Preview
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Opinion issued February 1, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas FILED
Chris Daniel
District Clerk
NO. 01-17-00492-CV time, FEB”! 2018
Harris County, Texas
By,
Deputy
STEVEN MOODY, Appellant
Vv.
SUCCESS HOLDING, LLC, DEBORAH GUILLORY, AND THOMAS
BENSON, Appellees
On Appeal from the 189th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-58409
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Steven Moody, attempts to appeal from the trial court’s October
21, 2016 “Order Voiding Default Judgment” in the underlying bill of reviewproceeding.’ Because Moody has not complied with Chapter 11 of Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, we dismiss the appeal.
Under Chapter 11, “[a] court may, on its own motion or the motion of any
party, enter an order prohibiting a person from filing, pro se, any new litigation in a
court to which the order applies under this section without permission of the
appropriate local administrative judge . . . if the court finds, after notice and hearing
..., that the person is a vexatious litigant.” TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
11.101(a) (West 2017). A Harris County district court has declared Moody a
vexatious litigant and signed a prefiling order. Moody v. Nonstop Bail Bonds, Co.,
No. 2015-52163 (113th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Feb. 12, 2016), available at
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/129779 l/Steven-Moody-Cause-No-201552163.pdf
(last visited Jan. 29, 2018); see Douglas v. Porter, No. 14-10-00055-CV, 2011 WL
1601292, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2011, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (noting court may take judicial notice of prior finding that party is
vexatious litigant). Because he is subject to a prefiling order, Moody “is prohibited
from filing, pro se, new litigation in a court to which the order applies without
seeking the permission of” the local administrative judge. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
We dismissed a previous appeal of the October 21, 2016 order, concluding that the
order was interlocutory and nota final, appealable judgment. See Moody v. Guillory,
No. 01-16-00907-CV, 2017 WL 1505608, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [Ist Dist.]
Apr. 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2CODE ANN. § 11.102(a)(1) (West 2017). And, the Clerk of this Court “may not file
a litigation, original proceeding, appeal, or other claim presented, pro se, by a
vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order” unless he obtains an order from the
appropriate local administrative judge permitting the filing. Jd. § 11.103(a) (West
2017); see Yazdchi v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 01-17-00301-CV, 2017 WL
2255773, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Because the record filed in this Court did not show that he had obtained
permission of the local administrative judge, the Clerk of this Court notified Moody
that his appeal was subject to dismissal unless, within thirty days of the date of the
order, he filed proof that he had obtained an order from the appropriate local
administrative judge permitting the filing of this appeal. See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CopE ANN. § 11.1035(b) (West 2017); TEx. R. App. P. 42.3; see also Potts v. Burger,
No. 01-14-00909-CV, 2015 WL 222125, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Houston [Ist Dist.]
Jan. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal after providing notice of intent
to dismiss when vexatious-litigant appellant did not provide copy of order permitting
filing of appeal). Moody responded with a motion requesting additional time to
respond to this Court’s notice. We granted appellant’s motion and extended the time
to respond. Moody then filed a second motion for additional time, stating that he had
filed his “Motion Requesting Permission to File [His] Appeal” with the local
administrative judge. On October 23, 2017, the local administrative judge deniedMoody’s request “to file additional litigation or pursue his claims in appellate cause
number 01-17-00492-CV.”? Moody v. Success Auto Sales, L.L.C., No. 2016-58409
(189th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Oct. 23, 2017); see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
Cove ANN. § 11.102(d) (providing local administrative judge may grant vexatious
litigant permission to file litigation only if it appears that litigation has merit and has
not been filed for purposes of harassment or delay).
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court does not have jurisdiction over
Moody’s attempted appeal and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX.
R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); see also Kastner v. Harris Cty., No. 01-12-00504-CV,
2013 WL 1618325, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (dismissing appeal when court records showed local administrative judge
denied appellant’s request for permission to continue appeal). And, we dismiss as
moot Moody’s “Second Motion for Extension of Time to File To Show Cause of
Proof to Obtain Administrative Judges Order Permitting the Filing of This Appeal.”
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Lloyd.
Appellant has not sought mandamus review of the administrative judge’s order. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.102(f), 11.103(d) (West 2017); Parker
v. McLaurin, No. 01-13-00606-CV, 2013 WL 5498151, at *1 (Tex. App—Houston
[Ist Dist.] Oct. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining appellate court did not have
jurisdiction because local administrative judge’s order was not appealable order and
appellant had not filed petition for writ of mandamus within thirty days of order).
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