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DOCKET NO. (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S
NANCY BURTON : SUPERIOR COURT
Plaintiff :
: COMPLEX LITIGATION
v. : DOCKET
: AT WATERBURY
DAVID PHILIP MASON, Et Al. :
Defendants : JULY 1, 2022
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH AND/OR MODIFY SUBPOENA
Defendants, State of Connecticut Department of Agriculture (“Department”), Bryan P.
Hurlburt, Commissioner of Agriculture (“Commissioner”), and Charles DellaRocco, State
Animal Control Officer (referred to collectively as “State Defendants”), file the present Reply in
support of State Defendant’s Motion to Quash and/or Modify Subpoena, (Entry No. 321.00), and
in opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection, (Entry No. 351.00). The subpoena at issue is directed to
Chief State Animal Control Officer, Jeremiah Dunn (“Chief Dunn”), in relation to a deposition
that took place, on April 7, 2022. Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s Objection continues the trend of the
filing of papers that are premised on deliberately false statements intended to mislead the Court.
Plaintiff makes a number of blatantly false assertions and baseless suggestions of
misconduct by the undersigned. Plaintiff falsely alleges that documents that were discoverable
were deliberately withheld. Plaintiff omits to acknowledge that the non-privileged documents
were indeed produced and were on the table in front of her during the entire deposition. More
preposterous was Plaintiff’s refusal to take the documents. At the start of the day, before Chief
Dunn’s deposition began, the undersigned attempted to provide the requested documents to
Plaintiff. She flatly refused to take them and said we would discuss it later. Later, during the
“deposition,” when Plaintiff began making allegations about not receiving requested documents,
the undersigned gestured toward the pile of documents and slid them closer to the Plaintiff.
1
Astonishingly, rather than take the documents, Plaintiff pushed the pile of documents back
across the table toward the undersigned and, initially, refused to take them. Plaintiff’s conduct
was perplexing to say the least. Plaintiff’s suggestion that those documents were not produced is
not based reality. Ultimately, the undersigned had to place the second collection of requested
documents, related to the deposition of the Commissioner, in front of Plaintiff and walk away.
The deposition record reflects this exchange. Plaintiff never offered any reasoning to the
undersigned for her refusal to take the documents initially or what her reluctance to accept them
was about.
Plaintiff’s substantive arguments are also easily dispensed. Plaintiff’s subpoena plainly
requests all communications between Chief Dunn and Attorney Carole Briggs (Department in-
house counsel) and his counsel at the CT Office of the Attorney General “which pertain to the
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s goats, [and] the Plaintiff’s property at 147 Cross Highway, Redding,
Connecticut.” (Caseflow Request, Application for Issuance of Subpoena, Entry No. 320.00.)
Said communications are plainly privileged and Plaintiff offers no compelling demonstration of
need. This request mirrors many of Plaintiff’s other discovery requests which are not designed
to obtain documents but, rather, are drafted so broadly as to inconvenience other parties and
request documents that are plainly not discoverable. Additionally, Plaintiff has a history of
requesting the same documents multiple times, despite already having them in her possession.
“In Connecticut, the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential giving of
professional advice by an attorney acting in the capacity of a legal advisor to those who can act
on it, as well as the giving of information to the lawyer to enable counsel to give sound and
informed advice. . . . The privilege fosters full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promotes the broader public interests in the observation of law and the
2
administration of justice.” (Internal quotations omitted; citation omitted.) State v. Kosuda-
Bigazzi, 335 Conn. 327, 342 (2020). “Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose,
made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.” (Internal quotations omitted;
citation omitted.) Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395 (1971).
Exception to the privilege should only be made where the reason for disclosure
outweighs the damaging effect of disclosure on the essential communications between attorney
and client. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 (1999).
Plaintiff offers no reason for disclosure at all. Plaintiff makes fanciful allegations of “colossal
fraud” and “unlawful civil conspiracy” but, as is always the case with Plaintiff’s filings, the
allegations are without merit and not supported by any particular factual allegations. (Objection,
Entry No. 351.00 at 1.) It must be further noted that the requested disclosures are not marginally
subject to the privilege. Instead, Plaintiff’s application for subpoena swings for the fences and
plainly seeks the disclosure of attorney-client communications that are directly related to her
cases. The request is as bold as it is baffling. Plaintiff goes on to allege that the Department has
not identified that the records are subject to the privilege, all the while overlooking the fact that
the application for the subpoena directly and unmistakably requests communications related to
this case and the ongoing litigation. Id. The fact that Plaintiff is requesting documents of
communications with a represented party, related to this and other litigation, clearly embodies a
request for privileged materials. Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, 305 Conn.
750, 777 (2012).
3
A motion to quash may be granted if the proposed testimony or sought after materials
would be irrelevant to the case, are unreasonable, oppressive, or the subpoena on its face is too
broad and sweeping. Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 179 (1984). The
application for subpoena describes a wide breadth of documents related to a litany of individuals,
both party and non-party. While most of the individuals listed have had no communication with
Chief Dunn whatsoever, some of the other parties work directly with Chief Dunn and
communicate with him on a regular basis. Likely, all of these communications would be
irrelevant to the case at bar but would require many hours to review given that Chief Dunn is in
communication with some of these parties (i.e., his subordinates) on a daily basis. It must be
emphasized: the routine care of the goats, scheduling of veterinarian visits, the administration of
the barn, etc. are not the subject of this litigation. This subpoena is not intended to obtain
information relevant to Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The subpoena application was
deliberately written to be broad and sweeping because Plaintiff is still very much fixated on the
status of the goats. Every one of Plaintiff’s baseless filings include references to her theory of
animal cruelty by the Department. This theory is completely fabricated and has nothing to do
with this case. The claim for animal cruelty has been dismissed for many months now. All the
Department’s records that demonstrate the abuse the goats suffered under Plaintiff’s ownership
are in her possession. These documents corroborate the substance of the search and seizure
warrant. To ask the Department to comb through hundreds, if not thousands, of routine emails
going back over a year and a half is completely unreasonable given the narrow issues that
Plaintiff has raised in her remaining claim. There is a reason that plaintiff never references the
thousands of pages of documents that the Department has turned over: they all corroborate the
search and seizure warrant and affirm the finding of the court, Cobb. J., that Plaintiff neglected
4
the goats and treated them cruelly. State of CT v. Sixty-Five Goats, UWY-CV21-6064254-S,
Mem. of Dec., Entry No. 136.00, at 2-4.
This Motion to Quash and/or Modify must be granted as to the above referenced elements
of the subpoena, and those outlined in the Motion to Quash and/or Modfiy. Said subpoena is
unreasonable and oppressive in that it requests documents that are clearly not subject to
production and are privileged and are unduly broad, burdensome and not likely to lead to
admissible evidence. Chief Dunn should not be commanded to produce documents that are
plainly subject to attorney-client privilege and deliberative process privilege on their face. To
that end, the subpoena should be modified to exclude production of communications between
Chief Dunn and the Commissioner, Department Staff, Attorney Briggs, and the Office of the
Attorney General.
DEFENDANTS
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BRYAN P. HURLBURT, COMMISSIONER OF
AGRICULTURE
CHARLES DELLAROCCO, STATE ANIMAL
CONTROL OFFICER
WILLIAM TONG
ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ___434270_____________________________
Jonathan E. Harding
Assistant Attorney General
Juris No. 434270
165 Capitol Ave.
Hartford, CT 06106
5
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the forgoing Reply in Support of Motion to Quash were
delivered electronically to the following counsel and self-represented parties July 1, 2022:
Nancy Burton
154 Highland Ave.
Rowayton, CT 06853
NancyBurtonCT@aol.com
Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq.
Howd & Ludorf, LLC
65 Wethersfield Avenue
Hartford, CT 06114
pnewbury@hl-law.com
Steve Stafstrom, Esq.
Pullman & Comley, LLC
850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
Bridgeport, CT 06601
sstafstrom@pullcom.com
James N. Tallberg, Esq.
Kimberly A. Bosse, Esq.
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC
500 Enterprise Dr., Suite 4B
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com
kbosse@kt-lawfirm.com
Michael D. Riseberg
Christine N. Parise
Rubin & Rudman, LLP
53 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
MRiseberg@rubinrudman.com
CParise@rubinrudman.com
____434270_________________________
Jonathan E. Harding
Commissioner of the Superior Court
6
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DOCKET NO. (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S NANCY BURTON : SUPERIOR COURT Plaintiff : : COMPLEX LITIGATION v. : DOCKET : AT WATERBURY DAVID PHILIP MASON, Et Al. : Defendants : JULY 1, 2022 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH AND/OR MODIFY SUBPOENA Defendants, State of Connecticut Department of Agriculture (“Department”), Bryan P. Hurlburt, Commissioner of Agriculture (“Commissioner”), and Charles DellaRocco, State Animal Control Officer (referred to collectively as “State Defendants”), file the present Reply in support of State Defendant’s Motion to Quash and/or Modify Subpoena, (Entry No. 321.00), and in opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection, (Entry No. 351.00). The subpoena at issue is directed to Chief State Animal Control Officer, Jeremiah Dunn (“Chief Dunn”), in relation to a deposition that took place, on April 7, 2022. Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s Objection continues the trend of the filing of papers that are premised on deliberately false statements intended to mislead the Court. Plaintiff makes a number of blatantly false assertions and baseless suggestions of misconduct by the undersigned. Plaintiff falsely alleges that documents that were discoverable were deliberately withheld. Plaintiff omits to acknowledge that the non-privileged documents were indeed produced and were on the table in front of her during the entire deposition. More preposterous was Plaintiff’s refusal to take the documents. At the start of the day, before Chief Dunn’s deposition began, the undersigned attempted to provide the requested documents to Plaintiff. She flatly refused to take them and said we would discuss it later. Later, during the “deposition,” when Plaintiff began making allegations about not receiving requested documents, the undersigned gestured toward the pile of documents and slid them closer to the Plaintiff. 1 Astonishingly, rather than take the documents, Plaintiff pushed the pile of documents back across the table toward the undersigned and, initially, refused to take them. Plaintiff’s conduct was perplexing to say the least. Plaintiff’s suggestion that those documents were not produced is not based reality. Ultimately, the undersigned had to place the second collection of requested documents, related to the deposition of the Commissioner, in front of Plaintiff and walk away. The deposition record reflects this exchange. Plaintiff never offered any reasoning to the undersigned for her refusal to take the documents initially or what her reluctance to accept them was about. Plaintiff’s substantive arguments are also easily dispensed. Plaintiff’s subpoena plainly requests all communications between Chief Dunn and Attorney Carole Briggs (Department in- house counsel) and his counsel at the CT Office of the Attorney General “which pertain to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s goats, [and] the Plaintiff’s property at 147 Cross Highway, Redding, Connecticut.” (Caseflow Request, Application for Issuance of Subpoena, Entry No. 320.00.) Said communications are plainly privileged and Plaintiff offers no compelling demonstration of need. This request mirrors many of Plaintiff’s other discovery requests which are not designed to obtain documents but, rather, are drafted so broadly as to inconvenience other parties and request documents that are plainly not discoverable. Additionally, Plaintiff has a history of requesting the same documents multiple times, despite already having them in her possession. “In Connecticut, the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential giving of professional advice by an attorney acting in the capacity of a legal advisor to those who can act on it, as well as the giving of information to the lawyer to enable counsel to give sound and informed advice. . . . The privilege fosters full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby promotes the broader public interests in the observation of law and the 2 administration of justice.” (Internal quotations omitted; citation omitted.) State v. Kosuda- Bigazzi, 335 Conn. 327, 342 (2020). “Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.” (Internal quotations omitted; citation omitted.) Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395 (1971). Exception to the privilege should only be made where the reason for disclosure outweighs the damaging effect of disclosure on the essential communications between attorney and client. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 (1999). Plaintiff offers no reason for disclosure at all. Plaintiff makes fanciful allegations of “colossal fraud” and “unlawful civil conspiracy” but, as is always the case with Plaintiff’s filings, the allegations are without merit and not supported by any particular factual allegations. (Objection, Entry No. 351.00 at 1.) It must be further noted that the requested disclosures are not marginally subject to the privilege. Instead, Plaintiff’s application for subpoena swings for the fences and plainly seeks the disclosure of attorney-client communications that are directly related to her cases. The request is as bold as it is baffling. Plaintiff goes on to allege that the Department has not identified that the records are subject to the privilege, all the while overlooking the fact that the application for the subpoena directly and unmistakably requests communications related to this case and the ongoing litigation. Id. The fact that Plaintiff is requesting documents of communications with a represented party, related to this and other litigation, clearly embodies a request for privileged materials. Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, 305 Conn. 750, 777 (2012). 3 A motion to quash may be granted if the proposed testimony or sought after materials would be irrelevant to the case, are unreasonable, oppressive, or the subpoena on its face is too broad and sweeping. Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 179 (1984). The application for subpoena describes a wide breadth of documents related to a litany of individuals, both party and non-party. While most of the individuals listed have had no communication with Chief Dunn whatsoever, some of the other parties work directly with Chief Dunn and communicate with him on a regular basis. Likely, all of these communications would be irrelevant to the case at bar but would require many hours to review given that Chief Dunn is in communication with some of these parties (i.e., his subordinates) on a daily basis. It must be emphasized: the routine care of the goats, scheduling of veterinarian visits, the administration of the barn, etc. are not the subject of this litigation. This subpoena is not intended to obtain information relevant to Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The subpoena application was deliberately written to be broad and sweeping because Plaintiff is still very much fixated on the status of the goats. Every one of Plaintiff’s baseless filings include references to her theory of animal cruelty by the Department. This theory is completely fabricated and has nothing to do with this case. The claim for animal cruelty has been dismissed for many months now. All the Department’s records that demonstrate the abuse the goats suffered under Plaintiff’s ownership are in her possession. These documents corroborate the substance of the search and seizure warrant. To ask the Department to comb through hundreds, if not thousands, of routine emails going back over a year and a half is completely unreasonable given the narrow issues that Plaintiff has raised in her remaining claim. There is a reason that plaintiff never references the thousands of pages of documents that the Department has turned over: they all corroborate the search and seizure warrant and affirm the finding of the court, Cobb. J., that Plaintiff neglected 4 the goats and treated them cruelly. State of CT v. Sixty-Five Goats, UWY-CV21-6064254-S, Mem. of Dec., Entry No. 136.00, at 2-4. This Motion to Quash and/or Modify must be granted as to the above referenced elements of the subpoena, and those outlined in the Motion to Quash and/or Modfiy. Said subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive in that it requests documents that are clearly not subject to production and are privileged and are unduly broad, burdensome and not likely to lead to admissible evidence. Chief Dunn should not be commanded to produce documents that are plainly subject to attorney-client privilege and deliberative process privilege on their face. To that end, the subpoena should be modified to exclude production of communications between Chief Dunn and the Commissioner, Department Staff, Attorney Briggs, and the Office of the Attorney General. DEFENDANTS STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE BRYAN P. HURLBURT, COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE CHARLES DELLAROCCO, STATE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER WILLIAM TONG ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ___434270_____________________________ Jonathan E. Harding Assistant Attorney General Juris No. 434270 165 Capitol Ave. Hartford, CT 06106 5 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that a copy of the forgoing Reply in Support of Motion to Quash were delivered electronically to the following counsel and self-represented parties July 1, 2022: Nancy Burton 154 Highland Ave. Rowayton, CT 06853 NancyBurtonCT@aol.com Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq. Howd & Ludorf, LLC 65 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114 pnewbury@hl-law.com Steve Stafstrom, Esq. Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601 sstafstrom@pullcom.com James N. Tallberg, Esq. Kimberly A. Bosse, Esq. Karsten & Tallberg, LLC 500 Enterprise Dr., Suite 4B Rocky Hill, CT 06067 jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com kbosse@kt-lawfirm.com Michael D. Riseberg Christine N. Parise Rubin & Rudman, LLP 53 State Street Boston, MA 02109 MRiseberg@rubinrudman.com CParise@rubinrudman.com ____434270_________________________ Jonathan E. Harding Commissioner of the Superior Court 6