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CAUSE NO. 2020-47657
JESUS TORRES and IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MIGUEL HERNANDEZ
Plaintiffs
V. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
CHENIERE ENERGY, INC.
SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., and
SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC
Defendants 269T™ DISTRICT COURT
DEFENDANTS, CHENIERE ENERGY, INC., SABINE PASS LNG, L.P.,
SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION, LLC’S
AMENDED MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
AND APPLY LOUISIANA LAW
DEFENDANTS, CHENIERE ENERGY, INC., SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE
PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION, LLC (collectively, “Cheniere”)
file their Amended Motion to Take Judicial Notice of and Apply Louisiana Law pursuant to Rule
202 of the Texas Rules of Evidence:
I INTRODUCTION
Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Evidence states that the Court “must take judicial notice if
a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.”! Further, the Court
2
“may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding. Here, Louisiana law and the
exclusive remedy provision of the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Statute should apply
because the incident at issue in this matter took place in Louisiana and because Louisiana has the
strongest interest in applying its law to this dispute.
1 Tex. R. Evid. 202(b)(2).
? Tex, R. Evid. 202(d).
{00299542.DOCX}
Il. FACTS
Zachry Industrial, LLC (“Zachry”) was engaged by Cheniere to provide general services
and maintenance at Cheniere’s LNG facility located at 9243 Gulf Beach Highway, Cameron,
Louisiana. Plaintiffs in this matter were employees of Zachry who performed some of those
duties pursuant to a General Services and Maintenance Agreement.
On October 29, 2019, Plaintiffs were working “at the Sabine Pass LNG plant in the state
of Louisiana.”? While working at that facility, they allege that they “became overwhelmed with
the odor of gas, inhaled vapors and began suffering severe bodily injuries.”*
Il. CONFLICT BETWEEN LOUISIANA AND TEXAS WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAWS
A court need not decide which state law applies unless those laws conflict.> Both Texas
and Louisiana have workers’ compensation statutes.° Under the Texas statute, recovery of
workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by worker’s
compensation insurance coverage.’ In Louisiana, the worker’s compensation statute is broader
and provides exclusive remedy protections for an employer and a statutory employer when a
worker is covered by workers’ compensation insurance.® Since there is a difference between the
workers compensation laws of Texas and those of Louisiana, and those laws are central to the
determination of liability and damages in this matter, this court must decide which state’s
substantive law applies.?
3 See Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition 413.
4 Id.
$ See Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.]
2020, pet. denied) (citing Sonat Exp. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. 271 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. 2008).
6 Tex. Labor Code §408.001(a)-(b); La. R.S. §23:1032.
7 Tex. Labor Code §408.001(a)-(b).
® La. RS. §23:1061.
° Torrington Co. v. Stutsman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000). The issue of which state’s substantive law applies is
a question of law for the court to decide.
{00299542.DOCX}
Iv. TEXAS CONFLICT OF LAW RULES
When a conflict occurs, Texas looks to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for
its conflict of law rules.!° The Restatement applies the “most significant relationship to the
occurrence” test to determine which law to apply.!' To determine if another state has a more
significant relationship, the factual matters listed in §145 are considered. Those factors include:
a) the place where the injury occurred;
b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
°) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
qd) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.'?
In determining which state law should apply, the number of contacts is not
determinative.'* Some contacts are more important than others because they implicate state
policies underlying the particular substantive issue.'4 Thus, selection of the applicable law
depends on the qualitative nature of the particular contacts as affected by the following general
policy factors:
a. the needs of the interstate and international systems,
b. the relevant policies of the forum,
Cc. the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
10 See Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. 2000)
"1 Jd.; Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §145 (1971).
7g
'3 Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984)
14g.
15 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).
{00299542.DOCX}
The Texas Supreme Court has determined that more specific Restatement provisions can
apply when determining a conflict of laws issue when the Restatement has more specific rules
applicable to the issues involved in the case under consideration.'® In particular, in Hughes
Wood, the court applied §184 (Abolition of Right of Action for Tort or Wrongful Death) to
determine the standard by which a defendant would be immune from a tort suit when workers’
compensation insurance is involved.'7 Section 184 states:
Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted in any state if the defendant is
declared immune from such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of a state
under which the defendant is required to provide insurance against the particular risk and
under which
a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury, or
b) the plaintiff could obtain an award for the injury, if this is the state (1) where the
injury occurred, or (2) where employment is principally located, or (3) where the
employer supervised the employee's activities from a place of business in the
state, or (4) whose local law governs the contract of employment under the rules
of §§ 187-188 and 196."
Vv. LOUISIANA WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW SHOULD APPLY
A. Louisiana Has The Most Significant Relationship To The Parties And Incident In
This Case.
The “most significant relationship test” stated in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws §145 favors Louisiana since it is undisputed that Louisiana is the state where the incident
occurred. It is also the location where the alleged “conduct” causing the injury occurred.
Further, it is a place of business of Cheniere and the location of the employer/employee
relationship at issue here. Therefore, all factors related to the most significant relationship test of
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws favor Louisiana Law.
16 Wellons v. Valero Refining
— New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020,
pet. denied). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §6 at 206 n.2.
"” Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000); Total Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Garcia, 711
S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. 1986).
18 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 184 (1971)(emphasis added)
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B. Policy Factors Weigh in Favor of Louisiana Law
As stated above, policy factors can also determine the applicable state law. Plaintiffs’
employer, Zachry, carried workers’ compensation insurance in the state of Louisiana for the
purpose of the work conducted at the Cheniere facility located there.!? The contract between the
employer and Cheniere specifically qualified Cheniere as a statutory employer under the
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Statutes.2? As such, Cheniere should be able to rely on the
protections afforded under those statutes.
According to Restatement (Second) Section 184, comment b:
Workmen's compensation usually has two basic purposes: (1) to benefit the
employee by providing that regardless of fault he will be compensated for all
injuries received in the course of his employment, and (2) to place some
restrictions upon the cost of industrial accidents by providing that the employer,
and sometimes other persons as well, shall be liable for the employee's injuries
only in accordance with a fixed scale of damages, and shall be relieved from
liability for tort or wrongful death. The statutes usually exempt from tort or
wrongful death liability only such persons as are required by statute to provide
workmen's compensation insurance for the employee. The immediate employer is
usually granted such an immunity. Under some statutes, a workmen's
compensation obligation, and a corresponding immunity from liability for tort and
wrongful death, is extended to an employer of an independent contractor with
respect to the latter's employees and to a general contractor with respect to the
employees of a subcontractor.
Suits for tort or wrongful death present different considerations. It is thought
unfair that a person who is required to provide insurance against a risk under the
workmen's compensation statute of one state which gives him immunity from
liability for tort or wrongful death should not enjoy that immunity in a suit
brought in other states. Also to deny a person the immunity granted him by a
workmen's compensation statute of a given state would frustrate the efforts of that
state to restrict the cost of industrial accidents and to afford a fair basis for
predicting what these costs will be.
Therefore, the application of Section 184 to this case 1) satisfies the needs of the
interstate system, 2) the relevant policies of the forum, 3) promotes the basic policies underlying
19 See Exhibit 2, Workers’ Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy —for policy period 6/1/19-
11/1/19; See also Exhibit 1, Business Records Affidavit of Steve Bird.
20 See Exhibit 3, Contract at Exhibit C, 23.15.2.
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the workers compensation system, 4) protects justified expectations, 5) facilitates certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result and finally, 6) eases the determination and application of
the law to be applied.?!
Louisiana has “an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its
territory.””? It has “an interest in maintaining a stable workers’ compensation system that binds
employers and employees.”” Therefore, no good policy reason exists in refusing to apply
Louisiana’s exclusive workers compensation law.”* As such, Louisiana law should be applied.
C. Plaintiffs are covered under a Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Policy and able to
file a claim under that policy.
In 2020 the Wellons court identified two key issues to determine applicability of Louisiana
law. The first was whether there was greater immunity under Louisiana law and second, whether
claimants obtained or could obtain benefits in Louisiana.?>
As discussed above, Cheniere was a statutory employer under Louisiana law which is
evidenced in the contract between Cheniere and Zachry.”° Notices of Injury for all plaintiffs
were filed in Louisiana under the applicable workers’ compensation policy.?” Further, a timely
filed tort suit interrupts the running of prescription on a workers’ compensation claim.?* As such,
all prerequisites for applying Louisiana law, as identified by the Supreme Court in Hughes and
2! Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971); See Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202
(Tex. 2000)
22 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §145, comment (a).
3 See La. R.S. § 23:1; see also Hughes, 18 S.W.3d at 207 and Larchmont Farms, Inc. v Parra, 941 S.W.2d 93, 95
(Tex. 1997).
24 See Hughes, 18 S.W.3d at 207 and Larchmont, 941 S.W.2d at 95.
?5 Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020,
pet. denied).
26 See Ex. 3.
27 See Exhibit 4, Worker’s Compensation — First Reports of Injury or Illness
?8 Torres v Louisiana Shrimp and Packing Co., 32 So.3d 803 (La. 2010); Isaac v. Lathan, 836 So. 2d 191-194-95
(La. App. 1 Cir. 2002).
(00299542. DOCX}
later followed by Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Wellons, were met and all Plaintiffs have the
opportunity to pursue claims under the applicable Louisiana workers’ compensation policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Application of Louisiana Law is proper in this case since the state of Louisiana has the
most significant relationship to the incident made the basis of this matter. The Plaintiffs in this
case worked in Louisiana when the incident occurred and are covered by a Louisiana workers’
compensation policy. Further, there is no public policy reason to refuse to apply Louisiana law to
the facts of this case, but instead there are policy reasons to apply it. The Supreme Court in
Hughes and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Wellons have held that because Plaintiffs can
still apply for benefits and Cheniere has greater immunity under Louisiana law than under Texas
law, Restatement 184 dictates that Louisiana law apply to the claims.?°
Vil. PRAYER
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants CHENIERE ENERGY, INC.,
SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS
LIQUEFACTION, LLC prays that the court take judicial notice of Louisiana law and apply
Louisiana law to the to the liability and damages issues in this case and grant these Defendants
all such other and further relief to which they may be entitled.
” Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d at 229 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020, pet.
denied); Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d at 207 (Tex. 2000);
{00299542.DOCX}
Respectfully Submitted,
Hicks THOMAS LLP
nh hp James R. Old, Jr.
State Bar No. 15242500
2615 Calder, Suite 720
Beaumont, Texas 77702
(409) 241-7252 — Telephone
(409) 419-1733 - Facsimile
Email: jold@hicks-thomas.com
Diane K. Bounds
State Bar No. 00783689
700 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 547-9100 - Telephone
(713) 547-9150 — Facsimile
Email: dbounds@hicks-thomas.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT,
CHENIERE ENERGY, INC, SABINE
PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE PASS LNG-GP,
LLC, AND SABINE PASS
LIQUEFACTION, LLC
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I certify that I contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel, Michael Tilton, regarding this motion and he
indicated his opposition.
Whraunds
Diane K. Bounds
{00299542.DOCX}
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served
on all counsel of record on this 7th day of March, 2022
Michael S. Tilton VIA E-SERVICE AND/OR EMAIL
Richard M. Franks VIA E-SERVICE AND/OR EMAIL
TILTON & TILTON, LLP
3730 Kirby Drive, Suite 1020
Houston, TX 77098
mtilton@tiltonlawfirm.com
rfranks@tiltonlawfirm.com
g—— RB
James R. Old, Jr.
{00299542 DOCX}
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CAUSE NO. 2020-47657 JESUS TORRES and IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MIGUEL HERNANDEZ Plaintiffs V. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS CHENIERE ENERGY, INC. SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., and SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC Defendants 269T™ DISTRICT COURT DEFENDANTS, CHENIERE ENERGY, INC., SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION, LLC’S AMENDED MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AND APPLY LOUISIANA LAW DEFENDANTS, CHENIERE ENERGY, INC., SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION, LLC (collectively, “Cheniere”) file their Amended Motion to Take Judicial Notice of and Apply Louisiana Law pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Evidence: I INTRODUCTION Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Evidence states that the Court “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.”! Further, the Court 2 “may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding. Here, Louisiana law and the exclusive remedy provision of the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Statute should apply because the incident at issue in this matter took place in Louisiana and because Louisiana has the strongest interest in applying its law to this dispute. 1 Tex. R. Evid. 202(b)(2). ? Tex, R. Evid. 202(d). {00299542.DOCX} Il. FACTS Zachry Industrial, LLC (“Zachry”) was engaged by Cheniere to provide general services and maintenance at Cheniere’s LNG facility located at 9243 Gulf Beach Highway, Cameron, Louisiana. Plaintiffs in this matter were employees of Zachry who performed some of those duties pursuant to a General Services and Maintenance Agreement. On October 29, 2019, Plaintiffs were working “at the Sabine Pass LNG plant in the state of Louisiana.”? While working at that facility, they allege that they “became overwhelmed with the odor of gas, inhaled vapors and began suffering severe bodily injuries.”* Il. CONFLICT BETWEEN LOUISIANA AND TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS A court need not decide which state law applies unless those laws conflict.> Both Texas and Louisiana have workers’ compensation statutes.° Under the Texas statute, recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by worker’s compensation insurance coverage.’ In Louisiana, the worker’s compensation statute is broader and provides exclusive remedy protections for an employer and a statutory employer when a worker is covered by workers’ compensation insurance.® Since there is a difference between the workers compensation laws of Texas and those of Louisiana, and those laws are central to the determination of liability and damages in this matter, this court must decide which state’s substantive law applies.? 3 See Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition 413. 4 Id. $ See Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (citing Sonat Exp. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. 271 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. 2008). 6 Tex. Labor Code §408.001(a)-(b); La. R.S. §23:1032. 7 Tex. Labor Code §408.001(a)-(b). ® La. RS. §23:1061. ° Torrington Co. v. Stutsman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000). The issue of which state’s substantive law applies is a question of law for the court to decide. {00299542.DOCX} Iv. TEXAS CONFLICT OF LAW RULES When a conflict occurs, Texas looks to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for its conflict of law rules.!° The Restatement applies the “most significant relationship to the occurrence” test to determine which law to apply.!' To determine if another state has a more significant relationship, the factual matters listed in §145 are considered. Those factors include: a) the place where the injury occurred; b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; °) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and qd) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.'? In determining which state law should apply, the number of contacts is not determinative.'* Some contacts are more important than others because they implicate state policies underlying the particular substantive issue.'4 Thus, selection of the applicable law depends on the qualitative nature of the particular contacts as affected by the following general policy factors: a. the needs of the interstate and international systems, b. the relevant policies of the forum, Cc. the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, the protection of justified expectations, the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 10 See Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. 2000) "1 Jd.; Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §145 (1971). 7g '3 Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984) 14g. 15 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971). {00299542.DOCX} The Texas Supreme Court has determined that more specific Restatement provisions can apply when determining a conflict of laws issue when the Restatement has more specific rules applicable to the issues involved in the case under consideration.'® In particular, in Hughes Wood, the court applied §184 (Abolition of Right of Action for Tort or Wrongful Death) to determine the standard by which a defendant would be immune from a tort suit when workers’ compensation insurance is involved.'7 Section 184 states: Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted in any state if the defendant is declared immune from such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of a state under which the defendant is required to provide insurance against the particular risk and under which a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury, or b) the plaintiff could obtain an award for the injury, if this is the state (1) where the injury occurred, or (2) where employment is principally located, or (3) where the employer supervised the employee's activities from a place of business in the state, or (4) whose local law governs the contract of employment under the rules of §§ 187-188 and 196." Vv. LOUISIANA WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW SHOULD APPLY A. Louisiana Has The Most Significant Relationship To The Parties And Incident In This Case. The “most significant relationship test” stated in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §145 favors Louisiana since it is undisputed that Louisiana is the state where the incident occurred. It is also the location where the alleged “conduct” causing the injury occurred. Further, it is a place of business of Cheniere and the location of the employer/employee relationship at issue here. Therefore, all factors related to the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws favor Louisiana Law. 16 Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §6 at 206 n.2. "” Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000); Total Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Garcia, 711 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. 1986). 18 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 184 (1971)(emphasis added) {00299542 DOCX} B. Policy Factors Weigh in Favor of Louisiana Law As stated above, policy factors can also determine the applicable state law. Plaintiffs’ employer, Zachry, carried workers’ compensation insurance in the state of Louisiana for the purpose of the work conducted at the Cheniere facility located there.!? The contract between the employer and Cheniere specifically qualified Cheniere as a statutory employer under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Statutes.2? As such, Cheniere should be able to rely on the protections afforded under those statutes. According to Restatement (Second) Section 184, comment b: Workmen's compensation usually has two basic purposes: (1) to benefit the employee by providing that regardless of fault he will be compensated for all injuries received in the course of his employment, and (2) to place some restrictions upon the cost of industrial accidents by providing that the employer, and sometimes other persons as well, shall be liable for the employee's injuries only in accordance with a fixed scale of damages, and shall be relieved from liability for tort or wrongful death. The statutes usually exempt from tort or wrongful death liability only such persons as are required by statute to provide workmen's compensation insurance for the employee. The immediate employer is usually granted such an immunity. Under some statutes, a workmen's compensation obligation, and a corresponding immunity from liability for tort and wrongful death, is extended to an employer of an independent contractor with respect to the latter's employees and to a general contractor with respect to the employees of a subcontractor. Suits for tort or wrongful death present different considerations. It is thought unfair that a person who is required to provide insurance against a risk under the workmen's compensation statute of one state which gives him immunity from liability for tort or wrongful death should not enjoy that immunity in a suit brought in other states. Also to deny a person the immunity granted him by a workmen's compensation statute of a given state would frustrate the efforts of that state to restrict the cost of industrial accidents and to afford a fair basis for predicting what these costs will be. Therefore, the application of Section 184 to this case 1) satisfies the needs of the interstate system, 2) the relevant policies of the forum, 3) promotes the basic policies underlying 19 See Exhibit 2, Workers’ Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy —for policy period 6/1/19- 11/1/19; See also Exhibit 1, Business Records Affidavit of Steve Bird. 20 See Exhibit 3, Contract at Exhibit C, 23.15.2. {00299542.DOCX} the workers compensation system, 4) protects justified expectations, 5) facilitates certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and finally, 6) eases the determination and application of the law to be applied.?! Louisiana has “an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory.””? It has “an interest in maintaining a stable workers’ compensation system that binds employers and employees.”” Therefore, no good policy reason exists in refusing to apply Louisiana’s exclusive workers compensation law.”* As such, Louisiana law should be applied. C. Plaintiffs are covered under a Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Policy and able to file a claim under that policy. In 2020 the Wellons court identified two key issues to determine applicability of Louisiana law. The first was whether there was greater immunity under Louisiana law and second, whether claimants obtained or could obtain benefits in Louisiana.?> As discussed above, Cheniere was a statutory employer under Louisiana law which is evidenced in the contract between Cheniere and Zachry.”° Notices of Injury for all plaintiffs were filed in Louisiana under the applicable workers’ compensation policy.?” Further, a timely filed tort suit interrupts the running of prescription on a workers’ compensation claim.?* As such, all prerequisites for applying Louisiana law, as identified by the Supreme Court in Hughes and 2! Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971); See Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000) 22 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §145, comment (a). 3 See La. R.S. § 23:1; see also Hughes, 18 S.W.3d at 207 and Larchmont Farms, Inc. v Parra, 941 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. 1997). 24 See Hughes, 18 S.W.3d at 207 and Larchmont, 941 S.W.2d at 95. ?5 Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). 26 See Ex. 3. 27 See Exhibit 4, Worker’s Compensation — First Reports of Injury or Illness ?8 Torres v Louisiana Shrimp and Packing Co., 32 So.3d 803 (La. 2010); Isaac v. Lathan, 836 So. 2d 191-194-95 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2002). (00299542. DOCX} later followed by Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Wellons, were met and all Plaintiffs have the opportunity to pursue claims under the applicable Louisiana workers’ compensation policy. VI. CONCLUSION Application of Louisiana Law is proper in this case since the state of Louisiana has the most significant relationship to the incident made the basis of this matter. The Plaintiffs in this case worked in Louisiana when the incident occurred and are covered by a Louisiana workers’ compensation policy. Further, there is no public policy reason to refuse to apply Louisiana law to the facts of this case, but instead there are policy reasons to apply it. The Supreme Court in Hughes and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Wellons have held that because Plaintiffs can still apply for benefits and Cheniere has greater immunity under Louisiana law than under Texas law, Restatement 184 dictates that Louisiana law apply to the claims.?° Vil. PRAYER WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants CHENIERE ENERGY, INC., SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION, LLC prays that the court take judicial notice of Louisiana law and apply Louisiana law to the to the liability and damages issues in this case and grant these Defendants all such other and further relief to which they may be entitled. ” Wellons v. Valero Refining — New Orleans, L.L.C., 616 S.W.3d at 229 (Tex. App. — Houston [14" Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d at 207 (Tex. 2000); {00299542.DOCX} Respectfully Submitted, Hicks THOMAS LLP nh hp James R. Old, Jr. State Bar No. 15242500 2615 Calder, Suite 720 Beaumont, Texas 77702 (409) 241-7252 — Telephone (409) 419-1733 - Facsimile Email: jold@hicks-thomas.com Diane K. Bounds State Bar No. 00783689 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 547-9100 - Telephone (713) 547-9150 — Facsimile Email: dbounds@hicks-thomas.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, CHENIERE ENERGY, INC, SABINE PASS LNG, L.P., SABINE PASS LNG-GP, LLC, AND SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION, LLC CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE I certify that I contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel, Michael Tilton, regarding this motion and he indicated his opposition. Whraunds Diane K. Bounds {00299542.DOCX} CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served on all counsel of record on this 7th day of March, 2022 Michael S. Tilton VIA E-SERVICE AND/OR EMAIL Richard M. Franks VIA E-SERVICE AND/OR EMAIL TILTON & TILTON, LLP 3730 Kirby Drive, Suite 1020 Houston, TX 77098 mtilton@tiltonlawfirm.com rfranks@tiltonlawfirm.com g—— RB James R. Old, Jr. {00299542 DOCX}