Understanding Disparate Impact in Employment in Maryland

“Disparate impact claims involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” (See University of Maryland v. Boyd (1992) 93 Md. App. 303, 314; Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324, 336 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396; Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158.)

Prima Facie Case for Discrimination

“A party claiming discrimination must first make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and show that the totality of the relevant facts creates an inference of discriminatory purpose. Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the striking party to produce neutral explanations for the exercise of its strikes.” (See Berry v. State (2004) 155 Md. App. 144, 160; Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834.)

“A prima facie case of disparate impact must, in the context of this case, identify a specific employment practice that has a significantly disparate impact…” (See University of Maryland v. Boyd (1992) 93 Md. App. 303, 314; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, 656-658, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2124-25, 104 L.Ed.2d 733.)

“A prima facie case of disparate impact may be established with general population statistics and there is no need to require that the data reflect the actual employees alleged to be affected by the disparate impact.” (See id; Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786.)

Standard for Discrimination Cases Resting on Circumstantial Evidence

“For employment discrimination cases resting on circumstantial evidence, Maryland has adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. This test is designed to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” (See Prince George's Cnty. Mem'l Library Sys. v. Naftal, No. 1262-2022, at *9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 8, 2023); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8.)

“Under the standard framework, the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” (See id; Belfiore v. Merch. Link, LLC, (2018) 236 Md.App. 32, 45.)

“The employer may then rebut the employee's case by presenting evidence of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged disparate treatment.” (See id.)

“Finally, if the employer rebuts the case, the employee has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were [instead] a pretext for discrimination.” (See id.)

Federal Law on Disparate Impact

“Federal courts have permitted plaintiffs to prove discrimination with circumstantial evidence by demonstrating that similarly situated individuals outside the[ir] protected class were treated more favorably. Under some circumstances, circumstantial evidence has been deemed more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” (See White v. Parker, No. 2171, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 24, 2017); Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. (2011) 647 F.3d 652, 662; Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. (2010) 601 F.3d 289, 299-300.)

“Title VII is the federal analog to Article 49B of the Maryland Code and our courts traditionally seek guidance from federal cases in interpreting Maryland's Article 49B. Federal courts have permitted plaintiffs to prove discrimination with circumstantial evidence by demonstrating that “similarly situated individuals outside the[ir] protected class were treated more favorably. Under some circumstances, circumstantial evidence has been deemed “more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” (See Taylor v. Giant of Maryland, LLC (2012) 423 Md. 628, 652; Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2007) 396 Md. 469, 481, 481 n. 8, 914 A.2d 735; Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. (2011) 647 F.3d 652, 662; Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. (2010) 601 F.3d 289, 299–300.)

Current as of April 01, 2024 | Updated by Trellis Law Content Team

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