Motion to Bifurcate Civil Trial in Pennsylvania

Background

The bifurcation of a trial is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(b), which states in relevant part: “the court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may ... on motion of any party, order a separate trial of ... any separate issue....” (Beam v. Thiele Mfg., LLC, J. A16021/17, at *14 [Pa. Super. Ct. May 2, 2018] quoting Pa.R.C.P. 213(b).)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“Bifurcation is permissible under Pa.R.C.P. 213, which states:

‘The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may, ... on motion of any party, order a separate trial of any cause of action, claim, or counterclaim, set-off, or cross-suit, or of any separate issue.’”(Pa.R.C.P. 213(b).)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed that “bifurcation should be carefully and cautiously applied and be utilized only in a case and at a juncture where informed judgment impels the court to conclude that application of the rule will manifestly promote convenience and/or actually avoid prejudice.” (Stevenson, infra at 419; Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P. (2017) 161 A.3d 285, 297.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“The decision whether to bifurcate is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the necessity for such measures.” (Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P. (2017) 161 A.3d 285, 297 quoting Gallagher v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. (2005) 584 Pa. 362.)

“Thus, the appellate court must determine if the trial court's bifurcation decision ‘is a reasonable exercise of its discretion in this respect.’” (Castellani, id., citing Stevenson v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1987) 513 Pa. 411.)

“[A reviewing court] will not find an ‘abuse of discretion unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.’” (Castellani, id., citing Biese v. Biese (2009) 979 A.2d 892, 895.)

The Court’s Decision

“In Stevenson, [the] supreme court was called upon to decide whether a jury's finding of liability — made at the close of the liability phase of a bifurcated proceeding — is unassailable by the trial judge after the damage phase of the trial.” (Coleman v. Philadelphia Newspapers (1990) 391 Pa. Super. 140, 144-45 citing Stevenson v. General Motors Corp., supra, 513 Pa. at 415.) “In concluding that it was not unassailable, the Stevenson court affirmed the decision of this court which had, in turn, affirmed the trial judge in granting a new trial.” (Id.)

“Bifurcation is discouraged in those cases in which evidence relevant to both issues would be excluded in one portion of the trial and would result in prejudice to the objecting party.... However, bifurcation is strongly encouraged and represents a reasonable exercise of discretion where the separation of issues facilitates the orderly presentation of evidence and judicial economy ... or avoids prejudice....” (Kenrich Athletic Club v. 19th & Sansom Corp., No. 955 C.D. 2013, at *13 [Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Aug. 11, 2014] quoting Coleman v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. (1990) 570 A.2d 552, 555.)