Preview
1 Harry B. Gill (State Bar No. 296730) Electronically Filed
Email: harry.gill@hbglaw.com Superior Court of California
2 Preetptal Toor (State Bar No. 325663) County of San Joaquin
Email: preetpal.toor@hbglaw.com 2022-06-22 15:03:16
3 Jerome A. Clay, Jr. (State Bar No. 327175) Clerk: Natalie Bashaw
Email: jerome.clay@hbglaw.com
4 HBG Law, PC
4317 North Star Way, Suite B
5 Modesto, CA 95356
Telephone: (209) 285-2100
6 Facsimile: (209) 285-2114
7 Attorneys for Defendant
REEDY MECHANICAL, INC.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN
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JASPREET SINGH, Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339
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Plaintiff, DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S
14 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S
v.
15 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION
REEDY MECHANICAL, INC., a California FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL
16 Corporation and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, PROCEDURE §128.5
17 Defendants.
Hearing Date: June 29, 2022
18 Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 10D
19 Judge: Hon. Barbara Kronlund
20 Complaint Filed: December 16, 2021
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Defendant REEDY MECHANICAL, INC., (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant” or “Reedy”)
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by and through its attorney, Harry B. Gill, and hereby files this Reply to Plaintiff JASPREET SINGH’S
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(hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (hereinafter
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referred to as “Opposition”), and respectfully shows unto the Court as follows:
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 1
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions is frivolous. Plaintiff, through his
3 Opposition, tried to mislead the Court by justifying his bad faith actions and/or tactics in filing the
4 Complaint despite knowing that the Complaint is without merit, baseless, frivolous, or solely intended
5 to harass the Defendant. Before filing its Motion for Sanction, Defendant provided the Plaintiff an
6 opportunity to withdraw the frivolous Complaint because it is prima facie clear that the Plaintiff lacks
7 standing to bring an action for a declaratory judgment to declare the subject Lease as invalid and
8 eviction of Defendant from the Property (commonly known as 690 Frewert Road, Lathrop, San
9 Joaquin County, CA 95330, Parcel No. 191-260-230) (hereinafter referred to as “Subject Property”).
10 It is clear that Plaintiff is not a party to the Lease nor related to it in any manner (directly or indirectly).
11 From Plaintiff’s actions, it likely appears that he does not want to end this litigation because he is
12 unnecessarily filing the documents in the Court to which Defendant is compelled to submit replies
13 and incurring legal costs to his detriment.
14 By this Reply, no attempt is made to respond to each of Plaintiff’s contentions, most of which
15 are fully covered by Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions. Only those points requiring additional
16 comment will be raised to assist this Court in resolving the pertinent issues. For the reasons set forth
17 here and in the Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions, Defendant requests this Court to grant its Motion
18 for Sanctions and impose monetary sanctions upon Plaintiff and his counsel.
19 II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
20 A. Plaintiff Cannot Justify His Bad Faith Actions and/or Tactics in Filing the
Complaint Despite Knowing That the Complaint Is Without Merit, Baseless,
21 Frivolous, or Solely Intended to Harass the Defendant.
22 Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to declare that the Lease for the Subject Property is
23 invalid, void, and of no force or effect. Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous because Plaintiff lacks standing
24 to file a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Ejectment based upon the Lease to which he is not a
25 party. “For a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist...” (Emphasis bold)
26 (Turner v. Victoria (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1118 (283 Cal.Rptr.3d 136).) Further, Code of Civ.
27 Proc. § 1060 provides that “a person who desires a declaration of his or her rights and duties with
28 respect to another may, in cases of actual controversy, bring an action for declaratory relief.”
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 2
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 984 (132 Cal.Rptr.2d 635).)
2 Instead of showing that Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Eviction of
3 Defendant from the Subject Property is meritorious, Plaintiff vaguely argued that “Mr. Singh has
4 waited a tremendous amount of time to be able to purchase and close escrow on the Property. The
5 only ones who benefit from any further delay are the Reedys [sic]…This lawsuit was file to make such
6 a determination, and was clearly not brought for any improper purpose, nor to delay the closing of
7 the escrow.” (See Plaintiff’s Opp. Pg. 4, ll. 20-26).
8 Plaintiff’s argument is without merit because Plaintiff failed to show his standing to bring an
9 action for eviction and declaratory judgment against Defendant based upon the Lease of the Subject
10 Property. Thus, Plaintiff’s Opposition did not justify his standing1.
11 On a separate note, Plaintiff’s ill-motive bad faith intention also becomes apparent from the
12 Proposed Order he prepared for Reedys’ approval in support of his Motion to Appoint Court Clerk as
13 Elisor in Superior Court Case No. STK-CV-URP-2019-2097. Plaintiff attached the Sale Escrow
14 Instructions, Grant Deed, and Notification to Buyer and Seller Regarding Tax Withholding
15 Requirements of California Revenue and Taxation Code section 18662, with the Proposed Order,
16 which shows the name, signature, and initials of Pawandeep Gill as buyer along with the
17 Plaintiff. However, Pawandeep Gill was never a party to the Purchase Sale Agreement and is
18 unknown to Reedys. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and filed in bad faith only to harass
19 the opposite party.
20 B. Plaintiff’s Argument Related to the Standing Is Just a Red Herring and Is
Without Merit.
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22 Plaintiff's argument that he “is an interested Person in the Lease Agreement” is just a red
23 herring and is without merit. Plaintiff is not the party to the Lease, therefore, has no standing to
24 claim the Declaratory Relief on the validity of the Lease. It is prima facie evidence that the subject
25 Lease was executed by Jeff C. Reedy and Dorinda Reedy (“Reedys”) as Landlords with Defendant
26 Reedy Mechanical as Tenant on December 28, 2015. However, the Purchase Sale Agreement was
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1 Although standing is used for this motion, Defendants also emphasize that ripeness is also a requirement for
28 declaratory relief (see Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 531 (211 Cal.Rptr.3d 705, 708, 6 Cal.App.5th 527,
531); Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 408 (256 Cal.Rptr. 240, 242).)
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 3
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 executed on December 20, 2018, three years after the subject Lease. Thus, Plaintiff was not a party
2 to the Lease, and the subject Lease was not executed for his benefit and tenets of property law dictate
3 that any leasehold interests run with the land. After listing the Subject Property for sale, on December
4 23, 2018, Reedys provided Plaintiff with a “Seller Property Questionnaire, signed and initialed by
5 Reedys and Plaintiff on each page and signed by all parties.” More specifically, on page 3 of the
6 questionnaire in section J, Title, Ownership, Lien, and Legal Claims, Reedys checked ‘yes’ for Leases
7 by which they specifically disclosed the subject Lease to Plaintiff.
8 By pursuing this action, Plaintiff is just wasting time and resources of this Court, while having
9 the Reedys incur more legal fees. Plaintiff's arguments are the same as he had alleged in his Motion
10 to Appoint Court Clerk as Elisor (Superior Court Case No. STK-CV-URP-2019-2097), upon which the
11 Court had already ruled. In his Motion, he specifically argued that “the Reedys have continued to
12 refuse to close escrow unless Mr. Singh assumes the lease and executes documents accepting the
13 lease agreement through escrow. The Reedys’ proceeded to record the lease, despite not having
14 disclosed it when the parties were originally in contract, and the title company will not proceed with
15 the close of escrow absent an agreement between the parties as to the validity of the lease
16 agreement.” (Motion to Appoint Elisor pg. 2, ll. 22-27). While ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court
17 had stated that Plaintiff’s Motion “may be granted solely as to the transfer of property, not the transfer
18 of property absent the rental agreement.” (Emphasis bold).
19 It may be true that Plaintiff’s arguments sound good in listening but have no legal basis to
20 justify his standing to bring a cause of action for Defendant’s eviction from the Subject Property and
21 a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the Lease to which he is neither a party nor any
22 beneficiary2.
23 It cannot be stated that Plaintiff is related to the Lease in any manner from the time Lease was
24 entered. By contrast under California law “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
25 party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) The real party in
26 interest has “ ‘an actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of the action,’ and stands to be
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2 Defendants emphasize what the Arbitrator told Mr. Singh about the lease (i.e., if Mr. Singh doesn’t want the
28 lease, Mr. Singh should not purchase the subject property). There are also subleases and easements which Mr.
Singh will need to assume.
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 4
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 ‘benefited or injured’ by a judgment in the action.” (City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126
2 Cal.App.4th 43, 59–60 (24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72).)” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150
3 Cal.App.4th 42, 54-55 (58 Cal.Rptr.3d 225).)
4 Here, Plaintiff has obtained a judgment of the specific performance of the Purchase Sale
5 Agreement because he was a proposed buyer and a party to the Purchase Sale Agreement, but it is
6 true that he cannot obtain a declaratory judgment and eviction of Reedy from the Subject Property
7 now because he is neither a party nor a beneficiary to the subject Lease. If this tactic was allowed,
8 then any person can pay below market for a leased property, and prior to taking title, seek declaratory
9 relief to evict the tenant and absconding contract and real property principles and defeating purpose
10 of the lease to the detriment of existing tenements. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this
11 action against Defendant. Based upon Plaintiff’s lack of standing, the Complaint is frivolous. Thus,
12 the Court should impose a monetary sanction upon Plaintiff and his counsel for filing a frivolous
13 lawsuit against Defendant Reedy.
14 C. Arbitrator’s Ruling on Denying the Plaintiff’s Request to Determine the Validity
of the Lease Is Final for Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Purposes.
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16 Contrary to Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions, res judicata is directly applicable to the instant
17 facts and bars Plaintiff’s lawsuit. A final judicial arbitration award, if clear and unambiguous, is res
18 judicata in any subsequent proceeding on the same cause of action. (Flynn v. Gorton (1989) 207
19 Cal.App.3d 1550, 1555 (255 Cal.Rptr. 768).) In fact, Plaintiff and his new counsel have attempted,
20 albeit unsuccessfully, in multiple efforts to challenge the arbitration award. It is safe to say Reedys
21 are not happy with the decision but have agreed to accept it and proceed forward with their obligations
22 and duties.
23 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Reedys (Superior Court Case No.: STK-CV-URP-2019-2097)
24 for Specific Performance of the Purchase Sale Agreement. The Arbitrator heard the matter (ADR
25 Services Case No. 20-1213-BLS). In the Final Award, the Arbitrator had specifically stated that
26 “Plaintiff’s request that the Arbitrator make an express finding that the Commercial Lease dated
27 December 28, 2015, marked as Exhibit 18 at the Arbitration, is invalid is DENIED.” (Emphasis
28 bold). On August 13, 2021, while signing the Plaintiff’s Proposed Order confirming the Interim and
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 5
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 Final Arbitration Award, the Judge of the Superior Court had specifically deleted and removed
2 Plaintiff’s request to find that “there is no finding the validity of the Commercial Lease dated December
3 28, 2015.” (Emphasis italics). Conversely, the Lease is valid. Additionally, the Arbitration Award
4 expressly provides that “(a)ny issue not addressed herein or in the Interim Award is deemed denied.”
5 In his Opposition, Plaintiff alleged that “Plaintiff’s prior complaint never requested a
6 determination of the lease agreement because Plaintiff was not aware of the alleged Lease.” Even
7 though, Plaintiff had requested the Arbitrator to find that the subject Lease was invalid because
8 Reedys did not disclose the subject Lease to him before executing the Purchase Sale Agreement.3
9 Reedys disclosed the lease and Plaintiff did not want the lease and attempted to circumvent it by
10 challenging it and still hoping to get the property at a discount because of the lease.
11 To contradict Plaintiff’s position entirely, on December 23, 2018, Reedys provided Plaintiff with
12 a “Seller Property Questionnaire” signed and initialed by Plaintiff and Reedys on each page. Thus,
13 the question to determine the validity of the Lease was whether or not the Reedys had disclosed the
14 Lease to Plaintiff. It is clear from the Seller Property Questionnaire that Plaintiff was aware of the
15 subject Lease and he was free to walk away. Notwithstanding the fact that the issue of the validity
16 of the Lease had already been decided by Arbitrator in ADR Services Case No. 20-1213-BLS
17 between Plaintiff and Reedys.
18 Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment against Defendant, the tenant of the
19 Subject Property, to declare the Lease as invalid, void, and of no force or effect. However, while
20 confirming the Interim and Final Arbitration Award, the Judge of the Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s
21 request for a finding of the validity of the Lease. Therefore, Plaintiff’s whole Complaint is frivolous
22 and barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Additionally, in ruling on the
23 Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Elisor, on April 5, 2022, the Court issued a tentative ruling against the
24 Plaintiff. The Court has stated that “Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Elisor may be granted solely as to
25 the transfer of property, not the transfer of property absent the rental agreement.”
26 Briefly, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in bad faith, and it is without merit, baseless, frivolous, or
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3 This contention is at issue in Reedy v. Dewhurst (Case No.: CV-STK-2020-0009671) against the dual agent
28 realtor, also noteworthy as Mr. Singh did not need to close on the property, it was being sold as-is and as a buyer
he was free to walk away.
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 6
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 solely intended to harass Defendant and have Defendant incur legal fees and costs to defend and
2 did not withdraw itwhen provided an opportunity to do so within the safe harbor waiting period.
3 Therefore, the Court should impose monetary sanctions upon Plaintiff and his counsel for filing a
4 frivolous lawsuit against Defendant Reedy.
5 D. The Court Should Deny Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions
6 “Section 128.5 authorizes sanctions for certain bad faith actions or tactics. (See Nutrition
7 Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMS, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 117, 123 (228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 737)
8 (Nutrition Distribution).) More specifically, former section 128.5 provided the trial court with discretion
9 to “order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
10 fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely
11 intended to harass or cause unnecessary delay.” (Former § 128.5(a).).” (CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC
12 v. Gray (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 997, 1001-1002 (240 Cal.Rptr.3d 847).)
13 Plaintiff is not entitled to court costs and fees associated with his Opposition. Plaintiff
14 requested sanctions against Defendant and its counsel, claiming that Defendant’s Motion itself is
15 without merit and brought to continue to delay the close of escrow. However, Plaintiff’s Opposition
16 lacks any explanation for why Defendant’s Motion should be viewed as frivolous or intended solely to
17 cause unnecessary delay under Cal Civ Proc Code §128.5. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Opposition is devoid
18 of any legal or factual basis to grant his request for sanctions; therefore, the Court should deny his
19 request for sanction.
20 III. CONCLUSION
21 Plaintiff and his attorney’s conduct is sanctionable under CCP § 128.5(a) in the bad faith filing
22 of frivolous Complaint for invalidating the Lease to which Plaintiff is a stranger. Plaintiff lacks the
23 standing to file his Complaint. For the reasons mentioned in Defendant’s Motion for Sanction and
24 this Reply, Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous, without merit, baseless, and brought only to harass
25 Defendant. Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to grant its Motion and order
26 Plaintiff and his attorneys under CCP § 128.5(a) to pay Defendant Monetary Sanctions, and all cost
27 and attorney’s fees incurred in connection to it.
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 7
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 Respectfully submitted,
2 Dated: June 7, 2022 HBG Law, PC
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5 Harry B. Gill
Attorneys for Defendant
6 REEDY MECHANICAL, INC.
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 8
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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1 Jaspreet Singh v. Reedy Mechanical, Inc., et. al.
Superior Court, County of San Joaquin
2 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339
3 PROOF OF SERVICE
4 I am resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the
within action. My business address is 4317 North Star Way, Suite B, Modesto, CA 95356.
5
On the date set forth below, I served the following document(s) described as:
6
DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET
7 SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
8
On the interested parties in this action by placing true copies thereof enclosed in sealed
9 envelopes and/or packages addressed as follows:
10 Mr. Charles L. Hastings, Esq. chastings@hastingslawoffice.com
Ms. Natali A. Ron, Esq. nron@hastingslawoffice.com
11 LAW OFFICES OF HASTINGS AND RON, APC
PMB 270 4719 Quail Lakes Dr., Suite G
12 Stockton, CA 95207
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Attorney(s) for Defendant: Reedy Mechanical, Inc.
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(MAIL) I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business
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practices. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collecting and processing
correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and
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mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service,
in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county
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where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail at Modesto,
California.
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(E-MAIL or ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) Based on a court order or an agreement of the
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parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be
sent to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed, I did not receive, within a reasonable time
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after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was
unsuccessful.
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
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true and correct.
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Executed on June 22, 2022, at Modesto, Stanislaus County, California.
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____________________________________________
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Kayla Brown
26 4860-3417-5269, v. 1
4860-3417-5269, v. 1
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Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 9
31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5
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Preview
1 Harry B. Gill (State Bar No. 296730) Electronically Filed Email: harry.gill@hbglaw.com Superior Court of California 2 Preetptal Toor (State Bar No. 325663) County of San Joaquin Email: preetpal.toor@hbglaw.com 2022-06-22 15:03:16 3 Jerome A. Clay, Jr. (State Bar No. 327175) Clerk: Natalie Bashaw Email: jerome.clay@hbglaw.com 4 HBG Law, PC 4317 North Star Way, Suite B 5 Modesto, CA 95356 Telephone: (209) 285-2100 6 Facsimile: (209) 285-2114 7 Attorneys for Defendant REEDY MECHANICAL, INC. 8 9 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN 11 12 JASPREET SINGH, Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 13 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S 14 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S v. 15 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION REEDY MECHANICAL, INC., a California FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL 16 Corporation and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, PROCEDURE §128.5 17 Defendants. Hearing Date: June 29, 2022 18 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: 10D 19 Judge: Hon. Barbara Kronlund 20 Complaint Filed: December 16, 2021 21 Defendant REEDY MECHANICAL, INC., (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant” or “Reedy”) 22 by and through its attorney, Harry B. Gill, and hereby files this Reply to Plaintiff JASPREET SINGH’S 23 (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (hereinafter 24 referred to as “Opposition”), and respectfully shows unto the Court as follows: 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 1 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions is frivolous. Plaintiff, through his 3 Opposition, tried to mislead the Court by justifying his bad faith actions and/or tactics in filing the 4 Complaint despite knowing that the Complaint is without merit, baseless, frivolous, or solely intended 5 to harass the Defendant. Before filing its Motion for Sanction, Defendant provided the Plaintiff an 6 opportunity to withdraw the frivolous Complaint because it is prima facie clear that the Plaintiff lacks 7 standing to bring an action for a declaratory judgment to declare the subject Lease as invalid and 8 eviction of Defendant from the Property (commonly known as 690 Frewert Road, Lathrop, San 9 Joaquin County, CA 95330, Parcel No. 191-260-230) (hereinafter referred to as “Subject Property”). 10 It is clear that Plaintiff is not a party to the Lease nor related to it in any manner (directly or indirectly). 11 From Plaintiff’s actions, it likely appears that he does not want to end this litigation because he is 12 unnecessarily filing the documents in the Court to which Defendant is compelled to submit replies 13 and incurring legal costs to his detriment. 14 By this Reply, no attempt is made to respond to each of Plaintiff’s contentions, most of which 15 are fully covered by Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions. Only those points requiring additional 16 comment will be raised to assist this Court in resolving the pertinent issues. For the reasons set forth 17 here and in the Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions, Defendant requests this Court to grant its Motion 18 for Sanctions and impose monetary sanctions upon Plaintiff and his counsel. 19 II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 20 A. Plaintiff Cannot Justify His Bad Faith Actions and/or Tactics in Filing the Complaint Despite Knowing That the Complaint Is Without Merit, Baseless, 21 Frivolous, or Solely Intended to Harass the Defendant. 22 Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to declare that the Lease for the Subject Property is 23 invalid, void, and of no force or effect. Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous because Plaintiff lacks standing 24 to file a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Ejectment based upon the Lease to which he is not a 25 party. “For a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist...” (Emphasis bold) 26 (Turner v. Victoria (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1118 (283 Cal.Rptr.3d 136).) Further, Code of Civ. 27 Proc. § 1060 provides that “a person who desires a declaration of his or her rights and duties with 28 respect to another may, in cases of actual controversy, bring an action for declaratory relief.” 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 2 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 984 (132 Cal.Rptr.2d 635).) 2 Instead of showing that Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Eviction of 3 Defendant from the Subject Property is meritorious, Plaintiff vaguely argued that “Mr. Singh has 4 waited a tremendous amount of time to be able to purchase and close escrow on the Property. The 5 only ones who benefit from any further delay are the Reedys [sic]…This lawsuit was file to make such 6 a determination, and was clearly not brought for any improper purpose, nor to delay the closing of 7 the escrow.” (See Plaintiff’s Opp. Pg. 4, ll. 20-26). 8 Plaintiff’s argument is without merit because Plaintiff failed to show his standing to bring an 9 action for eviction and declaratory judgment against Defendant based upon the Lease of the Subject 10 Property. Thus, Plaintiff’s Opposition did not justify his standing1. 11 On a separate note, Plaintiff’s ill-motive bad faith intention also becomes apparent from the 12 Proposed Order he prepared for Reedys’ approval in support of his Motion to Appoint Court Clerk as 13 Elisor in Superior Court Case No. STK-CV-URP-2019-2097. Plaintiff attached the Sale Escrow 14 Instructions, Grant Deed, and Notification to Buyer and Seller Regarding Tax Withholding 15 Requirements of California Revenue and Taxation Code section 18662, with the Proposed Order, 16 which shows the name, signature, and initials of Pawandeep Gill as buyer along with the 17 Plaintiff. However, Pawandeep Gill was never a party to the Purchase Sale Agreement and is 18 unknown to Reedys. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and filed in bad faith only to harass 19 the opposite party. 20 B. Plaintiff’s Argument Related to the Standing Is Just a Red Herring and Is Without Merit. 21 22 Plaintiff's argument that he “is an interested Person in the Lease Agreement” is just a red 23 herring and is without merit. Plaintiff is not the party to the Lease, therefore, has no standing to 24 claim the Declaratory Relief on the validity of the Lease. It is prima facie evidence that the subject 25 Lease was executed by Jeff C. Reedy and Dorinda Reedy (“Reedys”) as Landlords with Defendant 26 Reedy Mechanical as Tenant on December 28, 2015. However, the Purchase Sale Agreement was 27 1 Although standing is used for this motion, Defendants also emphasize that ripeness is also a requirement for 28 declaratory relief (see Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 531 (211 Cal.Rptr.3d 705, 708, 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 531); Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 408 (256 Cal.Rptr. 240, 242).) 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 3 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 executed on December 20, 2018, three years after the subject Lease. Thus, Plaintiff was not a party 2 to the Lease, and the subject Lease was not executed for his benefit and tenets of property law dictate 3 that any leasehold interests run with the land. After listing the Subject Property for sale, on December 4 23, 2018, Reedys provided Plaintiff with a “Seller Property Questionnaire, signed and initialed by 5 Reedys and Plaintiff on each page and signed by all parties.” More specifically, on page 3 of the 6 questionnaire in section J, Title, Ownership, Lien, and Legal Claims, Reedys checked ‘yes’ for Leases 7 by which they specifically disclosed the subject Lease to Plaintiff. 8 By pursuing this action, Plaintiff is just wasting time and resources of this Court, while having 9 the Reedys incur more legal fees. Plaintiff's arguments are the same as he had alleged in his Motion 10 to Appoint Court Clerk as Elisor (Superior Court Case No. STK-CV-URP-2019-2097), upon which the 11 Court had already ruled. In his Motion, he specifically argued that “the Reedys have continued to 12 refuse to close escrow unless Mr. Singh assumes the lease and executes documents accepting the 13 lease agreement through escrow. The Reedys’ proceeded to record the lease, despite not having 14 disclosed it when the parties were originally in contract, and the title company will not proceed with 15 the close of escrow absent an agreement between the parties as to the validity of the lease 16 agreement.” (Motion to Appoint Elisor pg. 2, ll. 22-27). While ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court 17 had stated that Plaintiff’s Motion “may be granted solely as to the transfer of property, not the transfer 18 of property absent the rental agreement.” (Emphasis bold). 19 It may be true that Plaintiff’s arguments sound good in listening but have no legal basis to 20 justify his standing to bring a cause of action for Defendant’s eviction from the Subject Property and 21 a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the Lease to which he is neither a party nor any 22 beneficiary2. 23 It cannot be stated that Plaintiff is related to the Lease in any manner from the time Lease was 24 entered. By contrast under California law “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real 25 party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) The real party in 26 interest has “ ‘an actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of the action,’ and stands to be 27 2 Defendants emphasize what the Arbitrator told Mr. Singh about the lease (i.e., if Mr. Singh doesn’t want the 28 lease, Mr. Singh should not purchase the subject property). There are also subleases and easements which Mr. Singh will need to assume. 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 4 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 ‘benefited or injured’ by a judgment in the action.” (City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 2 Cal.App.4th 43, 59–60 (24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72).)” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 3 Cal.App.4th 42, 54-55 (58 Cal.Rptr.3d 225).) 4 Here, Plaintiff has obtained a judgment of the specific performance of the Purchase Sale 5 Agreement because he was a proposed buyer and a party to the Purchase Sale Agreement, but it is 6 true that he cannot obtain a declaratory judgment and eviction of Reedy from the Subject Property 7 now because he is neither a party nor a beneficiary to the subject Lease. If this tactic was allowed, 8 then any person can pay below market for a leased property, and prior to taking title, seek declaratory 9 relief to evict the tenant and absconding contract and real property principles and defeating purpose 10 of the lease to the detriment of existing tenements. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this 11 action against Defendant. Based upon Plaintiff’s lack of standing, the Complaint is frivolous. Thus, 12 the Court should impose a monetary sanction upon Plaintiff and his counsel for filing a frivolous 13 lawsuit against Defendant Reedy. 14 C. Arbitrator’s Ruling on Denying the Plaintiff’s Request to Determine the Validity of the Lease Is Final for Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Purposes. 15 16 Contrary to Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions, res judicata is directly applicable to the instant 17 facts and bars Plaintiff’s lawsuit. A final judicial arbitration award, if clear and unambiguous, is res 18 judicata in any subsequent proceeding on the same cause of action. (Flynn v. Gorton (1989) 207 19 Cal.App.3d 1550, 1555 (255 Cal.Rptr. 768).) In fact, Plaintiff and his new counsel have attempted, 20 albeit unsuccessfully, in multiple efforts to challenge the arbitration award. It is safe to say Reedys 21 are not happy with the decision but have agreed to accept it and proceed forward with their obligations 22 and duties. 23 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Reedys (Superior Court Case No.: STK-CV-URP-2019-2097) 24 for Specific Performance of the Purchase Sale Agreement. The Arbitrator heard the matter (ADR 25 Services Case No. 20-1213-BLS). In the Final Award, the Arbitrator had specifically stated that 26 “Plaintiff’s request that the Arbitrator make an express finding that the Commercial Lease dated 27 December 28, 2015, marked as Exhibit 18 at the Arbitration, is invalid is DENIED.” (Emphasis 28 bold). On August 13, 2021, while signing the Plaintiff’s Proposed Order confirming the Interim and 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 5 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 Final Arbitration Award, the Judge of the Superior Court had specifically deleted and removed 2 Plaintiff’s request to find that “there is no finding the validity of the Commercial Lease dated December 3 28, 2015.” (Emphasis italics). Conversely, the Lease is valid. Additionally, the Arbitration Award 4 expressly provides that “(a)ny issue not addressed herein or in the Interim Award is deemed denied.” 5 In his Opposition, Plaintiff alleged that “Plaintiff’s prior complaint never requested a 6 determination of the lease agreement because Plaintiff was not aware of the alleged Lease.” Even 7 though, Plaintiff had requested the Arbitrator to find that the subject Lease was invalid because 8 Reedys did not disclose the subject Lease to him before executing the Purchase Sale Agreement.3 9 Reedys disclosed the lease and Plaintiff did not want the lease and attempted to circumvent it by 10 challenging it and still hoping to get the property at a discount because of the lease. 11 To contradict Plaintiff’s position entirely, on December 23, 2018, Reedys provided Plaintiff with 12 a “Seller Property Questionnaire” signed and initialed by Plaintiff and Reedys on each page. Thus, 13 the question to determine the validity of the Lease was whether or not the Reedys had disclosed the 14 Lease to Plaintiff. It is clear from the Seller Property Questionnaire that Plaintiff was aware of the 15 subject Lease and he was free to walk away. Notwithstanding the fact that the issue of the validity 16 of the Lease had already been decided by Arbitrator in ADR Services Case No. 20-1213-BLS 17 between Plaintiff and Reedys. 18 Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment against Defendant, the tenant of the 19 Subject Property, to declare the Lease as invalid, void, and of no force or effect. However, while 20 confirming the Interim and Final Arbitration Award, the Judge of the Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s 21 request for a finding of the validity of the Lease. Therefore, Plaintiff’s whole Complaint is frivolous 22 and barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Additionally, in ruling on the 23 Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Elisor, on April 5, 2022, the Court issued a tentative ruling against the 24 Plaintiff. The Court has stated that “Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Elisor may be granted solely as to 25 the transfer of property, not the transfer of property absent the rental agreement.” 26 Briefly, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in bad faith, and it is without merit, baseless, frivolous, or 27 3 This contention is at issue in Reedy v. Dewhurst (Case No.: CV-STK-2020-0009671) against the dual agent 28 realtor, also noteworthy as Mr. Singh did not need to close on the property, it was being sold as-is and as a buyer he was free to walk away. 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 6 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 solely intended to harass Defendant and have Defendant incur legal fees and costs to defend and 2 did not withdraw itwhen provided an opportunity to do so within the safe harbor waiting period. 3 Therefore, the Court should impose monetary sanctions upon Plaintiff and his counsel for filing a 4 frivolous lawsuit against Defendant Reedy. 5 D. The Court Should Deny Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions 6 “Section 128.5 authorizes sanctions for certain bad faith actions or tactics. (See Nutrition 7 Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMS, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 117, 123 (228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 737) 8 (Nutrition Distribution).) More specifically, former section 128.5 provided the trial court with discretion 9 to “order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's 10 fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely 11 intended to harass or cause unnecessary delay.” (Former § 128.5(a).).” (CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC 12 v. Gray (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 997, 1001-1002 (240 Cal.Rptr.3d 847).) 13 Plaintiff is not entitled to court costs and fees associated with his Opposition. Plaintiff 14 requested sanctions against Defendant and its counsel, claiming that Defendant’s Motion itself is 15 without merit and brought to continue to delay the close of escrow. However, Plaintiff’s Opposition 16 lacks any explanation for why Defendant’s Motion should be viewed as frivolous or intended solely to 17 cause unnecessary delay under Cal Civ Proc Code §128.5. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Opposition is devoid 18 of any legal or factual basis to grant his request for sanctions; therefore, the Court should deny his 19 request for sanction. 20 III. CONCLUSION 21 Plaintiff and his attorney’s conduct is sanctionable under CCP § 128.5(a) in the bad faith filing 22 of frivolous Complaint for invalidating the Lease to which Plaintiff is a stranger. Plaintiff lacks the 23 standing to file his Complaint. For the reasons mentioned in Defendant’s Motion for Sanction and 24 this Reply, Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous, without merit, baseless, and brought only to harass 25 Defendant. Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to grant its Motion and order 26 Plaintiff and his attorneys under CCP § 128.5(a) to pay Defendant Monetary Sanctions, and all cost 27 and attorney’s fees incurred in connection to it. 28 /// 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 7 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 Respectfully submitted, 2 Dated: June 7, 2022 HBG Law, PC 3 4 5 Harry B. Gill Attorneys for Defendant 6 REEDY MECHANICAL, INC. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 8 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32 1 Jaspreet Singh v. Reedy Mechanical, Inc., et. al. Superior Court, County of San Joaquin 2 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 3 PROOF OF SERVICE 4 I am resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is 4317 North Star Way, Suite B, Modesto, CA 95356. 5 On the date set forth below, I served the following document(s) described as: 6 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET 7 SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 8 On the interested parties in this action by placing true copies thereof enclosed in sealed 9 envelopes and/or packages addressed as follows: 10 Mr. Charles L. Hastings, Esq. chastings@hastingslawoffice.com Ms. Natali A. Ron, Esq. nron@hastingslawoffice.com 11 LAW OFFICES OF HASTINGS AND RON, APC PMB 270 4719 Quail Lakes Dr., Suite G 12 Stockton, CA 95207 13 Attorney(s) for Defendant: Reedy Mechanical, Inc. 14 (MAIL) I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business 15 practices. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and 16 mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county 17 where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail at Modesto, California. 18 (E-MAIL or ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) Based on a court order or an agreement of the 19 parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed, I did not receive, within a reasonable time 20 after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is 22 true and correct. 23 Executed on June 22, 2022, at Modesto, Stanislaus County, California. 24 ____________________________________________ 25 Kayla Brown 26 4860-3417-5269, v. 1 4860-3417-5269, v. 1 27 28 30 Case No. STK-CV-UCC-2021-11339 9 31 DEFENDANT REEDY MECHANICAL INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF JASPREET SINGH’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.5 32