Preview
DOCKET NO. X03-HHD-CV-19-61541616-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
ISLAMIC AMERICAN SOCIETY OF : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT, INC. : HARTFORD
:
PLAINTIFF, :
VS. : AT HARTFORD
:
JAWAD ASHRAF, ET ALEFENDANT. : JUNE 15, 2022
OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR SUBPOENA
The Counterclaim Defendant, Islamic American Society of Connecticut,
Inc., in this case, and the Defendants, Magdy Galal, Naveed Khan, and Sultan
Ali, in the consolidated case, Elawad, et al. v. Galal, et al., X03-HHD-CV21-
6154160-S, hereby object to the opposition’s latest attempt to perform discovery
during the pendency of a subject matter jurisdiction challenge, despite repeated
and clear court orders rejecting such attempts and staying discovery. The
Defendants in this case filed a confusing and unorthodox “Request for Subpoena
of Adverse Party Witness” [#195.00]. The Court should reject this Request
because (1) the Court [Bellis, J.) issued an Order staying all discovery in this
case “in light of the impending motion to dismiss which reportedly implicates
subject matter jurisdiction.” [#150.01]; (2) the Court (Pierson, J.) provided an
opportunity for the parties to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery designed to
elicit jurisdictional facts [#185.00], but found that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs
misused the opportunity and “DENIED in its entirety” the Motion for Order
(seeking depositions, written discovery and requests for admissions) [#186.01];
(3) the Request for Subpoena is confusing and misleading in light of the Court’s
(Farley, J.) Hearing Management Order [#193.00]; and (4) the Request is
otherwise improper.
1
A. Magdy Galal Is Protected from Having to Comply with the Requested
Subpoena Duces Tecum Pursuant to Judge Bellis’ Issuance of a
Protective Order and Staying All Discovery in this Case.
On April 7, 2021, the Counterclaim Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaims (#167.00) on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because, inter alia, the counterclaim plaintiffs lack standing. “It is
axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be
immediately acted upon by the court.” Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545
(1991). This “policy that all other action in a case ‘comes to a halt’ once the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised counsels against the allowance of
discovery prior to the court's determination of the jurisdictional issue.” Kelly v.
Albertsen, 114 Conn. App. 600, 608 (2009). Indeed, after extensive briefing by
both sides, this Court (Bellis, J.) recognized that discovery in this case should be
stayed pending the Court’s decision on the anticipated motion to dismiss. See
JDNO #150.10 (“Granted in light of the impending motion to dismiss which
reportedly implicates subject matter jurisdiction.”).
Judge Bellis’ Order was consistent with the Appellate Court’s warning that
“allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss
would . . . [be] inconsistent with the policy that once the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction has been raised, it must be decided immediately and before any other
action in the case is taken.” Kelly, supra, 114 Conn. App. at 607. Kelly was
subsequently clarified such that the only exception to a discovery stay is for
discovery (1) directed solely at jurisdiction and (2) necessary to the court’s
determination. Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642 (2016). See, e.g., LaPaglia v.
2
Connecticut Valley Hosp., No. CV175039918S, 2018 WL 2207879, at *1 (Wilson,
J.) (Apr. 18, 2018) (noting that “court issued an order that it would defer ruling on
all motions pending its ruling on the motion to dismiss”); Ritchie v. Nyfix, Inc.,
2007 WL 806240, at *1 (Nadeau, J.) (Feb. 22, 2007)(“The motion for protective
order is granted to stay discovery until resolution of the pending motion to
dismiss.”); Keller v. Beckenstein, No. CV074029705, 2007 WL 4733079, at *1
(Elgo, J.) (Dec. 18, 2007) (noting court’s prior order granting the motion to stay
discovery until the motion to dismiss is decided). These decisions prohibit any
and all discovery that does not solely focus on the specific jurisdictional issue
necessary for the Court’s determination.
B. Magdy Galal Should Not Have to Comply With Production Requests
Attached to the Subpoena Duces Tecum When Judge Pierson Specifically
Rejected Discovery Efforts Discovery While the Motion to Dismiss Was
Pending.
In a judicious and prudential ruling that balanced the Court’s potential
need for assistance with procurement of jurisdictional facts concerning
Counterclaim Defendant’s challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction with the
Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ desire to proceed with voluminous and unfettered
discovery despite a Court-imposed stay, the Court (Pierson, J.) provided the
parties with an opportunity and mechanism to propose limited discovery
designed solely to elicit jurisdictional facts. See Order, #185.00. The Court
cautioned the parties:
Failure to comply with this order, in whole or in part, may result in the
court's refusal to consider noncompliant filings and/or the denial of
requested jurisdictional discovery.
3
Id. (emphasis added). Yet, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs intentionally ignored this
clear warning, abused the opportunity, and failed to comply with the Order in
innumerable ways. After extensive briefing and oral arguments, Judge Pierson
denied the Counterclaim Plaintiffs requests for discovery and stated:
Having reviewed the voluminous proposed written discovery appended to
the counterclaim plaintiffs' filings, the court agrees with the counterclaim
defendant that the counterclaim plaintiffs have misused the
opportunity provided to conduct limited and focused jurisdictional
discovery, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the court's order of
October 28, 2021 (No. 185). As a result, in its discretion, and in
accordance with the foregoing order, none of the proposed written
discovery will be allowed.
Order, #186.01 (emphasis added).
Simply stated, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs wasted their opportunity for
limited discovery, justifying Judge Pierson’s denial of their requested
jurisdictional discovery in its entirety. See also Town of West Hartford v. Murtha
Cullina, LLP, 85 Conn. App. 15, 26–27, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 907 (2004) (court
properly rejected request to conduct discovery on a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing where plaintiff failed to explain how discovery would establish standing).
The discovery requests attached to the proposed Subpoena Duces Tecum
necessarily fall within the universe of discovery that Judge Pierson rejected (to
the extent that the production requests are comprehensible—see Part D, below).
C. The Requested Subpoena Is Confusing and Misleading in Light of Judge
Farley’s Hearing Management Order
In connection with the evidentiary hearing concerning the Counterclaim
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Farley issued a Hearing Management
Order that requires, inter alia, the parties to: (1) file a joint hearing report that
4
identifies the witnesses that each party intends to call by June 22, 2022; (2)
prepare a joint exhibit list that identifies all exhibits reasonably expected to be
introduced during the hearing by June 24, 2022; (3) provide bench copies of the
exhibits in a binder by June 24, 2022. The parties are supposed to be prepared
to proceed with submitting the exhibits to the Court at 10 AM.
The Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum goes beyond the Hearing
Management Order and attempts to force Galal to bring with him to the hearing
the entire universe of documents relating to the IASC and membership in the
possession of the Keeper of Records for the IASC including any and all
documents, communications, electronically-stored information, notes, and
telephone calls from January 2007 to January 2019, even if such documents are
not on the exhibit list required by the Hearing Management Order. This would be
an utter waste of the Court’s, counsel’s, and parties’ time and resources.
D. The Request for Subpoena is Improper for a Multitude of Other Reasons
The Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum is improper for many reasons
and Galal should not be required to produce any documents at the hearing.
First, the proposed Subpoena Duces Tecum commands that Galal bring
with him to the hearing all of the documents and materials requested in Schedule
A. Schedule A, on the other hand, appears to be directed to a Keeper of
Records of the IASC, rather than Galal. But, more importantly, the subpoena
commands the Keeper of Records to produce the records to an unrelated law
firm at a past date and time:
This Subpoena seeks information and documents from the period from the
inception or commencement of IASC operations to the present date. The
5
production of such documents, copies or written authorizations shall take
place at the Law Office of Garrett Moore, Esq. 891 Straits Turnpike
Middlebury, Connecticut 06762 of not later than February 10, 2021.
Request for Subpoena, Schedule A (emphasis added). Compliance would be
impossible as the date and time for compliance has passed.
Second, Galal is a party defendant in the consolidated matter and the
production requests attached to the subpoena do not provide the witness with
sufficient time to comply with the voluminous and expansive fishing expedition.
Ordinarily, a party would have 60 days to respond, object, or comply with
requests for production. Moreover, the attempt to insert discovery in the form of
production requests in the subpoena flies in the face of Judge Pierson’s order
denying all such discovery in its entirety.
Third, the requests for production are incomplete and incomprehensible.
For example, the first request seeks “Bylaws, including all amendments from the
date of corporate formation to the January 1, 2019 which membership rules.”
This is an incomplete statement and Galal would have no idea what the “which
membership rules” phrasal limitation references. Similarly, the third request
seeks IASC membership records from IASC’s certification of formation to
“1/1/119”. This is an incomprehensible date. The fourth request seeks
membership records from the date of certificate of format; but, again, this in
incomprehensible as the request does not identify the certificate in question nor
explain what a certificate of format is. The sixth request also seems to be
missing words, context or phrasing as it seeks “voting records and committee
meeting minutes from corporate formation to January 1, 2019, which would
6
votes of members and meeting attended by members per IASC bylaws
requirement” (emphasis added). The meaning of this request in light of the
emphasized language is not readily discernible.
Fourth, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs appear to be trying to take advantage
of the difference between a “Request” and “Motion”. This is completely improper.
A “Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum” is not authorized by the Connecticut
Practice Book. Practice Book §11-2 describes and defines the differences
between a “Motion” and a “Request”:
As used in these rules, the term “motion” means any application to the
court for an order, which application is to be acted upon by the court or
any judge thereof; and the term “request” means any application to the
court which shall be granted by the clerk by operation of these rules
unless timely objection is filed.
Practice Book §11-2 (2022). Thus, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs, despite needing
Court permission to serve production requests on a party when the Court has
repeatedly disallowed such discovery efforts during the pendency of the motion
to dismiss, try to pull a fast one by calling it a “Request” in the hopes that the
Clerk grants the Request. This effort must fail.
CONCLUSION
The Counterclaim Defendant contends that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs are
not now and have never been members of the IASC and possess none of the
rights or privileges of the membership status. Rather, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs
were merely invited to and welcomed to participate in religious activities
conducted at the facilities of the IASC and donated money and services to the
mosque. Thus, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs, as non-members, are outsiders to the
7
governing bodies of the IASC and lack standing for their claims. This issue was
timely raised in a Motion to Dismiss filed in April 2021.
The Counterclaim Plaintiffs have effectively thwarted efforts to have the
Court decide the standing issue by any means necessary, including pursuit of
broad-based expansive discovery. Judge Pierson gave the Counterclaim
Plaintiffs an opportunity to get certain discovery designed to elicit jurisdictional
facts. Instead, Counterclaim Plaintiffs disregarded Judge Pierson’s Order
#185.00; failed to comply with the explicit and implicit limitations concerning the
content, focus and purpose of the proposed discovery; unnecessarily burdened
the parties and the Court with a discovery dump consisting of hundreds of
completely objectionable and unrelated discovery requests; improperly shifted
their burden to the Court to figure out what information from the discovery dump
could possibly elicit jurisdictional facts; and utterly failed to articulate any
reasonable basis for allowing any of the requested discovery. Judge Pierson
correctly and forcefully denied all of the proposed discovery of the Counterclaim
Plaintiffs (#186.01).
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should not allow the
Counterclaim Plaintiffs to circumvent Judge Pierson’s Orders by pursuing the
documents through discovery requests attached to a subpoena for the limited
hearing that the Court has scheduled for June 29, 2022.
8
THE COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT,
By:/s/ Jonathan A. Kaplan
Jonathan A. Kaplan
Pullman & Comley, LLC
90 State House Square
Hartford, CT 06103-3702
Juris No. 409177
Telephone 860 424 4379
Facsimile 860 424 4370
Its Attorneys
By:/s/ Keith R. Rudzik
Keith R. Rudzik
Howard, Kohn, Sprague &
Fitzgerald, LLP
237 Buckingham Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Juris No. 028160
Telephone 860 525 3101
Facsimile 860 247 4201
9
CERTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or
delivered electronically or non-electronically on June 15, 2022, to all counsel and
self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery
was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or
will immediately be electronically served.
Refai M. Arefin, Esq.
Law Office of Refai Arefin, LLC
1224 Mill Street, Bldg. B
East Berlin, CT 06023
refai@rarefinlaw.com
Meryl Anne Spat, Esq.
Law Office of Meryl Anne Spat
27 First Avenue
Waterbury CT 06710
spatfax@gmail.com
/s/ Keith R. Rudzik_______
Commissioner of the Superior Court
10
Related Content
in Hartford County
Preview
DOCKET NO. X03-HHD-CV-19-61541616-S : SUPERIOR COURT : ISLAMIC AMERICAN SOCIETY OF : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, INC. : HARTFORD : PLAINTIFF, : VS. : AT HARTFORD : JAWAD ASHRAF, ET ALEFENDANT. : JUNE 15, 2022 OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR SUBPOENA The Counterclaim Defendant, Islamic American Society of Connecticut, Inc., in this case, and the Defendants, Magdy Galal, Naveed Khan, and Sultan Ali, in the consolidated case, Elawad, et al. v. Galal, et al., X03-HHD-CV21- 6154160-S, hereby object to the opposition’s latest attempt to perform discovery during the pendency of a subject matter jurisdiction challenge, despite repeated and clear court orders rejecting such attempts and staying discovery. The Defendants in this case filed a confusing and unorthodox “Request for Subpoena of Adverse Party Witness” [#195.00]. The Court should reject this Request because (1) the Court [Bellis, J.) issued an Order staying all discovery in this case “in light of the impending motion to dismiss which reportedly implicates subject matter jurisdiction.” [#150.01]; (2) the Court (Pierson, J.) provided an opportunity for the parties to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery designed to elicit jurisdictional facts [#185.00], but found that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs misused the opportunity and “DENIED in its entirety” the Motion for Order (seeking depositions, written discovery and requests for admissions) [#186.01]; (3) the Request for Subpoena is confusing and misleading in light of the Court’s (Farley, J.) Hearing Management Order [#193.00]; and (4) the Request is otherwise improper. 1 A. Magdy Galal Is Protected from Having to Comply with the Requested Subpoena Duces Tecum Pursuant to Judge Bellis’ Issuance of a Protective Order and Staying All Discovery in this Case. On April 7, 2021, the Counterclaim Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims (#167.00) on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because, inter alia, the counterclaim plaintiffs lack standing. “It is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court.” Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545 (1991). This “policy that all other action in a case ‘comes to a halt’ once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised counsels against the allowance of discovery prior to the court's determination of the jurisdictional issue.” Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn. App. 600, 608 (2009). Indeed, after extensive briefing by both sides, this Court (Bellis, J.) recognized that discovery in this case should be stayed pending the Court’s decision on the anticipated motion to dismiss. See JDNO #150.10 (“Granted in light of the impending motion to dismiss which reportedly implicates subject matter jurisdiction.”). Judge Bellis’ Order was consistent with the Appellate Court’s warning that “allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss would . . . [be] inconsistent with the policy that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, it must be decided immediately and before any other action in the case is taken.” Kelly, supra, 114 Conn. App. at 607. Kelly was subsequently clarified such that the only exception to a discovery stay is for discovery (1) directed solely at jurisdiction and (2) necessary to the court’s determination. Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642 (2016). See, e.g., LaPaglia v. 2 Connecticut Valley Hosp., No. CV175039918S, 2018 WL 2207879, at *1 (Wilson, J.) (Apr. 18, 2018) (noting that “court issued an order that it would defer ruling on all motions pending its ruling on the motion to dismiss”); Ritchie v. Nyfix, Inc., 2007 WL 806240, at *1 (Nadeau, J.) (Feb. 22, 2007)(“The motion for protective order is granted to stay discovery until resolution of the pending motion to dismiss.”); Keller v. Beckenstein, No. CV074029705, 2007 WL 4733079, at *1 (Elgo, J.) (Dec. 18, 2007) (noting court’s prior order granting the motion to stay discovery until the motion to dismiss is decided). These decisions prohibit any and all discovery that does not solely focus on the specific jurisdictional issue necessary for the Court’s determination. B. Magdy Galal Should Not Have to Comply With Production Requests Attached to the Subpoena Duces Tecum When Judge Pierson Specifically Rejected Discovery Efforts Discovery While the Motion to Dismiss Was Pending. In a judicious and prudential ruling that balanced the Court’s potential need for assistance with procurement of jurisdictional facts concerning Counterclaim Defendant’s challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction with the Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ desire to proceed with voluminous and unfettered discovery despite a Court-imposed stay, the Court (Pierson, J.) provided the parties with an opportunity and mechanism to propose limited discovery designed solely to elicit jurisdictional facts. See Order, #185.00. The Court cautioned the parties: Failure to comply with this order, in whole or in part, may result in the court's refusal to consider noncompliant filings and/or the denial of requested jurisdictional discovery. 3 Id. (emphasis added). Yet, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs intentionally ignored this clear warning, abused the opportunity, and failed to comply with the Order in innumerable ways. After extensive briefing and oral arguments, Judge Pierson denied the Counterclaim Plaintiffs requests for discovery and stated: Having reviewed the voluminous proposed written discovery appended to the counterclaim plaintiffs' filings, the court agrees with the counterclaim defendant that the counterclaim plaintiffs have misused the opportunity provided to conduct limited and focused jurisdictional discovery, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the court's order of October 28, 2021 (No. 185). As a result, in its discretion, and in accordance with the foregoing order, none of the proposed written discovery will be allowed. Order, #186.01 (emphasis added). Simply stated, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs wasted their opportunity for limited discovery, justifying Judge Pierson’s denial of their requested jurisdictional discovery in its entirety. See also Town of West Hartford v. Murtha Cullina, LLP, 85 Conn. App. 15, 26–27, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 907 (2004) (court properly rejected request to conduct discovery on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing where plaintiff failed to explain how discovery would establish standing). The discovery requests attached to the proposed Subpoena Duces Tecum necessarily fall within the universe of discovery that Judge Pierson rejected (to the extent that the production requests are comprehensible—see Part D, below). C. The Requested Subpoena Is Confusing and Misleading in Light of Judge Farley’s Hearing Management Order In connection with the evidentiary hearing concerning the Counterclaim Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Farley issued a Hearing Management Order that requires, inter alia, the parties to: (1) file a joint hearing report that 4 identifies the witnesses that each party intends to call by June 22, 2022; (2) prepare a joint exhibit list that identifies all exhibits reasonably expected to be introduced during the hearing by June 24, 2022; (3) provide bench copies of the exhibits in a binder by June 24, 2022. The parties are supposed to be prepared to proceed with submitting the exhibits to the Court at 10 AM. The Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum goes beyond the Hearing Management Order and attempts to force Galal to bring with him to the hearing the entire universe of documents relating to the IASC and membership in the possession of the Keeper of Records for the IASC including any and all documents, communications, electronically-stored information, notes, and telephone calls from January 2007 to January 2019, even if such documents are not on the exhibit list required by the Hearing Management Order. This would be an utter waste of the Court’s, counsel’s, and parties’ time and resources. D. The Request for Subpoena is Improper for a Multitude of Other Reasons The Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum is improper for many reasons and Galal should not be required to produce any documents at the hearing. First, the proposed Subpoena Duces Tecum commands that Galal bring with him to the hearing all of the documents and materials requested in Schedule A. Schedule A, on the other hand, appears to be directed to a Keeper of Records of the IASC, rather than Galal. But, more importantly, the subpoena commands the Keeper of Records to produce the records to an unrelated law firm at a past date and time: This Subpoena seeks information and documents from the period from the inception or commencement of IASC operations to the present date. The 5 production of such documents, copies or written authorizations shall take place at the Law Office of Garrett Moore, Esq. 891 Straits Turnpike Middlebury, Connecticut 06762 of not later than February 10, 2021. Request for Subpoena, Schedule A (emphasis added). Compliance would be impossible as the date and time for compliance has passed. Second, Galal is a party defendant in the consolidated matter and the production requests attached to the subpoena do not provide the witness with sufficient time to comply with the voluminous and expansive fishing expedition. Ordinarily, a party would have 60 days to respond, object, or comply with requests for production. Moreover, the attempt to insert discovery in the form of production requests in the subpoena flies in the face of Judge Pierson’s order denying all such discovery in its entirety. Third, the requests for production are incomplete and incomprehensible. For example, the first request seeks “Bylaws, including all amendments from the date of corporate formation to the January 1, 2019 which membership rules.” This is an incomplete statement and Galal would have no idea what the “which membership rules” phrasal limitation references. Similarly, the third request seeks IASC membership records from IASC’s certification of formation to “1/1/119”. This is an incomprehensible date. The fourth request seeks membership records from the date of certificate of format; but, again, this in incomprehensible as the request does not identify the certificate in question nor explain what a certificate of format is. The sixth request also seems to be missing words, context or phrasing as it seeks “voting records and committee meeting minutes from corporate formation to January 1, 2019, which would 6 votes of members and meeting attended by members per IASC bylaws requirement” (emphasis added). The meaning of this request in light of the emphasized language is not readily discernible. Fourth, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs appear to be trying to take advantage of the difference between a “Request” and “Motion”. This is completely improper. A “Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum” is not authorized by the Connecticut Practice Book. Practice Book §11-2 describes and defines the differences between a “Motion” and a “Request”: As used in these rules, the term “motion” means any application to the court for an order, which application is to be acted upon by the court or any judge thereof; and the term “request” means any application to the court which shall be granted by the clerk by operation of these rules unless timely objection is filed. Practice Book §11-2 (2022). Thus, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs, despite needing Court permission to serve production requests on a party when the Court has repeatedly disallowed such discovery efforts during the pendency of the motion to dismiss, try to pull a fast one by calling it a “Request” in the hopes that the Clerk grants the Request. This effort must fail. CONCLUSION The Counterclaim Defendant contends that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs are not now and have never been members of the IASC and possess none of the rights or privileges of the membership status. Rather, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs were merely invited to and welcomed to participate in religious activities conducted at the facilities of the IASC and donated money and services to the mosque. Thus, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs, as non-members, are outsiders to the 7 governing bodies of the IASC and lack standing for their claims. This issue was timely raised in a Motion to Dismiss filed in April 2021. The Counterclaim Plaintiffs have effectively thwarted efforts to have the Court decide the standing issue by any means necessary, including pursuit of broad-based expansive discovery. Judge Pierson gave the Counterclaim Plaintiffs an opportunity to get certain discovery designed to elicit jurisdictional facts. Instead, Counterclaim Plaintiffs disregarded Judge Pierson’s Order #185.00; failed to comply with the explicit and implicit limitations concerning the content, focus and purpose of the proposed discovery; unnecessarily burdened the parties and the Court with a discovery dump consisting of hundreds of completely objectionable and unrelated discovery requests; improperly shifted their burden to the Court to figure out what information from the discovery dump could possibly elicit jurisdictional facts; and utterly failed to articulate any reasonable basis for allowing any of the requested discovery. Judge Pierson correctly and forcefully denied all of the proposed discovery of the Counterclaim Plaintiffs (#186.01). For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should not allow the Counterclaim Plaintiffs to circumvent Judge Pierson’s Orders by pursuing the documents through discovery requests attached to a subpoena for the limited hearing that the Court has scheduled for June 29, 2022. 8 THE COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT, By:/s/ Jonathan A. Kaplan Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 90 State House Square Hartford, CT 06103-3702 Juris No. 409177 Telephone 860 424 4379 Facsimile 860 424 4370 Its Attorneys By:/s/ Keith R. Rudzik Keith R. Rudzik Howard, Kohn, Sprague & Fitzgerald, LLP 237 Buckingham Street Hartford, CT 06106 Juris No. 028160 Telephone 860 525 3101 Facsimile 860 247 4201 9 CERTIFICATION I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on June 15, 2022, to all counsel and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served. Refai M. Arefin, Esq. Law Office of Refai Arefin, LLC 1224 Mill Street, Bldg. B East Berlin, CT 06023 refai@rarefinlaw.com Meryl Anne Spat, Esq. Law Office of Meryl Anne Spat 27 First Avenue Waterbury CT 06710 spatfax@gmail.com /s/ Keith R. Rudzik_______ Commissioner of the Superior Court 10