Understanding False Imprisonment in DC

“False imprisonment is defined, in this jurisdiction, as the restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another without consent or legal justification.” (See Faniel v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co. (1979) 404 A.2d 147, 150; Tocker v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company (1963) D.C.App., 190 A.2d 822, 824.)

“‘False arrest’ is indistinguishable as a practical matter from the common law tort of ‘false imprisonment.’ ... The gravamen of a complaint for false arrest or false imprisonment is an unlawful detention.” (See Bradshaw v. Dist. of Columbia (2012) 43 A.3d 318, 322 n.7; Enders v. District of Columbia (2010) 4 A.3d 457, 461.)

Prima Facie Case for False Imprisonment

“A successful claim of false imprisonment requires a plaintiff to establish (1) the detention or restraint of one against his will and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.” (See Doe v. Safeway, Inc. (2014) 88 A.3d 131, 132; Enders v. District of Columbia (2010) 4 A.3d 457, 461.)

“When an individual or private entity that called the police regarding a person is sued for false imprisonment, the making of the call is not enough to sustain a claim of false arrest so long as the decision whether to make the arrest remains with the police officer and is without the persuasion or influence of the accuser.” (See id; Smith v. District of Columbia (1979) 399 A.2d 213, 218.)

“Thus, liability exists when by acts or words, one directs, requests, invites or encourages the unlawful detention of another. Private entities and individuals will not be immune from liability, however, if they knowingly and maliciously make false reports to the police.” (See Doe v. Safeway, Inc. (2014) 88 A.3d 131, 132; Vessels v. District of Columbia (1987) 531 A.2d 1016, 1020.)

Determining Conduct that Constitutes False Arrest

“In determining whether particular conduct constitutes false arrest or imprisonment it is not the subjective state of mind of the plaintiff but, rather, the actions or words of the defendant [which] must at least furnish a basis for a reasonable apprehension of present confinement.” (See Weishapl v. Sowers (2001) 771 A.2d 1014, 1020; Dent v. May Dep't Stores, Co. (1982) 459 A.2d 1042, 1044; Clarke v. District of Columbia (1973) 311 A.2d 508, 511.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on False Imprisonment

It is well settled that “[w]e have held that [t]he gist of any complaint for ... false imprisonment is an unlawful detention.” (See DeWitt v. District of Columbia (2012) 43 A.3d 291, 295; Clarke v. District of Columbia (1973) 311 A.2d 508, 511; Doe v. Safeway, Inc. (2014) 88 A.3d 131, 132 n.2.)

It is also well settled “[t]he unlawful detention of a person without a warrant for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty or freedom of locomotion . . . by actual force, or by fear of force, or even by words constitutes false imprisonment. . .” (See Weishapl v. Sowers (2001) 771 A.2d 1014, 1020; Dent v. May Dep't Stores, Co. (1982) 459 A.2d 1042, 1044; Clarke v. District of Columbia (1973) 311 A.2d 508, 511.)

Current as of April 01, 2024 | Updated by Trellis Law Content Team

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