Motion for Summary Judgment in JOHN HUGHES, III ET AL VS ROMAN FLICKER ET AL| Trellis.Law

On February 06, 2019 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between Flicker Construction Inc., Hughes, John, Iii, and Flicker, Roman, Mid-Continent Casualty Company, for Contract & Indebtedness in the District Court of Miami-Dade County.

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Filing # 123280808 E-Filed 03/17/2021 03:59:48 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY’S BREACH OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND

Plaintiff, JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

pursuant to Rule 1.510 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves for partial summary

judgment and seeks a determination that Defendant, MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY

COMPANY (“MCC”) breached its duty to defend Flicker Construction from the underlying

Manuel Perea v. Flicker Construction, Inc. lawsuit, and in support thereof states:

1. In Count V of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

MCC breached its duty to defend Flicker Construction from the underlying Manuel Perea v.

Flicker Construction, Inc. lawsuit (“Underlying Lawsuit”).

2. In its Answer, MCC denied that it owed a duty to defend Flicker Construction from

the Underlying Lawsuit, denied that it breached any duty to defend Flicker Construction from the

Underlying Lawsuit, and denied that any breach caused damages.

3. On June 15, 2020, this Court entered an order determining, as a matter of law, that

MCC owed a duty to defend Flicker Construction from the Underlying Lawsuit. See Exhibit 1,

Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Mid-Continent
Casualty Company’s Duty to Defend and Denying Mid-Continent Casualty Company’s Cross

Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

4. “To satisfy its obligation to defend, an insurer [] must provide

an adequate defense.” Carrousel Concessions, Inc. v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 483 So. 2d 513,

516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (emphasis removed).

5. It is undisputed MCC was notified of the Underlying Lawsuit and presented with

an opportunity to defend. See Exhibit 2, Email chain between MCC to H. Joshua Diamond, dated

July 21-22, 2011; Exhibit 3, Letter dated August 29, 2011 from H. Joshua Diamond to MCC;

Exhibit 4, Letter dated September 1, 2011 from MCC to H. Joshua Diamond; Exhibit 5, Letter

dated September 1, 2011 from MCC to Flicker Construction. This Court also already determined

that MCC received the underlying complaint when determined that MCC owed a duty to defend

Flicker Construction from Perea’s lawsuit. Ex. 1, p.7.

6. Additionally, it is undisputed that MCC did nothing to attempt to defend Flicker

Construction from the Underlying Lawsuit. See Exhibit 6, Excerpts of Deposition of MCC’s

Corporate Representative Michael Brader, pp. 74-75 (“Q: Did MCC at any point take any steps to

attempt to defend Flicker Construction from the claims or lawsuit of Manuel Perea? A: It is my

understanding we did not.”)

7. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a determination that MCC breached its duty to defend

Flicker Construction from the Underlying Lawsuit as a matter of law.

8. By this Motion, Plaintiff is not seeking summary judgment as to the amount

damages caused by MCC’s breach.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant it partial summary judgment

determining that Defendant MCC breached its duty to defend Flicker Construction from the
underlying Manuel Perea v. Flicker Construction, Inc. lawsuit, along with any other relief it deems

appropriate.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been electronically

filed and furnished by e-mail to Edward T. Sylvester, esylvester@hinshawlaw.com,

lleon@hinshawlaw.com, and Alina N. Yaniz, ayaniz@hinshawlaw.com, Hinshaw & Culbertson

LLP, 2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 4th Floor, Coral Gables, FL 33134, on this 17th day of March,

2021.

/s/ Brent Steinberg
BRANDON G. CATHEY
Florida Bar No.: 941891
BRENT G. STEINBERG
Florida Bar No.: 0085453
SWOPE, RODANTE P.A.
1234 E. 5th Ave.,
Tampa, Florida 33605
Tel: (813) 273-0017
Fax: (813) 223-3678
Team2eservice@swopelaw.com
eservice@swopelaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

EXHIBIT 1
Filing # 108852814 E-Filed 06/15/2020 12:05:46 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 2019-003916-CA-01
SECTION: CA27
JUDGE: Oscar Rodriguez-Fonts

John Hughes, III et al
Plaintiff(s)

vs.

Roman Flicker et al
Defendant(s)
____________________________/

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY’S DUTY
TO DEFEND AND DENYING MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY’S CROSS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Defendant Mid-Continent Casualty Company’s Duty to Defend (“Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment”) and Mid-Continent Casualty Company’s (“Defendant MCC”)

Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Cross Motion”)

(collectively “Motions”). The Court, having reviewed the Motions, responses and replies, case

law, having conducted a hearing on April 22, 2020, and being otherwise fully advised in the

premises, finds as follows:

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2010 Manuel Perea (“Perea”) filed suit against Flicker Construction (“Flicker”) in an action

styled Manuel Perea v. Flicker Construction, Inc, Case No.: 10-58782-CA-01 (“Underlying

Lawsuit” or “Underlying Complaint”). The underlying matter proceeded to a jury trial and a

judgment was entered in favor of Perea.

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 1 of 9
The Plaintiff in the present matter filed a Complaint, which was later amended, alleging

that Roman Flicker fraudulently transferred assets from Flicker Construction and breached

certain fiduciary duties. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant MCC, breached its duty to defend

and indemnify Flicker Construction for the damages awarded to Perea in the Final Judgment of

the Underlying Lawsuit.

Plaintiff now moves this Court to grant partial summary judgement on the issue of

whether Defendant MCC had a duty to defend Flicker in the Underlying Lawsuit. Conversely,

Defendant MCC moves this Court for entry of an order granting summary judgment finding the

Defendant MCC owed no duty to defend or indemnify in the Underlying Lawsuit.

ANALYSIS

Under Florida law, an insurer’s duty to defend is separate and distinct from its duty to

indemnify, and it is more extensive. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of

Pittsburgh, Pa., 695 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (citing Klaesen Bros., Inc. v.

Harbor Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 611, 612-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)). The insurance provider’s duty

to defend depends solely on the facts and legal theories alleged in the pleadings and claims

against the insured.” James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270,

1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nova Casualty Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1332

(S.D.Fla.2006)). “A liability insurer’s obligation, with respect to its duty to defend, is not

determined by the insured’s actual liability but rather by whether the alleged basis of the action

against the insurer falls within the policy’s coverage.” XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skystream,

Inc., 943 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Accordingly, a determination regarding the duty to defend requires the Court to examine

the allegations in the complaint and the insurance policy. See Lime Tree Vill. Cmty. Club

Ass’n Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1993). An insurer is

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 2 of 9
obligated to defend a claim even if it is uncertain whether coverage exists under the policy, as

long as the pleadings bring the case fairly and potentially within the scope of coverage. 6HH

)LUVW$P7LWOH,QV&R 695 So. 2d at 476; .HHQY)ORULGD6KHULIIV¶6HOI,QV, 962 So. 2d

1021, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “If the allegations of the complaint leave any doubt as to the

duty to defend, the question must be resolved in favor of the insured.” /LPH7UHH9LOO&PW\

&OXE$VV¶Q,QF, 980 F.2d at 1405. Insurance contracts are construed in accordance with the

plain language of their provisions. $XWR±2ZQHUV,QV&RY$QGHUVRQ 756 So. 2d 29, 33-34

(Fla. 2000). Still, if the pertinent policy language is susceptible to multiple reasonable

interpretations then the policy is ambiguous and should be interpreted liberally in favor of the

insured and strictly against the insurer. ()ORULGD+DXOLQJ,QFY/H[LQJWRQ,QV&R 913

So. 2d 673, 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

In the present case, the Underlying Complaint alleges in pertinent part:

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Defendant MCC issued commercial general liability policy number 04-GL-000784399 to

Flicker which was effective from March 12, 2010 through March 12, 2011. The pertinent policy

provision provides that MCC will have the right and duty to defend Flicker against any suit

seeking damages as a result of bodily injury or property damage, unless it is bodily injury or

property damage to which that policy did not apply.

Based on the Underlying Complaint and the insurance policy, the allegations fairly and

potentially bring the suit within policy coverage for purposes of the duty to defend. However,

although an insurer must defend the insured when the complaint fairly brings the case within the

scope of coverage, if the complaint shows the applicability of a policy exclusion then the insurer

has no duty to defend. 6WDWH)DUP)LUH &DV&RY7LSSHWW, 864 So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2003) (citing 5HOLDQFH,QV&RY5R\DO0RWRUFDU&RUS 534 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1988)). See also .HHQ, 962 So. 2d at 1024. Exclusionary clauses are strictly construed.

(VWDWHRI7LQHUYLQY1DWLRQZLGH0XW,QV&R, 23 So. 3d 1232, 1236–37 (Fla. 4th DCA

2009). “However, exclusionary provisions which are ambiguous or otherwise susceptible to

more than one meaning must be construed in favor of the insured, since it is the insurer who

usually drafts the policy.” 0LG&RQWLQHQW&DV&RY5R\DO&UDQH//&, 169 So. 3d 174, 182

(Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting 6WDWH)DUP0XW$XWR,QV&RY3ULGJHQ 498 So. 2d 1245,

1248 (Fla.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant MCC’s liability policy contains a “Worker’s Compensation Exclusion,” which

eliminates coverage for “any obligation of the insured under any workers’ compensation,

disability benefits or unemployment compensation or any similar law.” This exclusion bars

coverage of claims arising from bodily injuries for which the insured is required to pay benefits

under workers’ compensation law. 0RUDOHVY=HQLWK,QV&R, 152 So. 3d 557, 561 (Fla.

2014). As both parties suggest, a Worker’s Compensation Exclusion has been held to apply

&DVH1R&$ 3DJHRI
whenever the injured claimant is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under Chapter 440

of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 563. To determine whether the Workers’ Compensation Exclusion

eliminated MCC’s duty to defend, this Court must decide whether the Underlying Complaint

demonstrates that Flicker was required to provide workers’ compensation benefits to Perea for

his bodily injury claim. See Advanced Sys., Inc. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 272 So. 3d 523, 527

(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Because [insurer] relies on an exclusion to deny coverage, it has the

burden of demonstrating that the allegations of the complaint are cast solely and entirely within

the policy exclusion and are subject to no other reasonable interpretation.” (quoting Castillo v.

State Farm Florida Ins. Co., 971 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation

marks removed)). This Court cannot do so.

Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes provides several exclusions to worker’s compensation

coverage and benefits. See § 440.02, Fla. Stat. (2015) (Employee means any person who

receives remuneration from an employer, including all persons who are being paid by a

construction contractor as a subcontractor, unless the subcontractor has validly elected an

exemption as permitted by this chapter, or has otherwise secured the payment of compensation

coverage as a subcontractor, further, the term Employee does not include a volunteer). The

Underlying Complaint is vague as to both Perea and Flicker’s relationship and Flicker’s role in

the construction project. The Underlying Complaint does not refer to Perea as an employee nor

does it refer to Flicker as an employer, a subcontractor or a general contractor. The Underlying

Complaint makes no reference to Workers’ Compensation coverage or exceptions thereto. It is

not unreasonable to infer, as Defendant MCC urges this Court to do, that Flicker was the general

contractor because it is the only defendant in the underlying action, was alleged to be in control

of the premises and breached duties to Perea. It is also not unreasonable to infer that Underlying

Complaint sets forth an employer-employee relationship. However, even making these

assumptions, the Court does not find that the allegations in the Underlying Complaint are cast

solely and entirely within the policy exclusion. These allegations are subject to other reasonable

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 5 of 9
interpretations, such as the exceptions to coverage set forth in the statute. Therefore, this Court

does not find that the Worker’s Compensation Exclusion clearly applies, subject to no other

reasonable interpretation.

The second relevant exclusion in Defendant MCC’s policy is the “Employer’s Liability

Exclusion.” This exclusion eliminates coverage for an employee who was injured in the course

of their employment by the insured or performance of duties related to the conduct of the

insured’s business. In the policy, “Employee” is defined to include a “leased worker,” but not a

“temporary worker.” Thus, Defendant MCC would owe a duty to defend if the injured claimant

was a “temporary worker” rather than an “employee” as defined in the policy. See Nat’l

Indem. Co. of S. v. Landscape Mgmt. Co., Inc., 963 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Again, to determine whether the Employer’s Liability Exclusion eliminated Defendant MCC’s

duty to defend, this Court must decide whether the Underlying Complaint shows that Perea was

an employee of Flicker, as defined by the policy. See Advanced Sys., Inc., 272 So. 3d at 527.

Again, this Court cannot do so. The Underlying Complaint fails to set forth enough information

to show that Perea was an employee of Flicker as defined in the policy and not a temporary

worker. The Underlying Complaint is vague as to both Perea and Flicker’s relationship. The

Underlying Complaint does not refer to Perea as an employee, it states that he was either directly

or indirectly retained. The Underlying Complaint does not allege how Perea was “retained” or in

what capacity, only that it was to perform bathroom tile installation. Retain is defined as “[t]o

hire” or “to engage for the provision of services (as by a lawyer, an accountant, an employee,

etc.).” RETAIN, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The broadness of the term “retain”

along with the broadness of “directly or indirectly” lead this Court to conclude that these

allegations are not solely and entirely within the policy exclusion, subject to no other reasonable

interpretations. Particularly, there is nothing in the Underlying Complaint that determines

whether Perea was a temporary worker as defined by the policy.

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 6 of 9
Therefore, based on the allegations in the Underlying Complaint reviewed in unison with

the insurance policy, this Court cannot conclude Defendant MCC had no duty to defend Flicker

based on the pertinent exclusions.

The Plaintiff and Defendant MCC urge this Court to consider other record evidence in

order to rule on the Motions. “The duty to defend is not determined by the complaint’s wording

alone.” Keen, 962 So. 2d at 1024 (citing Tippett, 864 So.2d at 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

Indeed, a court may consider extrinsic facts “if those facts are undisputed, and, had they been

pled in the complaint, they clearly would have placed the claims outside the scope of coverage.”

Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2014). However, in

Florida, such circumstances are found only in exceptional cases “where courts have crafted an

equitable remedy when it is manifestly obvious to all involved that the actual facts placed the

claims outside the scope of coverage.” Id. (quoting First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. 633 Partners,

Ltd., 300 Fed.Appx. 777, 786 (11th Cir.2008)). That is not the case here. The extensive

evidence does not make it “manifestly obvious” that the actual facts place the claim outside the

scope of coverage and it would be improper for this Court to weigh the evidence. See

Advanced Sys., Inc., 272 So. 3d at 528 (the record before the court “contains no objective fact

that is manifestly obvious to all involved, nor are there uncontroverted facts that simply were not

pled in the Underlying Action[.]” As such, this Court cannot consider extrinsic facts.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that Defendant MCC had a duty to

defend in the Underlying Lawsuit. First, the allegations in the Underlying Complaint fairly and

potentially bring Perea’s suit within the scope of coverage of the general liability policy issued

by Defendant MCC. Second, although Defendant MCC relies on exclusions to deny any duty to

defend, the allegations in the Underlying Complaint are not cast solely and entirely within the

policy exclusions and are subject to other reasonable interpretations. Therefore, it is hereby

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 7 of 9
ORDERED and ADJUGDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

Defendant Mid-Continent Casualty Company’s Duty to Defend is GRANTED. Accordingly, for

these same reasons, Defendant Mid-Continent Casualty Company’s Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida on this 15th day of June,
2020.

2019-003916-CA-01 06-15-2020 11:54 AM
Hon. Oscar Rodriguez-Fonts

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
Electronically Signed

No Further Judicial Action Required on THIS MOTION

CLERK TO RECLOSE CASE IF POST JUDGMENT

Electronically Served:
Brandon Cathey, Team2eservice@swopelaw.com
Brandon Cathey, eservice@swopelaw.com
Brandon G Cathey, BrandonC@swopelaw.com
Brandon G Cathey, team2eservice@swopelaw.com
Brandon G Cathey, eservice@swopelaw.com
Brent G Steinberg, team2eservice@swopelaw.com
Brent G Steinberg, eservice@swopelaw.com
David P Carlton, dpc@carltonslaw.com
David P Carlton, jah@carltonslaw.com
Edward T. Sylvester, esylvester@hinshawlaw.com
Edward T. Sylvester, lleon@hinshawlaw.com
Edward T. Sylvester, esylvester@hinshawlaw.com
Edward T. Sylvester, mislacalleiro@hinshawlaw.com
Michael T. Tomlin, mtomlin@hinshawlaw.com
Michael T. Tomlin, clucas@hinshawlaw.com

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 8 of 9
Siobhan E Grant, sgrant@hinshawlaw.com
Siobhan E Grant, lleon@hinshawlaw.com

Physically Served:

Case No: 2019-003916-CA-01 Page 9 of 9
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

EXHIBIT 2
MCC000011
MCC000012
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

EXHIBIT 3
MCC000166
MCC000167
MCC000168
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

EXHIBIT 4
MCC000178
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

EXHIBIT 5
MCC000179
MCC000180
MCC000181
MCC000182
MCC000183
MCC000184
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2019-003916-CA-01
v.

ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

EXHIBIT 6
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION

--------------------------------

JOHN HUGHES, III, as Receiver of
FLICKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.:
vs. 2019-003916-CA-01
ROMAN FLICKER and MID-CONTINENT
CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants.

--------------------------------

VIDEOTAPED
DEPOSITION OF: MICHAEL BRADER
Corporate Representative of
Mid-Continent Casualty Company

TAKEN AT: All Parties Appeared
Via Videoconference
DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 4, 2021
Commencing at 11:13 a.m.

REPORTED BY: Pamela Cook, RPR, CRR, CLR
Notary Public, State of Florida

CLARK REPORTING SERVICE
Joseph Garcia International Center
1101 Channelside Drive, Suite 303
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813)229-3332

Clark Reporting Service - 813-229-3332

Electronically signed by Pamela Cook (601-036-650-6810)
Electronically signed by Pamela Cook (601-036-650-6810) 21306155-a571-4910-97d9-cd1f4b0c3a03
Page 74
1 there are two interrogatories that were

2 issued. Same objections. These

3 interrogatories also were objected to. To the

4 extent that there were answers given regarding

5 claims materials in the federal court

6 interrogatory, that does not apply to the

7 state court. And I would just reiterate the

8 work product, attorney-client, any other

9 objections identified in the motion for

10 protective order.

11 And, Brandon, I don't know if there are

12 any others that you are aware of, any other

13 interrogatories.

14 MR. CATHEY: You know better than me.

15 BY MR. CATHEY:

16 Q Did MCC at any point do anything to

17 attempt to defend Flicker Construction from the

18 Perea claim or Perea lawsuit?

19 MR. SYLVESTER: I just have a form

20 objection on that. I'm not sure I understand

21 the question.

22 THE WITNESS: Could you repeat that?

23 Yeah, could you repeat that for me, please?

24 BY MR. CATHEY:

25 Q Sure. Did MCC at any point take any

Clark Reporting Service - 813-229-3332

Electronically signed by Pamela Cook (601-036-650-6810)
Electronically signed by Pamela Cook (601-036-650-6810) 21306155-a571-4910-97d9-cd1f4b0c3a03
Page 75
1 steps to attempt to defend Flicker Construction

2 from the claims or lawsuit of Manuel Perea?

3 A It is my understanding we did not.

4 MR. CATHEY: All right. Nothing

5 further.

6 MR. SYLVESTER: Okay. We'll read.

7 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. We are going

8 off the record.

9 THE COURT REPORTER: Brandon, would you

10 like to order the transcript?

11 MR. CATHEY: Yes, please.

12 MR. SYLVESTER: I'll take a copy,

13 please.

14 THEREUPON, the deposition of Michael

15 Brader taken at the request of Plaintiff was

16 concluded at 12:54 p.m.

17 * * * * *

Clark Reporting Service - 813-229-3332

Electronically signed by Pamela Cook (601-036-650-6810)
Electronically signed by Pamela Cook (601-036-650-6810) 21306155-a571-4910-97d9-cd1f4b0c3a03

Case Info

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

March 17, 2021

Case Filing Date

February 06, 2019

County

Parties

FLICKER CONSTRUCTION INC. Plaintiff
Flicker, Roman Defendant
Grant, Siobhan E. P. Attorney for the Defendant
Hernandez, Pedro E, Jr Attorney for the Defendant
Hughes, John, III Plaintiff
Mid-Continent Casualty Company Defendant
Party Name Party Description
Smith, Matthew Tyson Attorney for the Plaintiff
Sylvester, Edward Thomas, Jr Attorney for the Defendant
Sylvester, Edward Thomas, Jr Attorney for the Defendant
Wyman, James H Attorney for the Defendant
Brent Steinberg Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Brandon Cathey Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Daniel Greene Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David Carlton Attorney
Ronald Kammer Attorney
Robert Rodriguez Attorney
Kevin Vannatta Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Kathryn Ender Attorney
James Hada Attorney
Gregg Steinberg Attorney
Alina Yániz Attorneys for Defendants
Duty Greene Attorney
Jacob Schuster Attorney
Brian Jacobson Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Michael Tomlin
H Diamond Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Motion,Ex Parte: JOHN HUGHES, III ET AL VS ROMAN FLICKER ET AL

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Case Info

Parties