Legal Document: CONTINENTAL EAST FUND IV, LLC vs DONALD RAY CROCKET A/K/A RAY CROCKETT

On July 17, 2012 a CALIFORNIA CASES (INCORRECT-REFILED) was filed involving a dispute between and for OTHER CIVIL, FOREIGN JUDGMENT in the District Court of Tarrant County.

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342-260306-12 FILED
TARRANT COUNTY
2/27/2015 10:01:46 AM
CAUSE NO. 342-260306-12 THOMAS A. WILDER
DISTRICT CLERK

CONTINENTAL EAST FUND IV, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 342"d JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
DONALD RAY CROCKETT, aka §
RAY CROCKETT §
Defendant. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

CALIFORNIA CASES

AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF

Respectfully submitted:

Isl Thmnas P. Jackson
Thomas P. Jackson
State Bar No. 10496600
Law Office of Thomas P. Jackson
5430 Glen Lakes Drive, Suite 230
Dallas, Texas 75231
tpj @dfwlawyer. com
(972) 387-0007- Telephone
(972) 485-6159- Facsin1ile
342-260306-12

Mary Jane Wilson v.
Th ma i
i I I I
Empire Shows, Inc.
342-260306-12
Page 1

fit® LexisNexisOil
MARY JANE WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS DAVID MARCHING-
TON; INLAND EMPIRE SHOWS, INC., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 96-35145

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

127 F.3d 805; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25994; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7553; 97 Daily
Journal DAR 12175

July 22, 1997, Argued, Submitted, Seattle, Washington
September 23, 1997, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Certiorari De- K. Jerome Gottschalk, Native American Rights Fund,
nied April 20, 1998, Reported at: 1998 U.S. LEXIS Boulder, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae, The Three Affili-
2555. ated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, and the
Chippewa Cree Tribe ofthe Rocky Boy's Reservation.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Districtof Montana. D.C. No. Charles [**2] G. Cole, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington,
CV-92-00127-PGH. Paul G. Hatfield, DistrictJudge, D.C., for Amicus Curiae, Burlington Northern Railroad
Presiding. Company.

DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Steven J. Lechner, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae,
Mountain States Legal Foundation.

COUNSEL: William 0. Bronson, James, Gray, Bronson Lana E. Marcussen, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
& Swanberg, Great Falls, Montana, for the defend- Amicus Curiae, The Bighorn Livestock Association.
ants-appellants.
JUDGES: Before: Eugene A. Wright, Stephen Rein-
Channing J. Hartelius and Cameron Ferguson, Hartelius, hardt, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges. Opinion by
Ferguson, Baker & Kazda, Great Falls, Montana, for the Judge Thomas.
plaintiff-appellee.
OPINION BY: SIDNEY R. THOMAS
Jeanne S.Whiteing, Whiteing & Smith, Boulder, Colo-
rado and Donald G. Kittson, Browning, Montana, for OPINION
Amicus Curiae, Blackfeet Tribe.
[*807] OPINION
George C. Dalthorp and Michael E. Webster, Crowley, THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana,
for Amicus Curiae, National Association of Independent This appeal presents the question of whether, and
under what circumstances, a tribal court tort judgment is
Insurers.
entitled torecognition in theUnited States Courts. We
conclude that the principles of comity, not full faith and
Paul R. Haffeman, Davis, Hatley, Haffeman & Tighe,
credit, govern whether a districtcourt should recognize
Great Falls, Montana, for Amicus Curiae, Glacier Elec-
and enforce a tribal court judgment. In this instance, be-
tric Cooperative, Inc.
cause the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, its judgment is
not entitled to recognition in the United States courts.
Harley R. Harris, Office of Attorney General, Helena,
Montana, for Amicus Curiae, State ofMontana. I
Page 2 342-260306-12
127 F.3d 805, *; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25994, **;
97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7553; 97 Daily Journal DAR 12175

The trafficaccident which precipitated thisaction Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
involved Mary Jane Wilson, who is an enrolled member each Stateto the public Acts, Records,
of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, and Thomas Marchington, and judicial Proceedings of every other
who is not. On July 17,1989, Marchington was driving State.And the Congress may by general
on U.S. Highway 2 within the boundaries [**3] of the Laws [**5] prescribe the Manner in
Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana on assignment which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
for his employer Inland Empire Shows, an Idaho carnival ings shall be proved, and the Effect there-
company. Wilson, driving ahead of Marchington on the of.
two-lane road, signalled a left tum.Marchington, in ig-
norance or in disregard of Wilson's intent,attempted to
pass her on the left, careening into her car as she exited U.S. Canst. art. IV,§ 1.
Highway2.
By its terms, the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies
Wilson sued Marchington and Inland Empire in the only to the states.Nothing in debates of the Constitu-
Blackfeet Tribal Court. The tribal jury found in favor of tional Convention concerning the clause indicatesthe,
Wilson and awarded her$ 246,100. The Blackfeet Court framers thought the clause would apply to Indian tribes.
of Appeals reversed for a hearing on whether punitive The Constitution is silent about recognition of tribal
damages had been improperly awarded, but the Blackfeet judgments, though it specificallyaddresses other tribal
Supreme Court reversed the Blackfeet Court of Appeals concerns. See U.S. Canst. art. I,§ 2, cl.3 (excluding
and reinstated the original judgment in favor of Wilson. non-taxed Indians from the calculation of representative
apportionment); art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress the
Claiming her judgment was entitled to full faith and
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes);
credit or comity, Wilson brought suit in the United States
amend. XIV, § 2 (excluding non-taxed Indians from the
District Court for the District of Montana to register the
calculation of representative apportionment).1
Thus, the
tribalcourt judgment inthe federal court system. The
Constitution itself does not afford full faith and credit to
districtcourt granted summary judgment in favor of
Indian tribal judgments.
Wilson.
II Additionally, as a matter of constitutional
philosophy, it may not make sense to extend the
No legal judgment has any effect, of its own force,
constitutional mandate of full faith and credit "to
beyond the limits of thesovereignty from which its au-
a legal system largely outside the purview of the
thority is derived. Because states and Indian tribes coex-
Constitution." Note, Recognition of Tribal Deci-
ist as sovereign [**4] governments, they have no direct
sions in State Courts, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1397,
power to enforce their judgments in each other's jurisdic-
1414 (1985).
tions. By contrast,the United States Constitution and
implementing legislation require fullfaith and credit be [**6] Initial legislation implementing the full faith
given to judgments of sister states, territories,
and pos- and creditclause was passed in 1790. The statute was
sessions of the United States. U.S. [*808] Const. art. modified in 1804 to include the extension of fullfaith
IV, § 1, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The extent to which the and creditto United Statesterritoriesand possessions.
United States, or any state, honors the judicial decrees of Subsequent technical amendments were made and the
foreign nations isa matter of choice,governed by "the current full faith and credit statute reads in relevant part:
comity of nations." Hilton v.Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163,
40 L. Ed. 95, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895). Such Acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings or copies thereof, so authenti-
Determining comity to be a proper basis for recog- cated, shallhave the same fullfaithand
nizing a tribal court judgment is not a remarkable notion; credit in every court within the United
indeed, both parties agree that it is appropriate. However,
States and its Territories
and Possessions
Wilson asserts comity only as an alternativeanalysis,
as they have by law or usage in the courts
contending that a tribal judgment must be recognized by
of such State, Territory or Possession
the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the imple-
from which they are taken.
menting legislationof the United States Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause pro- 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
vides:
Because Indian nations are not referenced in the
statute, thequestion iswhether tribes are "territories or
possessions" of the United States under the statute.
The
Page 3 342-260306-12
127 F.3d 805, *; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25994, **;
97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7553; 97 Daily Journal DAR 12175

United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise A later legislative act can be regarded as a legislative·
issue and its pronouncements on collateralmatters are interpretation of an earlier act and "is therefore entitled to
inconclusive. For example, in United States ex ref. great weight in resolving any ambiguities [**9] and
Mackey v.Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 103-04, 15 L. Ed. 299 doubts." Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239,
(1855), the Court held the Cherokee nation was a terri- 243-44, 34 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 477 (1972) (quoting
tory as that term was used in a federal letters of admin- United States v.Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64-65, 85 L. Ed.
New
istration statute. By contrast, in [**7] York ex rei. 40, 61 S. Ct.102 (1940)). If full faith and credit had al-
Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 474-75, 53 L. Ed. 286, ready been extended to Indian tribes,enactment of the
29 S. Ct. 190 (1909), the Court cited with approval Ex Indian Land Consolidation Act, the Maine Indian Claims
Parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883) in Settlement Act, and the Indian Child Welfare Act would
which the districtcourt held that the Cherokee nation not have been necessary. Further, the separate listing of
was not a "territory" underJhe federal extradition statute. territories,
possessions and Indian tribes in the Indian
State courts have reached varied results,citing either Child Welfare Act provides an indication that Congress
Mackey or Morgan as authority,depending on the out- did not view these terms as synonymous. Thus, we con-
come. 2 clude that Congress did not extend full faith and credit to
the tribes under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
2 Compare Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs.,87 N.M.
Further, if Congress had specifically intended to in-
362, 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (citingMackey
clude Indian tribes under the umbrella of 28 U.S.C. §
and holding that tribesare entitledto fullfaith
1738, it could have easily done so either by specifically
and credit) and In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555
referencing them in the 1804 amendments, or by further
P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976) (citing CIT and con-
amending the statute once ambiguous judicial construc-
cluding that tribesare entitled to fullfaithand
tions appeared. It chose not to, but rather elected to cre-
credit) with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117
ate a specialexception in cases of Indian child custody
Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct.App. 1977)
determinations and land trusts.
(citing Morgan and holding that an Indian reser-
vation is not a territory for purposes of full
faith Given this history,itwould be imprudent of us to
and credit). now construe the phrase "territories and possessions"in
the 1804 statute[* *10] to assume the meaning of the
In our view, the decisive factor in determining Con-
language Congress used in the Indian Child Welfare Act
gress's intent was the enactment [*809] of subsequent
and
("every territory or possession of the United States,
statutes which expressly extended full faith and credit to
every Indian tribe") (emphasis added) and Indian Land
certain [**8] tribalproceedings: the Indian Land Con-
Consolidation Act.
solidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1983) (extend-
ing fullfaith and creditfor certain actions involving Certainly, there are policy reasons which could
trust,restrictedor controlled lands), the Maine Indian support an extension of full faithand creditto Indian
Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (1980) (re- tribes. Those decisions, however, are within the province
quiring the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation of Congress or the states, 3 not this Court. Full faith and
and the State ofMaine to "give full faith and credit to the credit is not extended to tribal judgments by the Consti-
judicial proceedings of each other"), and the Indian Child tution or Congressional act,and we decline to extend it
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.(extend- judicially.
ing full faithand credit totribalcustody proceedings).
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides in relevant part: 3 See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 728 (permitting
the Supreme Court of the Stateof Oklahoma to
The United States, every State,every extend full faithand credit totribalcourt judg-
territory or possession of the United ments); Wis. Stat.§ 806.245 (granting fullfaith
States,and every Indian tribeshaH give and credit to judgments of Wisconsin Indian trib-.
full faithand credit to the public acts, al courts);Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 5-1-111 (granting
records, and judicial proceedings of any fullfaith and credit to judicialdecisions of the
Indian tribe applicable to Indian child Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes
custody proceedings to the same extent of the Wind River Reservation). Montana has ju- ·
that such entities give full faith and credit dicially refused toextend fullfaith and credit to
to the public acts,records, and judicial tribal orders, judgments and decrees. In re Day,
proceedings of any other entity. 272 Mont. 170,900 P.2d 296,301 (Mont. 1995).
[**11] ni
Id.§ 1911(d).
342-260306-12
Page 4
127 F.3d 805, *; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25994, **;
97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7553; 97 Daily Journal DAR 12175

In absence of a Congressional extension of full faith (2) the judgment conflicts with an-
and credit,the recognition and enforcement of tribal other final judgment that is entitled to
judgments in federal court must inevitably rest on the recognition;
principles of comity.Comity "is neither a matter of ab-
(3) the judgment is inconsistent with
solute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
the parties' contractual choice of forum; or
and good will, upon the other." Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S.
113, 163-64, 40 L. Ed. 95, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895). As a (4) recognition of the judgment, or
general policy, "comity should be withheld only when its the cause of action upon which it is based,
acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the inter- is against the public policy of the United
est of the nation called upon to give it effect." Somportex States or the forum state in which recog-
Ltd v.Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, nition of the judgment is sought.
440 (3d Cir. 1971). At its core, [*810] comity in-
volves a balancing of interests."Itis the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legis-
lative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to internationalduty and conven- 4
ience, and to the rightsof its own citizens,
or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton, Where there has been oppor-
159 U.S. at 164. Although the status of Indian tribes as tunity for a full and fair trial
"dependent domestic nations" presents some unique cir- abroad before a court of competent
cumstances, comity still affords the best general analyti- jurisdiction,conducting the trial
cal framework for recognizing tribal judgments. upon regular proceedings, after
due citationor voluntary appear-
[** 12] As we recognized in Her Majesty the
ance of the defendant, and under a
Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 n.4 (9th Cir.
system of jurisprudence likelyto
1979), Hilton provides the guiding principles of comity. 4
secure an impartialadministration
More recently, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
of justice between the citizensof
tions Law of the United States(1986) [hereinafter Re-
its own country and those of other
statement (Third)] suggested two mandatory and six dis-
countries, and there is nothing to
cretionary grounds for non-recognition of foreign judg-
show either prejudice in the court,
ments. 5
While Hilton and the Restatement (Third) pro-
or in the system of laws under
vide sound guidance for assessing legal judgments of
which it was sitting,or fraud in
other nations, special considerations arising out of exist-
procuring the judgment, or any
ing Indian law merit some modification in the applica-
other special reason why the com-
tion of comity to tribal judgments.In synthesizing the
ity of this nation should not allow
traditionalelements of comity with the special require-
it full effect, the merits of the case
ments of Indian law, we conclude that, as a general prin-
should not, in an action brought in
ciple, federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal
this country upon the judgment, be
judgments. However, federal courts must neither recog-
tried afresh, as on a new trial or an
nize nor enforce tribal judgments if:
appeal, upon the mere assertion of
the party that the judgment was
( 1) thetribalcourt did not have both
erroneous in law or in fact.
personal and subject matter jurisdiction;
or
(2) the defendant was not afforded Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
due process oflaw. [** 14]
5 The Restatement (Third) § 482 provides:
In addition, a federal court may, in its
discretion,decline to recognize and en-
(1) A court in the United States
force a tribal judgment on equitable
may not recognize a judgment of
grounds, including [**13] the following
the court of a foreign state if:
circumstances:
(a) the judgment was rendered
(1) the judgment was obtained by
under a judicial system that does
fraud;
not provide impartial tribunals or
342-260306-12
Page 5
127 F.3d 805, *; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25994, **;
97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7553; 97 Daily Journal DAR 12175

procedures compatible with due tion Act which has been adopted by twenty-five states,
process of law; or including Montana. Louise E. Teitz, Transnational Liti-
gation 253 & n.5 (1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 25-9-601 et
(b) the court that rendered the seq. Accordingly, the existence of both personal and
judgment did not have jurisdiction
subject matter jurisdictionis a necessary predicate for
over the defendant in accordance
federal court recognition and enforcement of a tribal
with the law of the rendering state
judgment.
and with the rules set forth in §
421. A federal court must also reject a tribal judgment if
the defendant was not afforded due process of law. "It
(2) A court in the United
has long been the law of the United State that a foreign
States need not recognize a judg- judgment cannot be [**16] enforced if it was obtained'
ment of the court of a foreign state
in a manner that did not accord with the basics of due
if: process." Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi,58 F.3d 1406, 1410
(a) the court that rendered the (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 989, 116 S. Ct. 519, 133'
judgment did not have jurisdiction L. Ed. 2d 427 (1995). The guarantees of due process are
ofthe subject matter of the action; vital to our system of democracy. We demand that for-
eign nations afford United States citizens due process of
(b) the defendant did not re- law before recognizing foreign judgments; we must ask
ceive notice of the proceedings in no less ofNative American tribes.
sufficienttime to enable him to
defend; Due process, as that term isemployed in comity,
encompasses most of the Hilton factors,namely that
(c) the judgment was obtained there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial before
by fraud; an impartial tribunal that conducts the trial upon regular
the cause of action on proceedings after proper service or voluntary appearance
which the judgment was based, or of the defendant, and that thereis no showing of preju-
the judgment itself, is repugnant to dice in the tribalcourt or in the system of governing
the public policy of the United laws. Further, as the Restatement (Third) noted, evidence
States or of the State where recog- "that the judiciary was dominated by the political
nition is sought; branches of government or by an opposing litigant,
or
that a party was unable to obtain counsel, to secure
(e) the judgment conflicts documents or attendance of witnesses, or to have access
with another final judgment that is to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the
entitled to recognition; or legal system was one [* *17] whose judgments are not
(f) the proceeding in the for- entitled to recognition."
Restatement (Third) § 482 cmt.,
eign country was contrary to an b.
agreement between the parties to Comity does not require that a tribe
utilize judicial
submit the controversy on which procedures identicalto those used in the United States
the judgment is based to another Courts. "Foreign-law notions are not per se disharmoni-
forum. ous with due process by reason of their divergence from
the common-law notions of procedure." Panama Pro-
cesses, S.A.v. Cities Serv.Co., 796 P.2d 276, 286 n.36
[**15] The lack of personal jurisdiction mandates (Okla. 1990). Indeed, Hilton rejected challenges to a
rejection of a foreign judgment under [*811] the Re- judgment based on lack of adequate cross-examination
statement (Third) and thatrequirement must logically and unsworn testimony. 159 U.S. at 205. Federal courts
extend to tribaljudgments. Although the Restatement must also be careful to respect tribal jurisprudence along
(Third) lists subject matter jurisdiction as a discretionarywith the special customs and practical limitations of trib-
inquiry, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is
a al court systems. Extending comity to tribal judgments is
threshold inquiry in virtuallyevery federal examination not an invitation for the federal courts to
exercise unnec-
of a tribal judgment. E.g.,Strate v. Ac-1 Contractors, essary judicial paternalism in derogation of tribal
U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1411, 137 L. Ed. 2d 661 self-governance. However, the tribalcourt proceedings
(1997); Montana v. United States,450 U.S. 544, 565-66, must afford the defendant the basic tenets of due process
67 L. Ed. 2d 493, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). Additionally, or the judgment willnot be recognized by the United
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is mandatory States.
under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
Page 6.
342-260306-12
127 F.3d 805, *; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25994, **;
97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7553; 97 Daily Journal DAR 12175

Marchington urges us to require reciprocal recogni- bouti judgment in Montana, for example, it is
unlikely
tion of judgments as an additionalmandatory prerequi- that Djibouti would have had the prior opportunity to
site.In Hilton, the Supreme Court determined that a consider recognition of a Montana judgment.
[** 18] judgment from a foreign country would not be
im-
Despite these dissimilarities, the theory that the
enforced by the United States courts if the foreign coun-
position of a reciprocity requirement isnot a matter for
try would not enforce a similar American judgment in its
courts to decide independently is generally sound. The
courts. 159 U.S. at210. However, the reciprocityre-
question of whether a reciprocityrequirement ought to
quirement has fallen into disfavor. In Banco Nacional de
be imposed on an Indian tribe before its judgments may
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 11 L. Ed. 2d 804, 84 S.
be recognized is essentially a public policy question best
Ct. 923 (1964), the Supreme Court stated, "although
left tothe executive and legislativebranches. The fact
Hilton v.Guyot ... contains some broad language about
that some states have chosen to impose such a condition
the relationship of reciprocity to comity, the case in fact
by statute reinforces this conclusion, 6 as does the judicial
imposed a requirement of reciprocity only in regard to
response of looking to applicable statutes to decide reci-
conclusiveness of judgments, and even then only in lim-
procity issues. See, e.g.,Banque Libanaise Pour le
ited circumstances." Id at 411. According to the Re-
Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (5th Cir.
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1988) [herein-
1990) (examining the Texas Recognition Act to deter-
after Restatement (Second)], "except when otherwise
mine if an Abu [**21] Dahbi judgment should be en-,
required by local statute, the great majority of State and
forced).
~ederal courts have [*812] extended recognition to
J~dgments of foreign nations without regard to any ques-
6 See, e.g.,S.D. Codified Laws§ 1-1-25 (2)(b)
tiOn ofreciprocity." § 98 cmt. f.The Restatement (Sec-
(permitting South Dakota courts to recognize a'
ond) addresses the Hilton problem by noting thatthe
tribal judgment if thecourts of that tribe recog-
?ecision involved "one isolatedsituation,"and suggest-
nize the orders and judgments of the South Da-
mg that Hilton be limited to itsfacts.Jd Additionally,
kota courts);Okla. Stat. tit.
12, § 728(B) (allow-
Judge Learned Hand has observed that the Supreme
ing the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to recognize
Court "certainlydid [**19] not mean to hold that an
tribal court judgments where the tribalcourts
American court was to recognize no obligations or duties
agree to grant reciprocity of judgments); Wis.
arising elsewhere until it appeared that the sovereign of
Stat. § 806.245(l)(e) (granting full faith and
the locus reciprocally recognized similar obligations ex-
credit to judgments of Wisconsin Indian tribal
isting here. That doctrine I am happy to say is not a part
court judgments if, inter alia,
the tribe grants full
of American jurisprudence." Direction der Discon-
faith and credit to the judgments of Wisconsin
to-Gesellschaft v.United States Steel Corp.,300 F. 741,
courts); Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 5-1-lll(a)(iv) (grant-
747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), affd, 267 U.S. 22, 69 L. Ed. 495,

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