Motion for Continuance in Vermont

What Is a Motion for Continuance?

Understanding the Purpose and Significance of a Motion for Continuance

“Our continuance rule leaves control of docket management with the courts." (See In re A.H., SUPREME COURT No. 2013-054, at *2 (Vt. Sep. 13, 2013).)

“Purpose of rule of procedure governing calendar, assignment and continuances is to avoid unnecessary delay and to seek out alternatives preferable to postponement of trial if the rights of the parties can be accommodated.” (See Thorburn v. Town of Norwich (1982) 141 Vt. 242.)

“Such a continuance can be granted where a particular, known person is needed to supply missing evidence.” (See State v. Kelly (1973) 131 Vt. 582, 589.)

“The court, on its own motion, after reasonable notice to all the parties, may dismiss any action that has been pending two years unless good cause is shown for continuance.” (See Thorburn v. Town of Norwich (1982) 141 Vt. 242, 243.)

Information included in an affidavit accompanying a Motion for Continuance

“Continuances are governed by V.R.Cr.P. 50. Rule 50(b) requires that a motion for a continuance be filed two days before calendar call.” (See State v. Jones (1991) 157 Vt. 553, 556.)

“V.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) specifies information to be included in an affidavit which accompanies a motion for a continuance.” (See Kokoletsos v. Frank Babcock Son (1987) 149 Vt. 33, 35-36.)

“Motions for continuance shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating the reason therefor and the time when such reason was first known.” (See State v. Heffernan (2017) 180 A.3d 579, 585.)

“The required information includes the reason for the motion; the time the reason was first known; and if the motion is grounded on the absence of a witness, the substance of the expected testimony, and the measures taken to procure his or her attendance or deposition.” (See V.R.C.P. 40(d)(1); Kokoletsos v. Frank Babcock Son (1987)149 Vt. 33, 35-36.)

“This rule reflects the concern that courts must have for the orderly use of court facilities and is designed to avoid unnecessary delays by seeking out alternatives to postponement while accommodating the rights of the parties.” (See id; Thorburn v. Town of Norwich (1982) 141 Vt. 242, 244, 448 A.2d 141, 142.)

Discretion of the Court in Deciding a Motion for Continuance

“The trial court has discretion to deny or grant a continuance.” (See Cameron v. Burke (1990) 153 Vt. 565, 572-73; In re Nolen, SUPREME COURT No. 2013-304, at *3 (Vt. Feb. 20, 2014).)

“Likewise, we review the court's denial of a motion to continue for abuse of discretion.” (See Cegalis v. Knutsen, No. 22-AP-280, at *3 (Vt. May 5, 2023).)

“To support a claim of abuse of discretion, prejudice must be shown.” (See Board of Health v. Waterbury (1970) 129 Vt. 168, 173.)

“Abuse of discretion must clearly appear in order for this Court to interfere.” (See Richardson v. Persons (1951) 116 Vt. 413, 416, 417, 77 A.2d 842 (1951); Segalla v. Segalla (1971) 129 Vt. 517, 525.)

“This Court will not interfere with a discretionary action of the trial court as long as a reasonable basis exists for the court's decision.” (See Brooks v. Brooks (1973) 131 Vt. 86, 93, 300 A.2d 531, 535; State v. Streich (1995) 163 Vt. 331, 350.)

“Further, the trial court's ruling must be upheld unless that discretion is exercised upon grounds clearly untenable, or to an extent clearly unreasonable." (See Cartin v. Continental Homes (1976) 134 Vt. 362, 365, 360 A.2d 96, 99; Goslant v. Goslant (1972) 130 Vt. 210, 290 A.2d 22; Kokoletsos v. Frank Babcock Son (1987) 149 Vt. 33, 35.)

“The court's discretion to manage its docket, set deadlines, and allocate its resources is equally broad, and subject to reversal only for an abuse of discretion.” (See Pcolar v. Casella Waste Sys., Inc. (2012) VT 58, ¶ 20, 192 Vt. 343; Brosnahan v. Brosnahan, SUPREME COURT No. 2014-316, at *2 (Vt. Apr. 10, 2015).)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on a Motion for Continuance

It is well settled that a “motion for continuance may be based on claim that absence is due to illness if supported by affidavit from physician stating the disease and character of disability.” (See In re L.W., SUPREME COURT No. 2014-376, at *2 (Vt. Mar. 6, 2015).)

It is also well settled that “failure to request a continuance at the time of surprise, except under extraordinary circumstances, serves as a waiver of the party's rights.” (See Hartnett v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt. (1985) 146 Vt. 297

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