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  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
  • USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, et al Plaintiff vs. Elite Health Investents Inc, et al Defendant 3 document preview
						
                                

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Filing # 134225058 E-Filed 09/08/2021 05:43:31 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA Case No: CACE-21-010364 USA MEDICARE ADVISORS INSURANCE AGENCY LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff. V ELITE HEALTH INVESTMENTS, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, Defendant. i MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I, II, AND IV OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM PURSUANT TO FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.140(b)(6) AND MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.140(e) Plaintiff, USA Medicare Advisors Insurance Agency LLC, ("Plaintiff" or "UMA"), by and through undersigned counsel, moves to dismiss Count I (UnjustEnrichment), Count II (Promissory Estoppel), and Count IV (Breach of Contract Implied In Fact) of Defendant Elite Health Investments, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Counterclaimpursuant to Rule 1.140(b)(6) ofthe Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a cause of action. UMA further moves to strike Defendant's affirmative defenses pursuant to Rule 1.140(f) or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 1.140(e). In support thereof, UMA provides the following memorandum of law and fact. MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACT On May 24, 2021, UMA filed the underlying five-count complaint for unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, and violation 1 *** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 09/08/2021 05:43:31 PM.**** of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUPTA") in connectionwith the Partis' business relationship and a Downline Agent Agreement ("the Agreement") that was mutually executed by the Parties in October of 2020. In response, Defendant filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim on August 16, 2021, with the counterclaim being the subject of the instant motion to dismiss. Specifically, Defendant's counterclaim is a mirror image of UMA's complaint in that it asserts identical claims for unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, and FDUPTA violations. While UMA's unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied in fact contract claims are principally rooted in Defendant's non-payment of certain marketing materials, namely, client leads ("Marketing Materials") that are not covered by the Downline Agent Agreement, Defendant's identical claims all stem from what Defendant claims to be a purported breach of the Downline Agent Agreement itself, namely, UMA's non-paymentofpurportedly outstanding commissions in the alleged amount of $214,460.00 ("Commissions"). In other words, Defendant's claims for unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of an implied contract impermissibly allege the existence of a written contract, i. e., the Downline Agent Agreement, even though these equitable claims can only be maintained in the absence of a written agreement. Because Defendant fails to state a cause of action for Count I (Unjust Enrichment), Count II (Promissory Estoppel), and Count IV (Breach of Contract Implied In Fact), this Court should dismiss Counts I, II, and IV ofDefendant'scounterclaim. A. THE EXISTENCE OF THE DOWNLINE AGENT AGREEMENT PRECLUDES DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT, PROMISSORYESTOPPEL, AND BREACH OF IMPLIED IN FACT CONTRACT. When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true, including those that incorporate attachments, and look no further than the complaint and its attachments. Urribari v. 52 SW 5th Ct HWSE, LLC 266 2 So. 3d 1257, 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting Morin v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 963 So. 26 258,260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). "The court 'must confineitself strictly to the allegations withinthe four corners o f the complaint."' Pizzi v. Cent. Bank & Tr. Co., 250 So. 2d 895,897 (Fla. 1971? (quoting Kest v. Nathanson, 216 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968" Here, the Court may rely . on the Complaint (and accompanying attachments) and Defendant's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim. Pursuant to Florida contract law, it is axiomatic that there can be no unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel claim whenthere is an express contract between the parties.JAEEIndus. Co., Ltd. v. Paragon Metals, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27098, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010); see also Moynet v. Courtois, 8 So. 3d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009i ("[W]here there is an express contract between the parties, claims arising out of that contractual relationship will not support a claim for unjust enrichment."); Advanced Mktg. Sys. Corp. v. Zk Yacht Sales, 830 So. 2d 924,92S > Contract ... sale of a yacht. Summary judgment was also granted in Formation > > General Overview the broker's favor on counterclaims for an account Acceptance stated and breach of an oral agreement. Contracts Law > Contract Formation > General Overview Overview The purchaser entered into an agreement for the Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contracts ... purchase of a yacht from the seller and the broker. Prior Law > Types of Contracts > Guaranty Contracts to signing, the purchaser alleged that the broker agreed orally to return some of the commission, at which point the purchaser agreed to pay for various services to be HA/1[&] Contract Formation, Acceptance provided. After the agreement was signed, the broker In order to create a contract, it is essential that there Veronika Balbuzanova Page 2 of 6 830 So. 2d 924, *924; 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 17154, **1 should be reciprocal assent to a certain and definite a proposition. So long as any essential matters are left open for further consideration, the contract is not Business & Corporate Compliance > ... > Contract complete, and the minds of the parties must assent to Formation > Consideration > Detrimental Reliance the same thing in the same sense. Where an offer of guaranty or any contract is made and delivered subject Contracts Law > ... > Consideration > Enforcement to a condition which is not accepted, such a guaranty or of Promises > General Overview contract is not enforceable. Contracts Law > Contract Formation > Consideration > General Overview Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contract Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contract ... ... Formation > Consideration > Promissory Estoppel Formation > Consideration > Promissory Estoppel Contracts Law > > Consideration > Enforcement ... HN41&1 Consideration, Detrimental Reliance of Promises > General Overview Promissory estoppel does not apply to oral statements Contracts Law > Contract made prior to the written contract, where the contract Formation > Consideration > General Overview covers the same subject matter. Promissory estoppel is not a doctrine designed to give a party to a negotiated HN21ti Consideration, PromissoryEstoppel commercial bargain a second bite at the apple in the event it fails to prove breach of contract. The basic elements of promissory estoppel include a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or Contracts Law > ... > Affirmative Defenses > Fraud forbearance. Such is binding if injustice can be avoided & Misrepresentation > General Overview only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy grantec for breach may be limited as justice requires. HN5[&] Affirmative Defenses, Fraud & The character of the reliance protected is explained as Misrepresentation follows: the promisor is affected only by reliance which A party cannot recover in fraud for alleged oral he does or should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Satisfaction of the latter misrepresentations that are adequately covered or requirernent rnay depend on the reasonableness of the expressly contradicted in a later written contract. promisee's reliance, on its definite and substantial Counsel: Kenni F. Judd, Robert L. Jennings and John character in relation to the remedy sought, on the W. Stevens of Jennings & Valancy, P.A., Fort formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and Lauderdale, for appellants. channeling functions of form are met by the commercial Lawrence S. Ben of Chikovsky, Ben & Schafer, setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such Hollywood, for appellees. other policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant. Judges: HAZOURI, J. WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. Opinion by: HAZOURI Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contract ... Formation Consideration Promissory Estoppel > > Opinion HN3 lAi Consideration, PromissoryEstoppel A cause of action for promissory estoppel does exist. r925] HAZOURI, J. The doctrine of promissory estoppel comes into play where the requisites of contract are not met, yet the The trial court granted final summary judgment against promise should be enforced to avoid injustice. appellants, Advanced Marketing Systems Corporation Veronika Balbuzanova Page 3 of 6 830 So. 2d 924, *925; 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 17154, **1 (Advanced Marketing) and Douglas Pierce, on their surveys, and sea by the appellants before requiring trial Sixth Amended Complaint for (I) breach of contract, (Il) their acceptance or rejection of the Bondo by December breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (I I I) 5, 1997. The purchase agreement provided for the promissory estoppel, (IV) closing of the sale to occur on or before December 12, misrepresentation, and (V) unjust enrichment. The trial 1997. On December 5, 1997, the parties closed on the court also granted summary judgment in favor of yacht. A closing statement was approved and signed by appellees, ZK Yacht Sales, Inc., and Alan Charlap, on Advanced Marketing through its president, Douglas their counterclaims for (I) account stated and (I I) breach Pierce. It provided for the disbursement of the yacht of an oral contract and denied appellants' motion to brokerage commission in the amount of $ 140,000 to ZK amend their affirmative defenses to these Yacht Sales. On that same day, Charlap presented to counterclaims. We affirm summary judgment [**2] on Pierce a three- year listing agreement for the resale of the complaint, reverse summary judgment on the the Bondo but Pierce refused to sign [**4] because the counterclaim and remand for further proceedings. listing period was too long. Appellants subsequently filed suit against appellees for the return of $ 90,000. The appellants' claim and the appellees' counterclaim Appellants allege that, prior to executing the purchase arise from the purchase of a motor yacht know as the agreement, appellees agreed to return $ 90,000 of the "Bondo." On November 29, 1997, Advanced Marketing cornrnission to thern after the sale was completed. entered into a purchase agreement for the Bondo with Appellees deny they agreed to this rebate except as Poseidon Marine Limited, the seller, and ZK Yacht conditioned in the handwritten offer. Sales, the authorized selling broker. The agreement provided for a purchase price of $ 2 million and a [*926] Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment commission of $ 140,000 to bepaid to ZK Yacht Sales. on appellants' Sixth Amended Complaint arguing that The agreement contained integration an clause and an the integration clause precluded recovery on any oral amendment clause which provide: agreements which may have been made before the purchase agreement was executed. Appellees also 20. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the argued that there could be no reliance on Charlap's entire agreement between the parties. There are no handwritten document, because Pierce never entered other terms, conditions, promises, undertakings, into a listing agreement. The trial court granted ndemnities, statements, representations or warranties appellees' rrlotion and entered Partial Surnrnary express or implied, concerning the transactions Judgment for appellees on the Sixth Amended contemplated by this Agreement. This Agreement Complaint. supersedes any prior agreement or understanding between them, oral or written, all of which are hereby Appellees' counterclaim is for $ 39,527.55, which they cancelled. incurred providing goods and services for the Bondo at appellants' request. There is no issue of fact concerning 21. Amendment. Except as otherwise provided herein, appellants' agreement with appellees to provide the the provisions hereof may be amended, supplemented, goods and services. At the hearing on appellees' rnotion waived or changed, only by a writing that makes for the surnrnary judgrnent on counterclairn, specific [**3] reference to this Agreement and is signed appellants [**5] argued that appellees were estopped by the party as to whom enforcement of any on this claim because appellants only agreed to accept amendment, supplement, waiver or modification the goods and services provided by ZK Yacht Sales in agreement [sic]. reliance upon appellants' understanding that appellees were going to return $ 90,000 of the commission. On December 3, 1997, Charlap signed a handwritten Appellees responded that appellants did not sufficiently document in his capacity as president of ZK Yacht Sales plead the affirmative defense of estoppel. Appellants in which he wrote: argued that they sufficiently pled estoppel and, I Alan Chalap president of ZK Yacht Sales will return to alternatively,requested leave to amend their affirmative defenses. The trial court disregarded appellants' motion Douglas Pierce Purchaser of the Vessel Bondo a 1991 and agreed with appellees' argument that the affirmative 96' Versilcraft $ 90,000 on the signing of the listing on defenses pled were insufficient. Appellees' motion for the Vessel Bondo to be renamed. These funds will be paid on or before 12/12/97. summary judgment was granted. Appellants thereafter filed a motion to amend their affirmative defenses, which The purchase agreement provided for inspections, the trial court denied, thereafter entering final judgment Veronika Balbuzanova Page 4 of 6 830 So. 2d 924, *926; 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 17154, **5 for appellees on their counterclaim. Id. at 357 (quoting Strong & Trowbridqe Co. v. H. Baars & Co., 60 Fla. 253, 54 So. 92, 93 (1910)). On Count I for breach of contract, appellants allege that prior entering into a formal contract for the purchase to of the Bondo or any yacht, appellees orally agreed to "Where an offer of guaranty or any contract is made and provide a substantial discount to appellants on any delivered subject to a condition which is not accepted, brokerage commission on any purchase. Appellants such a guaranty or contract is not enforceable." Juliana, allege that appellees breached this agreement by failing /nc. v. Salzman, 181 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). to return $ 90,000 from the commission [**6] appellees The handwritten document is an offer by Charlap to pay received on this transaction. The purchase agreement Pierce $ 90,000 in return for the [**8] listing of Pierce's provides for the payment of the entire commission to yacht Bondo. As a listing agreement was never signed, appellees with no provision for a discount. The purchase the contract is not complete and appellants are not agreement also provides that it "supercedes any prior entitled to its enforcement. agreement or understanding between [the parties], oral or written" and that all prior agreements are canceled. In the alternative, appellants argue that the handwritten The trial court concluded that the written purchase document is subsequent written modification because a agreement was unambiguous, and in light of the "the parties a contract may modify the written to ntegration clause, may not be varied by orai agreement by subsequent oral agreement or course of statements. It further found that appellees did not dealing with one another despite the requirement of a breach any obligation imposed by the written agreement writing in order to modify." Linear Corp. v. Standard and entered summary judgment on this count in Hardware Co., 423 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1 st DCA appellees' favor. 1982). However, the decision in Linear was based upon a finding of a waiver of the requirement that a Appellants first argue that appellees are not parties to subsequent modification be in writing and that a the contract and therefore are not entitled to rely on the subsequent modification actually occurred. We find the integration clause. This argument is without basis in fact decision in Linear is inapplicable because Charlap's because the contract specifically provides on the offer was never accepted and a subsequent signature page of the purchase agreement that "the modification never occurred. parties have executed this Agreement" below which all three parties, Charlap for ZK Yacht Sales, Poseidon Appellants next argue that the trial court should not Marine Limited's agent, and Pierce, signed the purchase have granted appellees' motion for summary judgment agreement. with respect to appellants' promissoryestoppel claim. In appellees' summary judgment motion, they argue that promissory estoppel is an affirmative defense and not a that cause of action. Alternatively, they argue that [**9] Appellants next Charlap's handwritten argue document is a contract collateral to, but [**71 appellants' promissory estoppel claim lacks the required ndependent of a contract of sale that is not precluded element of detrimental reliance. On appeal appellants by the existence of an integration clause. See Attanasio argue that they adequately pled the elements of a claim v. Excel Dev. Corp., 757 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 4th tor promissory estoppel and there remain issues of DCA 1998). Appellees respond that the handwritten material fact which preclude summary judgment on this document is not a contract and, therefore, there is claim. nothing to enforce. We agree. \n W.R. Grace and Co. v. Geodata Services, Inc., 547 \n Holloway v. Gutman, 707 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1989), the supreme court held that the 1998), the fifth district held: theory of promissory estoppel could be applied under the following circumstances: HN1[V] In order to create a contract, it is essential that there should be reciprocal [*927] a assent to a certain HN2[7] The basic elements of promissoryestoppel are and definite proposition. So long set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 as any essentiai matters are left open for further consideration, the (1979), which states: contract is not complete, and the minds of the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense. (1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearanceon the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such Veronika Balbuzanova Page 5 of 6 830 So. 2d 924, *927; 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 17154, **9 action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be designed to give a party to a negotiated commercial avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The bargain a second bite at the apple in the event it fails to - remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice prove breach of contract." Gen. Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna requires. Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1042 (6th Cir. 1990), (quoting Walker v. KFC Corp., 728 F.2d 1215,1220 (9th The character of the reliance protected is explained as Cir. 1984)). Here, theperformance [**12] that satisfied follows: the detrimental reliance requirement of appellant's promissoryestoppel theory- -appellant's purchase of the The promisor is affected only by reliance which he does Bondo- -is the same performance which represents or should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary consideration for the written purchase agreement so to avoid injustice. Satisfaction of the latter requirement that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not may depend on the reasonableness [**10] ofme applicable. See Gen. Aviation, 915 F.2d at 1042. promisee's reliance, on its definite and substantial character in re/ation to the remedy sought, on the The trial court also found in favor of appellees on formality with which the promise is made, on the extent appellants' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and Appe\\antsargue, c\Ung Mejiav. Jurich, 781 So. 2d 1175 channeling functions of form are met by the commercial (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), that "the existence of a merger or setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such integration clause, which purports to make oral other policies as the enforcement [*928] of bargains agreernents not incorporated into the written contract and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant. unenforceable, does not affect oral representations which are alleged to have fraudulently induced a person /d. (emphasis added). to enter into the agreement." li at 1178. However, the holding in Mejia is limited to when the 547 So. 2d at 924. Thus, the supreme court has held subject of the oral agreement is not covered by the that HA/3[V] a cause of action for promissory estoppel contract. As this court held in Hillcrest Pacific Corp. v. does exist. \n Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., Yamamura, 727 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), 717 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court held "HN5[*] a party cannot recover in fraud for alleged oral that "the doctrine of promissory estoppel comes into misrepresentations that are adequately covered or play where the requisitesof contract are not met, yet the expressly contradicted [**13] in a later written contract." promise should be enforced to avoid injustice." /d. at 1056. The subject of appellees' commission is adequately covered by the purchase agreement and Appellants allege in their complaint that appellees precludes appellants' recovery in fraud. agreed to rebate $ 90,000 and the subsequent handwritten document offering that amount in return for As stated above, appellees counterclaimed against a listing agreement induced them to offer to purchase appellants for an account stated and breach of an oral the Bondo and, after the seller accepted, to confirm the contract. ZK Yacht Sales provided an engine survey, purchase agreement after the sea trials and survey. insurance, and other services in connection with the Appellants gave their [**11] final acceptance of the of the Bondo for which purchase appellants agreed to purchase agreement which contained the integration reimburse ZK Yacht Sales. This is a separate clause and the specific amount of the commission to be agreement from the purchase agreement and is not paid appellees with no mention of the rebate. subject to integration clause. Appellant's defense an Promissory estoppel is unavailable in this case because appears to be that its agreement to [*929] accept a written contract between the parties covered the sale goods and services and to pay for them was contingent of the yacht and the commissions due to the broker. upon ZK Yacht Sales' reimbursement of the $ 90,000 See Jhaver v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 903 F.2d 381, 385 commission. Issues of fact remain. Appellant's motion to (5th Cir. 1990) (observing that "under Texas law, a amend their affirmative defenses should have been contract comprising the disputed promise precludes granted. recovery under promissory estoppel"); Borowski v. State Chem. Mfq. Co., 97 Ohio App. 3d 635,64.N.E.2d 230, \n conclusion, we affirm the summary judgment against 235 (Ohio App. 1994) (holding that "HN4[V] promissory appellants on their claims and revirie Fhe summary estoppel does not apply to oral statements made prior to judgment in favor of appellees on appellees' the written contract, where the contract covers the same counterclaims. subject matter"). "'Promissory estoppel is not a doctrine Veronika Balbuzanova Page 6 of 6 830 So. 2d 924, *929; 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 17154, **13 AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. End of Document Veronika Balbuzanova LexisNexis User Name: Veronika Balbuzanova Date and Time: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 3:21:00 PM EDT Job Number: 152430597 Document (1) 1. Baron v. Osman, 39 So. 3d 449 Client/Matter: -None- Search Terms: 39 So. 3d 449 Search Type: Natural Language Narrowed by: Content Type Narrowed by Cases -None- LexisNexislAbout LexisNexis I Privacy Policy I Terms & Conditions I Copyright@ 2021 LexisNexis Veronika Balbuzanova ? Positive As of: September 8,2021 7:21 PM Z Baron v. Osman Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District July 2, 2010, Opinion Filed Case No. 5D09-1781 Reporter 39 So. 3d 449 *; 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 9747 **; 35 Fla. L. Weekly D 1464 JOHNNY BARON, JR., AHMED M. associate alleged that he orally agreed to provide his Appellant, v. services in exchange for 30 percent of the gross OSMAN A/K/A AHMEN M. OSMAN, et al., Appellees. income. The payroll records reflected such payment. The associate acquired contractsfor transportation with Subsequent History: Released for Publication July 21, various clients. Such facts, if proven, clearly evinced 2010. that the associate was providing his services with the Prior History: [**1] Appeal from the Circuit Court for mutual understanding that he would share in the Volusia County, John V. Doyle, Judge. proceeds of the business. The associate also sufficiently alleged an alternative cause of action for quasi-contract Core Terms by alleging that he acquired a contract and provided services resulting in revenues for the business, and that the founder knowingly accepted the associate's implied-in-fact,quasi-contract, second amended services, and that his retention of the resulting proceeds complaint, cause of action, allegations, Contracts, would be inequitable. proceeds, assent, director of operations, provide transportation, business relationship, breach of contract, Outcome unjust enrichment, express contract, resulting damage, The court reversed the order and remanded the matter material breach, gross proceeds, thirty percent, gross for further proceedings. income, orally agree, transportation, terminating, compensate, manifested, inferred, charter, damages, LexisNexis@ Headnotes proven, unjust, words Case Summary Procedural Posture Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contracts ... Appellant associate sought review of an order from the Circuit Court for Volusia which Law > Types of Contracts > Contracts Implied in County (Florida), Fact dismissed his action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against appellees, a business and its Business & Corporate founder. Compliance > > Breach ... > Breach of Contract Actions > Elements of Contract Claims Overview The associate's claims were based upon an alleged Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contracts... agreement between the associate and the founder to Law > Types of Contracts Express Contracts > cooperate in the undertaking of the business. The associate alleged that the founder failed to pay the HA/1[&] Types of Contracts, Contracts Implied in associate his share of the gross proceeds before Fact terminating their business relationship. The court found that the associate asserted sufficient allegations to To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a establish the existence of an express oral contract or, iiIn need complaint only allege facts that establish the the alternative, an implied-in-fact contract. The existence of a contract,a material breach, and resulting Veronika Balbuzanova Page 2 of 3 39 So. 3d 449, *449; 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 9747, **1 damages. A valid contract arises when the parties' business founded by Osman. The attachments to the assent is manifested through written or spoken words, complaint indicate Baron was issued 3030 shares in or inferred in whole part or in from the parties' conduct. Cypress Tours and was appointed vice president and A contract based parties' words is characterized on the director of operations. Baron alleged that he and Osman as express, whereas, a contract based on the parties' orally agreed to equally split sixty percent of the gross conduct is said to be implied in fact. The only distinction income and that Osman failed to pay Baron his share of between an express and implied-in-fact contract is the the gross proceeds before terminating their business manner in which the parties' assent is manifested or relationship. Baron's second amended complaint sought proven. While the law will not recognize an implied-in- damages from Cypress Tours and Osman for breach of fact contract where an express contract exists, a contract and unjust enrichment. Without explanation, the contract may be inferred where an express contract fails trial court dismissed Baron's second amended complaint for lack of proof. with prejudice. We review de novo the dismissal and accept all well-pled allegations as true. See Labance v. Dawsv, 14 So. 3d 1256,1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Business & Corporate Compliance > > Contracts HN1[V] ... To [**2]state a cause of action for breach of Law > Types of Contracts > Quasi Contracts need contract, a complaint only allege facts that establish the existence of a contract, a material breach, Contracts Law > Remedies > Equitable