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IN THE STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
SULEMAN TEJANI,
Plaintiffs,
v. CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO.: 21-C-07910-S5
SEAN HILL, an individual, and DONNA
HILL, an individual,
Defendants.
PLAINITFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS SEAN HILL AND DONNA HILL’S
MOTION TO DIMISS AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, responds and objects as follows to
Defendants Sean Hill and Donna Hill’s Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, and shows as
follows:
I. OVERVIEW
This is not a renewal action of a prior lawsuit, but an original action filed on November 4,
2021 in which Defendant Sean Hill failure to yield caused a motor vehicle accident in which
Plaintiff sustained injuries. The subject motor vehicle was owned by Defendant Donna Hill. On
June 6, 2022, the Court dismissed this action for want of prosecution. On June 14, 2022, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Dismissal For Want of Prosecution having
found that caused exists. Additionally, the Order granted Plaintiff additional time to perfect service
upon Defendants until further notice of the Court. On July 8, 2022, Defendants were served at the
same address as was listed in the Complaint.
Defendants moved to dismiss the claim arguing that Plaintiff failed to serve the original
lawsuit upon Defendants and that the statute of limitations has expired, and that Plaintiff is guilty
of laches by not exercising the greatest possible diligence in perfecting service after the expiration
of the statute of limitations.
Defendants’ motion is misplaced for a number of reasons. As a threshold matter,
Defendants’ motion alleges this current action is a renewal action. Instead, this Court rightfully
granted an order to vacate and set aside dismissal for want of prosecution. “Under Georgia law, a
trial court's power to set aside its own judgments during the same term of court is extensive. A
court has plenary control of its judgments, orders, and decrees during the term at which they are
rendered, and may amend, correct, modify, or supplement them, for cause appearing, or may, to
promote justice, revise, supersede, revoke, or vacate them, as may, in its discretion seem
necessary.” Utilicom Supply Associates, LLC v. Terra Tech, Inc., 360 Ga. App. 509, 509, 861
S.E.2d 449, 450 (2021).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) will not be sustained unless
(1) the allegations in the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled
to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint
sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.” State v. Singh, 291 Ga. 525, 529 (2012).
Defendants motion fails on both grounds. In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to perfect
service within the statute of limitations are to be construed most favorably to the party who needs
to perfect service, and all doubts regarding delays must be resolved in the filing party’s favor.
III. ARGUMENT
A. PLAINTIFF IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF EXERCISED
THE GREATEST DILIGENCE IN PERFECTING SERVICE.
The entire premise of Defendants’ motion was that Plaintiff failed to exercise the greatest
possible diligence in perfecting service is inaccurate. “In Georgia, if a complaint has been timely
filed, and is followed by diligent service, perfected as required by law, even though such service
is outside the statute of limitation, it will relate back to the time of filing of the complaint.” McCane
v. Sowinski, 143 Ga. App. 724, 240 S.E.2d 132 (1977); OCGA § 9–11–4.
OCGA § 9–11–4(c) provides in pertinent part: “When service is to be made within this
state, the person making such service shall make the service within five days from the time of
receiving the summons and complaint; but failure to make service within the five-day period will
not invalidate a later service.” “The correct test is whether the plaintiff showed that he acted in a
reasonable and diligent manner in attempting to ensure that a proper service was made as quickly
as possible.” Moore v. Wilkerson, 283 Ga. App. 340, 641 S.E.2d 578 (2007).
“In proving that plaintiff exercised due diligence in perfecting service after statute of
limitations had run, plaintiff's efforts regarding due diligence must be supported by specific dates
and details.” Moore v. Wilkerson, 283 Ga. App. 340, 641 S.E.2d 578 (2007).
Here, Plaintiff showed efforts of good faith and reasonable diligence to serve Defendants
supported by specific dates and details. See Exhibit A. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to serve
Defendants at least nine times at the same address listed in the original complaint. Id. Addotionally,
Plaintiff’s performed a skip trace and a search of Defendants’ tax records search to confirm
Defendants’ residential address, which verified that Defendant Donna Hill owned the home at the
address listed in the Complaint.
On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff hired a private process server to perform a three hour stake out
at the Defendants home which also resulted in another unsuccessful service attempt with further
unsuccessful attempts thereafter. Plaintiff has continuously made good faith efforts to serve
Defendants prior to the Court’s dismissal.
On June 14, 2022, the Court’s Order to Vacate and Set Aside Dismissal for Want of
Prosecution also granted Plaintiff additional time to perfect service upon Defendants until further
notice of the Court.
On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff directed the private process server to serve the Defendants. On
June 21, 2022, at 3:26 p.m., the private process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve
Defendants, noting no answer at the door, jeep parked outside GA tag CKD5968. Again, on June
21, 2022, at 8:44 p.m., the private process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendants,
noting no answer at the door, spoke to neighbor they stated subject out of town. Then, on July 8,
2022, at 2:59 p.m., the private process server successfully served both Defendants. See Exhibit B.
Please note that any delays in service from June 21, 2022 to July 8, 2022 were based upon
the private process server discovering, through conversations with neighbors, that the Defendants
were out of town. Therefore, Plaintiff timely perfected service upon Defendants in this present
action and Defendants Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
B. EVEN IF THIS ACTION WAS A RENEWAL ACTION, WHICH IT IS NOT,
DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT WILL FAIL BECAUSE A RENEWAL ACTION IS
DEEMED TO BE AN ACTION DE NOVO AND PLAINTIFF IS NOT GUILTY OF
LACHES.
Defendant contends the current action is renewal action, and that the action should be
dismissed for insufficient service of process because Plaintiff did not comply with Georgia law
governing service of process citing Plaintiff’s timeline from the first action, November 4, 2021,
to July 8, 2022, when Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint. According to
Ga. Code Ann. § 9–2–61(a), a renewal suit filed after a voluntary dismissal is deemed an action
de novo, in which defenses to the original action are inapplicable, unless they would render the
original action void and not just voidable.
For example, in Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 54, 701 S.E.2d 165, 166–67 (2010), the
plaintiff waited almost two years to file a complaint for personal injury and property damage
arising out of a truck accident and almost five more years to serve the complaint on the
defendants. Before the defendants had a chance to respond, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the
complaint and filed a renewal action under OCGA § 9–2–61(a), and the complaint in the new
action was then timely served on the defendants. The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment based on the delay in service of the complaint in the original action, which the trial
court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed in which The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
As in, Cox v. Progressive Bayside Ins. Co., 316 Ga. App. 50, 728 S.E.2d 726 (2012),
after Plaintiff brought action against driver seeking damages allegedly sustained in automobile
accident, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit and re-filed renewal action after the statute of
limitations had expired. The trial court granted insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss, and The
Court of Appeals affirm. The Court held that Appellant's argument that the renewal pleading
relates back to the original pleading for purposes of perfecting service is misguided. The renewal
statute, OCGA § 9–2–61, allows a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses a timely filed suit to file
suit within six months, regardless of whether the statute of limitation has run. However, a
renewal suit is “an action de novo.” Therefore, the procedural requirements of filing a new
complaint and perfecting service must be met anew. The fact that Appellant may have perfected
service against Dodson in the prior suit does not affect the fact that she has not perfected service
against him in the renewal suit, and accordingly, no action was ever commenced.
As with, Fine v. Higgins Foundry & Supply Co., Inc., 201 Ga. App. 275, 410 S.E.2d 821
(1991), a bicyclist filed personal injury action against manufacturer and installer of grate in road.
The trial court dismissed renewed complaint after bicyclist had voluntarily dismissed first action
and refiled within six months, and The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals held
that: (1) because service in original suit was perfected, even though belatedly, original action was
voidable and not void so that renewal action related back to date of original filing and was thus
not barred by limitations period, and (2) service in renewal action was timely. The Court
reasoned that affirmative defenses of laches raised in this renewal action were not proper
defenses because the delayed service in the first action was not repeated and appellee was served
promptly in the renewal action. Therefore, affirmative defense of laches was proper in the
original action where service was belated, it had no basis in fact in the renewal action, and thus
the statute of limitation was tolled during the six-month renewal period.
The pioneering case in this long line of cases is Cutliffe v. Pryse, 187 Ga 51, 200 S.E.
124 (1938). Plaintiff brought a suit against the Defendant who was not served until well after the
statute of limitations had passed. Prior to any adjudication on the question of late service, the
case was dismissed by the Plaintiff and refiled in another county. Proper and timely service was
had in the second suit, and this Honorable Court determined that any problem with service in the
original suit would not form the basis for dismissal of the second action, noting that the prior suit
was not “void”, but merely “voidable”.
If this case was a renewal action, which it is not, Plaintiff’s renewal action was granted
on June 14, 2022, Plaintiff diligently searched and perfected service on Defendants on July 8,
2022, See Exhibit B.
There is a direct statute in Georgia, OCGA § 9–2–61(a), which directly states that diligence
in perfecting service of process in an action properly refiled must be measured from the time of
filing the renewed suit, and any delay in service in a valid first action is not available as an
affirmative defense in the renewal action.
Furthermore, Georgia Courts has consistently held that whether diligence in service of
process of a renewed complaint brought under OCGA § 9–2–61(a) must be measured from the
time of filing the renewed action. For example, in Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi U.S., Inc.,
262 Ga. 502, 422 S.E.2d 191, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that defenses which are raised
in the renewal action will be adjudicated only with respect to that which occurred subsequent to
refiling.
In Hobbs v. Arthur, 264 Ga. 359, 360, 444 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1994), the Supreme Court of
Georgia held, “The dismissal, discontinuance, or nonsuit of any proceeding which has for its
object the assertion of a right should not prejudice that right so far as the statute of limitations is
concerned, if that proceeding is renewed in the same or in any other form within six months.”
The procedural requirements of filing a new complaint and perfecting service must be met
anew when bringing a renewal action. West's Ga. Code Ann. § 9–2–61. If the current action is a
renewal action, Plaintiff’s unsuccessfully attempts to serve the Defendants in the original action
has no bearing on the renewal action. Plaintiff timely served Defendants given the circumstances,
in the renew action. Therefore, Defendants’ motion is unsupported by law.
C. CONCLUSION
Although service of process was perfected after the statute of limitation expired, Plaintiff
showed that he acted reasonably and diligently in attempting to serve Defendants. Plaintiff ‘s
efforts to perfect service are supported by actions that are outlined in Exhibit B. Without question,
Plaintiff exercised the greatest possible diligence in perfecting services after the expiration of the
Statute of Limitations. Therefore, Defendant’s motion should be denied.
This 26th day of August, 2022.
/s/ Brandon Dixon__
Brandon Dixon
Georgia Bar No. 442156
Attorney for Plaintiff
LAW OFFICE OF
BRANDON DIXON, P.C.
2964 Peachtree Road, Suite 260
Atlanta, Georgia 30305
O: (404) 884-8991
F: (404) 953-6005
brandon@brandondixonlaw.com
IN THE STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
SULEMAN TEJANI,
Plaintiffs,
v. CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO.: 21-C-07910-S5
SEAN HILL, an individual, and DONNA
HILL, an individual,
Defendants.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 26, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the Odyssey File and Serve system. I also certify that the foregoing
documents is being served this day on all parties of record identified below via transmission of
Notices of Electronic Filing generated Odyssey File and Serve system by electronic mail in
accordance with O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-5 (b) by STATUTORY ELECTRONIC SERVICE.
To: Counsel for SEAN HILL AND DONNA HILL
Jason B. Schwartz
Strickland & Schwartz, LLC
2200 Century Parkway, NE
Suite 1050
Atlanta, Georgia 30345
T: (404) 296-6692
F: (404) 296-6045
jbs@stricklanandschwartz.com
This 26th day of August, 2022.
/s/ Brandon Dixon______
Brandon Dixon
Georgia Bar No. 442156
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA SULEMAN TEJANI, Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: 21-C-07910-S5 SEAN HILL, an individual, and DONNA HILL, an individual, Defendants. PLAINITFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS SEAN HILL AND DONNA HILL’S MOTION TO DIMISS AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, responds and objects as follows to Defendants Sean Hill and Donna Hill’s Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, and shows as follows: I. OVERVIEW This is not a renewal action of a prior lawsuit, but an original action filed on November 4, 2021 in which Defendant Sean Hill failure to yield caused a motor vehicle accident in which Plaintiff sustained injuries. The subject motor vehicle was owned by Defendant Donna Hill. On June 6, 2022, the Court dismissed this action for want of prosecution. On June 14, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Dismissal For Want of Prosecution having found that caused exists. Additionally, the Order granted Plaintiff additional time to perfect service upon Defendants until further notice of the Court. On July 8, 2022, Defendants were served at the same address as was listed in the Complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss the claim arguing that Plaintiff failed to serve the original lawsuit upon Defendants and that the statute of limitations has expired, and that Plaintiff is guilty of laches by not exercising the greatest possible diligence in perfecting service after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Defendants’ motion is misplaced for a number of reasons. As a threshold matter, Defendants’ motion alleges this current action is a renewal action. Instead, this Court rightfully granted an order to vacate and set aside dismissal for want of prosecution. “Under Georgia law, a trial court's power to set aside its own judgments during the same term of court is extensive. A court has plenary control of its judgments, orders, and decrees during the term at which they are rendered, and may amend, correct, modify, or supplement them, for cause appearing, or may, to promote justice, revise, supersede, revoke, or vacate them, as may, in its discretion seem necessary.” Utilicom Supply Associates, LLC v. Terra Tech, Inc., 360 Ga. App. 509, 509, 861 S.E.2d 449, 450 (2021). II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD “A motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) will not be sustained unless (1) the allegations in the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.” State v. Singh, 291 Ga. 525, 529 (2012). Defendants motion fails on both grounds. In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to perfect service within the statute of limitations are to be construed most favorably to the party who needs to perfect service, and all doubts regarding delays must be resolved in the filing party’s favor. III. ARGUMENT A. PLAINTIFF IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE GREATEST DILIGENCE IN PERFECTING SERVICE. The entire premise of Defendants’ motion was that Plaintiff failed to exercise the greatest possible diligence in perfecting service is inaccurate. “In Georgia, if a complaint has been timely filed, and is followed by diligent service, perfected as required by law, even though such service is outside the statute of limitation, it will relate back to the time of filing of the complaint.” McCane v. Sowinski, 143 Ga. App. 724, 240 S.E.2d 132 (1977); OCGA § 9–11–4. OCGA § 9–11–4(c) provides in pertinent part: “When service is to be made within this state, the person making such service shall make the service within five days from the time of receiving the summons and complaint; but failure to make service within the five-day period will not invalidate a later service.” “The correct test is whether the plaintiff showed that he acted in a reasonable and diligent manner in attempting to ensure that a proper service was made as quickly as possible.” Moore v. Wilkerson, 283 Ga. App. 340, 641 S.E.2d 578 (2007). “In proving that plaintiff exercised due diligence in perfecting service after statute of limitations had run, plaintiff's efforts regarding due diligence must be supported by specific dates and details.” Moore v. Wilkerson, 283 Ga. App. 340, 641 S.E.2d 578 (2007). Here, Plaintiff showed efforts of good faith and reasonable diligence to serve Defendants supported by specific dates and details. See Exhibit A. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendants at least nine times at the same address listed in the original complaint. Id. Addotionally, Plaintiff’s performed a skip trace and a search of Defendants’ tax records search to confirm Defendants’ residential address, which verified that Defendant Donna Hill owned the home at the address listed in the Complaint. On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff hired a private process server to perform a three hour stake out at the Defendants home which also resulted in another unsuccessful service attempt with further unsuccessful attempts thereafter. Plaintiff has continuously made good faith efforts to serve Defendants prior to the Court’s dismissal. On June 14, 2022, the Court’s Order to Vacate and Set Aside Dismissal for Want of Prosecution also granted Plaintiff additional time to perfect service upon Defendants until further notice of the Court. On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff directed the private process server to serve the Defendants. On June 21, 2022, at 3:26 p.m., the private process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendants, noting no answer at the door, jeep parked outside GA tag CKD5968. Again, on June 21, 2022, at 8:44 p.m., the private process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendants, noting no answer at the door, spoke to neighbor they stated subject out of town. Then, on July 8, 2022, at 2:59 p.m., the private process server successfully served both Defendants. See Exhibit B. Please note that any delays in service from June 21, 2022 to July 8, 2022 were based upon the private process server discovering, through conversations with neighbors, that the Defendants were out of town. Therefore, Plaintiff timely perfected service upon Defendants in this present action and Defendants Motion to Dismiss should be denied. B. EVEN IF THIS ACTION WAS A RENEWAL ACTION, WHICH IT IS NOT, DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT WILL FAIL BECAUSE A RENEWAL ACTION IS DEEMED TO BE AN ACTION DE NOVO AND PLAINTIFF IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES. Defendant contends the current action is renewal action, and that the action should be dismissed for insufficient service of process because Plaintiff did not comply with Georgia law governing service of process citing Plaintiff’s timeline from the first action, November 4, 2021, to July 8, 2022, when Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint. According to Ga. Code Ann. § 9–2–61(a), a renewal suit filed after a voluntary dismissal is deemed an action de novo, in which defenses to the original action are inapplicable, unless they would render the original action void and not just voidable. For example, in Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 54, 701 S.E.2d 165, 166–67 (2010), the plaintiff waited almost two years to file a complaint for personal injury and property damage arising out of a truck accident and almost five more years to serve the complaint on the defendants. Before the defendants had a chance to respond, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint and filed a renewal action under OCGA § 9–2–61(a), and the complaint in the new action was then timely served on the defendants. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the delay in service of the complaint in the original action, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed in which The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. As in, Cox v. Progressive Bayside Ins. Co., 316 Ga. App. 50, 728 S.E.2d 726 (2012), after Plaintiff brought action against driver seeking damages allegedly sustained in automobile accident, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit and re-filed renewal action after the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss, and The Court of Appeals affirm. The Court held that Appellant's argument that the renewal pleading relates back to the original pleading for purposes of perfecting service is misguided. The renewal statute, OCGA § 9–2–61, allows a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses a timely filed suit to file suit within six months, regardless of whether the statute of limitation has run. However, a renewal suit is “an action de novo.” Therefore, the procedural requirements of filing a new complaint and perfecting service must be met anew. The fact that Appellant may have perfected service against Dodson in the prior suit does not affect the fact that she has not perfected service against him in the renewal suit, and accordingly, no action was ever commenced. As with, Fine v. Higgins Foundry & Supply Co., Inc., 201 Ga. App. 275, 410 S.E.2d 821 (1991), a bicyclist filed personal injury action against manufacturer and installer of grate in road. The trial court dismissed renewed complaint after bicyclist had voluntarily dismissed first action and refiled within six months, and The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) because service in original suit was perfected, even though belatedly, original action was voidable and not void so that renewal action related back to date of original filing and was thus not barred by limitations period, and (2) service in renewal action was timely. The Court reasoned that affirmative defenses of laches raised in this renewal action were not proper defenses because the delayed service in the first action was not repeated and appellee was served promptly in the renewal action. Therefore, affirmative defense of laches was proper in the original action where service was belated, it had no basis in fact in the renewal action, and thus the statute of limitation was tolled during the six-month renewal period. The pioneering case in this long line of cases is Cutliffe v. Pryse, 187 Ga 51, 200 S.E. 124 (1938). Plaintiff brought a suit against the Defendant who was not served until well after the statute of limitations had passed. Prior to any adjudication on the question of late service, the case was dismissed by the Plaintiff and refiled in another county. Proper and timely service was had in the second suit, and this Honorable Court determined that any problem with service in the original suit would not form the basis for dismissal of the second action, noting that the prior suit was not “void”, but merely “voidable”. If this case was a renewal action, which it is not, Plaintiff’s renewal action was granted on June 14, 2022, Plaintiff diligently searched and perfected service on Defendants on July 8, 2022, See Exhibit B. There is a direct statute in Georgia, OCGA § 9–2–61(a), which directly states that diligence in perfecting service of process in an action properly refiled must be measured from the time of filing the renewed suit, and any delay in service in a valid first action is not available as an affirmative defense in the renewal action. Furthermore, Georgia Courts has consistently held that whether diligence in service of process of a renewed complaint brought under OCGA § 9–2–61(a) must be measured from the time of filing the renewed action. For example, in Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi U.S., Inc., 262 Ga. 502, 422 S.E.2d 191, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that defenses which are raised in the renewal action will be adjudicated only with respect to that which occurred subsequent to refiling. In Hobbs v. Arthur, 264 Ga. 359, 360, 444 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1994), the Supreme Court of Georgia held, “The dismissal, discontinuance, or nonsuit of any proceeding which has for its object the assertion of a right should not prejudice that right so far as the statute of limitations is concerned, if that proceeding is renewed in the same or in any other form within six months.” The procedural requirements of filing a new complaint and perfecting service must be met anew when bringing a renewal action. West's Ga. Code Ann. § 9–2–61. If the current action is a renewal action, Plaintiff’s unsuccessfully attempts to serve the Defendants in the original action has no bearing on the renewal action. Plaintiff timely served Defendants given the circumstances, in the renew action. Therefore, Defendants’ motion is unsupported by law. C. CONCLUSION Although service of process was perfected after the statute of limitation expired, Plaintiff showed that he acted reasonably and diligently in attempting to serve Defendants. Plaintiff ‘s efforts to perfect service are supported by actions that are outlined in Exhibit B. Without question, Plaintiff exercised the greatest possible diligence in perfecting services after the expiration of the Statute of Limitations. Therefore, Defendant’s motion should be denied. This 26th day of August, 2022. /s/ Brandon Dixon__ Brandon Dixon Georgia Bar No. 442156 Attorney for Plaintiff LAW OFFICE OF BRANDON DIXON, P.C. 2964 Peachtree Road, Suite 260 Atlanta, Georgia 30305 O: (404) 884-8991 F: (404) 953-6005 brandon@brandondixonlaw.com IN THE STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA SULEMAN TEJANI, Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: 21-C-07910-S5 SEAN HILL, an individual, and DONNA HILL, an individual, Defendants. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 26, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the Odyssey File and Serve system. I also certify that the foregoing documents is being served this day on all parties of record identified below via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated Odyssey File and Serve system by electronic mail in accordance with O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-5 (b) by STATUTORY ELECTRONIC SERVICE. To: Counsel for SEAN HILL AND DONNA HILL Jason B. Schwartz Strickland & Schwartz, LLC 2200 Century Parkway, NE Suite 1050 Atlanta, Georgia 30345 T: (404) 296-6692 F: (404) 296-6045 jbs@stricklanandschwartz.com This 26th day of August, 2022. /s/ Brandon Dixon______ Brandon Dixon Georgia Bar No. 442156 Attorney for Plaintiff