Motion for Writ in Vikki Hui Xin Han v. Karma Triyana Dharmachakra Monastery, Inc., Karma Kagyu Institute, Inc.| Trellis.Law

On March 23, 2022 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Vikki Hui Xin Han, and Karma Kagyu Institute, Inc., Karma Triyana Dharmachakra Monastery, Inc., for Other Matters - CPLR 3102(e) application for disclosure in the District Court of Delaware County.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF DELAWARE

VIKKI HUI XIN HAN,

Petitioner,

-against- Index No. EF2022-182
(Hon. Brian D. Burns)

KARMA TRIYANA
DHARMACHAKRA MONASTERY,
INC., & KARMA KAGYU
INSTITUTE, INC.,

Respondents.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRE-ACTION
DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO CPLR § 3102(c)

McALLISTER OLIVARIUS
Dr. Ann Olivarius
Dr. Jef McAllister
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
641 Lexington Ave., Fl. 13
New York, New York 10022
Phone: (212) 433-3456
E-Mail: jmcallister@mcolaw.com
aolivarius@mcolaw.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................... ii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................. 3

I: Petitioner Has Pleaded Meritorious Claims ............................................................... 3
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) ........................................................................ 3
1. KLRC Entities Knowingly Benefited ................................. 4
2. KLRC Entities Participated in a Venture ............................. 5
3. KLRC Entities Knew or Should Have Known of Violation 7
B. The Requests are Material and Necessary ....................................... 8

II: Petitioner’s Requests & the Scope of Pre-Action Disclosure ................................... 9
A. First Request .................................................................................... 9
B. Respondents’ Partial Response Is Insufficient ............................... 10
C. Second Request .............................................................................. 11
D. Ms. Dowiat’s Affidavit Renders
Petitioner’s Third Request Unnecessary ....................................... 12

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 13

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
455 F. Supp. 3d 171 (E.D. Pa. 2020) ......................................................................................... 8

Akhtar v. Vitamin Herbal Homeopathic Center,
Civ. No. 19-1422, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 255148 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2021) ......................... 3

Bonanni v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc.,
133 A.D.2d 585 (1st Dep’t 1987) .............................................................................................. 4

Byramin v. Stevenson,
278 A.D.2d 619 (3d Dep’t 2000) ....................................................................................... 10, 11

Canosa v. Ziff,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13263 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019)....................................................... 5, 6

Emmrich v. Technology for Information Management, Inc.,
91 A.D.2d 777 (3d Dep’t 1982) ........................................................................................ 10, 11

Ero v. Graystone Materials,
252 A.D.2d 812 (3d Dep’t 1998) ............................................................................................. 11

In re Houlihan Parnes, Realtors,
58 A.D.2d 629 (2d Dep’t 1977) ........................................................................................... 9, 12

Jean-Charles v. Perlitz,
937 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Conn. 2013) .................................................................................... 4, 6

Jin Hee Son v. 315 Mgt. Corp.,
2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5632 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 27, 2018) ........................................................... 4

K.B. v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp.,
Civ. No. 19-1213, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250721 (D.N.H. Sept. 28, 2020) ............................ 5

Liberty Imports. v. Bourguet,
146 A.D.2d 535 (1st Dep’t 1989) ............................................................................................. 10

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Matter of Cohen v. Google, Inc.,
887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2009) .............................................................................. 8

Matter of Delgado v. Lader,
885 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 2009) ........................................................................................... 12

Matter of Neham v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
202 A.D.3d 965 (2d Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................. 11

M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019) ................................................................................ 4, 12

Ricchio v. Bijal, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2019) ........................................................................................ 3

Ricchio v. McLean,
853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................... 6

Slate v. State,
267 A.D.2d 839 (3d Dep’t 1999) ............................................................................................. 12

Stump v. 209 E. 56th St. Corp.,
622 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st Dep’t 1955) ......................................................................................... 10

Walsh v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
289 A.D.2d 842 (3d Dep’t 2001) ............................................................................................. 10

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1591 ........................................................................................................ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7

18 U.S.C. § 1595 ................................................................................................................ 1, 3, 5

Civil Practice Rules and Laws

CPLR § 213-c ............................................................................................................................ 4

CPLR § 3101............................................................................................................................ 10

CPLR § 3102........................................................................................................................ 4, 10

iii

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Other Authorities

Make a Donation, Karma Triyana Dharmachakra (KTD), https://kagyu.org/donate ............... 5

Han v. Dorje (May 19, 2021),
https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/21/09/2021BCSC0939cor1.htm ...................................... 13

Albany Karma Thegsum Chöling, https://albanyktc.org/welcome/ ........................................... 9

Friend of SMKTC, Santa Monica Karma Thegsum Chöling,
https://santamonicaktc.com/friendofsmktc/ ............................................................................... 9

Buddhanet Buddha Dharma Education Association Inc.,
http://www.buddhanet.info/wbd/province.php?province&offset=7500 .................................... 9

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondents’ arguments fundamentally misread Petitioner’s pre-action disclosure

requests (“Requests”). Respondents assert that Petitioner has already alleged sufficient facts

against Karma Triyana Dharmachakra, Inc. (“KTD”) and Karma Kagyu Institute (“KKI”) to

file claims against them, and, therefore, her Petition should be denied outright. This both

misconstrues the role of pre-action disclosure and undercuts Respondents’ later argument that

the Petition fails to allege meritorious claims. Whether Petitioner can state a claim against

KTD or KKI alone is irrelevant to whether her Petition should succeed.

Before more time elapses from the rape that forms the basis of her complaint, Petitioner

must identify the correct defendants. Out of respect for the court and to avoid filing an

incomplete complaint, Petitioner sought pre-action disclosure because she lacks the necessary

information to ensure that Respondents are the sole, correct defendants for her action.

Petitioner has detailed, through exhibits and affidavits, evidence sufficient to state a claim that

Karme Ling Retreat Center (“KLRC”) staff and management used specific methods to facilitate

Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s (the “Karmapa”) access to and abuse of trainee nuns and devotees. This

pattern suggests that the entities or directors that operate, manage, direct, or fund KLRC—

whether those entities are Respondents or other related Karma Kagyu entities or individuals—

received benefits from their participation in a venture with the Karmapa sufficient to establish

liability pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”). (See 18 USC § 1595 et

seq.). Respondents, not Petitioner, are in the position to reveal the names of the proper

defendants for this cause of action. But instead of providing these simple answers,

Respondents have chosen evasiveness and improper accusations.

For the reasons set forth in her opening brief and below, Petitioner respectfully requests

that this Court grant the first two Requests in her Petition. As noted below, see infra Section

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II(d), Petitioner obtained the information she required for her third Request from Ms. Dowiat’s

Affidavit, (D.E. 55), and respectfully withdraws that Request from the Petition.

ARGUMENT

To name the proper defendants and accurately form her claims, Petitioner respectfully

requested in her initial Petition the following pre-action disclosure: (1) the identities of all

entities 1 from January 1, 2015 to the present, that own, operate, manage, fund, or direct KLRC

activity (the “KLRC Entities”) (“First Request”); (2) Respondents’ corporate structure,

ownership, and directorship (“Second Request”); and (3) the entity or individual that funded

previous payments to Petitioner on the Karmapa’s behalf (“Third Request”), which as stated

above, she now withdraws. (See D.E. 1, Petition [“Pet.”], ¶ 43.)

I. Petitioner Has Pleaded Meritorious Claims

Petitioner first addresses Respondents’ arguments that she has not established

meritorious claims to which the information sought is material and necessary. (See D.E. 54,

Opposition [Op.], 13-15.)

A. 18 U.S.C. § 1595

An entity or individual is civilly liable under the TVPA if that party “‘knowingly

benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which

that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation” of the TVPA.

(Ricchio v. Bijal, Inc., 424 F Supp 3d 182, 193-94 [D Mass 2019] [emphasis added] [citing 18

USC § 1595].) Because “knew or should have known” “echoes common language used in

describing an objective standard of negligence,” a defendant can be found liable “under [this]

civil standard even in the absence of proof of intentional conduct.” (Id. [citations omitted].) A

1
Respondents repeatedly object to Petitioner’s references to “related entities.”
Op., 3, 11.As noted above, supra
1, Petitioner filed this action because she does not know the entities and directors that ran KLRC.
If she could be
more specific, this Petition would be redundant. In fact, Petitioner transmitted the draft Petition to the Karmapa’s
counsel and requested that he share it with KTD in the hopes of receiving answers to these outstanding questions
without litigating them. D.E. 34. KTD chose not to respond. D.E. 35.

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defendant “cannot avoid liability” for a benefitting-financially claim “by claiming ignorance.”

(Akhtar v Vitamin Herbal Homeopathic Ctr., 2021 US Dist LEXIS 255148, *31 [ED NY, Apr.

30, 2021, No. 19-CV-1422 (WKE/RER)] [allowing TVPA claims to survive motion to

dismiss].)

“Participation in a venture” is defined as “knowingly assisting, supporting, or

facilitating a violation” of Section 1591(a)(1). (18 USC § 1591(e)(4).) “Venture” is defined

as “any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.” (18

USC § 1591(e)(6).) Civil liability for “participation” under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 has been found

to attach even where the defendants were not direct participants in the acts violating the act,

such as trafficking. (See Jean-Charles v Perlitz, 937 F Supp 2d 276, 288-89 [D Conn 2013];

M.A. v Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F Supp 3d 959, 968-70 [SD Ohio 2019].)

Petitioner states a prime facie civil rape claim against the Karmapa 2 and a TVPA claim

against the KLRC Entities, who benefitted financially from participation in a venture with the

Karmapa, in which the KLRC Entities knew or should have known of his sexually predatory

behavior. Thus, “[u]nlike other cases denying pre-action disclosure petitions, [Petitioner] has

identified what caused her injury”—a sexual assault and related trafficking on KLRC’s

grounds. (Jin Hee Son v 315 Mgt. Corp., 2018 NY Misc LEXIS 5632, 2018 NY Slip Op

2
Respondents do not seem to dispute that Petitioner has alleged a prima facie civil rape claim.See generally Op.
Instead, they argue that the Petition fails because it does not “set forth any factual basis to support a claim against
Respondents pursuant to CPLR § 213-c.” Op., 13-14. Because the underlying civil rape events are highly relevant
to understanding Plaintiff’sTVPA claims against Respondents and/or related entities,Petitioner’s brief has
described her civil rape claim against the Karmapa in detail. This claim was also highly relevant to the Third
Request.

Further, a petition for pre-action disclosure is an appropriate tool for use in determining the correct defendants,
should the issue of piercing the corporate veil be relevant. See Bonanni v Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 133
AD2d 585, 587 (1st Dept 1987) (discussing how respondent could have, but did not, use CPLR § 3102(c) to seek
discovery regarding his alter ego claim).

Petitioner notes that she retains other causes of action against Respondents, but as the focus of this Petition was
to determine the correct defendants for the TVPA and civil rape claims, she has not detailed those additional
causes of action in the pending Petition.

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32983(U), *4 [Sup Ct, NY County, Nov. 27, 2018] [citation omitted] [granting broad pre-action

disclosure].)

1. KLRC Entities Knowingly Benefited

The Petition clearly alleges how the KLRC Entities benefited both financially and

spiritually from their participation in a venture with the Karmapa. (See, e.g., Pet., ¶¶ 4, 5, 17

[KLRC insisted that devotees must obey the Karmapa to avoid generations of bad karma], 28

[KLRC Entities “received monetary value and publicity” from the Karmapa’s visits]; D.E. 20.)

The KLRC Entities encouraged the Karmapa to visit their properties, presumably because his

presence resulted in massive financial donations. (D.E. 6 at 2 [KTD would like the Karmapa

to “establish his base in the United States, making him the first Asian religious leader of that

magnitude to live in the West”].) Appearances by the Karmapa at religious events and trainings

earn Karma Kagyu entities large sums in ticket prices, book sales, and related donations. (See,

e.g., D.E. 16; D.E. 32.) KTD still solicits financial benefits based on their association with the

Karmapa today. 3

Respondents’ contrary arguments are strikingly similar to those rejected in Canosa v.

Ziff. (2019 WL 2088435, 2019 US Dist LEXIS 13263, *61-64 [SD NY, Jan. 28, 2019, No. 18-

CV-4115 (PAE)].) There, The Weinstein Company (“TWC”) argued that the financial benefit

that it received from Harvey Weinstein’s promotion of the company was “inadequate” for

TVPA liability. (Id. at 61.) The court disagreed, noting that “by facilitating and covering up

Weinstein’s sexual assaults, TWC made Weinstein more likely to continue to work for TWC.

While the facts developed in discovery may or may not substantiate this allegation, [Plaintiff]

adequately pleads a symbiotic relationship between the TWC Companies and Weinstein, in

which the companies affirmatively enabled and concealed Weinstein’s predations as a means

3
Make a Donation, KTD (offering devotees the ability to “make the following donation to the KTD general fund
to . . . support the activities and programs of His Holiness the 17th Karmapa in the West”), https://kagyu.org/
donate (last accessed May 12, 2022).

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of keeping him happy, productive, and employable which led the companies to achieve fame

and reap financial benefits.” (Id. at 63-64; see also K.B. v Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 2020

WL 8674188, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 250721, *10 [D NH, Sept. 28, 2020, No. 19-CV-1213

(AJ)].)

2. KLRC Entities Participated in a Venture

The KLRC Entities participated in a venture with the Karmapa by facilitating his abuse

of Petitioner. Respondents incorrectly suggest that to meet the TVPA’s “participation in a

venture” standard, Petitioner must allege “how the Respondents have profited or benefited from

the Karmapa’s alleged [trafficking] conduct.” (Cf. Op., 14.) But, as noted above, supra Section

I(a)(1), Petitioner only need demonstrate that the KLRC Entities received a benefit from

participation in a venture with the Karmapa, while they knew or should have known of the

Karmapa’s TVPA-violating behavior. (See 18 USC § 1595.)

Jean-Charles v. Perlitz is also instructive. (937 F Supp 2d 276, 288 [D Conn 2013].)

There, a university chaplain failed to respond to a program administrator’s concerns about an

employee, despite knowing the employee had invited one student to live with him and shown

another student a pornographic video. (Id.) The court concluded that this both constituted a

venture and imputed the chaplain’s negligence to the university. (Id.; see also Canosa, 2019

US Dist LEXIS 13263 at *62-63 [refusing to dismiss claim where TWC used “specific means

and methods . . . to facilitate [Weinstein’s] sexual assaults and to cover them up afterwards”];

Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F3d 553, 555-56 [1st Cir 2017] [plaintiff adequately alleged

benefitting-financially liability where hotel allegedly received rent payments from a guest,

when they knew or recklessly disregarded that defendant was holding and “grooming [plaintiff]

for service as a prostitute”].)

The KLRC Entities facilitated the Karmapa’s abuse through their association with him

in a venture. KTD countersigned Petitioner’s KLRC contract, (D.E. 3, ¶ 6; D.E. 15), and served

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as the Karmapa’s North American seat of power, (D.E. 6 at 2). The Karmapa, who avers to

have no income, (D.E. 3, ¶¶ 17-19), lived lavishly while in North America, presumably funded

by United States Karma Kagyu donations, (id.; Pet., ¶¶ 9, 23). The KLRC Entities regularly

encouraged the Karmapa to visit their grounds, showering him with privileges unavailable to

trainee monastics, and providing him with a place to stay. (See, e.g., D.E. 3, ¶¶ 10-11; D.E. 27

at 1; Pet., ¶ 3.) When at KLRC, the Karmapa entered the women’s quarters at will, though

other men were largely barred from entry. (See, e.g., D.E. 3, ¶¶ 10, 11.) The Karmapa entered

and remained inside Petitioner’s KLRC dormitory room in July 2017, an event that would have

been very rare, (D.E. 3, ¶ 10), yet staff raised no concerns, (id., ¶¶ 10, 12). When KLRC invited

him back in October, the Karmapa raped and impregnated Petitioner. (Id., ¶ 11.) In response,

the KLRC Entities expelled Petitioner for seeking medical care rather than investigating the

rape or instituting protections for future trainee nuns. (See id., ¶ 11, 15.) This facilitation is

sufficient to establish civil liability. (See 18 USC § 1595; id. § 1591.)

3. KLRC Entities Knew or Should Have Known of Violations

The Petition also demonstrates that the KLRC Entities knew or should have known of

the Karmapa’s behavior (which Respondents seem to acknowledge amounts to an underlying

trafficking violation), as well as similar predatory behavior in other monastic retreats, (see,

e.g., D.E. 29).

First, Petitioner has illustrated KLRC’s pattern of facilitating the Karmapa’s sexually

predatory behavior. See supra Section I(a)(2). Second, Petitioner described other women’s

narratives of the Karmapa’s abuse of female devotees. Published online accounts show that

the Karmapa has flaunted sexual relationships with trainee nuns and girlfriends while in New

York and been “gifted” women for his sexual predations by a top Buddhist lama. (See D.E. 8

at 10-11 [alleging the Karmapa publicly groped Ms. Huang in New York, in the company of

other Karma Kagyu practitioners]; D.E. 9 at 3, D.E. 10 at 1 [describing the Karmapa’s alleged

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“harem,” filled with women who were allegedly “pimped” to him by another leading Tibetan

lama].) Given the chasm between these narratives and the Karmapa’s public image as a celibate

guru, it is challenging to believe that the KLRC Entities could have remained unaware of the

Karmapa’s sexual behavior—unless those entities were behaving negligently. 4 (A.B. v

Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455 F Supp 3d 171, 193 [ED Pa 2020] [“At this preliminary stage, we read

[plaintiff’s] allegations regarding the hospitality industry generally as background and

supporting [plaintiff’s] allegation [defendant] . . . knew about the problem of sex trafficking.”].)

B. The Requests are Material and Necessary

Petitioner has also demonstrated that her Requests—the identities of the controlling and

directing KLRC Entities during the relevant times—are material and necessary to the

actionable wrong. (See Matter of Cohen v Google, Inc., 25 Misc 3d 945, 948-49, 2009 NY

Slip Op 29369, ¶ 3, 887 NYS2d 424, 426 [Sup Ct, NY County, Aug. 17, 2009] [requiring

disclosure of the identity of a blogger, which was material and necessary so that he could be

named as a defendant].) Respondents’ arguments that Petitioner does not genuinely seek to

“determin[e] the identity of the defendant against whom the cause of action lies” are baseless.

(See Op., 6; but see Pet., ¶ 1 [seeking the KLRC Entities, whose “identities are presently

unknown”].)

Here, Respondents repeatedly misconstrue the goal of pre-action discovery, arguing

that “the requested information is unnecessary for Petitioner to bring an action against the

Respondents,” (Op., 5), and that Petitioner’s Requests are “far beyond the information required

to bring an action against the Respondents,” (id., 8). But Petitioner named Respondents in this

action because they clearly have knowledge regarding who owned, operated, managed, funded,

or directed KLRC during the relevant time. (See D.E. 55, ¶ 4 [averring that KTD alone

4
Respondents seemingly acknowledge that Petitioner has pleaded meritorious claims, stating that Petitioner has
“demonstrated that she possesses sufficient information to enable her to frame” her claims and, in fact, could
easily rebrand her moving brief as a “Complaint.” Op., 6-7.

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encompasses “thirty branch centers”].) Petitioner sought this information herself, but it was

not publicly available. (Pet., ¶¶ 37-40, 44.) What was available suggested that United States

Karma Kagyu entities are a web of overlapping entities. 5

II. Petitioner’s Requests & the Scope of Pre-Action Disclosure

A. First Request

Respondents’ argument that the First Request—the names of the entities that owned,

operated, managed, directed, or funded KLRC—is a “fishing expedition” for additional causes

of action, is unhinged from the substance of Petitioner’s brief. Because the statutorily defined

term “venture” encompasses any association of two or more individuals, whether constituted

formally as a legal entity or not, a benefitting-financially claim lies against any entity or

individual that associated in the relevant “venture” with the Karmapa. (See supra Section

I(a)(1)-(3).) Petitioner clearly seeks the identities of those defendants involved in this venture,

not facts regarding a cause of action. (Cf. Op., 10-11.)

In re Houlihan-Parnes, Realtors clarifies this distinction. There, the court affirmed an

order allowing a pre-action deposition where the respondent “failed to provide petitioner with

the identities of the limited and general partners and the role, if any, such individuals played in

the closing the [relevant] transaction.” (58 AD2d 629, 630 [2d Dept 1977].) Although “[a]

pre-action examination may not be had to ascertain whether facts exist to support a cause of

action,” where “the facts alleged state a cause of action, the protection of a party’s affairs is no

longer the primary consideration and an examination to determine the identities of the parties

and what form or forms the action should take is appropriate.” (Id.) Again, Petitioner does not

seek facts to “ascertain whether there is” an additional cause of action against these KLRC

Entities, but merely needs those entities’ or individuals’ identities to “facilitate accurate

5
See also Albany Karma Thegsum Choling (an “affiliated center” of KTD), https://albanyktc.org/welcome/ (last
accessed May 12, 2022); Santa Monica KTC (an “affiliated center” of KTD), https://santamonicaktc.com/friend
ofsmktc/ (last accessed May 15, 2022); Buddhanet.info, (listing various “affiliated centers” of KTD”), http://www.
buddhanet.info/wbd/province.php?province&offset=7500 (last accessed May 12, 2022).

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pleading” and name them in her suit. (See also Liberty Imps. v Bourguet, 146 AD2d 535, 536

[1st Dept 1989].)

Respondents also baselessly argue that the First Request is wholly outside the bounds

of discovery, apparently because the information sought predates Petitioner’s physical arrival

on the KLRC grounds. (See Op., 11.) However, Plaintiff has been a practicing Karma Kagyu

Buddhist since the winter of 2013. (D.E. 3, ¶ 5.) In 2014 and 2015, she attended events or

visited temples where the Karmapa spoke and studied. (Id., ¶ 6.) Throughout this time, Karma

Kagyu affiliates encouraged and enhanced Petitioner’s “spiritual commitment to Tibetan

Buddhism.” (Id.) Moreover, the Karmapa’s predatory behavior likely was, or should have

been, well-known within the KLRC community before Plaintiff began her training contract.

(See supra Section I(a)(2)-(3).) The KLRC Entities that ran the retreat in the months before

Plaintiff’s arrival, while Petitioner was an active Karma Kagyu devotee, could clearly fall

within the scope of proper defendants. 6 (See CPLR § 3101.)

B. Respondents’ Partial Response Is Insufficient

Respondents provided a partial answer to the Requests, asserting that only KTD

currently “operates” KLRC and that “it is [Ms. Dowiat’s] understanding that there are no other

legal entities which serve to operate the retreat.” (D.E. 55, ¶¶ 13-14.) Respondents also state

that KKI has been “dormant for several years.” (Op., 4.) These responses are insufficient.

6
For this same reason, cases cited by Respondents where the petitioner had not “set forth any facts that would
indicate he has a viable cause of action” are inapposite.
Byramin v Stevenson, 278 AD2d 619, 619 (3d Dept 2000);
see also Stump v 209 E. 56th St. Corp., 622 NYS2d 517, 518 (1st Dept 1995) (denying pre-action disclosure where
petitioner “failed to establish that he has a viable claim of defamation against certain yet-unnamed people”);
Emmrich v Tech. for Information Management, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 777 (3d Dept 1982) (denying pre-action disclosure
where the “only facts which plaintiff has put forward are that his TIM stock is worthless and that in 1976 a new
corporation . . . was formed and uses a similar name and the same address as TIM.”).

It is not clear why Respondents have cited to Walsh v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 289 AD2d 842 (3d Dept 2001), which
does not reference “fishing expeditions” or pre-action disclosure pursuant to Section 3102(c). However, to the
extent Respondents rely on it for the proposition that discovery is not to be used “to find a cause of action,” it is
inapposite for the same reasons articulated above. Id.

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Respondents have failed to clearly articulate whether other entities contributed to the

management, operation, or funding of KLRC during the relevant time. (See id.) Ms. Dowait

avers that KTD is the “over-arching” organization that runs thirty Karma Kagyu centers around

the globe, but does not clarify the specific KTD corporate structure or entity that directs, funds,

or manages KLRC now, let alone in 2017. (D.E. 55, ¶ 4.) Further, although Respondents claim

that Petitioner is “speculating” that the same group of directors runs many Karma Kagyu

entities, Respondents do not deny that the same individual directors run KKI and KTD. (Op.,

4.) Respondents have not even clearly articulated that KTD (and not KKI or another KLRC

Entity) operated KLRC when Petitioner was physically present at the monastic retreat. (See

generally D.E. 55.)

Petitioner asks basic questions that should have simple answers. Unlike in the cases

cited by Respondents, she does not request an invasive pre-litigation deposition, (Byramin, 278

A.D.2d at 619), or a massive set of documents, (Emmrich, 91 A.D.2d at 777 [requesting pre-

action disclosure of “tax returns” and “all books and records relative to the operation” of

multiple corporations and an individual defendant]; Matter of Neham v N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,

202 AD3d 965, 966 [2d Dept 2022] [denying “unduly burdensome” pre-action discovery

requiring the preservation and inspection of physical evidence]). In fact, Petitioner supports

her brief with affidavits, avers to first-hand knowledge of the incidents at issue, and attaches

additional exhibits that “substantiate[] the claims of injury.” (Ero v Graystone Materials, 252

AD2d 812, 814 [3d Dept 1998].) Therefore, Respondents should be ordered to answer the First

Request, in full.

C. Second Request

The Second Request—Respondents’ corporate structure, ownership, and directorship

—is also entirely within the scope of pre-action disclosure. In reply, Respondents made no

attempt to articulate the directorship of KTD or the most recent directorship of KKI.

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Respondents’ argument that this Request does not “relate[] to a necessary element” of

Plaintiff’s causes of action again fundamentally misunderstands liability under the TVPA.

(Op., 11-12.). Petitioner has no knowledge of whether the KLRC Entitles are run by boards of

directors, constituted as corporations, or formed as general or limited liability partnerships.

Even if the Tibetan names of board members were known, their legal English names would not

be. Research into KTD’s incorporation status and location has been inconclusive. (Pet., ¶¶ 38,

39.) The Karma Kagyu entities in the United States seem to share directors and ignore

corporate formalities, and entities affiliated with the Karmapa have been charged in massive

financial crimes investigations. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 10, 24.) To answer her questions, Petitioner does

not request invasive financial documents, as in Slate v. State, but merely requests the corporate

structure or directorship of the Respondents and KLRC Entities under their dominion and

control. (Cf. 267 AD2d 839, 841 [3d Dept 1999].)

The KLRC Entities should not be allowed to avoid liability by hiding behind their tax-

exempt religious status, which has granted them the privilege of abstaining from the types of

public documentation that other corporate entities must submit to governing agencies.

Petition

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Brian D. Burns Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

May 18, 2022

Case Filing Date

March 23, 2022

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Motion-Secondary: Vikki Hui Xin Han v. Karma Triyana Dharmachakra Monastery, Inc., Karma Kagyu Institute, Inc.

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