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 882, 885-886 (Minn. 1978) (Providing that post-employment restrictive covenants are disfavored under Minnesota law and public policy, and must be strictly construed). Under the strict construction of the covenant required under Minnesota law, Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits on his breach of contract claim. Accordingly, this Dahlberg factor also weighs against granting the temporary injunction. The fourth Dahlberg factor requires the court to assess whether the granting of an injunction is consistent with public policy interests. This court finds that public policy would not be served by granting an injunction. Minnesota law generally does not favor restrictive covenants or restraints on trade and courts look upon such agreement with disfavor. See e.g. Kallok v. Medtronic. Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn. 1998); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic. Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); Nat'l Recruiters. Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982); Jim W. Miller Const., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1980); Harris v. Bolin, 247 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. 1976); Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a panoply of conduct, for reasons that are advanced in only general and conclusory ways. To restrict the activities of parties on the basis of such 27-CV-18-19659 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 2/1/2019 3:05 PM conclusory allegations, prior to the conduct of any discovery, would not serve the public interest. Accordingly, public policy would not support granting a temporary injunction in this case. The fifth Dahlberg factor requires the court to evaluate the administrative burden of imposing the temporary injunction. In the present case, the court finds that the administrative burden imposed by granting a temporary injunction as requested by Plaintiffs weighs neither against nor in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated irreparable harm. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Dahlberg factors weigh in favor of granting their request for immediate injunctive relief. Accordingly, their request for relief is, in all respects, denied. JRK