Understanding Sex/Gender Discrimination in Maryland

Statutory Protection Against Sex Discrimination

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established a broad prohibition of workplace discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.” (See Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Adkins (2016) 448 Md. 197, 209.)

“Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. In addition to prohibiting sexual harassment that is explicitly tied to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, Title VII prohibits sexual harassment that creates a work environment that is sufficiently hostile or abusive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” (See Manikhi v. Mass Transit Administration (1999) 127 Md. App. 497, 514-15; See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 65.)

“The source of the policy against hostile environment sexual discrimination is statutory, and exclusively statutory. Those statutes provide the remedies for their violation.” (See Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co. (1991) 322 Md. 467, 480.)

Additionally, “sex discrimination in employment contravenes clear mandates of public policy. That policy is declared in various enactments, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 2000e-3) and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Law (Md. Code (1986 Repl. Vol., 1988 Cum. Supp.), Art. 49B, § 14-18). The policy is reinforced by Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” (See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co. (1989) 316 Md. 603, 629-30.)

Standard of Review and Prima Facie Case to Show Sex Discrimination

“When the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case seeks to prove discrimination through circumstantial rather than direct evidence, Maryland courts apply the three-step burden shifting analysis first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” (See Belfiore v. Merchant Link, LLC (2018) 236 Md. App. 32, 45; Eichen v. Jackson & Tull Chartered Eng'rs, No. 1235, at *43-44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2019).)

“First, the employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” (See id.)

“Second, the employer may rebut the plaintiff's case by presenting evidence of 'some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the alleged disparate treatment.” (See id.)

“Third, if the employer rebuts the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." (See id.)

“An actionably hostile work environment may be created by the sexual harassment of an employee by a co-employee.” (See Manikhi v. Mass Transit Administration (1999) 127 Md. App. 497, 515; Spicer v. Virginia (1995) 66 F.3d 705, 708, 710; Wilson v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 803, 806, 809-10 (W.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd, 92 F.3d 1184 (4th Cir. 1996); Wall v. AT T Techs., Inc. (1990) 754 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (Title VII racial discrimination case).)

“To plead such a cause of action successfully, the plaintiff must allege:

1. the subject conduct was unwelcome;
2. it was based on the sex of the plaintiff;
3. it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and
4. it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer."

(See id; Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc. (1997) 123 F.3d 766, 772; Katz v. Dole (1983) 709 F.2d 251.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on Sex Discrimination

“It is well settled that workplace sexual harassment is a form of sex-based employment discrimination.” (See Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co. (1991) 322 Md. 467, 490; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49, 59; Katz v. Dole (1983) 709 F.2d 251, 254-255; Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1984) 298 Or. 76, 87, 689 P.2d 1292, 1298.)

It is also well settled that “for hostile environment sexual harassment to be actionable, the harassment must be severe or pervasive. The principal significance of the distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive.” (See Manikhi v. Mass Transit Administration (1999) 127 Md. App. 497, 515; Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 65; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct 2257, 2264.)

Current as of April 01, 2024 | Updated by Trellis Law Content Team

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