Party Notice: WHARTON -V- CALDWELL, ET AL Print

S-CV-0052402 Tierney, Ainsley vs. Raddigan, Ryann Elizabeth et al No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/07/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Raddigan, Jared; Raddigan Ryann Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Raddigan, Jared; Raddigan Ryann Per Local Rule 20.1.7 D. If a party or attorney has a conflict with future hearing dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, or opposes the future dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, the party or attorney must appear at the Case Management Conference. That attorney or party must provide at least 7 days’ notice to all other parties in the case of their intent to appear at the Case Management Conference. [Effective 1/1/19] 07/15/2024 CMC in Dept. 6 at 3 PM Calendar Notes

Case Number: 22NWCV01581 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C JULIO ZAYAS v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES CASE NO .: 22NWCV01581 HEARING : 7/10/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #6 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff counsel, Ryan J. Daneshrad and Shantel Yaghoobians motion to be relieved as counsel for Julio Zayas is DENIED. Moving Party to give NOTICE. The motion is unopposed as of July 8, 2024. This is a continuance. The Court granted the motion on condition that Plaintiffs counsel submit proof of service of the proposed order within 20 days. As of July 8, 2024, they have not done so. Thus, the Court DENIES the motion.

Case Number: 20STCV38569 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff Janice Michelle Supe (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants City of Los Angeles (City), County of Los Angeles (County), and Does 1-50 for general negligence and premises liability. On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against the City, the County, and Does 1-50 for premises liability. On June 10, 2022, the City filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Roes 1-10 for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief. On August 10, 2022, the Court dismissed the County without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. On June 27, 2023, the City amended its cross-complaint to include Cross-Defendant Montshire, LLC as Roe 1 (Montshire). On December 15, 2023, Montshire filed an answer to the cross-complaint. On June 20, 2024, Montshire filed an application for pro hac vice admission of Daniel R. Sarther to be heard on July 11, 2024. Trial is currently set for November 13, 2024. PARTYS REQUEST Montshire asks the Court to admit Daniel R. Sarther pro hac vice. LEGAL STANDARD A person who is not a licensee of the State Bar of California but who is an attorney in good standing of and eligible to practice before the bar of any United States court or the highest court in any state, territory, or insular possession of the United States, and who has been retained to appear in a particular cause pending in a court of this state, may in the discretion of such court be permitted upon written application to appear as counsel pro hac vice, provided that an active licensee of the State Bar of California is associated as attorney of record. No person is eligible to appear as counsel pro hac vice under this rule if the person is: (1) A resident of the State of California; (2) Regularly employed in the State of California; or (3) Regularly engaged in substantial business, professional, or other activities in the State of California. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).) Absent special circumstances, repeated appearances by any person under this rule is a cause for denial of an application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(b).) A person desiring to appear as counsel pro hac vice in a superior court must file with the court a verified application together with proof of service by mail in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1013a of a copy of the application and of the notice of hearing of the application on all parties who have appeared in the cause and on the State Bar of California at its San Francisco office. The notice of hearing must be given at the time prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 unless the court has prescribed a shorter period. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(c)(1).) The application must state: (1) The applicant's residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a licensee in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active licensee of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d.) The applicant must also pay a fee to the State Bar. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(e).) DISCUSSION Montshires application for pro hac vice admission of Daniel R. Sarther satisfies the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.40. The Court grants the application. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Cross-Defendant Montshire, LLCs application for pro hac vice admission of Daniel R. Sarther. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

SCV-270302, Kingsbury v. Magnell Plaintiff Thomas Kingsbury (“Plaintiff”) filed the currently operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this action against defendants Kent Magnell (“Magnell”), Justin D. Takacs (“Takacs”, together with Magnell, “Defendants”), and Does 1-10 for causes of action for battery (against Takacs), premises liability (against Magnell) and general negligence (against Defendants). This matter is on calendar for motions by Magnell for summary judgment or, in the alternative, adjudication pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) § 437c. Magnell’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. I. Underlying Facts Magnell owned a triplex home located at 220 Hazel Street/330 Orange Street, Santa Rosa (the “Property”) from 2007 to 2022. Magnell’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“MSS”), ¶ 1. Magnell rented out multiple rooms on the Property, and among his tenants, several were involved in twelve step programs. MSS ¶ 2. Takacs referred Plaintiff to Magnell about tenancy at the Property. Ibid; MSS ¶ 8. Before living at the Property, Plaintiff lived in another sober living environment where he was required to attend Narcotics anonymous meetings. MSS ¶ 3-4. Plaintiff saw Takacs at those meetings, but never heard him speak about addiction issues. MSS ¶ 5. Plaintiff would work for Takacs occasionally driving cars from auctions. MSS ¶ 6. Plaintiff knew Takacs would also be residing at the Property when he moved in. MSS ¶ 8-9. Plaintiff moved into the Property in 2019. MSS ¶ 10. Magnell also resided at the Property at this time. MSS ¶ 11. Magnell lived on the second floor in a separate unit, while Plaintiff and Takacs had separate bedrooms but used shared common areas on the third floor. MSS ¶ 12. Magnell had known Takacs since 2006. MSS ¶ 17. In that time, Magnell had never witnessed Takacs using drugs, nor had Takacs admitted as much to Magnell. MSS ¶ 18. Before Takacs moved into the property, Magnell had also never witnessed Takacs being violent, physically aggressive, or threatening to anyone. MSS ¶ 20. Magnell never saw Takacs handling firearms, knew that Takacs had previously been convicted of a crime, but did not know the nature of the offense. MSS ¶ 22. When Plaintiff moved into the Property, he and Takacs initially ate meals together, and Plaintiff would still work occasionally for Takacs. MSS ¶ 21. However, from mid- December 2019 to the date of the incident, Plaintiff began to feel that Takacs’ erratic and overbearing behavior was “scary”. MSS ¶ 26-28. Takacs seemed angry and volatile. MSS ¶ 28. Plaintiff never expressed to Magnell that he feared Takacs would become physically violent. MSS ¶ 29. On March 1, 2020, Plaintiff was in his bedroom with the door shut. MSS ¶ 35. Takacs threw a glass water bottle, striking the wall next to the door of Plaintiff’s room. Ibid. Plaintiff responded by texting a picture of the damage to Magnell. MSS ¶ 36. Plaintiff had consumed nitrous oxide about 5 or 10 minutes before Takacs threw the water bottle. MSS ¶ 40. Magnell came to confront Takacs about the incident at around 2pm. MSS ¶ 37. Later on that day, Plaintiff came out of his room to confront Takacs, which resulted in a verbal exchange. MSS ¶ 38. Eventually, Takacs pulled out a knife and used it to attack Plaintiff. Ibid. Plaintiff’s offered evidence in rebuttal shows that Magnell believed Takacs had relapsed into using methamphetamines in the months leading to the March 1, 2020, attack. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“PSS”) ¶ 19. Takacs had yelled at Plaintiff about “stealing Takacs’s tools” in front of Magnell. PSS ¶ 30. Plaintiff had multiple text conversations with Magnell’s son who co-habited with Magnell about Takacs’s erratic behavior. PSS ¶ 29. Plaintiff’s lease contains multiple provisions regarding clean and sober living environments binding both parties. PSS ¶ 13. On March 1, 2020, after Magnell confronted Takacs over the water bottle incident, Takacs said “I will have to think about what I am going to do to him” in regards to Plaintiff. PSS ¶ 37. Magnell and Plaintiff both acknowledged that it sounded like a threat. Ibid. Magnell told Plaintiff that if Takacs did anything to him, to call the police. Ibid. II. Evidentiary and Procedural Issues Magnell’s objections on reply 1, 2 and 4 are OVERRULED. Objection 3 is SUSTAINED as to Plaintiff’s statement as to when he consumed the nitrous oxide, five to ten minutes before the water bottle incident, and otherwise OVERRULED. III. The Burdens and Standards on Summary Judgment and Adjudication A. Generally Summary adjudication “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CCP § 437c(c). All evidence and inferences drawn reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary adjudication. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (“Aguilar”). A moving defendant meets its initial burden to show that one or more elements of a cause of action “cannot be established” (CCP § 437c(p)(2)) by presenting evidence that, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case cannot be established. Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 851; Kids Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 879. Alternatively, a defendant may show that there is a “complete defense” to a cause of action. CCP § 437c(p)(2). To show a complete defense, a defendant must present admissible evidence of each essential element of the defense upon which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See, e.g. Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 289. A defendant cannot base its “showing” on the plaintiff’s lack of evidence to disprove its claimed defense. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 472. A moving party does not meet its initial burden if some “reasonable inference” can be drawn from the moving party’s own evidence which creates a triable issue of material fact. See, e.g. Conn v. National Can Corp. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 630, 637; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840. If a defendant meets its initial burden to show a “complete defense,” the burden shifts to the plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the defense asserted. CCP § 437c(p)(2). Consumer Cause, Inc., 91 Cal.App.4th at 468. An issue of fact exists if “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 845. B. Negligence and Premises Liability “‘[P]roperty owners are liable for injuries on land they own, possess, or control.’ But … the phrase ‘own, possess, or control’ is stated in the alternative. A defendant need not own, possess and control property in order to be held liable; control alone is sufficient.” Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1162 (original italics, internal citations omitted). The law considers that one who is in possession, occupation, or control of the land is the one in the best position to discover a danger or control the activities on the premises. CC § 1714(a). “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; see also Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205; Civ. Code, § 1714(a). Specifically with respect to “premises liability,” it is well-established that a landowner is not an insurer of the safety of all persons on his property. Blodgett v. B.H. Dyas Co. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 511, 512. Thus, “[a]n initial and essential element of recovery for premises liability ... is proof a dangerous condition existed.” Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 566. In addition, a plaintiff suing for premises liability has the burden of proving that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition in time to correct it, or that the owner was “able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition.” Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1206. Determination of duty, such as whether a landlord has a duty to protect against third party crime, is a question of law for the court to resolve. Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213. The inquiry of the court in reviewing a landlord’s duty to prevent criminal acts against tenants is limited to the specific action the plaintiff claims the particular landlord should have taken in a particular case. Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 280. “Only after the scope of the duty under consideration is defined may a court meaningfully undertake the balancing analysis of the risks and burdens present in a given case to determine whether the specific obligations should or should not be imposed on the landlord.” Ibid. First, the court must determine the specific measures the plaintiff asserts the defendant should have taken to prevent the harm. This frames the issue for the court's determination by defining the scope of the duty under consideration. Second, the court must analyze how financially and socially burdensome these proposed measures would be to a landlord, which measures could range from minimally burdensome to significantly burdensome under the facts of the case. Third, the court must identify the nature of the third party conduct that the plaintiff claims could have been prevented had the landlord taken the proposed measures, and assess how foreseeable (on a continuum from a mere possibility to a reasonable probability) it was that this conduct would occur. Once the burden and foreseeability have been independently assessed, they can be compared in determining the scope of the duty the court imposes on a given defendant. The more certain the likelihood of harm, the higher the burden a court will impose on a landlord to prevent it; the less foreseeable the harm, the lower the burden a court will place on a landlord. Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1214, quoting Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 285, fn 10. IV. Analysis A. There are No Triable Issues as to Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action for Negligence Against Magnell Magnell shifts his initial burden. Magnell presents evidence that there were no prior reported violent incidents between Takacs and anyone else on the Property prior to the attack on Plaintiff. Magnell had no knowledge of Takacs having violent incidents before. Magnell had never heard of Takacs making violent threats. Takacs threw a water bottle at the wall outside Plaintiff’s bedroom on March 1, 2020. As a result of the water bottle incident, Magnell told Takacs that he would evict him in 10 days. Plaintiff plead no actions which Magnell had a duty to undertake to prevent the subsequent violence. Based on the evidence presented in the moving papers, Magnell has adequately shown that the attack which occurred later on March 1, 2020, was not foreseeable, and therefore Magnell had no duty to prevent the incident. Determinations of duty such as this are matters appropriately determinations of law, properly decided by the Court. There being no duty, Magnell cannot therefore be held negligent. Magnell shifts his initial burden on summary judgment and adjudication. In response, Plaintiff argues that there are triable issues of fact, as there were several actions which Magnell should have undertaken to prevent the March 1, 2020, attack. Plaintiff avers (dispersed across multiple papers) that the actions Magnell should have taken to prevent the attack was to: 1) evict Takacs for violating the sober living agreement (Kingsbury Declaration, ¶ 42); have Takacs arrested for illegal drug use (Id. at ¶ 43); called the police about Takacs possession of guns and ammunition (Id at ¶ 44.); 4) evicted Takacs on March 1, 2020, for threatening Plaintiff; 5) move Plaintiff to a downstairs apartment so he was more removed from Takacs or vice versa (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition, pg. 12:16-17.). Each of these fails as measures for a variety of reasons. Plaintiff argues that Magnell’s admitted knowledge of Takacs’s drug use while under the subject of the sober living tenancy presents adequate reason to deny summary judgment, as it shows that eviction was adequately supported. There are several deficiencies with this line of reasoning. First, while anecdotal evidence of violent incidents resulting from methamphetamine use is plentiful and pervasive, Plaintiff provides no evidence that would allow the Court to draw any meaningful conclusions on what effect Takacs’s drug use has on the foreseeability of the violent incident. No expert testimony is presented. Statistical evidence linking methamphetamine use to violence is not provided. Therefore, Magnell’s knowledge of Takacs methamphetamine use is only relevant for the purpose of showing the effect it had on Takacs’s demeanor. Second, any averment that Magnell had an affirmative duty to evict Takacs based solely on drug use is undercut on two bases. Plaintiff provides no authority showing that a landlord has an affirmative duty to evict individuals based on drug use, even in the context of a sober living environment. Additionally, Plaintiff’s admitted use of nitrous oxide on the date of the attack would equally require that Magnell evict him on this same logic. See Kingsbury Declaration, ¶ 26. However, none of that is probative to show that Magnell had an affirmative duty to evict Takacs. Plaintiff presents evidence that Takacs suffered paranoid delusions. However, the only evidence presented which could be construed as an indication of violent intent is that Takacs asked Plaintiff to help him kill the “invisible people”. See Declaration of Kingsbury, ¶ 18. Plaintiff presumes that Takacs was referring to Magnell and his son. Ibid. In presenting this evidence, Plaintiff presents nothing to show that Magnell had any knowledge of Takacs’s intent to “kill” anyone. Therefore, it presents nothing probative to the analysis of whether Takacs’s actions were foreseeable. Similarly, Plaintiff’s text messages to Magnell’s son do not present evidence that his concerns were actually communicated to Magnell. Therefore, Plaintiff’s presentation of these conversations does not provide any material basis for finding the attack foreseeable. Plaintiff’s presentation of evidence that Takacs was in possession of knives also appears inadequate to display a basis for Magnell’s liability. The only evidence of the knives being used for an improper purpose is the attack which led to Plaintiff’s injuries. There is no evidence presented that Magnell was aware that Takacs had knives or any other dangerous items until after the March 1, 2020, incident. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, Deposition of Magnell, pg. 77:17- 78:9, 79:7-17 (Magnell found the Takacs knives for the first time when cleaning out his room after the March 1, 2020 attack). The same applies to the guns found by Magnell after the incident. Id. at 60:22-61:8. Therefore, in determining what was foreseeable, Takacs weapons and Magnell’s contemporaneous knowledge of them is of little consequence. Even if Magnell had been aware, it is of limited probative value, as Plaintiff has presented no basis to show that Takacs’s possession of knives was somehow illegal or otherwise prohibited. In reviewing the foreseeability based on Takacs’s paranoia, knife possession, and apparent drug use, Davis v. Gomez (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1401 appears controlling. In that case, a tenant named Ms. Townsend murdered another tenant by shooting him as he walked by her door. Id. at 1402-1403. The plaintiffs were the murdered tenant’s parents, who sued both Townsend and the landlord. Ibid. Landlord moved for summary judgment based on a lack of foreseeability that Townsend was likely to murder someone. Id. at 1403. Before the trial court, evidence was presented that Townsend was prone to erratic behavior, including talking to herself, and “casting spells”, each corroborated by multiple tenant complaints. Ibid. There were also several reports that Townsend had a gun. Ibid. “By May 1986, it was apparent that Ms. Townsend was “losing her mind.” Ibid. Despite multiple complaints, the landlord undertook no action to evict Townsend before the shooting. Ibid. The trial court found that without some physical violence or threat of bodily harm, there was insufficient indicia to make the shooting foreseeable. Ibid. Townsend’s general behavior as a nuisance did not create an obligation to evict her in order to prevent the unforeseeable harm. Ibid. The Court of Appeal agreed. They posited that it was erroneous to assume that the landlord would have discovered anything indicative of Townsend’s possibility for violence even had they investigated further based on the complaints, in spite of the fact that Townsend had been convicted of shooting her husband. Id. at 1406. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish by citing to Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1464 (“Barber”) and Madhani v. Cooper (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 412, 415 (“Madhani”). Each of these cases are distinguished from the facts at bar. In each case, there were actual violent incidents of which the landlord had demonstrable knowledge from three weeks (Barber at 1464) to six months (Madhani at 414) before the tort occurred. As is addressed below, there is simply inadequate time between any plausible indication of violent tendencies and the tortious event for these cases to be applicable, as no prescriptive action offered could do so in the intervening time frame. Plaintiff represents that on February 29, 2020 (the day before the attack) he heard Takacs repeatedly kick a door on Magnell’s level. Plaintiff presents no evidence regarding how he knew Takacs was kicking a door, as Plaintiff does not aver to have witnessed what occurred or any observable damage. Kingsbury Declaration ¶ 25. There is no evidence that Magnell was present to hear the alleged incident, and therefore it does not present anything of probative value. Plaintiff also points to the March 1, 2020, incident where Takacs threw a green glass water bottle, and it struck the wall next to Plaintiff’s closed door. Kingsbury Declaration ¶ 26. Plaintiff’s conclusion that the water bottle as being thrown at him is unpersuasive. Plaintiff and Takacs were not engaged with each other, and Takacs threw the water bottle outside of Plaintiff’s wall while Plaintiff was in his room with the door closed. There is no evidence presented that the action of throwing the water bottle was an act particularly directed at Plaintiff. Without any articulable intent, this act is destructive, but not indicative of a violent intent toward Plaintiff. The only incident of which Plaintiff provides evidence of actual, physical violence is the incident which occurred later on March 1, 2020. Plaintiff avers that Magnell could have evicted Takacs that day based on Takacs statement that “I will think about what I am going to do to him.” Plaintiff provides no authority displaying this constitutes a criminal threat. Plaintiff has not shown that Magnell knew there was adequate basis to evict Takacs on any basis other than being a nuisance until the very day of the incident. Despite Plaintiff’s averment to the contrary (without supporting authority), eviction proceedings are subject to numerous timing safeguards for the protection of tenants. A three-day notice to quit is the common requirement for nuisance or even unlawful activity. CCP §1161 (4). Simply put, there was no opportunity to evict Takacs between the threat and the attack. Plaintiff’s prescriptive action is untenable as a result. The argument that moving either Takacs (who had been told he was being evicted in 10 days), or Plaintiff (who presumably did not feel he needed to avoid any further contact with Takacs before the attack) to the first floor is similarly unmoving. In meeting the shifted burden, Plaintiff must show that there was foreseeable harm, and that there were prescriptive actions which Magnell could have taken for which the burden of the action was not outweighed by the risk to Plaintiff based on the foreseeability. Plaintiff fails to present evidence that Takacs had dangerous tendencies or a propensity for violence. Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1464. The lone incident which might have prompted some foreseeability is the water bottle interaction earlier on March 1, 2020. The prescriptive actions proposed by Plaintiff fail to either be legally viable or relate to the foreseeable results of Magnell’s known facts. Having tenants such as Takacs arrested or evicted, with the information that was available to Magnell at the time of the incident, places a great burden on Magnell as a landlord. It is unquestionable that Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of Takacs actions. However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Magnell had adequate information where Plaintiff’s injuries were foreseeable. There being no foreseeability, Magnell did not have a duty to take the burdensome prescriptive measures Plaintiff asserts would have prevented the incident. Plaintiff fails to meet the shifted burden. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the cause of action for negligence is GRANTED. B. The Premises Liability Cause of Action Also Fails As is noted above, the elements of premises liability and negligence are the same. Therefore, the analysis to this cause of action is the same as that reflected above. Magnell’s motion for summary judgment and adjudication is GRANTED. V. Conclusion Magnell’s motion for summary judgment and adjudication is GRANTED. Magnell shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b). 6-8. SCV-273578, County of Sonoma v. Cupp In this property abatement action, the County of Sonoma (the “County”) filed the complaint (the “Complaint”) against defendant Ronald Cupp (“Defendant”), as owner of the property commonly known as 4640 Arlington Avenue, Santa Rosa, California (the “Property”), in the County of Sonoma. This matter is on calendar for the motions by Defendant to compel further responses to requests for admission, form interrogatories, and special interrogatories. These motions are continued to August 7, 2024, at 3:00 pm in Department 19 to be heard at the same time as the County’s motion for protective order which appears to turn on similar considerations. No further briefing on the motions to compel is permitted. **This is the end of the Tentative Rulings.***

Case Number: 23STCV21848 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 immigrant rights defense council, llc ; Plaintiff , vs. laura e. vaca , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV21848 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: (1) motion to set aside court order of march 22, 2024 deeming requests for admissions admitted (2) motion for monetary sanctions against plaintiffs attorney MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC (1) Motion to Set Aside Court Order of March 22, 2024 Deeming Requests for Admission Admitted (2) Motion for Monetary Sanctions against Plaintiffs Attorney The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each motion. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The court sustains plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLCs evidentiary objections, filed on June 26, 2024, because defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc. did not authenticate the exhibits to which the objections are directed. MOTION TO SET ASIDE COURT ORDER OF MARCH 22, 2024 DEEMING REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION ADMITTED Defendants Laura E. Vaca (Vaca) and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc. (API) (collectively, Defendants) request that the court set aside its March 22, 2024 order granting the motion to deem requests for admissions admitted, filed by plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC (Plaintiff), or, alternatively, striking Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. First, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should set aside its March 22, 2024 order granting Plaintiffs motion and deeming admitted the truth of the matters specified in the Requests for Admission directed to defendant API. Defendants contend that API responded to Plaintiffs discovery at the same time that Vaca served her responses. In support of that contention, Defendants have filed Defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada De Inmigracion, Inc.s Responses to Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLCs Requests for Admission, Set One, served on Plaintiff on November 10, 2023. (Mot., Exhibit A, pp. 1, 8.) Defendants have also submitted the November 27, 2023 email from Plaintiffs counsel, in which counsel stated that [b]ecause [Defendants] responded jointly, [counsel would] treat the responses together. (Mot., Ex. C, p. 1.) Defendants have not, however, presented evidence or argument establishing that these responses were served in connection with the Requests for Admission that were the subject of the courts March 22, 2024 order. Specifically, the court ruled on Plaintiffs motion as to the Requests for Admission that were served on defendant API on December 28, 2023. (March 22, 2024 Order, p. 2:3-4; Pl. Mot. to Deem Admissions Admitted, filed Feb. 9, 2024, p. 1:22-26 [moving for an order deeming admitted the admissions in the requests served on API on December 28, 2023], and Medvei Decl., Ex. 1 [Requests for Admission, Set One, served on API on December 28, 2023].) Defendants did not present evidence or argument establishing that (1) API served responses to the Requests for Admission that Plaintiff propounded on it on December 28, 2023, or (2) APIs responses to the Requests for Admission directed to defendant Vaca may constitute responses to the Requests for Admission directed to API, particularly in light of the facts that (i) Plaintiff served the subject discovery on API on December 28, 2023, but (ii) the responses that API argues satisfied its obligation to respond to that discovery were served on Plaintiff before that date, on November 10, 2023. Further, Defendants did not argue, or present evidence establishing, that API should be relieved of its admissions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300. The court therefore finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should set aside its March 22, 2024 order granting Plaintiffs motion to deem admitted the truth of the matters specified in the Requests for Admission directed to defendant API. Second, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action by failing to present adequate argument establishing lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should strike Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and dismiss this action on that ground. Third, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff does not have standing. Thus, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should strike Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and dismiss this action on that ground. Here, Plaintiff has prayed for, inter alia , injunctive relief and attorneys fees. (FAC, p. 10, Prayer, ¶¶ 1-2.) Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 22446.5, [a]ny other party who, upon information and belief, claims a violation of this chapter has been committed by an immigration consultant may bring a civil action for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public and, upon prevailing, shall recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22446.5, subd. (b); Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC v. Hudson Ins. Co. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 305, 308 [pursuant to this statute, any person who believes an [Immigration Consultant Act] violation has been committed may bring a civil action on behalf of the general public seeking solely injunctive relief].) Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff, as a party who claims that Defendants have violated the Immigration Consultant Act, may not bring this action for injunctive relief against them. (FAC ¶¶ 14-15, 19-20.) Moreover, while the court notes that Defendants have cited Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th 305 in support of their argument, in that case, the court held that Plaintiff did not fall within the class of persons who may recover against an ICA bond , and did not hold that Plaintiff may not bring an action under section 22446.5, subdivision (b). ( Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 261 [emphasis added].) Instead, the court recognized that this statute sets forth three classes of plaintiff who may pursue actions against immigrant consultants who violate the Immigration Consultant Act, including any party who believes a violation has been committed by an immigration consultant pursuant to section 22446.5, subdivision (b). ( Id. at pp. 309-310.) Fourth, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs cause of action for violation of the Immigration Consultant Act is preempted by federal law. ( People v. Salcido (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 529, 534 [holding that federal law does not preempt the application of the [Immigrant Consultant Act] to the defendant].) Thus, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should strike the First Amended Complaint or dismiss this action on that ground. For the reasons set forth above, the court denies Defendants motion. Finally, the court is concerned about the tone and content of a number of remarks made by Defendants and their counsel in the papers filed in connection with this motion, which include personal attacks, disparaging remarks, taunts, and insults against Plaintiffs counsel. (Mot. to Set Aside, pp. 5:17-19, 14:27, 15:13-14, and Vaca Decl., p. 18:5, 18:24-25.) The court finds that such remarks are distracting from the merits of the issues and arguments presented, are not persuasive advocacy, and have no place in written or oral submissions, presentations, or communications made to the court or to other parties or counsel in this litigation. As the court states in section 1 of its Courtroom Information for Department 53 posted on the courts website, [t]he court places a very high value on civility, courtesy, and professionalism in the practice of law and the judicial process.¿ The court expects all attorneys and parties to treat each other, witnesses, jurors, court personnel, the court, and others with the highest level of civility, courtesy, and professionalism, both inside and outside the courtroom. The court expects all parties, attorneys, and other participants in this litigation to govern their conduct accordingly. MOTION FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY Defendants move the court for an order awarding monetary sanctions in their favor and against counsel for Plaintiff, Sebastian Medvei (Medvei), in the total amount of $145,756.30. It appears that Defendants move for this relief on the ground that Medvei engaged in misuses of the discovery process by (1) violating the meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290, and (2) filing discovery motions beyond the 45-day deadline that applies to motions to compel further discovery responses. (Mot., pp. 2:9-3:19 5:19-21, 5:30-6:15, 7:5-6 [The express admission to engage in the meet and confer requirement, when mandatory, makes the award of attorney fees obligatory].) First, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs counsel, Medvei, engaged in a misuse of the discovery process in electing not to meet and confer before filing three discovery motions on behalf of Plaintiff. As noted by Defendants, Plaintiff filed the following three motions on February 9, 2024: (1) motion to deem admitted the Requests for Admission served on defendant API, which the court granted on March 22, 2024, (2) motion to compel defendant API to respond to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which is set for hearing on October 28, 2024, and (3) motion to compel defendant API to respond to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories, Set One, which is set for hearing on October 29, 2024. As a threshold matter, the court notes that it has not yet ruled on Plaintiffs motions to compel defendant APIs responses to its document demands and interrogatories. Thus, any determination on the merits of those motions is premature. The court does not issue any rulings as to whether Plaintiff has shown that it is entitled to the relief requested in those motions. However, the court notes that Plaintiff filed those motions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280, 2031.300, and 2030.290, respectively. (Pl. Feb. 9, 2024 Mot. to Deem Admissions Admitted, p. 2:1-3; Pl. Feb. 9, 2024 Mot. to Compel Responses to Doc. Demands, pp. 2:1-3, 4:1-20; Pl. Feb. 9, 2024 Mot. to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, pp. 2:1-3, 4:1-17.) Those statutes do not set forth a meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.280, 2031.300, 2030.290.) Plaintiff did not file its motions pursuant to sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290, and therefore Defendants have not shown that the meet and confer requirements of those statutes apply to Plaintiffs motions. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.290, subd. (b)(1) [meet and confer declaration required for motion to compel further responses to requests for admission], 2030.300, subd. (b)(1) [meet and confer declaration required for motion to compel further responses to interrogatories], 2031.310, subd. (b)(2) [meet and confer declaration required for motion to compel further responses to document demands].) To the extent that Defendants contend that Plaintiff brought its motions under the incorrect statutes (i.e., based on Defendants assertion that defendant API did serve responses to the subject discovery), the remedy would be to file opposition papers requesting that the court deny those motions. [1] The court finds, however, that Defendants, have not shown, for purposes of this motion only, that Medvei violated the meet and confer requirements of statutes inapplicable to the motions that Plaintiff filed on February 9, 2024. Second, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs counsel, Medvei, engaged in a misuse of the discovery process by filing the three discovery motions on behalf of Plaintiff on February 9, 2024. Defendants contend that Plaintiff waived the right to compel further responses to discovery by failing to file the three motions described above within 45 days of the date of November 10, 2023. However, as set forth above, Plaintiff filed its motions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280, 2031.300, and 2030.290, which are not subject to the 45-day deadline set forth in sections 2033.290, 2031.310, and 2030.300. To the extent that Defendants contend that Plaintiff should have filed its motions pursuant to those statutes and failed to satisfy their requirements, Defendants may file opposition papers requesting that the court deny those motions. [2] For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Medvei has engaged in a misuse of the discovery process and therefore denies their motion for sanctions. The court denies Medveis request for monetary sanctions against Defendants. ORDER The court denies defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc.s motion to set aside March 22, 2024 order deeming requests for admission admitted. The court denies defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc.s motion for sanctions. The court orders plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court [1] As set forth above, the court does not issue any rulings regarding whether Plaintiff has properly filed those motions or has shown that it is entitled to the relief requested therein. [2] As set forth above, the court does not make any rulings as to the merits of Plaintiffs pending motions to compel discovery responses.

Case Number: 23TRCV00434 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B DIEGO RODRIGUEZ BARRERA, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No.: 23TRCV00434 vs. [Tentative] RULING JOSE FUENTES VEGA, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Moving Parties: Proposed intervenor National Continental Insurance Company Responding Party: None Motion to Intervene The Court considered the moving papers. No opposition was filed. RULING The motion is GRANTED. National Continental Insurance Company is ordered to file its complaint-in-intervention within five days. BACKGROUND On February 15, 2023, Diego Rodriguez Barrera and Yaneth Alexandra Rizzo Verel filed a complaint against Jose Fuentes Vega and Alcocer, Inc. for motor vehicle negligence based on an incident that occurred on December 28, 2021, at LAX. On December 12, 2023, the court granted plaintiffs motion to serve the secretary of state as to Alcocer. DISCUSSION National Continental Insurance Company (National) requests leave to file a complaint-in-intervention on behalf of defendants Jose Fuentes Vega and Alcocer, Inc. pursuant to CCP §387. CCP §387(d) states: (1) The court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene. (B) The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that persons ability to protect that interest, unless that persons interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. (2) The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. To establish a direct and immediate interest in the litigation for purposes of permissive intervention, a non-party seeking intervention must show that he or she stands to gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment, even if no specific interest in the property or transaction at issue exists. Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1201. Whether the interveners interest is sufficiently direct must be decided on the facts of each case . . . . And section 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention. Id. at 1200. In order that a party may be permitted to intervene it is not necessary that his interest in the action be such that he will inevitably be affected by the judgment. It is enough that there be a substantial probability that his interests will also be so affected. 'The purposes of intervention are to protect the interests of those who may be affected by the judgment . . . .'" Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal. App. 3d 873, 881-82 (citations and italics omitted). Under California law, an insurance carrier who is not a party to an action can intervene on behalf of its insured when the insurance carrier could be subject to a subsequent action under Ins. Code §11580. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal. App. 4th 383, 386, where the court states: An insurers right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damages, arises as a result of Ins. Code section 11580. Section 11580 provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the policy limits. Thus, where the insurer may be subject to a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by a judgment creditor who has or will obtain a default judgment in a third party action against the insured, intervention is appropriate. Id. See also Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal. App. 3d 1459, 1468 (permitting an insurer to intervene in lawsuit to litigate liability and damage issues). National contends that it is the liability insurer for defendants Vega and Alcocer, Inc. National retained Olson Law Group, APC (OLG) to represent defendants. Despite diligent efforts, OLG has not established contact with Alcocer and has been unable to maintain contact with Vega. See Heather Lunn decl. If defendants cannot defend themselves, and no defense is provided by National on defendants behalf, a default judgment will be obtained and enforced against defendants. National, as defendants insurer, could be required to satisfy that judgment up to the policy limits. Thus, National has a real, immediate, and concrete interest in the matter that is the subject of this litigation. Intervention will not enlarge the issues in this case. The Court finds that National has met its burden under CCP §387(d). National is so situated, as the insurer, that the disposition of the action against defendants may, as a practical matter, impair or impede Nationals ability to protect that interest. Nationals interest is not adequately represented by its insured. The motion for leave to intervene is therefore GRANTED. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. National is ordered to file its complaint-in-intervention within five days. National is ordered to give notice of the ruling.

Case Number: 22SMCV02350 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Woods Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Evidentiary Sanctions, and/or Issue Preclusion as Against Plaintiff is DENIED. Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Wood to give notice. REASONING Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Wood (Defendants) moves the Court for an order imposing terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Marcelino Arcos (Plaintiff) in the form of dismissing Plaintiffs case against Defendants for failing to provide code-compliant responses, without objections, and pay sanctions as ordered by the Court on August 8, 2023. If a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose sanctions including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery also constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).) [T]wo facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Admrs, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, ellipsis omitted.) A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) While Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Courts prior order, the Court finds that terminating sanctions are not warranted at this juncture. Notably, the Court considered an almost identical motion by Defendants on January 3, 2024, and denied it on the ground that it would be improper to jump from an order entering an order compelling discovery responses to an order for terminating sanctions because this did not represent the incremental approach contemplated by California law. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [the California discovery statutes provide an incremental approach to discovery sanctions].) The Court further noted that Defendants provided no proof of meeting and conferring with Plaintiff or attempts to contact Plaintiff to obtain the subject responses, less severe sanctions [may] produce compliance with the discovery rules, and until the Court had imposed incrementally harsher sanctions to curb Plaintiffs failure to provide discovery responses, the Court declined to impose the ultimate sanction of termination. (See ibid.) As to an alternative remedy of evidentiary or issue sanctions, Defendants had provided no argument for the same, such that the Court had no basis to determine whether those requested remedies were proper. Defendants have renewed their motion here, but it is more of a motion for reconsideration given that little more has happened since the Court issued its order on January 3, 2024. Plaintiff failed to appear before the Court on three dates, on December 5, 2023, January 3, 2024, and on May 9, 2024, and Plaintiff has not yet provided the same discovery responses, but failure to appear at court hearings is not a basis for ordering terminating sanctions, and the Court previously stated that the failure to provide that discovery alone would not warrant terminating sanctions. Defendants again provide no argument as to the alternative remedies of evidentiary or issue sanctions. Accordingly, Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Woods Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Evidentiary Sanctions, and/or Issue Preclusion as Against Plaintiff is DENIED.

DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR OTHER NON-PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY WASHBON VS STATE FARM DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORT CVRI2401690 MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE (OVER $35,000) OF STEVE INSURANCE COMPANY WASHBON BY STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ADAM ANDERSON Tentative Ruling: SUSTAIN with 30 days leave to amend. The third cause of action is uncertain because it includes allegations of negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which are separate causes of action. While Cal. Rule of Court 2.112 does not expressly require Plaintiff to split his claims into separate causes of action, Plaintiff should set forth the different theories into separate counts to facilitate the adjudication of their validity. Moreover, as pointed out by Defendant, this cause of action asserts some allegations against Anderson only, and some allegations against Defendants jointly, rendering the cause of action uncertain. The fourth cause of action for fraud does not state a cause of action with the required degree of specificity. Plaintiff does not describe where or when or by what means the representations were made. Additionally, these representations appear to be contradictory. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits and no coverage was available for the claim, while also asserting Defendants misrepresented that coverage existed. Because there is no context for either assertion, these allegations are confusing and ambiguous. Further, it is not clear who made the representations, or if the employee had authority to speak on behalf of the company. (Plaintiff states that the customer service representatives did not have authority and Plaintiff was not assigned an adjuster. (Complaint Para. 20.)) The allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action for fraud.