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Krsto Mijanovic (Bar No. 205060)
kmijanovic@hbblaw.com San Fi D
Lisa T. Omoto (Bar No. 303830) in francisco County Superior Court
lomoto@hbblaw.com
HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP AUG 24 2021
555 South Flower Street, Forty-Fifth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071 CLERK QF THE/COURT
Telephone: 213.542.8000 By. oe —~
Facsimile: 213.542.8100 jeputy Clerk
Attorneys for Defendants SHERMAN LEWIS
WRIGHT, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and
CHARIOT TRANSIT, INC.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
DAVID NGUYEN, Case No. CGC-19-576056
Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Garrett L. Wong, Dept. 206
v.
}] ORDER GRANTING
SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
MOTOR COMPANY, CHARIOT TRANSIT, | SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INC., and DOES 1 to 30,
Defendants. Date: August 24, 2021
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept.: 302
Action Filed: May 16, 2019
Trial Date: January 3, 2022
The Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of
Defendants SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and CHARIOT
TRANSIT, INC. (“Defendants”) against Plaintiff DAVID NGUYEN (“Plaintiff”) came on for
hearing before this Court in Department 302 on August 24, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Lisa T. Omoto of
Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP appeared on behalf of Defendants. Eric A. Forstrom of First Law
Group, APC appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.
After full consideration of the evidence, moving, opposing, and reply papers, the separate
statements submitted by each party, the authorities submitted by each party, and upon such
evidence and argument presented prior to and at the hearing, the Court orders as follows:
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PS27-0000012 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Defendants’ (SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and
CHARIOT TRANSIT, INC.) motion for summary judgment is granted.
In this vehicle accident case, plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wright breached his duty of care and
caused plaintiff’s injuries. Whether a defendant breaches its duty of care is usually an issue for the
trier of fact to resolve. (See Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 44, 53
[Breach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury; if the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant’s conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by
the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court.”].) Moreover, the Court liberally
construes the evidence in favor of plaintiff, as the party opposing summary judgment. (See
Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.)
Nevertheless, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment where it demonstrates that
plaintiff's claim cannot be established and the plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of material
fact. “A party can obtain summary judgment only by establishing the merit of his [or her] case ‘as
a matter of law.’ (... § 437c, subd. (c).) The phrase ‘as a matter of law’ is another way of saying
that the evidence available to the parties, and placed before the court in support of and in
opposition to the motion, raises no material issue that a trier of fact could resolve in favor of the
party opposing the motion.” (Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 756.)
“There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier
of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the [plaintiff] in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
Defendants assert that Mr. Wright initiated his left turn once the light turned red and the
intersection was clear. (Wright Decl., par. 6; Defendants’ Appendix of Evidence, Ex.4 (dashcam
video.) Defendants aver that as a matter of law Mr. Wright complied with his duty of care under
Vehicle Code Section 21801(a) by making his turn “with reasonable safety.”
The Court admits the dashcam video into evidence. Plaintiff fails to show that defendants
“willfully” withheld evidence such that exclusion of it on this motion is warranted. (See Thoren v.
Johnson & Washer (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 270, 275 [court could exclude testimony from witness
where interrogatory response that failed to identify witness was “willfully false”); Biles v. Exxon
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Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1324 [error to exclude witness testimony where no
showing that party willfully failed to supplement discovery response that was truthful when
provided].) Here, plaintiff merely establishes that “Defendants' ‘dash cam video’ was never
produced as part of a verified document Production.” (Forstrom Decl., | 5.) The evidence is
admitted because plaintiff makes no showing that defendant willfully withheld the video.
Based on the Court’s review of the dashcam video, the Court agrees with defendants that
no reasonable trier of fact could find that Mr. Wright breached his duty of care. The video shows
that Mr. Wright entered the intersection while the light was yellow, executed the left turn when the
light was red and the oncoming cars had stopped, and plaintiff ran the red light and collided with
defendants’ vehicle. Under these circumstances, defendants cannot be liable as a matter of law
and plaintiff essentially concedes the same. (See Defendants’ Appendix of Evidence, Ex.6
(Plaintiff's Depo: 69:13-70:1; 70:20-71:15).) The Court further finds that Mr. Wright’s
ambiguous statements to Officer Siracusa fail to create a triable issue of material fact in light of all
of the evidence in the record. (See Scott v. Harris (2007) 550 U.S. 372, 379 [where the plaintiff's
version of what happened “quite clearly contradicts” what videotape evidence showed, there was
no genuine issue of material fact, absent allegations that the video was altered]; Swigart v. Bruno
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 529, 553, fn 4 [“[t]o the extent that [plaintiff's] witnesses’ testimony was
inconsistent with the video, we do not consider such inconsistency a disputed fact and have relied
on the evidence in the video.”].)
“Where a car has actually entered an intersection before the other approaches it, the driver
of the first car has the right to assume that he will be given the right of way and be permitted to
pass through the intersection without danger of collision. He has a right to assume that the driver
of the other car will obey the law, slow down, and yield the right of way, if slowing down be
necessary to prevent a collision.” (Leblanc v. Cloverdale (1931) 213 Cal. 654, 658.) A left-
turning driver is not liable “[i]f another driver, by reason of his violation of a statutory provision,
or by reason of other negligent conduct, collides with him.” (Washam v. Peerless Automatic Staple
Mach. Co. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 174, 178.) “[E]very person has a right to presume that every
other person will perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of reasonable ground to
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PS27-0000012 {PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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think otherwise it is not negligence to assume that he is not exposed to danger which comes to him
only from violation of law or duty by such other person.” (Dickinson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines
(1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 824, 827.)
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Wright was negligent per se because he did not have the correct
type of driver’s license on the date of the incident. (See Evid. Code sec. 669.) Negligence is a
rebuttable evidentiary presumption and to trigger that presumption, plaintiff must show that “[t]he
violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property.” (Evid Code § 669(a)(2);
CACI 418.) Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how improper licensure was a proximate cause of
the accident, especially in light of the dashcam video that shows that Mr. Wright was driving his
vehicle in a safe manner and the accident was caused by plaintiff running the red light.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August “ 7, 2021
Fb A_—
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
ETHAN P. SCHULMAN
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co ND HW FF WN NY YN NN NY S&B Be Be Be Be Be eB Be ReRRRRBBRKHSE Se DADE BReSTS Krsto Mijanovic (Bar No. 205060) kmijanovic@hbblaw.com San Fi D Lisa T. Omoto (Bar No. 303830) in francisco County Superior Court lomoto@hbblaw.com HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP AUG 24 2021 555 South Flower Street, Forty-Fifth Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 CLERK QF THE/COURT Telephone: 213.542.8000 By. oe —~ Facsimile: 213.542.8100 jeputy Clerk Attorneys for Defendants SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and CHARIOT TRANSIT, INC. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO DAVID NGUYEN, Case No. CGC-19-576056 Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. Garrett L. Wong, Dept. 206 v. }] ORDER GRANTING SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MOTOR COMPANY, CHARIOT TRANSIT, | SUMMARY JUDGMENT INC., and DOES 1 to 30, Defendants. Date: August 24, 2021 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept.: 302 Action Filed: May 16, 2019 Trial Date: January 3, 2022 The Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Defendants SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and CHARIOT TRANSIT, INC. (“Defendants”) against Plaintiff DAVID NGUYEN (“Plaintiff”) came on for hearing before this Court in Department 302 on August 24, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Lisa T. Omoto of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP appeared on behalf of Defendants. Eric A. Forstrom of First Law Group, APC appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. After full consideration of the evidence, moving, opposing, and reply papers, the separate statements submitted by each party, the authorities submitted by each party, and upon such evidence and argument presented prior to and at the hearing, the Court orders as follows: 1 PS27-0000012 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 13571396.1 JUDGMENTCe NA Hh FY NY DN YM Be Se Be Be Bie Be ew Be BRRRRPBBHEBERSERWREDESHRES Defendants’ (SHERMAN LEWIS WRIGHT, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and CHARIOT TRANSIT, INC.) motion for summary judgment is granted. In this vehicle accident case, plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wright breached his duty of care and caused plaintiff’s injuries. Whether a defendant breaches its duty of care is usually an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. (See Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 44, 53 [Breach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury; if the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court.”].) Moreover, the Court liberally construes the evidence in favor of plaintiff, as the party opposing summary judgment. (See Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) Nevertheless, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment where it demonstrates that plaintiff's claim cannot be established and the plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of material fact. “A party can obtain summary judgment only by establishing the merit of his [or her] case ‘as a matter of law.’ (... § 437c, subd. (c).) The phrase ‘as a matter of law’ is another way of saying that the evidence available to the parties, and placed before the court in support of and in opposition to the motion, raises no material issue that a trier of fact could resolve in favor of the party opposing the motion.” (Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 756.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the [plaintiff] in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Defendants assert that Mr. Wright initiated his left turn once the light turned red and the intersection was clear. (Wright Decl., par. 6; Defendants’ Appendix of Evidence, Ex.4 (dashcam video.) Defendants aver that as a matter of law Mr. Wright complied with his duty of care under Vehicle Code Section 21801(a) by making his turn “with reasonable safety.” The Court admits the dashcam video into evidence. Plaintiff fails to show that defendants “willfully” withheld evidence such that exclusion of it on this motion is warranted. (See Thoren v. Johnson & Washer (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 270, 275 [court could exclude testimony from witness where interrogatory response that failed to identify witness was “willfully false”); Biles v. Exxon 2 PS27-0000012 _PPROPOSEDT ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 13571396.1 JUDGMENTAU FF WN co oO ND 10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1324 [error to exclude witness testimony where no showing that party willfully failed to supplement discovery response that was truthful when provided].) Here, plaintiff merely establishes that “Defendants' ‘dash cam video’ was never produced as part of a verified document Production.” (Forstrom Decl., | 5.) The evidence is admitted because plaintiff makes no showing that defendant willfully withheld the video. Based on the Court’s review of the dashcam video, the Court agrees with defendants that no reasonable trier of fact could find that Mr. Wright breached his duty of care. The video shows that Mr. Wright entered the intersection while the light was yellow, executed the left turn when the light was red and the oncoming cars had stopped, and plaintiff ran the red light and collided with defendants’ vehicle. Under these circumstances, defendants cannot be liable as a matter of law and plaintiff essentially concedes the same. (See Defendants’ Appendix of Evidence, Ex.6 (Plaintiff's Depo: 69:13-70:1; 70:20-71:15).) The Court further finds that Mr. Wright’s ambiguous statements to Officer Siracusa fail to create a triable issue of material fact in light of all of the evidence in the record. (See Scott v. Harris (2007) 550 U.S. 372, 379 [where the plaintiff's version of what happened “quite clearly contradicts” what videotape evidence showed, there was no genuine issue of material fact, absent allegations that the video was altered]; Swigart v. Bruno (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 529, 553, fn 4 [“[t]o the extent that [plaintiff's] witnesses’ testimony was inconsistent with the video, we do not consider such inconsistency a disputed fact and have relied on the evidence in the video.”].) “Where a car has actually entered an intersection before the other approaches it, the driver of the first car has the right to assume that he will be given the right of way and be permitted to pass through the intersection without danger of collision. He has a right to assume that the driver of the other car will obey the law, slow down, and yield the right of way, if slowing down be necessary to prevent a collision.” (Leblanc v. Cloverdale (1931) 213 Cal. 654, 658.) A left- turning driver is not liable “[i]f another driver, by reason of his violation of a statutory provision, or by reason of other negligent conduct, collides with him.” (Washam v. Peerless Automatic Staple Mach. Co. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 174, 178.) “[E]very person has a right to presume that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of reasonable ground to 3 PS27-0000012 {PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 13571396.1 JUDGMENTeo Oo YN DH PF WHY Noy NN Ne Be Be eB ee eB ee BNRRRREBBRHBE Ge wWREAEBSHAS think otherwise it is not negligence to assume that he is not exposed to danger which comes to him only from violation of law or duty by such other person.” (Dickinson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 824, 827.) Plaintiff argues that Mr. Wright was negligent per se because he did not have the correct type of driver’s license on the date of the incident. (See Evid. Code sec. 669.) Negligence is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and to trigger that presumption, plaintiff must show that “[t]he violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property.” (Evid Code § 669(a)(2); CACI 418.) Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how improper licensure was a proximate cause of the accident, especially in light of the dashcam video that shows that Mr. Wright was driving his vehicle in a safe manner and the accident was caused by plaintiff running the red light. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August “ 7, 2021 Fb A_— JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT ETHAN P. SCHULMAN 4 s27.0000012. [PROI }] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 13571396.1 JUDGMENT