“The trial court possesses the power to order consolidation of actions for trial when the actions involve the same parties and the same subject matter, if no prejudice or harmful complications will result therefrom.” (See Kanoy v. Hinshaw (1968) 273 N.C. 418, 423.)
“This power is vested in the trial Judge so as to avoid multiplicity of suits, unnecessary costs, delays, and to afford protection from oppression and abuse.” (See id.)
Specifically, “under Rule 42 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, when actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending in one division of the court, the judge may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; he may order all the actions consolidated.” (See Barrier v. Radford (2007) 646 S.E.2d 840, 841.)
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending in both the superior and the district court of the same county, a judge of the superior court in which the action is pending may order all the actions consolidated.” (See In re Moore (1971) 11 N.C. App. 320, 321-22.)
The judge “may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (See id.)
“Whether or not consolidation of cases for trial, where permissible, will be ordered is in the discretion of the court." (See Barrier v. Radford (2007) 646 S.E.2d 840, 841-42.)
“Thus, defendant must not only show a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying its motion, but must also show injury or prejudice arising therefrom." (See id.)
“A trial court's ruling on a Rule 42 motion will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (See id.)
“Indeed, when the trial court's failure to consolidate is assigned as error, the appellant must establish that it was injured or prejudiced.” (See id.)
It is well settled that “Rule 42(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides the trial court with authority to consolidate pending actions involving a common question of law or fact.” (See Boone Ford, Inc. v. IME Scheduler, Inc. (2017) 253 N.C. App. 1, 3.)
It is also well settled that “the Court may, ex mero motu, and in its discretion, consolidate for trial separate actions by different plaintiffs against common defendants for damages arising out of the same accident except when such consolidation would be injurious or prejudicial to one or more of the parties." (See Fleming v. Light Co. (1948) 229 N.C. 397, 404.)
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